ROBERT R. REED, J.
This is an action to recover first-party insurance proceeds for
Plaintiff is the owner of a building located at 40 Prince Street in Manhattan that was allegedly damaged by a neighboring construction project in or around October 2014. Plaintiff alleges that the rear wall of the neighboring building provided lateral support to the east exterior wall of plaintiff's building, and when that rear wall was demolished, plaintiff's building suffered structural movement and damage.
Defendant National Union issued a property insurance policy, policy No. BB014917749-02, providing coverage for "direct physical loss of damage to" plaintiff's premises. Plaintiff alleges that it made a claim for coverage under the policy and that it has otherwise complied with all of the policy's terms and conditions for coverage, but that National Union has acted in bad faith by making unreasonable and burdensome requests for information and by failing to provide a coverage determination. Plaintiff alleges that National Union's actions have forced it to incur substantial costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees.
The original complaint alleged a cause of action for breach of the policy and a second cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, by which plaintiff sought to recover consequential damages "including, without limitation, prejudgment interest on the amount owed under the Policy, and the attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements incurred by DK Property in enforcing its rights as a consequence of National Union's bad faith conduct" (complaint ¶ 36). National Union moved to dismiss the second cause of action, arguing that it was duplicative of the breach of contract claim. The carrier also argued that the complaint contained insufficient allegations to support plaintiff's demand for consequential damages, particularly the request for attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements. By order dated June 16, 2017, this court granted the motion. The dismissal, however, was "without prejudice, specifically for plaintiff to replead allegations that are specific in nature as to the consequential damages being sought and the legal underpinning for bad faith claims with respect to the insurer's investigation thus far."
The amended complaint also alleges that National Union's delay and unreasonable demands for information and inspections of the premises have caused plaintiff to incur certain other expenses. In this regard, the amended complaint alleges:
National Union again moves for partial dismissal of the amended complaint, arguing that plaintiff's attempt to cure the pleading deficiencies that plagued its original complaint
National Union argues that New York courts do not, in the first-party insurance context, recognize a separate, independent, non-contractual cause of action for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing or for "bad faith claims handling." Plaintiff argues to the contrary. The case law on this issue, unfortunately, is not a model of clarity.
In support of National Union's position, just last December, the First Department ruled that "[t]here is no independent cause of action for bad faith breach of insurance contract arising from an insurer's failure to perform its obligations under an insurance contract" (Head v Emblem Health, 156 A.D.3d 424, 424-425 [1st Dept 2017], citing Orient Overseas Assoc. v XL Ins. Am., Inc., 132 A.D.3d 574, 577 [1st Dept 2015]; McGowan v Great N. Ins. Co., 78 A.D.3d 1137, 1137 [2d Dept 2010]). However, in the Orient Overseas case, the First Department was careful to distinguish cases where the insured had asserted, not a tort claim, but a separate claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (132 AD3d at 576). Likewise, the holding of the other case cited by the First Department, McGowan v Great N. Ins. Co., was that "[t]here is no separate cause of action in tort for an insurer's failure to perform its obligations under an insurance contract" (78 AD3d at 1137 [emphasis added]). Indeed, the cause of action at issue in Head v Emblem Health was a tort claim seeking damages for the wrongful death and pain and suffering of an insured allegedly arising from his insurance company's bad faith in denying approval for inpatient detoxification treatment for substance abuse.
Other cases do recognize a separate contract-based cause of action against an insurer for breach of its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing as long as the claim is not wholly duplicative of the insured's claim for breach of the policy (see 25 Bay Terrace Assoc., L.P. v Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 144 A.D.3d 665, 668 [2d Dept 2016]; Gutierrez v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 136 A.D.3d 975, 976-977 [2d Dept 2016]; see also Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 238 F.Supp.3d 314, 324-325 [ND NY 2017]). Both of the Second Department cases cited above relied on Bi-Economy Mkt., Inc. v Harleysville Ins. Co. of
Plaintiff's second cause of action is not duplicative of the breach of contract claim. In the first cause of action, plaintiff alleges that National Union has breached its obligations under the policy by refusing to acknowledge coverage for plaintiff's property loss, and seeks the coverage it is owed under the policy.
