Justice SAYLOR.
In this interlocutory appeal by permission, we consider the contours of the Board of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction pertaining to procurement litigation against Commonwealth agencies. More specifically, we are asked to determine whether such jurisdiction forecloses original jurisdiction proceedings in the Commonwealth Court, challenging a Commonwealth agency's cancellation of a request for proposals and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
The procurement of supplies, services, and construction for the public in Pennsylvania is governed by the Commonwealth Procurement Code.
The Procurement Code, as substantially rewritten via 2002 amendments,
Also of special relevance here, Section 521 of the Procurement Code allows for cancellation of solicitations by a Commonwealth agency or purchasing agent, as follows:
62 Pa.C.S. § 521 (emphasis added). Moreover, the right of protest is expressly cabined so as to exclude cancellations per Section 521. See id. § 1711.1(a) (establishing a right of protest for bidders, offerors, and certain others aggrieved in connection with the solicitation or award of a contract, "except as provided in section 521 (relating to cancellation of invitations for bids or requests for proposals)").
The 2002 amendments to the Procurement Code also reconstituted the Board of Claims,
Id. § 1724(d).
In 2010, DGS, on behalf of the Department of Revenue, issued a request for proposals for design, development, implementation, and maintenance of a computer control system to monitor slot machines at gaming venues across the Commonwealth. See 62 Pa.C.S. § 513(b).
Several months later, an agreement on contract terms was reached. Draft contract documents were exchanged between DGS and SGI, and DGS's Office of Chief
Petition for Preliminary Injunction, Ex. D (emphasis added). SGI returned a signature page executed by its president, along with the following observation: "As you confirmed, the Commonwealth will affix the necessary signatures electronically and send a fully executed copy back to [SGI]." Id., Ex. E.
The Commonwealth signature and approval process proceeded at least to the stage of development where the cover contract was signed by the Secretary of the Department of Revenue, but the documents were not yet approved as to form and legality by the Offices of General Counsel and Attorney General. In terms of the effectiveness of the contract documents, a contract term was that SGI "must be granted a manufacturer's license from the [Gaming Control] Board as a condition precedent to the commencement of this Contract." IT Contract Terms and Conditions ¶ 1(d).
GTECH was informed that the contract had been awarded to SGI and submitted a protest in May 2011. See 62 Pa.C.S. § 1711.1(b). Two months later, DGS's Deputy Secretary for Administration issued a final determination denying GTECH's protest, in material part, with prejudice. See id. § 1711.1(f). GTECH appealed from the determination, see id. § 1711.1(g), and requested, among other things, that the request for proposals be cancelled.
Subsequently, SGI commenced an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Departments of Revenue and General Services in the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction and petitioned for a preliminary injunction. SGI invoked the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction under Section 761(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a) ("The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings ... [a]gainst the Commonwealth government," subject to enumerated exceptions).
In the substantive averments of the complaint, SGI advanced two counts, both entitled "Violation of 62 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 521 (Declaratory Judgment)." Complaint at 10, 13. SGI alleged that DGS and SGI had executed an enforceable contract, and, therefore, cancellation was not available under Section 521. See 62 Pa. C.S. § 521 (establishing the right of best-interests cancellation "at any time prior to the time a contract is executed by all parties"). To the extent the contract was not executed by all necessary persons, parties, or entities, SGI asserted, DGS's cancellation was unauthorized, arbitrary, and capricious. In this regard, it was SGI's position that the cancellation derived from a meritless and abusive protest pursued by GTECH, and that the cancellation plainly was not in the best interests of the Commonwealth in any event, given SGI's superior and more cost-efficient proposal. The
GTECH intervened in the proceedings before the Commonwealth Court, and both it and the Commonwealth agencies involved filed preliminary objections. Among other things, these asserted that SGI's claims sounded in contract and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Claims. According to the Commonwealth agencies and GTECH, SGI's assertion of a statutory violation (of Section 521) was obfuscatory, in that the complaint hinged on contract execution. See, e.g., Brief of GTECH in Support of Its Preliminary Objections in Scientific Games Int'l, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 34 A.3d 307 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011) (No. 380 MD 2011), at 9 (asserting that "only if SGI had an enforceable and fully executed contract with the Commonwealth could DGS possibly have violated Section 521 of the Procurement Code when it cancelled the RFP and award," since Section 521 only permits cancellation prior to execution of a contract by all parties). In this regard, the Commonwealth agencies and GTECH stressed that longstanding decisions of this Court establish that the Board of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to decide claims arising from Commonwealth contracts, including the threshold question of whether an enforceable contract actually exists in the first instance. See Shovel Transfer & Storage, Inc. v. Simpson, 523 Pa. 235, 239-40, 565 A.2d 1153, 1155 (1989).
