Filed: Jul. 08, 2004
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Will. v . London No. 03-5573 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0215P (6th Cir.) Utility Comm’n, et al. File Name: 04a0215p.06 _ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS COUNSEL FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ARGUED: Christopher D. Miller, RAMBICURE, MILLER _ & PISACANO, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Charles D. Cole, STURGILL, TURNER, BARKER & MALONEY, DEWEY MICHAEL WILLIAMS, X Lexington, Kentucky, Robert L. Roark, WALTHER, Plaintiff-
Summary: RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Will. v . London No. 03-5573 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0215P (6th Cir.) Utility Comm’n, et al. File Name: 04a0215p.06 _ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS COUNSEL FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ARGUED: Christopher D. Miller, RAMBICURE, MILLER _ & PISACANO, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Charles D. Cole, STURGILL, TURNER, BARKER & MALONEY, DEWEY MICHAEL WILLIAMS, X Lexington, Kentucky, Robert L. Roark, WALTHER, Plaintiff-A..
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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Will. v. London No. 03-5573
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0215P (6th Cir.) Utility Comm’n, et al.
File Name: 04a0215p.06
_________________
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS COUNSEL
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ARGUED: Christopher D. Miller, RAMBICURE, MILLER
_________________ & PISACANO, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Charles
D. Cole, STURGILL, TURNER, BARKER & MALONEY,
DEWEY MICHAEL WILLIAMS, X Lexington, Kentucky, Robert L. Roark, WALTHER,
Plaintiff-Appellant, - ROARK, GAY & TODD, Lexington, Kentucky, for
- Appellees. ON BRIEF: Christopher D. Miller, William C.
- No. 03-5573 Rambicure, RAMBICURE, MILLER & PISACANO,
v. - Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Charles D. Cole,
> Douglas L. McSwain, STURGILL, TURNER, BARKER &
,
LONDON UTILITY - MALONEY, Lexington, Kentucky, Robert L. Roark,
COMMISSION , et al., - LaDonna L. Koebel, WALTHER, ROARK, GAY & TODD,
Defendants-Appellees. - Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellees.
- _________________
N
Appeal from the United States District Court OPINION
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at London. _________________
No. 01-00161—William O. Bertelsman, District Judge.
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Dewey Michael
Argued: June 10, 2004 Williams appeals from the adverse grant of summary
judgment on his breach-of-contract and disability-
Decided and Filed: July 8, 2004 discrimination claims, arising from his employment as
superintendent of the London Utility Commission. Mr.
Before: MARTIN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; Williams alleges that the district court erred: (1) in holding
WILLIAMS, Senior District Judge.* that Mr. Williams's employment agreement was void from its
inception because the London Utility Commission exceeded
its statutory authority by creating the contract without the
approval of the Mayor; and (2) in holding that Mr. Williams
did not prove that the City of London's reasons for firing him
were pretext for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities
Act. Finding no error, we affirm.
*
The Honorable Glen M. Williams, Senior United States District
Judge for the W estern D istrict of V irginia, sitting by designation.
1
No. 03-5573 Williams v. London 3 4 Will. v. London No. 03-5573
Utility Comm’n, et al. Utility Comm’n, et al.
I. alleged that Mr. Williams was upset by the removal of his
authority and refused to solve petty employment issues on his
The London Utility Commission of London, Kentucky, own. The Mayor also believed that Mr. Williams had lied to
hired Mr. Williams in late 1992. In March 1998, the Utility him, but he was unable to identify a specific instance in which
Commission entered into an employment contract with Mr. Mr. Williams lied.
Williams. At the time that the contract was signed, both the
Utility Commission and Mr. Williams knew that the contract On February 22, 2001, one of the London Utility
might be invalid if the Utility Commission lacked authority Commissioners told Mr. Williams that he must attend a
to enter into the agreement. meeting with Mayor Smith. The Commissioner told Mr.
Williams that he was going to be fired. At the meeting with
The contract provided that Mr. Williams would be the mayor, the subject of Mr. Williams's health arose. At the
employed for a three-year term, and the contract would renew conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Williams and the Mayor
automatically for another three-year term unless one party agreed that Mr. Williams could stay until June 2001, so that
gave the other 90-days written notice of termination, which he could apply for disability benefits. Subsequently, Mr.
the defendants concede was not given. The contract also Williams sent a letter to the Mayor stating that he had a valid
provided that Mr. Williams could be removed only for cause contract and that the Mayor did not have the power to
by the Utility Commission. The agreement was signed by the terminate him. After receipt of this letter, Mayor Smith
Commissioners, but not signed by Mayor Smith. terminated Mr. Williams on February 28, 2001.
