MEMORANDUM OPINION

GREGORY L. TADDONIO, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Reinstate Counts Nine and Ten of Plaintiffs' Complaint Against Beyondsoft Consulting Inc. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7015 and 7016,1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15 and 16, and Local Bankruptcy Rules 7016-1 and 7008 (the "Motion")2 and Defendant Beyondsoft Consulting, Inc.'s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reinstate Counts Nine and Ten Against Beyondsoft.3

The Court considers the Motion to be a request to amend the complaint under Civil Rule 15(a)(2), which is applicable to this proceeding pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7015.4 Because the Court will DENY the motion to amend, it need not reach the question of whether the Court's scheduling orders should be modified under Civil Rule 16(b)(4), made applicable to these proceedings by Bankruptcy Rule 7016.

A.

The Plaintiffs commenced this adversary proceeding on August 21, 2014.5 Among the allegations contained within the Complaint, Count Nine alleged a claim against all defendants for violations of the automatic stay in the Prithvi Catalytic, Inc. bankruptcy case, and Count Ten sought a finding of civil contempt against each defendant "as a result of their actions in violating the automatic stay[.]"6 Defendant, Beyondsoft Corporation ("Beyondsoft") moved to dismiss the Complaint under Civil Rule 12(b)(6).7

On April 8, 2015, the Court entered its Memorandum Opinion which dismissed Counts Nine and Ten as to Beyondsoft.8 The Court found that, "[a]fter reviewing the Complaint and its attachments, the Court cannot identify a specific factual averment to suggest that BeyondSoft had notice of the Debtor's bankruptcy case when it committed the acts for which recovery is sought."9 Plaintiffs did not request reconsideration of that ruling.

In the months that followed, the parties engaged in extensive discovery pursuant to a Joint Discovery Plan and Statement of Estimated Time of Trial dated May 21, 2015 (the "Joint Plan") which included a schedule of pre-trial deadlines agreed to by the parties.10 Among other deadlines, the Joint Plan set September 30, 2015, as the last date to "amend the pleadings to add additional claims or defenses[.]"11 After conducting a pretrial status conference on June 18, 2015, the Court approved the Joint Plan and directed that its terms "shall not be modified except by leave of this Court upon a showing of good cause."12

The Court conducted a second pre-trial status conference on October 29, 2015. At the status conference, Plaintiffs proposed an extension of the deadlines established in the Joint Plan because the exchange of written discovery was taking longer than originally anticipated.13 In particular, they requested that the fact discovery deadline be extended only as to the Plaintiffs, thereby affording them an opportunity to depose several defense witnesses.14 Commensurate with this request, Plaintiffs also asked that other case deadlines, including the date to file an amended complaint, be extended.15

Each of the defendants opposed an extension of the discovery period that benefited only the Plaintiffs. Collabera also opposed an extension of the date to file an amended complaint because the deadline had already expired one month before.16 After considering the parties' arguments, the Court extended the discovery period as to all parties, but it specifically denied Plaintiffs' request to extend the deadline to file an amended complaint.17 In light of the Court's ruling, the parties submitted their first amended joint discovery plan which was approved by the Court on November 9, 2015.18

As the case progressed, the parties agreed to modify the Joint Plan on two additional occasions.19 In each instance, the modifications contained the following language:

Pursuant to the Third Amended Joint Plan, the factual discovery period concluded on June 17, 2016.21

On July 13, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the current Motion, seeking to reinstate Counts Nine and Ten as to Beyondsoft. Plaintiffs claim that during the course of discovery, they obtained deposition testimony from employees of Microsoft and Beyondsoft which demonstrates that Beyondsoft had knowledge of Prithi Catalytic, Inc.'s bankruptcy case prior to committing the alleged actions which serve as the basis for Plaintiffs' complaint. Beyondsoft, the only defendant targeted in the Motion, opposes the requested relief.

Subsequent to the filing of the Motion, each of the parties filed a motion for summary judgment with the Court.22 Those motions are set to be heard by the Court on November 4, 2016.

This Court has jurisdiction of this matter under 28 U.S.C § 1334 and 157(b). This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C § 157(b)(2)(A).

B.

Civil Rule 15(a)(2) provides that a party may amend a pleading (including a complaint) "only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave." Whether to grant leave to amend under Civil Rule 15(a)(2) is within the discretion of the Court.23 Leave should be freely given whenever "justice so requires,"24 unless equitable considerations render it otherwise unjust.25 Among the factors that may justify denial of leave to amend are undue delay and undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment.26 Among these factors, the Third Circuit has repeatedly recognized that "prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial of an amendment."27 It is also not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend to reassert claims that were previously dismissed by the Court.28 When addressing a request to amend, the burden of proof is on the party opposing the amendment29

C.

After review of the procedural history of this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs unduly delayed their request to amend the Complaint. In the nearly 16 months that elapsed before the Motion was filed, Plaintiffs had at least four opportunities to amend the Complaint to reinstate Counts Nine and Ten against Beyondsoft. The failure to timely act now precludes them from asserting the claims at this late juncture.

As noted above, the deadline to file an amended complaint was established early in the case. Pursuant to the Joint Plan, the parties agreed that September 30, 2015 would be the last day to amend the pleadings.30 When it approved the Joint Plan, the Court directed the parties to comply with the agreed-upon schedule and cautioned that it would not be amended without "leave of this Court upon a showing of good cause."31

Plaintiffs sought an extension of the deadline to file an amended complaint on only one occasion, and it was after the deadline had already expired. At the October 29, 2015 status conference, Plaintiffs proposed to extend the deadline in conjunction with an extension of the discovery period to accommodate several depositions.32 Collabera opposed an extension, claiming that there is "no reason why at this late stage in the case any party at this point could have the ability to amend their complaint[.]"33 The Court agreed with Collabera's reasoning and denied the request.34 Several days later, the Court approved the First Amended Joint Plan, changing various deadlines but not the deadline for filing amended pleadings.35

Although the parties agreed to modify the Joint Plan on two subsequent occasions, they did not alter the deadline to file amended pleadings.36 To the contrary, each modification contained language in paragraph 10 confirming that unless a deadline was "expressly modified," the original dates in the Joint Plan shall "remain in full effect and [remain] binding on the parties."37 Because the deadline to amend pleadings was never altered, each subsequent scheduling order preserved September 30, 2015 as the last date to file an amended complaint.