SGI's response to these contentions is summarized in its responsive brief as follows:
SGI's Brief in Opposition to Defendants/Respondents' Preliminary Objections in Scientific Games Int'l, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 34 A.3d 307 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011) (No. 380 MD 2011), at 1, 16. SGI also cited GTECH Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 965 A.2d 1276 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009), for the proposition that, when statutory law does not provide a remedy, equity will intervene to fashion one. See id. at 1286.
In a published decision, a Commonwealth Court panel overruled the preliminary objections. See Scientific Games Int'l, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 34 A.3d 307 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011).
Id.
The Commonwealth Court panel recognized that the Procurement Code provides a procedure for those who have attained
The panel also acknowledged that SGI's complaint, in effect, sought specific performance of the asserted contract with the Commonwealth, see id. at 308, and that this Court has long held that specific performance generally is not available as a remedy against the Commonwealth government. See, e.g., XPress Truck Lines, Inc. v. PLCB, 503 Pa. 399, 408, 469 A.2d 1000, 1004 (1983). Again, however, the panel interpreted the relevant holding as pertinent only to the former Board of Claims Act. The panel reasoned that the previous precedent did not apply:
Scientific Games, 34 A.3d at 315. Notably, the Commonwealth Court did not address the Procurement Code's prominent reaffirmation of sovereign immunity. See 62 Pa.C.S. § 1702.
Reargument was requested, which the Commonwealth Court refused; however, per Appellants' request, the panel ultimately certified its order for interlocutory appeal. This Court granted Appellants' petitions for permission to appeal centered on the jurisdictional question, while allowing the Board of Claims to file an amicus brief, which it has done.
In the briefing, Appellants maintain that the longstanding decisional law interpreting the Board of Claims Act (for example, the Shovel Transfer and XPress Truck opinions) pertains equally to the Procurement Code, and that, under such caselaw, the parties' factual dispute as to the existence of a contract belongs exclusively before the Board of Claims. Appellants observe that Section 1724(a)(1) of the Procurement Code is "substantively identical" with the core jurisdictional prescription of the former Board of Claims Act, and that this Court has continued to recognize the Board of Claims' "expansive jurisdiction to decide disputes concerning contracts involving the Commonwealth" in cases decided post-amendment. Empr's Ins. of Wausau v. PennDOT, 581 Pa. 381, 389 n. 7, 393, 865 A.2d 825, 830 n. 7, 833 (2005). Such jurisdiction, Appellants highlight, has historically included the power to decide whether a contract exists in the first instance. See supra note 11; Brief for Dep't of Rev. & DGS at 13 ("[B]oth this Court and the Commonwealth Court (with the exception of the decision at issue here) have fully embraced the concept
It is Appellants' position that Section 1724(d) changed nothing in this regard, but rather, merely protected the status quo relative to express and specific statutory remedies and procedures "as provided by law." 62 Pa.C.S. § 1724(d). In the absence of an express and specific provision, Appellants contend that Section 1724(d) simply does not apply. Accord New Foundations, 893 A.2d at 829-30.
Appellants explain that the requirement of an express and specific provision conferring jurisdiction is consonant with the Legislature's clear desire for sovereign immunity to apply in the Procurement Code setting, except as otherwise specifically provided. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310; 62 Pa.C.S. § 1702. In this regard, Appellants elaborate extensively on the interrelationship between sovereign immunity and attendant constraints on Commonwealth Court jurisdiction. Accord XPress Truck, 503 Pa. at 407-08, 469 A.2d at 1004 (explaining that the judicial decisions enforcing the limitations on the Commonwealth Court's jurisdiction to redress contract breaches involving a Commonwealth agency "are founded on the legislature's delegation of exclusive jurisdiction to hear contractual matters involving the Commonwealth to the Board of Claims, and the nature of that statute as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity"). According to Appellants, Section 1724(d) does not, by itself, constitute a specific waiver sufficient to provide for new causes of action where none previously existed. See, e.g., Brief for Dep't of Rev. & DGS at 16 ("This provision was not intended to, and by its plain language does not, create new jurisdiction or relief in any other forum, nor does it purport to overturn existing case law concerning a court['s] ability to order specific performance or mandatory injunctions.").
