IRVING, P.J., for the Court:
¶ 1. A group of concerned citizens (the "Foster Group") appeared before the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the City of Ruleville, Mississippi (the City), to contest garbage-service fee increases and the alleged use of city equipment to dig private graves. The City refused to take corrective action, and the Foster Group filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Sunflower County on March 26, 2007. The Foster Group sued the mayor and members of the board in their individual and official capacities. On July 8, 2008, the chancery court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
¶ 2. Because the Foster Group failed to perfect its appeal within the time limitation set forth in section 11-51-75, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Accordingly, we vacate the circuit court's judgment and dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
¶ 3. In 2003, the City entered into a garbage-collection contract. The contract provided for residential garbage collection at a rate of $10.75 per household. In 2004, the board approved a rate increase of $.75, for a cost of $11.50 per household. However, rates were actually increased by $1.75 per household. In 2005, fees were again increased by $2.00, for a cost of $14.50 per household. According to the Foster Group, these rate increases were not properly approved by the board or noticed to the public. The Foster Group voiced its concern regarding the rate increases
¶ 4. In the complaint filed in circuit court, the Foster Group made the same allegation that it had made in the complaint filed in the chancery court regarding the alleged illegal use of the City's backhoe, contending that the use of the City's backhoe to dig private graves constituted a donation in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 21-17-5(2)(g) (Rev. 2007). Additionally, the Foster Group alleged that the garbage-fee increases were unauthorized and constituted illegal expenditures under Mississippi Code Annotated section 31-7-57 (Rev.2010). The defendants again filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. In their motion, the defendants argued that because the Foster Group's claim was an appeal of a municipal action, it was required to proceed under section 11-51-75. The defendants further argued that since the Foster Group failed to initiate its action within the time limitation set forth in section 11-51-75, the City's decision became final, and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction.
¶ 5. The circuit court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred the Foster Group from re-litigating the same issues in circuit court. Even if those doctrines did not apply, the circuit court held that the Foster Group had failed to prove that genuine issues of material fact existed.
¶ 6. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issues.
¶ 7. Although the Foster Group raises three issues on appeal, we only find it necessary to address whether the case is properly before this Court. "Jurisdiction is a question of law, which [an appellate court] reviews de novo." Derr Plantation, Inc. v. Swarek, 14 So.3d 711, 715 (¶ 8) (Miss.2009) (quoting Issaquena Warren Counties Land Co. v. Warren County, 996 So.2d 747, 749 (¶ 5) (Miss.2008)).
¶ 8. The Foster Group is challenging a municipal action; therefore, the proper avenue for appeal is section 11-51-75, which provides in pertinent part:
The Mississippi Supreme Court has consistently held that the statute's ten-day time limit is both "mandatory and jurisdictional." Ball v. Mayor and Bd. of Aldermen of City of Natchez, 983 So.2d 295, 299 (¶ 8) (Miss.2008); Newell v. Jones County, 731 So.2d 580, 582 (¶ 10) (Miss.1999). Therefore, "[w]here an appeal is not perfected within the statutory time constraints[,] no jurisdiction is conferred on the appellate court[,] and the untimely action should be dismissed." Newell, 731 So.2d at 582 (¶ 10) (citing Moore v. Sanders, 569 So.2d 1148, 1150 (Miss.1990)).
¶ 9. In Newell, a case with nearly identical facts, the Jones County Board of Supervisors entered into a solid-waste-collection contract. Id. at 580 (¶¶ 2-3). A group of residents filed a complaint challenging the board of supervisors' decision to enter into the contract. Id. at (¶ 4). Jones County filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the residents' appeal was governed by section 11-51-75 and its ten-day time limit. Id. at 580 (¶ 5). The residents filed their complaint nearly three months after the board of supervisors entered into the contract. Id. at 582 (¶ 10). Therefore, the residents' appeal was untimely. Id. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the residents appealed. Id. at (¶ 6). Our supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision and held that "[w]here an appeal is not perfected within the statutory time constraints[,] no jurisdiction is conferred on the appellate court[,] and the untimely action should be dismissed." Id. at 582 (¶ 10) (citing Moore, 569 So.2d at 1150).
¶ 10. In this case, the Foster Group also failed to file its appeal within the time constraints of section 11-51-75, the exclusive avenue for appealing municipal-authority decisions. The rate increases complained of occurred in 2004 and 2005, but the Foster Group waited until 2007, years beyond the ten-day deadline, to file its first complaint. Therefore, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to grant summary judgment. Instead, the circuit court should have dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. This is true even though the Foster Group proceeded under sections 31-7-57
¶ 11.
LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.