Filed: Nov. 06, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D In the November 6, 2006 United States Court of AppealsCharles R. Fulbruge III Clerk for the Fifth Circuit _ m 06-30498 Summary Calendar _ BETTY A. HARRIS, Plantiff-Appellant, VERSUS JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana m 2:05-CV-3248 _ Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Betty Harris challenges a judgment affirm- Circuit Judg
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D In the November 6, 2006 United States Court of AppealsCharles R. Fulbruge III Clerk for the Fifth Circuit _ m 06-30498 Summary Calendar _ BETTY A. HARRIS, Plantiff-Appellant, VERSUS JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana m 2:05-CV-3248 _ Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Betty Harris challenges a judgment affirm- Circuit Judge..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
In the November 6, 2006
United States Court of AppealsCharles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 06-30498
Summary Calendar
_______________
BETTY A. HARRIS,
Plantiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
m 2:05-CV-3248
______________________________
Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Betty Harris challenges a judgment affirm-
Circuit Judges. ing a decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her
PER CURIAM:*
*
(...continued)
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has lished and is not precedent except under the limited
determined that this opinion should not be pub- circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
(continued...)
claim for social security disability benefits. We do not substitute our judgment for the
Because the Commissioner’s decision is sup- Commissioner’s, even if the evidence weighs
ported by substantial evidence and comports against her decision. Newton, 209 F.3d at 452.
with the relevant legal standards, we affirm. If we find conflicts in the evidence, we accept
the Commissioner’s resolution of the conflicts
I. so long as that resolution is supported by sub-
Because Harris is a pro se litigant, we lib- stantial evidence. Id.
erally construe her briefs and apply less strin-
gent standards in interpreting her arguments II.
than we would in the case of a counseled par- Harris alleges that the ALJ did not fully de-
ty. Grant v. Cuellar,
59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th velop the record and consider all relevant evi-
Cir. 1995). We read Harris’s briefs as attack- dence before finding that Harris did not qualify
ing the sufficiency of the record developed by for disability payments. An ALJ has a duty
the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and the fully and fairly to develop the facts relative to
ALJ’s reliance on the testimony of the voca- a claim for disability benefits. Ripley, 67 F.3d
tional expert (“VE”) to determine that Harris at 557. Reversal is appropriate, however, only
was not disabled under the Social Security if the applicant shows that he was prejudiced.
Act.1
Id. Prejudice can be established by showing
that had the ALJ adequately performed his
We review a denial of social security bene- duty, he “could and would have adduced evi-
fits “only to ascertain whether (1) the final de- dence that might have altered the result.”
cision is supported by substantial evidence and Kane v. Heckler, 731 F.2d 1216, 1220 (5th
(2) whether the Commissioner used the proper Cir. 1984). Harris bears the burden of proving
legal standards.” Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d her disability, Wren v. Sullivan,
925 F.2d 123,
448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence 128 (5th Cir. 1991), and if she is unable to
is more than a scintilla, but less than a prepon- provide sufficient medical evidence, the ALJ
derance, Spellman v. Shalala,
1 F.3d 357, 360 may make a decision based on the evidence
(5th Cir. 1993), and a decision is supported by available.
Id.
substantial evidence if we find evidence suffi-
cient to establish that a reasonable mind could The district court properly found that the
reach the Commissioner’s conclusion, Ripley ALJ had fairly and fully developed the record.
v. Chater,
67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995). The administrative record contains medical
records from River Parishes Mental Health
Clinic dated November 2001 through August
1
Harris also raises a number of other claims, 2003 and April 2004 through May 2004, and
including, inter alia, that she is being discriminated from St. Charles Parish Hospital dated January
against on account of her disability, race, and reli- 2004 through February 2004.2 The ALJ also
gion, and that an employee of the Social Security reviewed the opinion of the Social Security
Administration purged medical records from her Administration’s medical consultant and a con-
files. These arguments are not adequately briefed sultative examination report by a psychiatrist.
and, even considering the wide latitude we afford
pro se litigants, we require that arguments must be
briefed to be preserved. Price v. Digital Equip.
2
Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988). Harris alleges a disability onset date of Sep-
Thus, we deem these claims abandoned. tember 13, 2002.
2
Outside of a general allegation that some rec-
ords were intentionally purgedSSa claim with
no evidentiary supportSSHarris does not iden-
tify specific relevant records that the ALJ
failed to consider. Neither does she assert
why, had such records been considered, the
resulting decision would have been different.
III.
Harris asserts that the ALJ improperly re-
lied on the testimony of the VE. The use of a
VE is discretionary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e).
If, however, the claimant suffers from non-
exertional impairments, the Commissioner
must rely on a VE to establish that suitable
jobs exist in the economy. Newton, 209 F.3d
at 458. Harris suffers from paranoid schizo-
phrenia, a severe nonexertional impairment,
and thus not only was the ALJ within his dis-
cretion to rely on the VE, but he was required
to do so.
Because the Commissioner’s decision deny-
ing Harris benefits is supported by substantial
evidence and comports with the relevant legal
standards, we AFFIRM the district court’s
decision upholding the decision of the Com-
missioner.
3