In terms of Section 521, Appellants maintain that it confers no rights whatsoever upon offerors such as SGI but, rather, merely permits the Commonwealth to cancel procurements. Indeed, Appellants note, the Procurement Code expressly removes from the protest procedure any right to challenge the cancellation of requests for proposals. See 62 Pa.C.S. § 1711.1(a). Appellants regard SGI's equity action as, essentially, an effort to make an end run around such express legislative intentions.
In its brief, SGI adopts the Commonwealth Court panel's position that jurisdiction was proper under Section 1724(d). See, e.g., Brief for SGI at 16 ("On its face, Section 1724(d) preserves parties' ability to invoke any grants of jurisdiction to any other tribunal that would extend to contract actions against Commonwealth agencies for nonmonetary relief."). In terms of the general grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Board of Claims contained in Section 1724(a), SGI draws a distinction between "claims" and "issues," positing that exclusive jurisdiction attaches to the former but not the latter. See id. ("By its express terms, Section 1724(a) confers jurisdiction upon the Board of Claims with respect to `claims,' not issues."). While recognizing that the Board of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction attaches to "claims arising from" contracts with Commonwealth agencies, SGI contends that such jurisdiction does not necessarily attach where a litigant merely raises "an issue as to a Commonwealth agency contract." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this regard, SGI relies on the following statement from Keenheel v. Commonwealth, 523 Pa. 223, 565 A.2d 1147 (1989): "The jurisdiction of the Board of Claims is not triggered simply because a contract may be involved in an action, rather the jurisdictional predicate is satisfied only when the claimant relies upon the provisions of that contract in asserting the claim against the Commonwealth." Id. at 227-28, 565 A.2d at 1149. Describing its own claims as "statutory" and "non-contract based," Brief for SGI at 18-19, SGI maintains that they fall outside the Board of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction. According to SGI, the substantive basis of its claims is "the limitations the Procurement Code imposes upon the Agencies [per Section 521], not rights arising under the contract." Id. at 19. SGI elaborates as follows:
Brief for SGI at 21; accord id. at 15 ("To the extent any contract issues are presented, they are subsidiary to the primary issue of whether the Agencies exceeded their statutory authority and may be addressed by the Commonwealth Court ancillary to its jurisdiction over the claims asserted.").
It is SGI's position that the resolution of "these statutory issues" falls squarely within the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction under Section 761(a) of the Judicial Code and the Declaratory Judgments Act. Id. at 19. Indeed, SGI contends, "[r]esponsibility for assuring that procurements proceed in accordance with law is vested in the Commonwealth Court
SGI's brief proceeds to an examination of the specific terms of Section 1724(d), which it describes as "broadly and generically phrased" and as lacking in words of exclusion. Brief for SGI at 23-24. SGI reasons that such features convey that the Legislature meant the provision to be interpreted very broadly, to encompass all jurisdictional grants in other tribunals relative to nonmonetary relief, whether they may be specific, express, general, or indirect. See id. at 23. In this regard, SGI highlights that Section 1724(d) does not contain the words "expressly" or "specifically," and it challenges Appellants' approach as an inappropriate attempt to superimpose such terms upon the statute. Id. at 26.
