Filed: Feb. 08, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit February 8, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 04-61044 CAPITAL GAMING SUPPLIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS GAMETECH INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Mississippi (3:02-CV-1636) Before JONES, Chief Judge, DeMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Plaintiff-Appellant Capital Gaming Su
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit February 8, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 04-61044 CAPITAL GAMING SUPPLIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS GAMETECH INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Mississippi (3:02-CV-1636) Before JONES, Chief Judge, DeMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Plaintiff-Appellant Capital Gaming Sup..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit February 8, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-61044
CAPITAL GAMING SUPPLIES, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
GAMETECH INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Mississippi
(3:02-CV-1636)
Before JONES, Chief Judge, DeMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Capital Gaming Supplies, Inc. (“Capital”)
filed claims against Defendants-Appellees GameTech International,
Inc. (“GameTech”), International Gaming Systems, LLC, and
individual principals of the Appellee entities, alleging tortious
interference with Capital’s subleases with certain Mississippi
bingo halls, as well as breach of contract and breach of covenant
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
of good faith and fair dealing. GameTech counterclaimed for
interference with existing contracts. The entities are all
distributors of bingo gaming supplies to bingo halls licensed by
the Mississippi Gaming Commission. Capital and GameTech each
complained that the other interfered in its sub-lease agreements
with Mississippi bingo halls for the provision of fixed base video
bingo units.
Before the district court, multiple parties moved for summary
judgment and for dismissal. The court entered summary judgment for
Appellees and dismissed Capital’s cause, finding a central premise
of Capital’s tortious interference with contracts claim flawed and
determining that under Mississippi law Appellees were entitled to
judgment because (1) Capital failed to demonstrate a necessary
element of its claim; (2) temporary impossibility prevented any
charge of breach by nonperformance; and (3) Appellees’ preexisting
agreements were neither divisible nor partially terminated.
Capital appeals.1
This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standards as the district court. Vela v. City of
Houston,
276 F.3d 659, 666 (5th Cir. 2001); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c). In this diversity case, we apply the law of Mississippi and
look to the state’s appellate courts for guidance, where the
1
On April 7, 2005, Capital filed a stipulation of dismissal
of certain claims against Appellees relating to prospective
leases with particular bingo halls.
2
state’s supreme court has not spoken on an issue, unless we are
convinced that the supreme court of Mississippi would not adopt the
intermediate courts’ analysis. See Ladue v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
920 F.2d 272, 274 (5th Cir. 1991).
After a thorough review of the briefs, the oral arguments of
the parties, and the record on appeal, we conclude that the
district court correctly determined that Capital failed to prove a
necessary element of its claims and that the preexisting GameTech
agreements with the bingo halls were neither divisible nor
partially terminated. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s
grant of judgment to Appellees essentially for the reasons stated
in its memorandum opinion and order filed September 30, 2004.
AFFIRMED.
3