Filed: Jun. 23, 1994
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 93-3387 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, versus CARLOS I. MIRO, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (August 8, 1994) Before WISDOM and JONES, Circuit Judges, and COBB,* District Judge. COBB, District Judge: Carlos I. Miro appeals his sentence for mail fraud. We find no error and AFFIRM. I. Background Carlos I. Miro (Miro) engineered an insurance scam which resulted in t
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 93-3387 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, versus CARLOS I. MIRO, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (August 8, 1994) Before WISDOM and JONES, Circuit Judges, and COBB,* District Judge. COBB, District Judge: Carlos I. Miro appeals his sentence for mail fraud. We find no error and AFFIRM. I. Background Carlos I. Miro (Miro) engineered an insurance scam which resulted in th..
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 93-3387
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
versus
CARLOS I. MIRO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(August 8, 1994)
Before WISDOM and JONES, Circuit Judges, and COBB,* District Judge.
COBB, District Judge:
Carlos I. Miro appeals his sentence for mail fraud. We
find no error and AFFIRM.
I. Background
Carlos I. Miro (Miro) engineered an insurance scam which
resulted in the collapse of the Louisiana based Anglo-American
Insurance Company (Anglo). The State of Louisiana licensed Anglo
to do business in August, 1986. Primarily, Anglo marketed workers'
*
District Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
compensation insurance. The company was purportedly reinsured by
the Anglo-American International Reinsurance Company (Reinsurer),
operated out of Dublin, Ireland. Miro operated the insurers,
directed their solicitation of business, and successfully sought
loans on the companies' behalf.
Unfortunately for the policy holders, Anglo and its
Reinsurer were shams. After receiving premium payments from
various subscribers, Anglo would forward these funds overseas to
the Reinsurer. This gave the appearance that certain risks were
covered. In reality, however, Miro instead deposited portions of
these receipts into foreign bank accounts for personal use. Other
portions of the proceeds were funnelled back into Anglo's accounts,
fraudulently inflating the company's assets. With increased
assets, Anglo could (and did) secure loans and receive
authorization from the Louisiana Department of Insurance to
underwrite more policies.
In addition to the reinsurance farce, Anglo received
favorable treatment from the Louisiana Department of Insurance,
with which the company filed quarterly and annual statements
reflecting its solvency. The favorable treatment was a product of
bribes sent by Miro to Mr. Sherman Barnard, the then Louisiana
Commissioner of Insurance. However, when Barnard failed to secure
re-election, his successor launched an investigation into Louisiana
insurance fraud. Before long, the fraud became evident, and Anglo
was placed in liquidation. Anglo's collapse caused a total loss
estimated at over $20,000,000.00.
2
The United States secured an indictment charging Miro
with eighteen counts of mail fraud and one count of money
laundering arising out of his activities in the Eastern District of
Louisiana. Subsequently, the government acquired a superseding
indictment which dropped two of the mail fraud counts. The
remaining mail fraud counts charged Miro with receipt through the
mail of blocks of premium checks from its policy holders, the
proceeds of which contributed to execution of the fraudulent
scheme. The money laundering count charged Miro with executing
bank transfers to London in an attempt to conceal the source of
money unlawfully obtained from the mail fraud.
Perhaps coincidentally, Miro was visiting Spain at the
time the grand jury returned its original indictment. When the
United States began extradition proceedings, Miro was arrested and
held in custody there. Miro spent approximately eight months in
Spanish custody during the pendency of the extradition.
Ultimately, Spain extradited Miro but limited prosecution to the
mail fraud counts because the charge for money laundering did not
state an offense under Spanish law. Miro was returned to the
United States in July, 1992.
After negotiating with federal authorities, Miro agreed
to plead guilty to certain charges. The plea agreement provided,
inter alia, that Miro would plead guilty to counts one through
sixteen of the superseding indictment and fully cooperate with law
enforcement authorities in related prosecutions. In exchange, the
government (1) would not prosecute Miro for the remaining count for
3
money laundering; (2) would not proceed with prosecution for
related money laundering charges pending in the Middle District of
Louisiana; and (3) would bring the extent of Miro's cooperation to
the attention of the district court, and, in the government's
discretion, acknowledge Miro's substantial assistance prior to
sentencing pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines.
