ERIC L. FRANK, CHIEF U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.
In this bankruptcy case, a condominium association filed a proof of claim asserting that it holds a claim for delinquent condominium assessments that is secured by the debtor's condominium unit. The debtor filed this adversary proceeding seeking a determination that the mortgage lien with priority over the lien held by the condominium association exceed the value of her condominium unit. The debtor's initial goal is to bifurcate the condominium association's claim under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) so that its entire claim is a general unsecured claim. Her ultimate goal is to void the statutory lien that secures the condominium association's claim and to treat its entire claim as a dischargeable, general unsecured claim in her chapter 13 plan.
In response, the condominium association contends that a portion of its lien is granted priority over all other liens pursuant to the Pennsylvania Uniform Condominium Act, 68 Pa.C.S.A § 3315(b) ("the Pa. U.C.A."), and therefore, to that extent, its claim must be treated as a secured claim and its lien is not avoidable.
For the reasons that follow, I conclude that:
The following facts are not in dispute:
The Debtor filed a voluntary chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on June 3, 2014. Her Amended Chapter 13 Plan ("the Plan") was confirmed on March 3, 2015. The Plan provides that the lien held by North Point will be avoided under the "applicable sections of the Bankruptcy Code" in an adversary proceeding. (Plan ¶ 10) (Bky. No. 14-14544, Doc. # 16).
On February 16, 2015, a few weeks prior to confirmation, the Debtor initiated this adversary proceeding against North Point.
At a status hearing held on June 25, 2015, the parties agreed to file a joint stipulation of facts in lieu of a trial and simultaneous memoranda of law in support of their respective positions. (See Doc. # 7). On July 11, 2015, the parties filed the joint stipulation, which they supplemented on September 18, 2015. (Doc. #'s 10, 13). On September 4, 2015, the parties filed their respective briefs. (Doc. # s 11 & 12). The matter is ready for disposition.
In this adversary proceeding, the Debtor seeks a determination under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) that North Point's lien is entirely unsecured because the Condo is subject to the prior U.S. Bank mortgage lien which exceeds the Condo's value; in other words, there is no value in the Condo that supports North Point's lien. The Plan contemplates that this proceeding will result in the avoidance of North Point's lien.
Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code provides in relevant part:
Section 506(a) generally allows for the bifurcation of an undersecured claim into a secured claim and an unsecured claim if the unpaid balance of a claim exceeds the value of the property securing the claim. See, e.g., In re Hamilton, 2013 WL
Here, the Condo has a fair market value of $80,000.00 and U.S. Bank has a first priority mortgage lien of $97,657.47 over North Point. Thus, the U.S. Bank lien exceeds the value of the property. Based on these facts, it would appear that North Point's claim should be allowed as an unsecured claim only.
North Point concedes that its claim is largely unsecured, but asserts that a portion of its claim, in the amount of $1,663.61, has lien priority over U.S. Bank's mortgage. To that extent, North Point argues that it holds a secured claim and a lien against the Condo that is not avoidable. North Point bases its lien priority argument on the Pa. U.C.A.
The Pa. U.C.A. was enacted in 1980 by Pennsylvania's adoption of the Uniform Condominium Act of 1977 in its uniform version. See 68 Pa.C.S.A., Pt. II, Subpt. B, Refs & Annos. The goal of the uniform legislation was to "unify and modernize the law of condominiums." Id.
The provision of the Pa. U.C.A. most relevant in this proceeding is § 3315, which pertains to liens for condominium assessments. The general rule, as set forth in § 3315(a), is that a condominium association has a lien on a unit for any assessment levied against that unit or fines imposed against its unit owner from the time the assessment or fine becomes due. The priority of those liens is addressed in subsection (b). Condominium associations enjoy statutory priority over all other liens and encumbrances, except for mortgages recorded before assessment of the condominium association expenses and real estate taxes. See 68 Pa.C.S.A. § 3315(b)(1).
As a result, in a foreclosure based on a prior mortgage, the condominium association's lien is divested, subject to a limited statutory exception. The statutory exception is set forth in § 3315(b)(2), which provides for what has been referred to as a limited, "super-lien" upon the judicial sale of the condominium unit.
