Filed: Nov. 22, 2004
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT November 22, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 02-41501 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus BRANDON FRANKLIN, also known as Sircrease D. Brooks, Defendant-Appellant. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 9:01-CR-3-2 - Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges PER CURIAM:* Brandon Frankli
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT November 22, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 02-41501 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus BRANDON FRANKLIN, also known as Sircrease D. Brooks, Defendant-Appellant. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 9:01-CR-3-2 - Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges PER CURIAM:* Brandon Franklin..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT November 22, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-41501
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BRANDON FRANKLIN, also known as Sircrease D. Brooks,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 9:01-CR-3-2
--------------------
Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:*
Brandon Franklin conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing
with the intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing
more than four kilograms of codeine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Franklin was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for
following too closely, a violation of TEX. TRANSP. CODE §
545.062(a). He appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress evidence.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-41501
-2-
Franklin first argues that the initial stop of the vehicle
was unlawful. He contends that because the Texas statute lacks a
clear standard, the officer’s stop was based on mere opinion or
judgment. He argues that the officer’s subjective intent should be
closely scrutinized.
The stop of an automobile by police must be reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. See Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806,
810 (1996). The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below,
see United States v. Muniz-Melchor,
894 F.2d 1430, 1433-34 (5th
Cir. 1990), supports the district court’s determination that there
was probable cause for the stop of the vehicle. Because the legal
justification for the stop was objectively grounded in the
observations and knowledge of the officer, the officer’s subjective
intent is irrelevant. See United States v. Lopez-Valdez,
178 F.3d
282, 288 (5th Cir. 1999).
Franklin also argues that his prolonged detention was unlawful
under the Fourth Amendment, and he challenges the lawfulness of the
search of the vehicle. This court recently considered the appeal
of Reginald Brigham, the driver of the vehicle in which Franklin
was a passenger. See United States v. Brigham,
382 F.3d 500 (5th
Cir. 2004)(en banc). In Brigham we upheld the validity of the
detention, questioning, and search at issue here, rejecting the
same arguments raised herein by Franklin. See
Brigham, 382 F.3d at
506-12. We are satisfied that the detention and questioning of
No. 02-41501
-3-
Franklin was justified under the circumstances and that the search
of the vehicle was conducted pursuant to Brigham’s voluntary
consent. See
id.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.