Miro entered guilty pleas on November 18, 1992. He then
assisted federal authorities in four related prosecutions. As
promised, the government sent a letter to the court advising it of
the extent of Miro's service. Prior to sentencing, the government
memorialized the letter by filing a §5K1.1 motion to acknowledge
substantial assistance.
On May 26, 1993, the district court imposed sentence.
That court reasoned that counts one through nine involved mailings
that occurred prior to the effective date of the Guidelines and
sentenced Miro to five years on each count, all to run
concurrently. As to the remaining counts, the court applied the
Guidelines and imposed a forty-six month term on each count, also
to run concurrently.2 With respect to these counts, the district
court calculated Miro's offense level using the entire $20,000,000.
See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1). The court ordered the forty-six month
Guidelines sentence to run consecutive to the five year pre-
Guidelines sentence for a total sentence of 106 months. The court
2
The district court applied the Guidelines in effect at the time the
offenses were committed, to avoid an ex post facto challenge. References to the
Guidelines in this opinion are those applied by the district court.
4
considered the §5K1.1 motion, but chose not to grant a downward
departure. This appeal timely followed.
II. Discussion
We will affirm Miro's sentence unless he establishes
"that it was imposed in violation of the law, was imposed because
of an incorrect application of the Guidelines, or is outside the
range of applicable Guidelines and is unreasonable." United States
v. Parks, 924 F.2d 68, 71 (5th Cir. 1991).
A.
Miro first argues that his consecutive sentences for
pre-Guidelines and Guidelines offenses violate Double Jeopardy.
The district court took into account the total amount of the loss
for purposes of computing Miro's offense level because the loss was
incapable of division between the pre-Guidelines and Guidelines
counts. Miro argues that when the loss attributable to pre-
Guidelines offenses cannot be apportioned from Guidelines offenses,
Double Jeopardy requires the court to run the sentences
concurrently.
We have consistently rejected similar arguments and do so
again today. For starters, in Parks, we held that district courts
possess wide discretion to impose consecutive sentences for pre-
Guidelines and Guidelines offenses. 924 F.2d 68, 71 (5th Cir.
1991). We relied on Judge Wilkins' conclusion that "nothing in the
guidelines or the Sentencing Reform Act precludes the court from
ordering that a sentence imposed on a pre-guidelines count be
served consecutively to a sentence imposed on a guidelines count."
5
Parks, 924 F.2d at 73 (quoting United States v. Watford,
894 F.2d
665, 669 (4th Cir. 1990) (Wilkins, J., Chairman of the United
States Sentencing Commission)). Judge Wilkins had emphasized one
fundamental distinction between pre-Guidelines and Guidelines
sentences: Parole is available for the former, but not the latter.
Watford, 894 F.2d at 670. We concluded that nothing in the
Sentencing Reform Act precluded a judge, when fashioning what he or
she believes an appropriate punishment, from ordering consecutive
sentences.
Parks, 924 F.2d at 73.
To be sure, Parks did not expressly decide the Double
Jeopardy challenge here presented. We did, however, reject the
argument in United States v. Gaudet, 966 F.2d 959, 963 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1294 (1993). As the government
points out, the constitutional issue is really the same question
addressed by Parks. In multiple punishment cases such as this, the
issue is simply whether Congress intended to allow consecutive
sentences when it enacted the Sentencing Reform Act. This court
canvassed that question in Parks and disposed of it. We recognize
the apparently contrary position taken by the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Niven,
952 F.2d 289, 294 (9th Cir. 1991).
However, we are bound by our prior holdings in Parks, Gaudet, and
most recently, United States v. Kings,
981 F.2d 790, 794-95 (5th
Cir. 1993). We therefore hold that Miro's consecutive sentences do
not violate Double Jeopardy.
B.
Miro's second challenge is that the Guidelines apply to
6
all of his convictions because the mail fraud scheme straddled
November 1, 1987, the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act.