The term "super-lien" is used because the Pa U.C.A. and the version of the Uniform Act adopted in other states, elevate a limited portion of the condominium association lien to senior priority status over the first mortgage holder. See Grahame K. Wells, The Use of Super-Liens to Promote Cooperation Between Condominium Associations and Lenders, 13 Ann. Rev. Banking L.477, 478 (1994) ("Super-Liens"). Typically, the super-lien is an amount equal to six (6) months of condominium fees. Id. at 486. The balance of the condominium associations's lien remains subordinate to the first mortgage.
In Pennsylvania, the six (6) month super-lien provision is codified at § 3315(b)(2) of the Pa. U.C.A., which provides in relevant part:
(emphasis added).
The Pennsylvania Comment to the Pa. U.C.A. explains the meaning and effect of this provision as follows:
68 Pa.C.S.A. § 3315 Pa. cmt.
The issue presented is whether North Point can invoke § 3315(b)(2) of the Pa. U.C.A. to establish "super lien" status over U.S. Bank for six (6) months worth of unpaid assessments. If so, North Point holds an allowed secured claim in that amount and that portion of its lien cannot be avoided. In response, the Debtor argues that the requirements under subsection (b)(2) are not present. The Debtor is correct.
Courts interpreting the meaning of a Pennsylvania statute must consider the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991. See Warrantech Consumer Products Servs., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co. in Liquidation, 626 Pa. 218, 96 A.3d 346, 354 (2014). That statute instructs that the object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The best indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. Warrantech Consumer Prods., 96 A.3d at 354. When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no need to look beyond the plain meaning of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). The words and phrases of a statute are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a); Commonwealth v. Conklin, 587 Pa. 140, 897 A.2d 1168, 1175 (2006). Only if the words of the statute are not explicit may a court resort to the rules of statutory construction. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). A statute is ambiguous only if there are at least two (2) reasonable interpretations of the text under review. See, e.g., Warrantech Consumer Prods., 96 A.3d at 354-55; Pilchesky
Here, the text of the statute states that the condominium association's lien shall be divested except for common expense assessments "that come due during the six months immediately preceding
There is no ambiguity in this language. Under the plain reading of § 3315(b), the judicial sale is the point in time from which the prior six (6) months' worth of unpaid common expense assessments that are entitled to super-lien status is measured. In short, under the statute, a judicial sale is a threshold requirement for super-lien status.
North Point concedes there has not been a judicial sale and that no judicial sale was pending at the time the bankruptcy case or the adversary proceeding was filed. (Supp. Fact Stip. ¶¶ 3-4). Nevertheless, North Point seeks a determination that it holds a "super lien" of $1,663.61 based on an unspecified six (6) month period.
For the reasons set forth above, North Point's lien for unpaid condominium assessments lacks super-lien status under the Pa. U.C.A. and is entirely subordinate to U.S. Bank's mortgage lien — a prior mortgage that consumes all of the value of the Condo. Therefore, North Point's claim is entirely unsecured and the Debtor is entitled to an order determining that North Point's lien for unpaid prepetition condominium assessments is void, subject to completion of her chapter 13 plan. See nn.1 & 3, supra.
An appropriate order will be entered.
In this contested matter, the parties have stipulated that the subject lien is a statutory lien. (Joint Stip. ¶ 7). Therefore, it is subject to modification under § 1322(b)(2). I note further that even if North Point's claim is secured by a security interest, not a statutory lien, the claim still would not be subject to the anti-modification clause of § 1322(b)(2) under the McDonald holding.
In a previous opinion, I discussed the confusing state of the law regarding the statutory source of authority and the proper procedure for avoiding a lien in a reorganization case based on the value (or more accurately, the lack of value) of the property securing a creditor's claim. See In re Cusato, 485 B.R. 824, 829-31 & n. 6 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2013). I will not repeat that discussion here other than to point out that two (2) main approaches have developed since the Supreme Court held in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992) that 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) does not authorize the avoidance of a lien rendered unsecured by 11 U.S.C. 506(a):
In this district, the most common procedure invoked by chapter 13 debtors for avoidance of liens based on the secured property's lack of value is by adversary proceeding, a practice that the Third Circuit may have blessed implicitly in McDonald. See Cusato, 485 B.R. at 831 n. 6. However, at the conclusion of such adversary proceedings, the parties typically agree to include, or the court inserts, a provision in the lien avoidance order either deferring the effect of the avoidance until completion of the plan or vitiating the order if the case is converted or dismissed prior to completion of the plan. As a result, in this district, the line between the two (2) approaches described above is blurred and fairly indistinguishable.
Super-Liens at 477-78 (1994) (footnotes omitted).