Even were the second cause of action improper as its own separate cause of action, several courts have held that an insured may be entitled to consequential damages on its breach of contract claim, beyond the limits of the policy, based on the insurer's bad faith (Acquista v New York Life Ins. Co., 285 A.D.2d 73, 82 [1st Dept 2001] ["while plaintiff's cause of action alleging bad faith conduct on the part of the insurer cannot stand as a distinct tort cause of action, we conclude that its allegations may be employed to interpose a claim for consequential
In this court's view, plaintiff has properly segregated out its claim for coverage under the policy and the bases for its claim for consequential damages in two separate causes of action. Thus, the court declines to dismiss the second cause of action, but dismisses the claim for consequential damages in the first cause of action.
Plaintiff must allege and prove that the type of consequential damages it seeks were reasonably contemplated by the parties prior to contracting (Bi-Economy Mkt., Inc. v Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 10 NY3d at 192; Panasia Estates, Inc. v Hudson Ins. Co., 10 N.Y.3d 200, 203 [2008]). To make this determination, courts look to "what liability the defendant fairly may be supposed to have assumed consciously, or to have warranted the plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed, when the contract was made" (Bi-Economy, 10 NY3d at 193 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
Here, the amended complaint alleges only in a general conclusory fashion that "consequential damages for bad faith breach of the Policy were reasonably contemplated by DK Property and National Union at the time they entered into the Policy" (amended complaint ¶ 51). Plaintiff's pleading does not, as was alleged in the complaint in Sikarevich Family L.P. v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (30 F Supp 3d at 173), allege that the particular types of consequential damages sought, i.e., attorneys' fees, engineering fees, cost of monitoring services, cost of mitigation of water damages, painting repairs, and lost rent, were a natural and probable result of National Union's breach of its duty of good faith.
With the exception of attorneys' fees, discussed more fully below, some of the damages plaintiff seeks appear more in the nature of a property damage loss, such as painting and water mitigation. And since National Union issued only coverage for property loss, not business interruption coverage, as was the case in Bi-Economy Mkt., Inc. v Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y. (10 NY3d at 191), the claim for lost rents and inability to increase
As for the recovery of attorneys' fees, the amended complaint appears to be making a claim for two different types of attorneys' fees and costs: (1) the legal fees and other costs necessitated by plaintiff having to commence a separate lawsuit against the tortfeasors for damages; and (2) the legal fees and costs in prosecuting this action for insurance coverage (see amended complaint ¶¶ 20, 37, 50). The first type of legal fees and costs may be considered as part of plaintiff's reasonably foreseeable damages resulting from National Union's bad faith in delaying resolution of plaintiff's property loss claim (accord Panasia Estates, Inc. v Hudson Ins. Co., 2006 NY Slip Op 30352[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2006], affd 39 A.D.3d 343 [1st Dept 2007], affd 10 N.Y.3d 200 [2008]), assuming plaintiff prevails on liability and submits appropriate proof of its damages at trial.
As for plaintiff recovering its legal fees in this action, it has long been held that an insured may not recover the legal fees it incurs in bringing an action to settle its rights in an insurance policy (Mighty Midgets v Centennial Ins. Co., 47 N.Y.2d 12, 21 [1979]; Pandarakalam v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 137 A.D.3d 1234, 1236 [2d Dept 2016]). However, a narrow exception exists where the insured can prove that the carrier had no arguable basis to challenge its claim and can further show that no reasonable carrier would, under the given facts, challenge the claim (Sukup v State of New York, 19 N.Y.2d 519, 522 [1967]; Wurm v Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 308 A.D.2d 324, 329-330 [1st Dept 2003]; Greenburgh Eleven Union Free School Dist. v National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 304 A.D.2d 334, 336-337 [1st Dept 2003]). Accepting all of the allegations of the amended complaint as true, particularly the claim that National Union's own engineer agreed, in November 2016, that the negligent design and construction of the neighboring building was the source of distress to plaintiff's building, the amended complaint sufficiently alleges a claim for the recovery of plaintiff's attorneys' fees in prosecuting this action.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint is granted to the extent of dismissing the demand for consequential damages in the first cause of action and the demand for all consequential damages in the second cause of action, with the exception of the demand for attorneys' fees and other legal costs.