Filed: Sep. 18, 1995
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for the Fifth Circuit _ No. 95-10240 Summary Calendar _ ANGELO DEWELL BRANCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (3:89cv02246) _ (September 28, 1995) Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:1 Angelo Dewell Branch, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the district court's dismissal of his suit
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for the Fifth Circuit _ No. 95-10240 Summary Calendar _ ANGELO DEWELL BRANCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (3:89cv02246) _ (September 28, 1995) Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:1 Angelo Dewell Branch, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the district court's dismissal of his suit a..
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the Fifth Circuit
_____________________________________
No. 95-10240
Summary Calendar
_____________________________________
ANGELO DEWELL BRANCH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
______________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:89cv02246)
______________________________________________________
(September 28, 1995)
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Angelo Dewell Branch, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
appeals the district court's dismissal of his suit against Dallas
County Police Officer T.L. Little and Dallas County Sheriff Jim
Bowles. Branch, a Texas prison inmate, sought a declaratory
judgment and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he was
arrested and detained without probable cause. The court granted
summary judgment to Little on the basis of qualified immunity and
dismissed the suit against Bowles on the basis of limitations.
1
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
Branch also appeals the court's denial of his motion for partial
summary judgment against Little. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Officer Little spotted Branch walking in the same area that a
murder was committed one week earlier. Little knew of an
eyewitness's description of the murder suspect: African-American
male, 6 feet tall, slim build (155-175 pounds), 23 to 28 years old,
wearing a white dress shirt and dark dress pants. Little described
Branch as "a slim black male, weighing between 155 and 175 pounds,
appearing to be between the age of 23 to 28 years. His hair was
not long and he was wearing a white dress shirt and dark dress
pants." Branch stared intently at Officer Little when he drove
past. Little stopped the car, stepped out, and asked Branch where
he was going. Branch responded that he was going to a homeless
shelter in the area and showed identification to Little. Little
cleared Branch's identification with police dispatch and then
handcuffed him, patted him down, and drove him to the police
station.2
The date of Branch's arrest was October 31, 1987. He filed
suit against Little and the City of Dallas on September 1, 1989.
On February 15, 1990, the court dismissed the City from the case
and held Branch's suit against Little in abeyance for nine months
so that Branch could exhaust state habeas corpus remedies.
Subsequently, the court dismissed the suit against Little without
2
The murder eyewitness identified Branch in a photographic lineup
later that evening. A jury then convicted Branch of the murder.
2
prejudice. After Branch exhausted his state and federal habeas
remedies, the district court reopened his case on February 9, 1993.
The court then allowed Branch to file an amended complaint, in
which he named Bowles as a defendant.
DISCUSSION
We review a district court's dismissal of a case under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12 or grant of summary judgment under Rule
56 de novo. Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots' Ass'n, 987 F.2d
278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993); Weyant v. Acceptance Ins. Co.,
917 F.2d
209, 212 (5th Cir. 1990).
I.
The district court granted summary judgment to Little on the
basis of qualified immunity. The court determined that a material
issue of fact existed concerning whether Branch consented to his
transportation to the police station for further questioning.
Nevertheless, the court held that Little was entitled to qualified
immunity because a reasonable officer could have believed that he
had probable cause to make the arrest.
Because Branch alleges the violation of a clearly established
constitutional right))the right to be free from arrest without
probable cause))we consider whether Little's arrest of Branch was
objectively reasonable as measured by the law existing at the time
of the arrest. See Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 105, 108
(5th Cir. 1993). An officer has probable cause to arrest when he
knows of reasonably trustworthy information that would cause a
reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being
3
committed. United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 739 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied,
479 U.S. 950 (1986). We analyze probable cause under
the totality of the circumstances, and the officer's belief need
not be correct nor more likely true than false. United States v.
Antone,
753 F.2d 1301, 1304 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 818
(1985).
A reasonable officer in Officer Little's shoes could believe
that he was justified in arresting Branch. Little knew of the
eyewitness's description of the murder suspect, and Branch closely
matched that description. Further, Little spotted Branch walking
near the site of the murder, and Branch glared at Little when he
drove past. We agree with the district court that Officer Little's
arrest of Branch was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances.3
II.
The district court dismissed Branch's suit against Bowles on
account of limitations. Since no federal statute of limitations
exists for § 1983 actions, we borrow the forum state's general
personal injury limitations period. Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438,
439 (5th Cir. 1990). The applicable period in Texas is two years.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a) (West 1986). Both parties
agree that the cause of action accrued on the day of the arrest.
Without tolling, therefore, the limitations period for suit against
Bowles expired on October 31, 1989.
3
Because we agree with the district court on the issue of
qualified immunity, we need not consider the court's denial of
Branch's motion for partial summary judgment.
4
Branch first argues that the district court's order holding
the case in abeyance tolled the limitations period. The district
court's order, however, was entered months after the limitations
period had expired. Consequently, the district court's order could
not toll the limitations period.
Branch also argues that his amended complaint, because he
filed it before Little filed his original answer, relates back to
the date the complaint was filed. When a party names a new party
in an amended complaint, the amended complaint relates back to the
date of the original pleading when the named party "knew or should
have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the
proper party, the action would have brought against the party."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3)(B). Branch named Bowles as a new and
additional defendant to the suit. Branch has not pointed to any
mistake on his part concerning the identity of the proper party.
Consequently, his amended complaint does not relate back to his
original pleading, so his claims against Bowles are barred by
limitations.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's actions are
AFFIRMED.
5