In early 2001, Mayor Smith1 decided to terminate Mr. Mr. Williams filed suit in the district court claiming that he
Williams. He has given various reasons for this decision, suffered disability discrimination and age discrimination.3
including: Mr. Williams's inability to deal with personnel Mr. Williams also brought due process claims under
problems on his own, Mr. Williams's inability to get along 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law claims for breach of contract,
with customers and the public, and a complaint by Ken intentional interference with contractual rights, intentional
Wilson, a former employee.2 Mayor Smith also perceived infliction of emotional distress, and breach of the implied
that after the city passed Ordinance 981 (discussed below), covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court
Mr. Williams became obstinate and difficult. Mayor Smith granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims. Mr.
Williams appeals the section 1983 and state-law contract
claims and the disability-discrimination claim. He does not
1
Mayor Smith was elected in 1994.
appeal the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.
2
The district court states that Mayor Smith was mo tivated, at least in
part, by Ken Wilson's comp laint. However, the deposition of Mayor
Smith is directly contrary to this. Mayor Smith clearly states that this did
not motivate his decisio n to term inate Mr. W illiams. In fact, Ma yor Sm ith
believed that the letter of reprimand that was p laced in Mr. W illiams's file 3
was enough to de al with the situation. At the summary judgment stage, Although the age-discrim ination c laim was alleged in the complaint,
the district court is bound to view the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. W illiams did not contest summary judgment on this claim and does
the non-mo ving party, in this case Mr. W illiams. not appeal this issue.
No. 03-5573 Williams v. London 5 6 Will. v. London No. 03-5573
Utility Comm’n, et al. Utility Comm’n, et al.
II. or malfeasance in office." As noted by the district court,
Ordinance 344 appears as if it were organized to meet the
This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de strictures of section 96.530, rather than section 96.350.
novo. Lake v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 73 F.3d 1372, 1376
(6th Cir. 1996). In 1980, the Kentucky legislature passed the "Home Rule
Statutes." Section 83A.130(9) of the Kentucky Revised
We must first determine whether the London Utility Statutes provides that "[t]he mayor shall be the appointing
Commission had the power to enter into the contract with Mr. authority with the power to appoint and remove all city
Williams. Thus, we must examine the applicable Kentucky employees . . . except as tenure and terms of employment are
constitutional and statutory provisions, together with the protected by statute, ordinance or contract." Furthermore,
ordinances of the City of London. section 83A.020 provides that all ordinances which conflict
with the Home Rule Statutes are void.
In 1891, section 162 of the Kentucky Constitution was
adopted, which provides that "[n]o county, city, town or other The London Utility Commission hired Mr. Williams in
municipality shall ever be authorized or permitted to pay any 1992, and the parties entered into the employment contract in
claim created against it, under any agreement or contract question in 1998. In December 2000, the City of London
made without the express authorization or law, and all such passed Ordinance 981, which repealed Ordinance 344 and
unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void." reorganized the Utility Commission to align with the Home
Subsequently, in 1942, the Kentucky legislature passed Rule Statutes. Ordinance 981 states that the Utility
section 96.530 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, which Commission shall recommend to the mayor a person to
allows cities to create and operate light, heat, and power employ as superintendent. Acknowledging the Home Rule
plants. This statute allows for the establishment of a utility Statutes, Ordinance 981 also states that the "[m]ayor shall
commission as a separate corporate body with the power to make all decisions relating to employment[, including] hiring,
contract and the power to manage all employment issues. As lay-offs, terminations, and other similar decisions relating to
the district court noted, this statute specifically does not employment." Section 9 of Ordinance 981 states that the
include water commissions. In fact, in 1942, the Kentucky "Commission shall be bound under the terms of any previous
legislature also passed section 96.350 of the Kentucky contracts and/or agreements made and entered into by or on
Revised Statutes, which allows certain cities, including the behalf of the Commission that exist at the time of enactment."
City of London, to operate waterworks facilities. This statute
does not provide for a commission organized as a separate We agree with the district court that the contract was void
corporate body with control of its own employees as does from its inception. Mr. Williams was hired after the passage
section 96.530. of the Home Rule Statutes, which indicate that only the
mayor has the power to hire and fire city employees.
In 1948, the City of London passed Ordinance 344, which According to the Home Rule Statutes, any ordinances in
created the Utility Commission for water and sewers. This conflict with the Home Rule Statutes are void. Thus,
ordinance gave the Utility Commission the authority to hire Ordinance 344 was void, at least in part, upon the passage of
a project superintendent, who could be removed by the the Home Rule Statutes. Because Mr. Williams was hired
Commission "for inefficiency, neglect of duty, misfeasance after the passage of the Home Rule Statutes, Ordinance 344
No. 03-5573 Williams v. London 7 8 Will. v. London No. 03-5573
Utility Comm’n, et al. Utility Comm’n, et al.
was void, and the Commission did not have the power to shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the stated reasons are
make this contract; only the Mayor held such power. pretext. See Martin v. Barnesville Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 209 F.3d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 2000).