He argues that because the guideline commentary requires grouping
of mail fraud offenses, the district court was bound to order
consecutive sentences on all counts. We disagree.
The Guidelines apply to all offenses committed after
November 1, 1987. United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 826 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1112,
109 S. Ct. 3172,
104 L. Ed. 2d
1033 (1989). The Guideline commentary suggests grouping of mail
fraud counts which comprise part of a single course of conduct with
a single criminal objective representing one composite harm to the
victim. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. We are bound by the commentary when it
interprets or explains a guideline unless it violates the
Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with or a
plainly erroneous reading of that guideline. United States v.
Stinson, U.S. ,
113 S. Ct. 1913, 1917-18 (1993). However, we
read Stinson only to mean that courts are bound by the commentary
with respect to offenses that are actually covered by the
Guidelines themselves. Congress has made it plain that the
Guidelines apply only to crimes committed after November 1, 1987.
Anticipating this reading of Stinson, Miro urges that his
convictions arose as part of a continuing or "straddle" offense.
We have recognized that the Guidelines cover some offenses
initiated prior to November 1, 1987, yet completed after that date.
See Gaudet, 966 F.2d at 961 (collecting cases). A perfect example
is a conspiracy initiated prior to November 1, 1987, but continuing
7
by virtue of a co-conspirator's overt act done after that date.
See United States v. Devine, 934 F.2d 1325, 1332 (5th Cir. 1991);
United States v. White,
869 F.2d 822, 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1112,
109 S. Ct. 3172,
104 L. Ed. 2d 1033 (1989). In such a
case, the conspiracy conviction is sentenced pursuant to the
Guidelines because the crime itself would not have been completed
until after November 1, 1987.
Just because criminal activity takes place over a period
of time does not mean it is a continuing or "straddle" offense.
Punishments under the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and the
conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, are quite different.
Execution of a scheme to commit mail fraud is punishable once per
mailing. United States v. Blankenship, 746 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir.
1984). Notwithstanding the continuing nature of the scheme itself,
each mailing constitutes a completed offense.
Id. We therefore
hold that the district court correctly imposed pre-Guidelines
sentences for mailings occurring prior to November 1, 1987, even
though the mailings were part of a continuing course of conduct
which overlapped the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act.
See United States v. Osum,
943 F.2d 1394, 1400 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991);
accord United States v. Niven,
952 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1991).
C.
Miro also challenges the district court's denial of a
downward departure. Miro argues that he provided substantial
assistance to the authorities, and the government's filing of a
motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 entitled him to the requested
8
departure. We disagree.
The decision to grant a § 5K1.1 motion is committed to
the discretion of the sentencing court. United States v. Damer,
910 F.2d 1239, 1240-41 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 991
(1990). Therefore, even assuming the government files a motion
under § 5K1.1, a defendant is not entitled, as a matter of right,
to the requested departure.
Damer, 910 F.2d at 1241. Moreover,
generally, a claim on appeal that a sentencing judge refused to
depart from the Guidelines and imposed a lawful sentence provides
no ground for relief. United States v. Buenrostro,
868 F.2d 135,
139 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 923 (1990). This court
will affirm a refusal to depart from the Guidelines unless the
refusal was in violation of law.
Buenrostro, 868 F.2d at 139.3 In
the past, we have declined to question a sentencing judge's refusal
to depart based on a defendant's claim that he had provided
substantial assistance to authorities under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
United States v. Rojas,
868 F.2d 1409, 1410 (5th Cir. 1989).
Because it does not appear that the district court violated any law
when it refused the downward departure, we reject Miro's argument.4
3
We have also suggested that a remand might be appropriate when the
record reveals that the sentencing judge erroneously believed it lacked the
authority to depart. See, e.g., United States v. Soliman, 954 F.2d 1012, 1014
(5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Miller,
903 F.2d 341, 349 n.10 (5th Cir. 1990).
However, the record in this case plainly reflects that the district judge was
aware of his authority to grant the requested departure. Consequently, Soliman
and Miller have no application.
