Filed: Mar. 07, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 7, 2007 FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk _ No. 06-30869 (Summary Calendar) _ CHAMBERS MEDICAL FOUNDATION, Plaintiff, versus CAROL M. PETRIE, Defendant - Appellee, versus RUSSELL C. CHAMBERS, Estate Movant - Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Louisiana No. 2:05-CV-786 Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* The Estate of
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 7, 2007 FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk _ No. 06-30869 (Summary Calendar) _ CHAMBERS MEDICAL FOUNDATION, Plaintiff, versus CAROL M. PETRIE, Defendant - Appellee, versus RUSSELL C. CHAMBERS, Estate Movant - Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Louisiana No. 2:05-CV-786 Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* The Estate of D..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 7, 2007
FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
_________________
No. 06-30869
(Summary Calendar)
_________________
CHAMBERS MEDICAL FOUNDATION,
Plaintiff,
versus
CAROL M. PETRIE,
Defendant - Appellee,
versus
RUSSELL C. CHAMBERS, Estate
Movant - Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana
No. 2:05-CV-786
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The Estate of Dr. Russell Chambers (“Estate”) appeals the district court’s denial of its motion
to intervene in the underlying suit between the Chambers Medical Foundation (“Foundation”) and
Carol Petrie Chambers (“Petrie”). The Estate filed a motion to intervene both as of right and
permissively, asserting that the Estate has an interest in the litigation because the Estate’s tax liability
may be affected by the outcome and because the Estate has an interest in seeing that Dr. Russell’s
“estate plan”, as embodied by the agreement at issue in the suit (“the Agreement”), is protected. The
district court denied intervention on the grounds that the Estate did not have a sufficient interest in
the litigation and that any interest the Estate did possess was adequately represented by the
Foundation.
A district court’s denial of a motion for intervention as of right is reviewed de novo. See Ross
v. Marshall,
426 F.3d 745, 753 (5th Cir. 2005). Intervention as of right is to be permitted upon
timely application “when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which
is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as
a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless the
applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.” FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). This
Court requires that the interest asserted in intervention be “direct, substantial and legally protectable.”
Ross, 426 F.3d at 757.
“Orders denying permissive intervention are reviewed for ‘clear abuse of discretion’ and will
be reversed only if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ are shown.” Trans Chemical Ltd. v. China Nat.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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Machinery Import and Export Corp.,
332 F.3d 815, 821-22 (5th Cir. 2003). Under Rule 24(b),
permissive intervention is appropriate where “an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have
a question of law or fact in common.”
Id. at 824.
The Estate first argues that the district court erred in denying its motion to intervene as of
right because the Estate’s interest in the litigation is sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 24(a).
The Estate argues that if Petrie alleges and the trial court finds that the entire Agreement is
unenforceable, the transaction embodied by the Agreement would have to be “unwound” and assets
shifted, which might have unspecified tax implications for the Estate and would undo Dr. Chambers’
“estate plan.” The Estate does not describe in detail how and to what degree the prospective results
from the instant litigation would actually affect the Estate’s tax liability or its ability to collect
contribution. Accordingly, the Estate’s fails to sufficiently specify its financial interest in the case
and does not meet its burden of showing a “direct, substantial and legally protectable” interest. See
Ross, 426 F.3d at 757. The Estate also cites no legal authority suggesting that its abstract interest
in ensuring that Dr. Chambers’ estate plan is effectuated is sufficient to render the Estate an
indispensable party and warrant intervention as of right. See
id. Further, the Estate does not
articulate why the Foundation cannot adequately represent its interest in defending the enforceability
of the Agreement. Because the Estate has failed to demonstrate either the sufficiency of its interest
or the inadequacy of the existing party’s representation if it, the district court did not err in denying
the Estate’s motion to intervene as of right.
Id.
The Estate also argues that the district court clearly abused its discretion in denying
permissive intervention. The Estate argues that permissive intervention was warranted because the
Estate has an economic interest in the outcome of the suit. The Estate cites no authority suggesting
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that refusal to allow permissive intervention by a party with an indirect and undefined economic
interest in the suit constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. The Estate also fails to otherwise establish
that “extraordinary circumstances” are sufficiently present to warrant reversal of the district court’s
decision. See Trans Chemical
Ltd., 332 F.3d at 821-22. Accordingly, we find that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention.
AFFIRMED.
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