The London Utility Commission was not authorized by
statute to operate independently. Mr. Williams argues The district court assumed without deciding that Mr.
extensively that, as a matter of agency law, the Utility Williams could prove a prima facie case of discrimination and
Commission, and not the City of London, was his employer. that Mayor Smith could demonstrate legitimate non-
We do not find his arguments persuasive. Although factually discriminatory reasons for the discharge. However, the
it appears that the Utility Commission controlled Mr. district court concluded that Mr. Williams was unable to
Williams's activities and acted as his employer, if the Utility prove that the Mayor's reasons were pretext. We do not have
Commission does not have the statutory power to employ Mr. to reach the issue of pretext to resolve this claim because we
Williams in view of section 83A.130(9) of the Kentucky do not believe that Mr. Williams can prove a prima facie case
Revised Statutes, then he must be an employee of the City of of disability discrimination.
London. Because Mayor Smith has ultimate authority over
city employees, Mayor Smith had the power to terminate Mr. A prima facie case of disability discrimination requires that
Williams. the plaintiff prove he was qualified to perform his job
requirements with or without reasonable accommodation.
If Mr. Williams has no contract, he is an employee-at-will, Mr. Williams's employment was terminated on February 28,
has no property interest in his employment and can be fired 2001, and Mr. Williams applied for disability benefits under
for any reason or no reason at all (except for a discriminatory the Kentucky Retirement System on March 1, 2001, claiming
reason). Because we hold that Mr. Williams's contract was that he was totally disabled. It is incongruous that Mr.
void and no party raises the issue of ratification of the Williams was able to perform his job requirements when he
contract, we think that Mr. Williams was an employee-at-will was terminated on February 28, but he was unable to perform
and that his termination was proper. Therefore, we affirm the the same work as of March 1.
district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on
Mr. Williams's contract-related and due process claims. The Supreme Court has explained that
III. [a]n ADA plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she
is a "qualified individual with a disability" — that is, a
A prima facie case of disability discrimination requires the person "who with or without reasonable accommodation,
plaintiff to prove that: "(1) he is an individual with a can perform the essential functions" of her job.
disability; (2) he is 'otherwise qualified' to perform the job 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). And a plaintiff's sworn assertion
requirements, with or without reasonable accommodations; in an application for disability benefits that she is, for
and (3) he was discharged solely by reason of his handicap." example, "unable to work" will appear to negate an
Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., 287 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2002). If essential element of her ADA case — at least if she does
the plaintiff can prove a prima facie case, then the burden not offer a sufficient explanation. For that reason, we
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non- hold that an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore the
discriminatory reason for the termination. Then, the burden apparent contradiction that arises out of the earlier []
No. 03-5573 Williams v. London 9
10 Will. v. London No. 03-5573
Utility Comm’n, et al. Utility Comm’n, et al.
disability claim. Rather, she must proffer a sufficient For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM the judgment of
explanation. the district court.
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806
(1999). This means that in order to survive a motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff's "explanation must be
sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that . . .
the plaintiff could nonetheless 'perform the essential
functions' of her job, with or without 'reasonable
accommodation.' "
Id. at 807.
Mr. Williams was terminated on February 28, and he
applied for disability benefits the very next day. Mr.
Williams subsequently filed suit, alleging that he was able to
perform his job requirements as of the date of his termination.
Mr. Williams has failed to offer sufficient evidence to explain
these contradictory statements. Mr. Williams argues that the
affidavit of Bobby Turner, M.D. explains the contradiction.
This affidavit states that "Mr. Williams' termination of
employment at or near the end of February 2001 had a
devastating effect upon him emotionally, which, in my
opinion, worsened his physical conditions." Furthermore, Dr.
Turner opined that "the termination and its emotionally
devastating effects upon Mr. Williams rendered him unable
to work when combined with his pre-existing physical
conditions." Accepting this statement as true, we do not think
that it provides a sufficient explanation for the contradictory
statements. Dr. Turner's statement was signed on April 25,
2001. While Mr. Williams's health may have declined to the
point where he became unable to work during this two-month
period, he provides no explanation for how his health
declined to the point of being unable to work on March 1,
2001, the date on which he filed for disability benefits and
one day after his termination. Because we hold that Mr.
Williams’s explanation of these contradictory statements was
insufficient, we affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment.
