Filed: Jan. 23, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 10, 2006 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III )))))))))))))))))))))))))) Clerk No. 05-10740 Summary Calendar )))))))))))))))))))))))))) CHARLES D. HIGGINBOTHAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:02-CV-0891-BE Before SMITH, GARZA, AN
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 10, 2006 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III )))))))))))))))))))))))))) Clerk No. 05-10740 Summary Calendar )))))))))))))))))))))))))) CHARLES D. HIGGINBOTHAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:02-CV-0891-BE Before SMITH, GARZA, AND..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 10, 2006
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
)))))))))))))))))))))))))) Clerk
No. 05-10740
Summary Calendar
))))))))))))))))))))))))))
CHARLES D. HIGGINBOTHAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:02-CV-0891-BE
Before SMITH, GARZA, AND PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Higginbotham applied for
Supplemental Social Security Income (“SSI”) benefits on December 9,
1999, claiming that mixed bipolar disorder rendered him disabled.
On April 19, 2000, the Social Security Administration denied
Higginbotham’s application. Higginbotham then requested, and was
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
granted, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The
ALJ denied Higginbotham’s claim for benefits because Appellant could
not sustain a claim of total disability under section 1614(a)(3)(A)
of the Social Security Act (“the Act”).1 Specifically, the ALJ held
that Higginbotham had no “exertional limitations,” but that he did
have “non-exertional limitations” that restricted him to jobs
requiring only short, simple instructions and limited interaction
with other people.
Appellant timely filed a request for review by the Appeals
Council. While his request was pending, Appellant, in accordance
with applicable regulations, submitted a medical source statement
completed by Chandrakant Patel, M.D. (“Dr. Patel”), his treating
physician. Dr. Patel’s evaluation concluded that Higginbotham
suffered from a complete loss of ability to perform regular
employment activity. In a letter dated August 30, 2001, the Appeals
Council denied Higginbotham’s request for review, reasoning that
although it had considered Dr. Patel’s statement, the additional
evidence did not provide a basis for reversing the ALJ’s decision.
Higginbotham then filed a complaint in the district court,
1
Section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act (“the
Act”) is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1382. It provides that an
individual is considered disabled for purposes of the Act if “he
is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.”
2
seeking review of the Commissioner’s denial of SSI benefits. On
October 15, 2003, the magistrate judge recommended that the
Commissioner’s decision be reversed so that the Commissioner could
examine the statement submitted by Dr. Patel. The district court,
however, rejected the magistrate judge’s recommendation,
specifically declining to consider the new evidence submitted to the
Appeals Council, and affirmed the Commissioner’s denial of SSI
benefits.
Higginbotham then filed an appeal for review in this Court.
Because we found that the district court erred by not considering
the new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council, we remanded the
case to the district court for further consideration. Higginbotham
v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 332, 337-38 (5th Cir. 2005).
On remand, the district court, again, affirmed the
Commissioner’s decision to deny Higginbotham’s claim for benefits,
holding that even after considering Dr. Patel’s statement, there was
still substantial evidence in the record to support the
Commissioner’s decision. Higginbotham then filed this appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of the Commissioner’s denial of SSI benefits is
restricted to considering whether the decision is supported by
substantial evidence in the record and whether the proper legal
standards were applied. See Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1022
(5th Cir. 1990). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla,
3
less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983). In applying
this standard, while we must review the entire record to determine
if such evidence is present, “we may neither reweigh the evidence
in the record nor substitute our judgment for the Secretary’s.”
Villa v. Sullivan,
895 F.2d 1019, 1022 (quoting Hollis v. Bowen,
837
F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988))(citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Higginbotham argues that we should either remand the case to
the Commissioner for further consideration of the additional
evidence, or that we should find that, in light of Dr. Patel’s
statement, the Commissioner’s decision to deny Appellant’s
application for SSI benefits is not supported by substantial
evidence. Because we determine that the Commissioner’s decision to
deny Appellant’s application for SSI benefits is supported by
substantial evidence in the record, we affirm.
