Filed: Feb. 27, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT February 26, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 06-30318 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ERIC W. VIGERS, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (2:04-CR-20115-6) Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Having pleaded guilty, Eric W. Vigers challenges his s
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT February 26, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 06-30318 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ERIC W. VIGERS, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (2:04-CR-20115-6) Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Having pleaded guilty, Eric W. Vigers challenges his se..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT February 26, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-30318
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ERIC W. VIGERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(2:04-CR-20115-6)
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Having pleaded guilty, Eric W. Vigers challenges his sentences
for conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2, and interference with commerce by robbery,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 2. (He does not contest his
sentence for using a firearm during a crime of violence.)
Vigers contends the district court’s Guideline’s §
2B3.1(b)(4)(B) offense-level enhancement, applicable if a person
was “physically restrained to facilitate the commission of the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
offense or to facilitate escape”, was reversible error because his
physically restraining victims during a robbery of the Lucky
Peacock Casino was neither alleged in the indictment nor admitted
to in his guilty plea’s factual basis.
Notwithstanding Vigers’ maintaining in his reply brief that
this contention was raised in district court, it is, instead,
raised for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, our review is
only for plain error. See United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725,
732-35 (1993). Under such review, Vigers must show a clear or
obvious error that affected his substantial rights. E.g., United
States v. Castillo,
386 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2004). Even then,
we retain discretion to correct the error; ordinarily, we will not
do so unless it “affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings”.
Id. (citation omitted).
Even after United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005), a
presentence investigation report (PSR) is presumed to be
sufficiently reliable such that a district court may properly rely
on it during sentencing. See United States v. Arviso-Mata,
442
F.3d 382, 385 n.10 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2309
(2006); see also United States v. Ramirez,
367 F.3d 274, 277 (5th
Cir. 2004). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating
information relied upon by the district court in sentencing to be
materially untrue. See United States v. Davis,
76 F.3d 82, 84 (5th
Cir. 1996). If the defendant fails to offer rebuttal evidence to
2
refute information in the PSR, the sentencing court is free to
adopt that information without further inquiry. See United States
v. Vital,
68 F.3d 114, 120 (5th Cir. 1995).
The district court did not err in attributing the physical
restraint of robbery victims at the casino to Vigers. The PSR
provided: two of Vigers’ co-conspirators remembered him being
personally involved in the robbery; and victims of that robbery
were physically restrained. Vigers offered no evidence to rebut
the facts contained in the PSR. Moreover, because the robbery was
within the scope of the conspiracy to which Vigers pleaded guilty,
even if he did not personally restrain the victims, his co-
conspirators physically restraining the victims could be attributed
to him, as such action was foreseeable given the nature of the
offense. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (in the case of a jointly-
undertaken criminal activity, a defendant’s offense level shall be
determined based upon “all reasonably foreseeable acts and
omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity”); United States v. Burton,
126 F.3d 666, 678
(5th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, there was no error, plain or
otherwise, with respect to the enhancement.
Vigers’ contention regarding the reasonableness of his
sentences has not been adequately briefed and is, therefore,
considered abandoned. See Yohey v. Collins,
985 F.2d 222, 224-25
3
(5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Thames,
214 F.3d 608, 612 n.3
(5th Cir. 2000).
AFFIRMED
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