Filed: Jul. 28, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 28, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 05-30868 SUE ANN EASTERLING, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF CONCORDIA PARISH, ET AL., Defendants SCHOOL BOARD OF CONCORDIA PARISH, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana 1:03-CV-985 Before JONES, Chief Judge, and BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:*
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 28, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 05-30868 SUE ANN EASTERLING, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF CONCORDIA PARISH, ET AL., Defendants SCHOOL BOARD OF CONCORDIA PARISH, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana 1:03-CV-985 Before JONES, Chief Judge, and BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* S..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 28, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-30868
SUE ANN EASTERLING,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SCHOOL BOARD OF CONCORDIA PARISH, ET AL.,
Defendants
SCHOOL BOARD OF CONCORDIA PARISH,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
1:03-CV-985
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Sue Ann Easterling filed the present suit against the School
Board of Concordia Parish (“School Board”) alleging various sex-
based discrimination claims under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, this Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
and related Louisiana statutes. The district court awarded the
School Board summary judgment on Easterling’s retaliation and
constructive discharge claims.1 Easterling appeals. We vacate and
remand in part and affirm in part.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Easterling is a teacher formerly employed at Vidalia High
School in Concordia Parish. She has a degree in physical
education, a minor in secondary education, and state certification
to teach physical education and adaptive physical education. In
more than twenty years of service as a teacher, Easterling has
coached basketball, track and field, volleyball, gymnastics, and
softball.
In February 2001, Easterling applied for the position of head
coach of the high school girls’ basketball team and did not get the
position. Instead, the school board hired a male applicant. The
hired coach had experience coaching girls at the high school level
but only possessed a temporary teaching certificate. Easterling
filed a formal charge against the School Board with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). She received a “right
to sue” letter from the EEOC on March 8, 2003. Easterling later
added retaliation charges to her complaint, receiving a second
“right to sue” letter on March 16, 2004.
1
The court denied the School Board summary judgment on
Easterling’s discrimination claim. That portion of the court’s
decision is not part of this appeal.
2
Easterling claims that the defendant retaliated against her
for filing the discrimination claim with the EEOC. She alleges
that the School Board (1) assigned her to two working offices ten
miles apart without increasing her compensation, (2) placed her in
an office that was inferior to those of other employees in her
position and had a foul odor,2 (3) forced her to work outdoors for
the first time in her twelve-year employment history with the
School Board, (4) hindered her success in her coaching efforts by
removing certain students from her teams, (5) removed her privilege
of writing directive memos, (6) prevented her from having weekly
Friday practices, (7) prevented her from routinely doing community
outings with students, (8) did not allow her access to files and
records during her preparation period, (9) prevented her from
reporting to other locations when needed, and (10) excluded her
from school-oriented social activities. Finally, Easterling
alleges that the School Board denied her a transfer to a higher
paying behavioral interventionist position. Instead, the School
Board hired two applicants who lacked teacher certification but
held master’s degrees.
Easterling resigned from her employment in May 2004. For the
same reasons enumerated above, she claims constructive discharge.
2
Easterling contends that one of her new offices was so
inadequate that it gave her a respiratory infection.
3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district
court. Hirras v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 95 F.3d 396, 399 (5th
Cir. 1996). Summary judgment should be granted only when there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The
evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. United Space Alliance,
378 F.3d 482, 486 (5th Cir. 2004).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Retaliation
The Supreme Court recently clarified the requirement for
proving retaliation under Title VII in Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Railway v. White, No. 05-259, slip. op. at 1–2 (U.S. June 22,
2006). It held that “the anti-retaliation provision does not
confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related
to employment” and rejected standards “that have limited actionable
retaliation to so-called ‘ultimate employment decisions.’” Id. at
12. The district court, applying precedent from this Circuit,
conducted its analysis under the old, now rejected, standard. For
that reason, we vacate the award of summary judgment on
Easterling’s retaliation claim and remand for a determination
consistent with Burlington Northern.
4
B. Constructive Discharge
Easterling’s constructive discharge claim fails as a matter of
law. To prove constructive discharge, a plaintiff must prove that
working conditions are so intolerable that “a reasonable person
would have felt compelled to resign.” Pennsylvania State Police v.
Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004). The environment must be
“something more” than that present in a harassment or hostile work
environment claim; a plaintiff must show a “‘worse case’ harassment
scenario, harassment ratcheted up to the breaking point.”
Id. at
147–48. Easterling has failed to meet this standard.
In analyzing a constructive discharge claim, a court must look
to the individual facts of each case without regard to the
employee’s subjective state of mind. Barrow v. New Orleans S.S.,
10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994). We have recognized the following
nonexclusive list of factors as being relevant to the
determination:
(1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in
job responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or
degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a younger
supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by
the employer calculated to encourage the employee’s
resignation; and (7) offers of early retirement that
would make the employee worse off regardless of whether
the offer was accepted or not.
Id. Easterling does not argue that any of these factors exist.
Rather, she rehashes evidence used to support her retaliation
claim. While she suggests that the School Board’s conduct amounted
to a type of humiliation and harassment, her evidence falls
5
woefully short of creating a fact issue under Suders. See also
Robinson v. Waste Management of Texas, 122 F.App’x 756, 759 (5th
Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (where the plaintiff alleged only the
sixth factor, she did not “demonstrate that her boss’s actions were
calculated to encourage her resignation”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on the retaliation claim is VACATED and REMANDED
for consideration under Burlington Northern. The grant of summary
judgment on the constructive discharge claim is AFFIRMED. In
addition, Appellee’s motion for leave to file supplemental briefing
is DENIED.
6