First, Appellant argues that because appeals of social security
cases are usually disposed of by way of summary judgment, we should
adopt a modified summary judgment standard in order to avoid
weighing the evidence.2 According to Appellant, that standard would
2
In this case, the magistrate judge issued an order
directing the parties to file briefs instead of cross-motions for
summary judgment.
4
require us to remand the case to the Commissioner.3 Under
Appellant’s proposed standard, the Commissioner, as movant for
summary judgment, must first establish that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision. Next, Higginbotham, as non-movant,
must present evidence that contradicts the substantial evidence
contention or demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact.
Appellant maintains that, in accordance with a summary judgment
policy of resolving all inferences in favor of the non-movant, Dr.
Patel’s statement should be given presumptive weight, and thus
establishes a genuine issue of material fact. Consequently,
Appellant contends, the case should be remanded to the Commissioner
for further review. Appellant’s argument that the case should be
remanded to the Commissioner for further consideration of Dr.
Patel’s statement based on a modified summary judgment standard is
unpersuasive and finds no support in case law.
If additional evidence is presented while the case is pending
review by the Appeals Council, courts of appeals customarily review
the record as a whole, including the new evidence, in order to
determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are still supported
by substantial evidence. See Wilkins v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Health and
3
It is important to note that Appellant does not argue that,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), additional evidence should be
presented to the Commissioner based on “a showing that there is
new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for
the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a
prior proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). To that end, Appelllant
fails to make the requisite showing.
5
Human Serv., 953 F.2d 93, 96 (4th Cir. 1991); Nelson v. Sullivan,
966 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1992); see also
Barnhart, 405 F.3d at
337-38 (directing the district court to consider the newly submitted
evidence in its review of the Commissioner’s decision).
Additionally, allowing these types of proceedings to be
reopened and remanded in the manner espoused by the Appellant would
create improper incentives for attorneys and litigants. By
remanding cases without meaningful regard to the substantial
evidence standard, we would be encouraging attorneys to hold back
some of their evidence in hopes of seeking reconsideration if
proceedings are not initially successful for their clients. By
remanding this case to the Commissioner, we would be, in part,
abandoning the substantial evidence doctrine, while also creating
a procedure at odds with the goal of orderly and speedy disposition
of claims.
Considering all of the evidence, including Dr. Patel’s
statement, we find that the Commissioner’s decision is still
supported by substantial evidence. While the Appellant is correct
in noting that we have long held that the “opinions, diagnoses, and
medical evidence of a treating physician who is familiar with the
claimant's injuries, treatments, and responses should be accorded
considerable weight in determining disability,” Scott v. Heckler,
770 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 1985), Dr. Patel’s conclusory statement
diagnosing Appellant as disabled did not contain supporting medical
6
evidence or any support otherwise, and therefore does not begin to
overcome the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision.
The ALJ noted that outpatient clinic records from Tarrant
County Mental Health & Mental Retardation clinic indicate that
Appellant consistently took his medication which adequately
controlled and stabilized his condition. Hence, medication
effectively inhibits Higginbotham’s mood swings, depression, and
emotional outburst with no reported side-effects. The Tarrant
County records also convey that Appellant was usually alert,
talkative, coherent, and properly groomed. Higginbotham also denied
experiencing any auditory or visual hallucinations. The record also
demonstrates that while Appellant’s moderate difficulty in
maintaining social functioning has seldom affected his concentration
and pace of performance, it has never resulted in a significant
disruption in a work-like setting. Moreover, the ALJ stated that
Appellant’s testimony at his hearing was “articulate and coherent.”
Finally, an impartial vocational expert testified that an individual
with Appellant’s abilities and limitations could successfully
perform duties consistent with Higginbotham’s past work experience.
Hence, Dr. Patel’s statement does not dilute the record to the point
that the ALJ’s ultimate finding is insufficiently supported.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that the Commissioner’s decision denying
Higginbotham benefits is supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole, including Dr. Patel’s statement, we AFFIRM that
7
decision.
8
