Filed: Apr. 29, 2008
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED April 29, 2008 No. 07-40597 Summary Calendar Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESUS CARBAJAL-ALVARADO, also known as Jesus N Carvajal, also known as Jesus Carbarjar, also known as Jesus Carbajal, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 3:06-CR-18-1 Before WIENER, GARZA, an
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED April 29, 2008 No. 07-40597 Summary Calendar Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESUS CARBAJAL-ALVARADO, also known as Jesus N Carvajal, also known as Jesus Carbarjar, also known as Jesus Carbajal, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 3:06-CR-18-1 Before WIENER, GARZA, and..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 29, 2008
No. 07-40597
Summary Calendar Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JESUS CARBAJAL-ALVARADO, also known as Jesus N Carvajal, also known
as Jesus Carbarjar, also known as Jesus Carbajal,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:06-CR-18-1
Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jesus Carbajal-Alvarado (Carbajal) appeals his conviction and sentence
for being found unlawfully in the United States following removal. Carbajal
argues that the sentence imposed was unreasonable because the district court
impermissibly applied a presumption of reasonableness to sentences within the
guidelines range. In reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we first determine
whether the district court’s sentencing decision was procedurally sound and then
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 07-40597
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Gall v. United States,
128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
The record shows that the district court applied a presumption of
reasonableness for sentences within the guidelines range and required the
existence of extraordinary circumstances to impose a sentence outside of the
guidelines range. The Supreme Court has since held that while an appellate
court may apply a presumption of reasonableness to sentences within the
guidelines range, a district court may not. Rita v. United States,
127 S. Ct. 2456,
2462-65 (2007);
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596-97. As the sentence imposed was not
procedurally sound, we vacate Carbajal’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
See
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596-97; see also United States v. Newsom,
508 F.3d 731,
733 (5th Cir. 2007) (implying that a procedurally unsound sentence should be
vacated by noting that issues of substantive reasonableness are not reached if
sentence is procedurally unsound).
Carbajal argues that his sentence was unreasonable as a matter of law
because this court’s precedent following United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220
(2005), has effectively reinstated the mandatory guidelines regime found
unconstitutional in Booker. He acknowledged that this argument was foreclosed
at the time he raised it, but raised the issue to preserve it in light of the then
pending Supreme Court cases of Gall and Kimbrough v. United States,
128 S. Ct.
558, 575 (2007). Gall and Kimbrough have now been decided, and nothing in
either case demonstrates that this court’s post-Booker precedent effectively
reinstated the mandatory guidelines. See
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594-602;
Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 569-76.
In light of Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000), Carbajal
challenges the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony
and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of
the offense that must be found by a jury. This argument is foreclosed by
Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). United States v.
2
No. 07-40597
Pineda-Arrellano,
492 F.3d 624, 625 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 872
(2008).
CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR
RESENTENCING.
3