ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

TERRENCE L. O'BRIEN, Circuit Judge.

This case involves the nearly ubiquitous claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and complaints about evidentiary rulings. Chad Nathan Harris, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se1 and in forma pauperis (ifp),2 wants to appeal from the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. The district court concluded he had not "made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). As that decision is not reasonably debatable, we deny his request for a certificate of appealability (COA) and dismiss this matter.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 24, 2005, Harris fatally shot Otto Reichel eight times. Present at the time of the shooting were Harris' girlfriend, Sarah Peters, and Reichel's roommate, Brett Myers. Both testified against Harris at trial.3 The jury found Harris guilty and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Harris filed a direct appeal. Relevant here, he argued he was prejudiced by the admission at trial of testimony about other crimes he committed, namely: (1) he had stolen the murder weapon and (2) he and Peters stole the van they used to flee to Texas two days after the murder. He also claimed the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because it was based on the uncorroborated testimony of Myers and Peters, who he alleged were both accomplices to the murder. Finally, Harris contended trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to impeach Peters with letters she sent Harris while they were in jail. In the letters, she disavowed many of the statements she made to the police, claimed the statements were made "under duress," blamed Myers for the murder and proclaimed Harris' innocence. (R. at 162.) Because the letters were not part of the record, Harris contemporaneously requested the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) order an evidentiary hearing on the claim. Harris attached the letters to his request.

The OCCA affirmed Harris' conviction on January 30, 2006. It determined the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting the stolen gun evidence because the evidence was relevant to show preparation. Because Harris had failed to object to the admission of the stolen van evidence, it reviewed for plain error and denied relief. It also rejected Harris' insufficiency of the evidence claim, finding the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient for a rational jury to have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, it found Peters not to be an accomplice to the murder, contrary to Harris' claim, so corroboration of her testimony was not required. The OCCA denied Harris' request for an evidentiary hearing, concluding he had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Peters with the letters.

On January 3, 2007, Harris filed a petition for post-conviction relief in state court. Among other things, he claimed trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to investigate which, in turn, left him unprepared to effectively cross-examine the State's witnesses and (2) eliciting evidence from Myers on cross-examination implicating Harris in another shooting. Harris also said appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal. He further argued he was denied the right to a fair trial when the prosecutor misstated the evidence in opening statements. Finally, he claimed newly discovered evidence demonstrated Myers had perjured himself at trial. That evidence consisted of a letter Harris' trial counsel received in April 2005 from a Richard Anderson. In the unsigned letter, Anderson claimed that while in a holding cell with "Brett" (presumably Myers) on June 21, 2004, he overheard Myers confess to killing "Otto." (R. at 46.) Myers also allegedly said Harris did not become involved until after the murder. Appellate counsel sent an investigator to speak to Anderson, who was unwilling to sign an affidavit attesting to the facts in the letter.

The trial court denied the petition and the OCCA affirmed on May 15, 2007. The OCCA determined the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims and prosecutorial misconduct claim could have been but were not raised on direct appeal and therefore were waived. It also concluded there was nothing in the appellate record indicating appellate counsel's representation was deficient or that Harris had been prejudiced by that representation. Finally, the court determined the newly discovered evidence did not entitle Harris to a new trial because Anderson was unwilling to sign an affidavit attesting to the facts in the letter. The OCCA concluded the new evidence was, at best, impeachment evidence and even if it had been introduced, it would not have changed the outcome of the trial.

On July 27, 2007, Harris filed a § 2254 petition raising four grounds. First, he realleged his ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims. He also, for the first time, claimed trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's misstatement of the evidence in opening statements and appellate counsel was ineffective for not allowing him sufficient time to review the opening brief and provide comments prior to it being filed. Second, Harris claimed prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecutor misstating the evidence in opening statements. Third, he alleged the admission of evidence concerning the stolen murder weapon and van deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Finally, Harris argued the newly discovered evidence demonstrated the State had obtained his conviction with perjured testimony and undermined the reliability of the jury's verdict. On September 12, 2007, Harris requested and obtained leave to file an amended § 2254 petition which added a fifth claim—the insufficiency of the evidence argument he had raised on direct appeal.

The State filed a motion to dismiss the fifth claim as time-barred. The district court granted the motion, concluding it was one day late and Harris had not demonstrated grounds for equitable tolling. In a separate order, the court also rejected Harris' remaining claims. It acknowledged Harris had, on direct appeal, raised his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel's failure to impeach Peters with her letters and requested an evidentiary hearing. It determined the OCCA's denial of an evidentiary hearing and its rejection of the claim on the merits were neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). It reasoned that even if counsel's performance was deficient, Harris failed to show prejudice, i.e., in light of the other evidence presented at trial, there was not a reasonably probability that but for the neglected impeachment the result of the proceeding would have been different.4

The district court analyzed the remaining ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims to determine whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise them on direct appeal. Because the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims lacked merit,5 the court determined the OCCA's rejection of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. As to Harris' claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to provide him a copy of the brief in time for him to review it and submit comments, the court determined he had not exhausted the claim but even if he had, Harris had failed to demonstrate the outcome of his appeal would have been different had he received a copy of the brief sooner.

The district court concluded the OCCA's resolution of Harris' newly discovered evidence claim as well as his claim that he was deprived of a fair trial by the admission of the stolen weapon and van evidence was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. As to the former, the state trial court had determined Anderson's letter lacked credibility, a finding which is entitled to deference. As to the latter, the court said the trial court had given a limiting instruction concerning the evidence's proper purpose and the stolen gun evidence was relevant to show preparation. Finally, the district court held it could not reach Harris' prosecutorial misconduct claim or the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims based on the failure to investigate and the improper cross-examination of Myers because the OCCA had rejected them on an independent and adequate state procedural ground and Harris had failed to show either cause and prejudice for the default or a fundamental miscarriage of justice resulting from the failure to consider the claims.

II. DISCUSSION

A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to our review of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). We will issue a COA "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, an applicant must demonstrate "that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (quotations omitted). "When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Id.

We have thoroughly reviewed the entire record, the district court's order, as well as Harris' combined opening brief and request for a COA. While we disagree with the district court that the fifth claim was untimely,6 we nevertheless conclude the OCCA's resolution of that claim—insufficiency of the evidence—was not "contrary to, or involve[ ] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" nor did it "result[ ] in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We agree with the district court's adjudication of the remaining claims as they are either procedurally barred or Harris failed to show the OCCA's resolution of them satisfied the "highly deferential" § 2254(d) standard, which is "doubly so" when applied to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (quotations omitted).

We DENY a COA and DISMISS this matter. We DENY Harris's request for appointment of counsel.