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Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 95-60157 Summary Calendar _ WILLIAM HAWKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus TORO COMPANY d/b/a Lawn-Boy, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi (1:94 CV25 B D) _ August 4, 1995 Before JONES, BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judges:* William Hawkins appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of Toro Company d/b/a Lawn-Boy in this employme
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 95-60157 Summary Calendar _ WILLIAM HAWKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus TORO COMPANY d/b/a Lawn-Boy, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi (1:94 CV25 B D) _ August 4, 1995 Before JONES, BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judges:* William Hawkins appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of Toro Company d/b/a Lawn-Boy in this employmen..
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 95-60157
Summary Calendar
_______________________
WILLIAM HAWKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TORO COMPANY d/b/a Lawn-Boy,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(1:94 CV25 B D)
_________________________________________________________________
August 4, 1995
Before JONES, BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judges:*
William Hawkins appeals the grant of summary judgment in
favor of Toro Company d/b/a Lawn-Boy in this employment termination
case. Finding no error in the district court's judgment, we
affirm.
*
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no
precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled
principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
BACKGROUND
Hawkins was fired on October 28, 1993, for use of abusive
language towards fellow employees in a break room after nine and a
half years of employment. It is undisputed that there was no
written employment contract. In fact, during appellant's
orientation as a new employee, he was given a handbook after
signing a receipt/acknowledgment which explicitly provided that his
employment was at will and could be terminated by either party with
or without notice and with or without cause.
Later versions of the company handbook, which Hawkins
received, also contained an acknowledgment page which again served
as a receipt and express disclaimer. In pertinent part, the page
read as follows:
This handbook does not represent a contract of
employment, and my employment relationship
with the company is an "at will" relationship
which may be terminated at any time, by either
party, with or without notice and with or
without cause.
This page of the handbook provided a line for the
employee's signature as well as one witness. Hawkins relies upon
the uncontested fact that he did not sign this page upon receipt of
the revised handbook.
Also of note in the handbook is a four-step progressive
disciplinary system providing corrective action guidelines,
escalating to termination, for certain misconduct. Toro did not
follow these procedures in firing Hawkins.
On appeal, appellant claims the district court erred in
granting summary judgment as the disciplinary system gave rise to
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an employment contract which was subsequently breached when Hawkins
was fired. Alternatively, appellant claims the employment handbook
also gave rise to a duty of good faith and fair dealing which was
breached as a result of the manner in which he was terminated.
DISCUSSION
Mississippi follows the common law rule that "where there
is no employment contract (or where there is a contract which does
not specify the term of the worker's employment), the
relation[ship] may be terminated at will by either party." Solomon
v. Walgreen Co., 975 F.2d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1992)(quoting Perry
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
508 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Miss. 1987). The
at-will doctrine means that either the employer or the employee may
have a good reason, a wrong reason, or no reason for terminating
the employment contract. Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co.,
397
So. 2d 874, 874-75 (Miss. 1981).
While Hawkins acknowledges the at will doctrine to be
controlling, he nonetheless attempts to escape its application by
arguing that Mississippi courts enforce handbook provisions
prescribing a progressive disciplinary system, and to such extent,
he had a contract with Toro. This argument fails as the Supreme
Court of Mississippi in Perry, held that although personnel manuals
can create contractual obligations, an express disclaimer of any
employment obligations in the agreement will preclude an action for
its alleged breach. Perry, 508 So. 2d at 1088. See also Hartle v.
Packard Elec.,
626 So. 2d 106 (Miss. 1993)(upholding summary
judgment for employer because express disclaimer in handbook
3
negated contract claim); Shaw v. Birchfield, 481 So. 2d 247 (Miss.
1985)(upholding summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's breach of
contract claim, because contract expressly stated employment was
terminable at-will). Thus, the express disclaimer in the original
receipt signed by Hawkins serves to preclude any reliance on
provisions in the handbook. Moreover, since the later versions of
the handbook in effect at discharge contained the same language
expressly disclaiming any intention to create a contract, and the
appellant was on notice of such language, his failure to sign the
later documents is not conclusive. Nichols v. City of Jackson,
848
F. Supp. 718, 724 (S.D.Miss. 1994)(employee has duty to follow
provisions of handbook that are reasonably believed to be
current).1
Hawkins next tries to defeat the disclaimer he signed by
relying upon Bobbitt v. The Orchard, Ltd., 603 So. 2d 356 (Miss.
1992), to develop his theory. This argument fails, however, as the
employment handbook upheld as giving rise to an implied contract in
Bobbitt did not contain any disclaimer of the sort found in the
matter sub judice. Additionally, the court in Perry, held that
validating a contradictory implied agreement in the face of an
already existing express agreement would be "ludicrous."
Perry,
508 So. 2d at 1088.
We also reject Hawkins's contention that the presence of
both progressive disciplinary language and an express at-will
1
Appellant's argument that the disclaimer fails as it was not boldfaced
or highlighted is contrary to the holdings of Solomon, supra, and
Shaw, supra where
each disclaimer precluded an action for breach despite appearing in regular font.
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disclaimer evidenced an ambiguity in the "contract." First, there
is no contract of employment. Second, the same argument has been
rejected in other cases, e.g. Shaw, supra, and is no more valid
here.
Hawkins also asserts that Toro breached its implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a result of the manner
in which he was terminated. Mississippi courts have repeatedly
held, however, that at will relationships are not governed by such
a covenant. Hartle v. Packard Elec., 626 So. 2d 106, 110 (Miss.
1993); Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
508 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Miss.
1987). This court has also observed that an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing does not exist in Mississippi
employment termination cases. Burroughs v. FFP Operating Partners,
L.P.,
28 F.3d 543, 547 (5th Cir. 1994). In light of these
authorities, Hawkins cannot prevail.
Therefore, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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