The scheduling orders are significant for two reasons. First, each time Plaintiffs consented to a modification of the Joint Plan, they affirmatively approved the language in paragraph 10 which kept all remaining dates in place. At no time did Plaintiffs seek to preserve their ability to amend the Complaint at a later time. Instead, all defendants (and the Court) were led to believe that the pleadings were closed. Secondly, the Third Amended Joint Plan was submitted by the parties on June 7, 2016, almost two months after the depositions of Soon Chong (April 6, 2016) and Tammy Joy (April 20, 2016), and weeks after the deposition of Alvin Yang (May 25-26, 2016). In the Motion, Plaintiffs rely on these depositions for proof that Beyondsoft knew of the bankruptcy at the time of committing the alleged acts. To the extent Plaintiffs believed these depositions changed the landscape of their claims, they should not have consented to the Third Amended Joint Plan in its entirety if they planned to challenge the September 30, 2015 deadline in the coming weeks.

Plaintiffs' dilatory behavior was never justified. It was possible to amend the Complaint prior to the September 30, 2015 deadline to correct the defect noted in the Court's Memorandum Opinion.38 After the deadline passed, Plaintiffs had four subsequent opportunities to preserve their request for an extension, but in each instance, they failed to act. Instead, they agreed to language confirming that the date was not altered. And when they finally had what they incorrectly believed was necessary proof for their allegation, they still waited another month after the Third Amended Joint Plan was approved before filing the Motion.

This litigation strategy is explicitly rejected in this circuit.39 As the Third Circuit observed in Maersk, delay alone is not sufficient to justify denial of leave to amend. "However, at some point ... delay will become `undue,' placing an unwarranted burden on the court ... [and] an unfair burden on the opposing party."40

Substantial or undue prejudice to the non-moving party also constitutes a sufficient ground for denial of leave to amend.41 The issue of prejudice focuses on the hardship to the defendants if the Court grants the amendment. Specifically, the Third Circuit considers "whether allowing an amendment would result in additional discovery, cost, and preparation to defend against new facts or new theories."42

After the Court dismissed Counts Nine and Ten against Beyondsoft, Plaintiffs failed to take any overt action to reinstate the claims over the ensuing year while discovery remained open.43 At the conclusion of discovery, Beyondsoft could fairly assume that it would not have to defend against a stay violation claim. It is noteworthy that the violation of stay claim is fundamentally different from the other claims asserted against Beyondsoft and the other defendants. The other claims are standard common law arguments based in tort and contract law. A violation of the stay is a statutory claim under the Bankruptcy Code. It is a "new theory" that Beyondsoft would need to separately examine. Indeed, since the arguments presented in the summary judgment motions currently involve the relations among the parties and how each defendant may have learned of the bankruptcy through other parties, it is conceivable that all Defendants as well as the Plaintiffs would need to reexamine their arguments concerning a violation of the stay.44

Depositions and other discovery are completed. During the past year, the parties exchanged thousands of documents and arranged for several cross-country and at least one cross-border deposition of numerous witnesses. The Court now observes that if an amendment is permitted at this juncture, Beyondsoft claims it will need to reopen discovery.45 The Court is very concerned that reopening discovery will add significant costs to a case in which substantial legal fees have already been incurred. Notably, the parties have frequently complained that discovery involves expensive national travel and complicated scheduling arrangements, which are at least partially responsible for the millions in fees and expenses the parties have allegedly incurred so far in this case.

The Court is also on the verge of considering the summary judgment motions filed by each of the parties. Reopening discovery at this stage of the proceedings would require a further change to the Joint Plan with its concomitant domino effect on the Court's schedules and burden.

The purpose of a pretrial scheduling order is to provide a framework for the litigants to follow. It also instills a sense of finality at certain stages of the proceeding, allowing the parties to transition from one phase of the case to the next. In this instance, the discovery phase is over and it is time to focus on dispositive motions and trial preparations. Given this posture, the Court is unwilling to rewind the clock and revisit discovery, especially when Beyondsoft and possibly other defendants would be prejudiced by the additional discovery expenses associated with an amended complaint.

D.

The claims Plaintiffs now seek to assert were not uncovered through written discovery, nor did deposition testimony reveal the existence of a cause of action that was previously unknown. To the contrary, Plaintiffs identified potential stay violations against each defendant from the out-set of the case. After the Court dismissed the claims as to Beyondsoft, Plaintiffs neglected to pursue a timely amendment to keep the claims viable. When balancing the equities and the potential harm to each party caused by the prospect of a late amendment, the Court cannot ignore that Plaintiffs could have easily avoided controversy with prompt action, whereas Beyondsoft could reasonably expect that Plaintiffs were no longer interested in pursuing those claims when the amendment deadline expired without extension.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs unduly delayed, without acceptable explanation, the filing of their request to amend the Complaint to assert claims for violations of the automatic stay and civil contempt against Beyondsoft. Plaintiffs had numerous opportunities to file the amendment and failed to do so. As it also appears that an amended complaint will cause undue prejudice to Beyondsoft by adding to the discovery costs at this late juncture, the Court finds the Motion is not well taken.

An appropriate Order will follow.