Filed: Jul. 11, 1996
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit _ No. 95-20584 _ NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS SCURLOCK PERMIAN CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Texas (CA-H-93-182) _ July 2, 1996 Before GARWOOD, DAVIS, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges. DAVIS, Circuit Judge:* National Steel Corporation (National) sued Scurlock Permian Corporation seeking to recover lost Department of Energy (DOE) refunds because
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit _ No. 95-20584 _ NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS SCURLOCK PERMIAN CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Texas (CA-H-93-182) _ July 2, 1996 Before GARWOOD, DAVIS, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges. DAVIS, Circuit Judge:* National Steel Corporation (National) sued Scurlock Permian Corporation seeking to recover lost Department of Energy (DOE) refunds because d..
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
___________________________
No. 95-20584
___________________________
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
SCURLOCK PERMIAN CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
(CA-H-93-182)
____________________________________________________
July 2, 1996
Before GARWOOD, DAVIS, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
DAVIS, Circuit Judge:*
National Steel Corporation (National) sued Scurlock Permian
Corporation seeking to recover lost Department of Energy (DOE)
refunds because defendant's predecessor-in-interest (Permian) had
negligently waived National's rights to those refunds.1 After a
three-day bench trial, the district court issued a take-nothing
judgement against National. We affirm.
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
1
National also alleged breach of fiduciary duty, but
abandoned this argument on appeal. This argument, therefore, is
not before us.
I.
This case arises from the interplay between two restitution
programs instituted by the DOE to distribute sums collected from
oil producers which had overcharged users in violation of DOE
regulations. The DOE established the first program, known as the
Subpart V program, in 1979. See 10 C.F.R. Part 205, Subpart V.
Under this program, the DOE was to place in escrow sums it
collected in enforcement actions. Petroleum end-users injured by
producer overcharges could then seek restitution by filing claims
against the fund. The second program, the Surface Transporters
Stripper Well Escrow Fund (Stripper Fund), was one of several
escrows created pursuant to the settlement of In re Department of
Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litigation, a massive interpleader
action. See In re Dep’t of Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litig.,
653 F. Supp. 108 (D. Kan 1986). The Stripper Well settlement
resolved claims for several types of refunds, including refunds
under the Subpart V program. A successful Stripper Fund claimant,
therefore, was required to withdraw “all covered claims for funds
based upon Alleged Crude Oil Violations” including Subpart V
claims.
On September 12, 1986, Permian executed a Stripper Fund claim
form which included a waiver and release. Permian agreed to forego
“all [its] existing and future claims” under various federal
restitution programs, including Subpart V. This form also provided
that it was “binding upon the Grantor [Permian], its parents,
subsidiaries, affiliates, successors and assigns.” It defined its
2
terms as having the same meaning as those used in the settlement
agreement. And it provided that execution of the claim form was the
equivalent of signing the Stripper Well settlement. Based on this
language and on the documents they received in the DOE’s Stripper
Well Information Packet, Permian officials understood that the
company was waiving its own claims to the listed restitution
programs, including Subpart V funds, and that Permian’s “parents,
subsidiaries, affiliates, successors and assigns” were bound by
Permian’s release of Permian’s own claims. The DOE, a federal
district court, and the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals have
since construed the Stripper Fund claim form very differently. The
current interpretation is that the Grantor waives not only its
claims for Subpart V refunds but also the claims of its related
entities, including “affiliates,” even when the affiliates’ claims
relate to completely separate purchases of overpriced fuel. E.g.,
Mid-America Dairyman, Inc. v. Herrington,
878 F.2d 1448 (Temp.
Emer. Crt. App. 1988). In 1986, both the appellant, National
Steel, and Permian were subsidiaries of the same corporation,
National Intergroup, Inc. National Steel and Permian were
therefore "affiliates" as that term is defined in the Stripper Well
settlement agreement.
Four and a half years after Permian had executed the Stripper
Fund claim form, the DOE denied Subpart V claims filed by National
Steel. The DOE explained that National Steel no longer was
entitled to Subpart V refunds because the claim form Permian had
executed wiped out the Subpart V rights of Permian's affiliates,
3
including rights belonging to National Steel.
National Steel responded by filing suit against Scurlock
Permian Corporation to recover for the Subpart V refunds National
had lost. National Steel alleged that Permian had negligently
relinquished National Steel's claims by signing the DOE claim form.
After a three-day trial, the district court rejected National’s
claims. The district court accepted the DOE's interpretation of
the claim form and concluded that Permian had waived National’s
rights. The court, nonetheless, determined that Permian owed no
duty of reasonable care to National in this circumstance. The
court found further that, even if Permian owed a duty to National
Steel, Permian had breached no duty. The district court
specifically found that Permian attorneys and agents had acted as
prudent persons would in the management of their own businesses.
Finally, the court determined that the statute of limitations
barred National’s suit.
II.
Although this case presents difficult duty and limitations
issues, we need not address them. The district court found that,
even if Permian did owe its one-time affiliate a duty of reasonable
care in this circumstance, it did not breach this duty. This
finding is not clearly erroneous.
Permian employees did not interpret the Stripper Fund claim
form as waiving its related entities’ rights to DOE refunds, unless
the refunds related to the same transactions on which Permian had
4
based its claim.2 This alleged mistake by Permian officials,
however, does not establish that they acted unreasonably. The
release provision in the claim form provided that “Grantor hereby
releases, and waives all Grantor’s existing and future claims.”
And the information letter included in the DOE’s Stripper Well
Refund Information Packet stated that “by receiving a refund from
any of the Stripper Well escrows you waive your right to receive a
refund from other crude oil overcharge funds.” At the time Permian
submitted its Stripper Fund claim form, no court had interpreted
the document as waiving affiliates’ Subpart V rights. Under the
circumstances, the district court did not clearly err in finding
that Permian employees were not negligent in failing to predict the
ultimate interpretation of these provisions.
In sum, the district court did not commit clear error in
finding that Permian officials acted reasonably.
AFFIRMED.
2
Indeed it is not clear to us how Permian would have the
power to waive rights of a separate entity, National.
5