4
Both parties rely on Damer to assume that the district court's
denial of the § 5K1.1 motion is reviewable on appeal under the abuse of
discretion standard. Surprisingly, neither party cited Rojas in its brief to
this court, although Rojas decided the same issue as Damer. More importantly, we
decided Rojas prior to Damer. When faced with conflicting panel opinions, the
earlier controls our decision. See, e.g., Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 960
F.2d 456, 459 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Fields,
923 F.2d 358, 360 n.4
(5th Cir.), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 937 (1991). Consequently, under Rojas, Miro's
9
D.
Miro next contends he was denied due process because the
district court punished him for exercising rights under the
extradition treaty between the United States and Spain. He argues
that a greater sentence was imposed because the government could
not prosecute him for money laundering under the extradition
treaty. We disagree.
Under the doctrine of specialty, "the requisitioning
state may not, without permission of the asylum state, try or
punish the fugitive for any crimes committed before the extradition
except the crimes for which he was extradited." Shapiro v.
Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir.), cert. dism'd.,
414 U.S.
884 (1973). The extradition treaty between Spain and the United
States provides that "the person extradited under the present
Treaty shall not be detained, tried or punished . . . for an
argument that the sentencing court refused to depart downward and imposed a
lawful sentence provides no valid claim for relief.
Of course, in this case, the discrepancy is a distinction without a
difference. Even if we were to review the district court's application of §
5K1.1 under the abuse of discretion standard, we would easily conclude no abuse
of discretion occurred. The government's § 5K1.1 motion apprised the district
court of Miro's cooperation and assistance in four other insurance fraud
prosecutions. At the sentencing hearing, the court considered this motion and
remarked, "after looking at all the facts and circumstances of this case I didn't
think the downward departure would send the right message to other people who
might be inclined to engage in similar conduct as Mr. Miro. And I thought that
as a general deterrent it was a mistake to depart downward in this case, and I
chose not to depart downward." The district court further justified the sentence
by noting that the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offenses did not
adequately take into account the total loss caused by Anglo's collapse.
The Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSR) supports the district
court's conclusion. The PSR suggests that an upward departure might have been
appropriate because the total loss caused by Anglo's collapse was much greater
than contemplated by the Guidelines. Additionally, the PSR states that an upward
departure might have been permitted on the grounds that governmental functions
had been disrupted because the ultimate burden of Anglo's failure would be borne
by the taxpayers of Georgia and Louisiana. Even under Damer, after examining all
of the facts and the circumstances of this case, we would not conclude that the
district court abused its discretion when it denied the § 5K1.1 motion.
10
offense other than that for which extradition has been granted."
Treaty on Extradition, May 29, 1970, U.S.-Spain, art. XIII, 22
U.S.T. 737, 744. Spain extradited Miro on only the mail fraud
counts, apparently because Spanish law does not prohibit nor punish
money laundering.
Miro's argument on this issue rests entirely on certain
comments made by the district court at sentencing. Our review is
therefore governed by the plain error standard because Miro could
have raised the point when the trial court's comments were made but
failed to do so. See United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182 (4th
Cir. 1992). Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b), "[p]lain errors or defects
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not
brought to the attention of the court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
This avenue is necessarily narrow, to encourage timely objection
"so as to provide the trial judge an opportunity to avoid or
correct any error, and thus avoid the costs of reversal." United
States v. Chaney,
662 F.2d 1148, 1151 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981).
In United States v. Olano, the Supreme Court recently
defined the limitations to plain error review. U.S. , 113
S. Ct. 1770 (1993). First, there must be an error, that is, a
deviation from a legal rule, unless the rule has been waived.
Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1777. Second, the error must be "clear" or
"obvious."
Id. Third, the substantial rights of the defendant
must have been adversely affected.
Id. at 1777-78. In the usual
case, this requires the defendant to make a specific showing of
actual prejudice.
