Filed: Mar. 27, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 27, 2007 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 06-20442 Summary Calendar MARIE-PAULE RENOIR; PAUL RENOIR; MARIE-PAULE RENOIR TRUST, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HANTMAN’S ASSOCIATES, INC., doing business as HANTMAN’S AUCTIONEERS; PAULA HANTMNAN, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division 4:05-CV-4152 Before DAVIS,
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 27, 2007 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 06-20442 Summary Calendar MARIE-PAULE RENOIR; PAUL RENOIR; MARIE-PAULE RENOIR TRUST, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HANTMAN’S ASSOCIATES, INC., doing business as HANTMAN’S AUCTIONEERS; PAULA HANTMNAN, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division 4:05-CV-4152 Before DAVIS, B..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 27, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-20442
Summary Calendar
MARIE-PAULE RENOIR; PAUL RENOIR; MARIE-PAULE RENOIR TRUST,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
HANTMAN’S ASSOCIATES, INC., doing business as HANTMAN’S
AUCTIONEERS; PAULA HANTMNAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, Houston Division
4:05-CV-4152
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiffs Marie-Paule Renoir, Paul Renoir, and the Paul
Renoir and Marie-Paule Renoir Revocable Living Trust (“the Trust”)
appeal the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction as to the Maryland defendants. We AFFIRM.
*
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
I. BACKGROUND
In February, 2004, Eckert Fine Art (“Eckert”), a Florida art
dealer, contacted a Maryland-based art auction and appraisal
company, Hantman’s Associates, Inc. d/b/a Hantman’s Auctioneers
(“Hantman’s”), to gauge its interest in handling the sale of the
late artist Pierre-Auguste Renoir’s personal artifacts collection
(the “collection”). Discussions ensued between Eckert and
Hantman’s, and Paula and Michael Hantman visited Florida to view
the collection. In April, 2004, Hantman’s mailed a sales proposal
and a proposed contract with a Maryland choice-of-law provision to
Eckert, which forwarded the materials to the Trust in Texas.
A Renoir family member initiated the first direct contact
between Hantman’s and the Trust by emailing the auction company in
May 2004 to discuss the contract. The Renoirs, the Trust, and
Hantman’s subsequently negotiated via telephone, mail, and email.
On June 15, 2004, the parties executed a contract, under which
Hantman’s would sell the collection on behalf of the Trust on a
consignment basis. The choice-of-law provision’s language in the
executed contract differed from earlier drafts, however, specifying
Texas rather than Maryland law. Both parties deny making the
change, and it is unclear when it was made.
After shipping the collection from Florida to Maryland,
Hantman’s discovered that some collection items were missing.
Paula Hantman made a one-day trip to Texas in August, 2004, to
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address those inconsistencies, and returned to Maryland with some
of the missing items and a watercolor painting that had not been
previously listed.
Hantman’s offered the collection for sale through auction on
May 14, 2005. The Trust did not establish a reserve or minimum
price. After the opening price of $150,000 failed to attract a bid,
Hantman’s marketed the collection to private buyers and received
a $135,000 offer. Hantman’s communicated the offer to the Trust on
June 5, 2005, but the Trust refused, stating that it would not agree
to sell the collection for less than $750,000. The buyer insisted
that Hantman’s had accepted the $135,000 offer and that the sale was
final, and filed a lawsuit asserting his right to the collection.
In August, 2005, Hantman’s sent the Trust a $100,100 check,
reflecting the proceeds of the sale less Hantman’s commission. On
August 18, 2005, the Renoirs and the Trust sued Hantman’s and Paula
Hantman in Texas state court. The defendants removed the action to
federal court, and the district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack
of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs appealed. We review a
district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction de
novo. Central Freight Lines Inc. v. APA Transport Corp., 322 F.3d
376, 380 (5th Cir. 2003).
II. DISCUSSION
The Texas long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to the
permissible limits of the Due Process Clause, and so we only need
to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this
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case would comport with those federal guarantees. Latshaw v.
Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999); Bullion v. Gillespie,
895 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1990). In order for personal
jurisdiction to satisfy Due Process requirements, a plaintiff must
show that (1) the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing “minimum
contacts” with the forum state, and (2) the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over that defendant does not offend “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945);
Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211.
A single act directed at the forum state can confer personal
jurisdiction so long as that act gives rise to the claim asserted,
but merely contracting with a resident of the forum state does not
establish minimum contacts. Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211;
Hydrokinetics, Inc. v. Alaska Mech., Inc.,
700 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th
Cir. 1983). We evaluate multiple factors in determining whether a
defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the
forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985).
Random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts are not sufficient to
establish jurisdiction.
Id. at 476.
Personal jurisdiction can be of either the general or specific
variety. Mink v. AAAA Develop., LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir.
1999), but the appellants only argue for specific jurisdiction. A
court’s exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate only when
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the defendants have purposefully directed their activities at
residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged
injuries arising out of or related to those activities. See Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 472;
Bullion, 895 F.2d at 216.
The various actions and events the plaintiffs list to
demonstrate that Hantman’s established minimum contacts with Texas
can be grouped in three categories: negotiating and contracting via
phone, email, and mail with the Trust and the Renoirs, who were
located in Texas; Paula Hantman’s visit to Texas in 2004 to address
items missing from the collection received in Maryland; and the
choice-of-law provision in the contract specifying Texas law. None
of these actions or events established the minimum contacts
necessary to confer personal jurisdiction.
As previously set forth, merely contracting with a resident of
the forum state does not establish minimum contacts. Latshaw, 167
F.3d at 211;
Hydrokinetics, 700 F.2d at 1028. An exchange of
communications in the course of developing and carrying out a
contract also does not, by itself, constitute the required
purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of Texas law.
Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey,
801 F.2d 773, 778 (5th Cir. 1986).
Otherwise, jurisdiction could be exercised based only on the
fortuity that one of the parties happens to reside in the forum
state.
Id. Similarly, Paula Hantman’s lone visit to Texas only
took place because of discrepancies between the appraisal report and
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the collection that was shipped from Florida to Maryland. The visit
was no more than a fortuity.
The presence of a choice-of-law provision can be helpful in
determining whether there is personal jurisdiction. See Jones v.
Petty-Ray Geophysical, Geosource, Inc., 954 F.2d 1061, 1069 (5th
Cir. 1992) (stating that forum-selection and choice-of-law
provisions “indicate rather forcefully” that defendant “did not
purposefully direct its activities towards Texas”). “[A] choice-of-
law provision should neither be ignored nor considered sufficient
alone to confer jurisdiction.” Electrosource, Inc. v. Horizon
Battery Techs, Ltd.,
176 F.3d 867, 873 (5th Cir. 1999).
In addition to not being independently determinative, the
provision specifying Texas law in the parties’ contract is of
dubious origin. Both parties accuse the other of drafting it, and
while it is clear from the record that the original drafts of the
contract specified Maryland law, and the executed contract specified
Texas law, we do not know exactly how or when that change came
about. While a choice-of-law provision can suggest whether a party
intended to purposefully avail itself of the benefits and
protections of doing business in Texas, it is disputed here whether
Hantman’s even knew the provision had been changed. Given this
uncertainty, it is difficult to draw any inference that the
appellees anticipated local jurisdiction or intended local availment
based on the provision.
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The appellants also argue that Hantman’s made
misrepresentations directed to them in Texas through telephone and
email communications. As the district court held, however, focusing
on where a defendant allegedly directed a tort incorrectly
emphasizes the relationship among the plaintiff, the forum, and the
litigation, rather than among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation. Properly considering all factors to evaluate whether
Hantman’s and Paula Hantman purposefully availed themselves of the
benefits and protections of doing business in Texas, the answer is
no. The physical location of the Renoirs and the Trust within Texas
was irrelevant for Hantman’s: the collection was primarily in
Florida, and then Maryland. The auction was held in Maryland.
Hantman’s only contact with Texas came about by the fortuity that
a collection in Florida happened to be owned by the appellants in
Texas.
Because the appellees never established minimum contacts with
the forum state, we need not consider whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.
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