Id. at 1778. Finally, our review is
11
discretionary, and we may only correct an error meeting the above
essentials if it "seriously affects the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. at 1779; see also
United States. v. Rodriguez,
15 F.3d 408, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1994).
Governed by these standards, we cannot vacate this
sentence because of any asserted violation of the specialty
doctrine. We may assume, arguendo, that increasing a sentence to
compensate for unextradited crimes might, under proper
circumstances, be a deviation from a legal rule such that it would
constitute error. However, Olano cautions that "the Court of
Appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the
error is clear under current law." When we review this record as
a whole, United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985), we are not
convinced that the district court plainly erred. First, it is
undisputed that Miro was never formally prosecuted for money
laundering. In addition, although the district court remarked that
the consecutive sentences were (at least partially) imposed because
of Miro's fight against extradition, these statements were made in
response to a plea for a more lenient sentence. To this extent,
the district court appears to have been simply unsympathetic toward
a fugitive. Finally, the PSR did not recommend the court take into
account as relevant conduct that Miro could not be prosecuted for
any remaining money laundering charges. We therefore cannot
conclude that the district court clearly and obviously erred.5
5
We also doubt that Miro would be able to succeed in making a
specific showing of prejudice. In order to prove that the asserted error
affected his substantial rights, Miro surely must have standing to raise this
12
We additionally emphasize that we allow plain error
review in only the most limited of circumstances so as not to upset
the "careful balancing of our need to encourage all trial
participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time
around against our insistence that obvious injustice be promptly
redressed." Young, 470 U.S. at 15 (quoting United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982)). Plain error review is discretionary,
exercised only when the failure to do so would result in a
miscarriage of justice. Olano, U.S. at , 113 S.Ct. at
1779. Left unchecked, a plain error results in a miscarriage of
justice only when the error "seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."
Id.
Even if we were to speculate that the district court
erred when it announced this sentence, the error is not the sort
which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. After Miro induced the public
to purchase bogus insurance, he pleaded guilty and was convicted
for sixteen counts of mail fraud. The district court announced
numerous reasons for this sentence. Among them was the thought
that the applicable Guidelines did not fairly account for the total
loss, which exceeded $20,000,000. The sentencing judge also noted,
in addressing the § 5K1.1 motion, that the sentence would generally
deter others from committing similar frauds. In short, consecutive
objection. In United States v. Kaufman,
874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir. 1989), we
suggested that a criminal defendant has no standing to argue the specialty
doctrine when the asylum state has failed to raise an objection to the
proceeding. There is no indication that Spain has objected to Miro's sentence.
13
terms for pre-Guidelines and Guidelines counts were plainly within
the district court's discretion to impose. We are satisfied that
the record supports Miro's total sentence and are convinced that
the failure to correct Miro's asserted error will not result in a
"miscarriage of justice." We therefore decline his invitation to
vacate the sentence on the ground that it violated the doctrine of
specialty.6
E.
Miro finally contests his sentence as being excessive
when compared with others similarly situated. This argument need
not long detain us. In the first place, we are somewhat skeptical
of this argument insofar as there has been no showing that the
defendants with whom Miro would seek to align himself were
sentenced under the same or similar circumstances. That is, he has
failed to specify, which of those defendants, if any, were
sentenced for both pre-Guidelines and Guidelines offenses. There
likewise is no indication whether the members of Miro's "comparison
pool" played as significant a role as Miro himself. Finally, we
note that both the pre-Guidelines and the Guidelines sentences were
within the applicable statutory and Guidelines ranges. We
therefore hold that Miro has failed to show that his sentence was
disproportionately excessive when compared with others similarly
situated. See United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324, 1332 (5th
Cir. 1992) (rejecting disparity argument when defendant failed to
6
For the same reasons, we reject Miro's argument that the sentence
violated the plea agreement. The plea agreement simply incorporated the
limitations set forth by the extradition treaty.
14
establish that differing sentences were unwarranted).
III. Conclusion
Today we hold that Miro's consecutive sentences do not
violate Double Jeopardy. In addition, the district court correctly
declined to group all the mail fraud counts, and Miro has failed to
show how the denial of the downward departure violated any law.
Miro has not shown plain error with regard to his claim that he was
punished for exercising extradition rights. Lastly, the record
does not support Miro's argument that he received a sentence that
was disproportionately excessive when compared with others. Our
disposition of this case makes it unnecessary for us to consider
whether the district court should be disqualified in the event of
a remand. Miro's sentence is therefore
AFFIRMED.
15