In terms of sovereign immunity, SGI regards the doctrine as irrelevant, since the General Assembly provided an exception, in Section 1702(b) of the Procurement Code, for "claims against Commonwealth agencies brought in accordance with ... Subchapter C (relating to Board of Claims)." 62 Pa.C.S. § 1702(b) (footnote omitted). In this regard, SGI highlights that Section 1724(d)'s reservation of jurisdiction in other tribunals relative to nonmonetary relief falls within subchapter C. Alternatively, SGI notes that sovereign immunity generally has been applied to foreclose the award of mandatory, but not prohibitive, injunctions. See, e.g., Fawber v. Cohen, 516 Pa. 352, 359-60, 532 A.2d 429, 433-34 (1987) (citing Phila. Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 410 Pa. 571, 576, 190 A.2d 111, 114 (1963)). SGI relates that it only wishes to restrain state officials from "further violations of Section 521 and 1711.1 of the Code." Brief for SGI at 31. Finally, to the extent that the Commonwealth may be immune from any of SGI's claims or prayers for relief, the company contends that the Commonwealth Court still could grant those remaining claims that do not implicate immunity.
In its amicus brief, the Board of Claims does not squarely take a position on the jurisdictional question presently before us. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Board of Claims at 8 ("[T]he Commonwealth Court may arguably issue some type of declaratory judgment (e.g. a declaration of the existence of a contract or some other relationship among the parties) and may even be able to enjoin performance of such contract[.]"). Rather, the Board of Claims asks for a broad-based holding that the Procurement Code preserved "200 plus years of history, public policy and case law surrounding Commonwealth contract claims," and did not alter or diminish the Board of Claims' jurisdiction, except as explicitly enumerated in "two minor areas (i.e. by eliminating Board jurisdiction over medical assistance claims and allowing for nonmonetary relief, excluding specific performance, on state contract claims before the Commonwealth Court)." Id. at 1 (citing 62 Pa.C.S. § 1724(c), (d)). In terms of its main request, the Board of Claims centers a substantial portion of its presentation on the question of whether the amendments to the Procurement Code reconstituting the tribunal narrowed its jurisdiction only to claims for breaches of procurement contracts. See generally
As noted, we are presented with issues of statutory construction, as to which our task is to determine the intent of the Legislature. The language of the statute at issue (here, the Procurement Code) is the primary guide. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a), (b). Where ambiguities exist, we may resort to principles of construction, including, among other considerations, evaluation of the occasion and necessity for the statute under review, the object to be attained, and the consequences of the particular interpretation. See id. § 1921(c)(1), (4), (6).
We begin with the doctrine of sovereign immunity, because we agree with Appellants that it plays an important role under the Procurement Code, which is designedly structured to accord immunity, subject only to specific and limited exceptions. See 62 Pa.C.S. § 1702.
One core subcomponent of SGI's argument is that, because Section 1724(d) resides in Subchapter C of the Procurement Code, claims brought in accordance with Section 1724(d) are also claims brought "in accordance with ... Subchapter C." Id. § 1702(b). Thus, the argument follows, such claims are subject to the salient Section 1702(b) waiver of sovereign immunity. One main difficulty with this position, however, is that Section 1724(d) does not itself establish any substantive or jurisdictional basis for a claim. Rather, Section 1724(d) only recognizes that other provisions of law may do so and preserves the independent effect of these other statutes. Along these lines, and at least in the absence of some other words evincing a wider application, a prescription commencing with the phrase "[n]othing in this section shall preclude" — e.g., Section 1724(d) — cannot be read to establish a basis for judicial review or relief broader than that which is contained in the provisions of law which are to be left un-precluded (here, those provisions of law which may independently sanction claims for relief against the sovereign). From this, and since Section 1724(d) also does not itself contain any waiver of sovereign immunity, it follows that such a waiver must be found in (or specifically be associated with) the other, un-precluded provisions of law.
Furthermore, by its own terms, section 1724(d) only operates as a constraint on the effect of "this section," i.e., Section 1724, and, therefore, has no effect on the scope of sovereign immunity as reaffirmed in a different section of the Procurement Code, i.e., Section 1702. Indeed, consistent with the above, in fashioning the immunity waiver associated with Subchapter C, the General Assembly characterized such subchapter as "relating to Board of Claims." 62 Pa.C.S. § 1702(b). This is entirely consonant with the understanding that the legislative purpose was to implement such waiver relative to denominated proceedings in the Board of Claims, not other tribunals. See generally XPress Truck, 503 Pa. at 407-08, 469 A.2d at 1004 (explaining that the judicial decisions enforcing the limitations on the Commonwealth
The constitutionally-grounded, statutory doctrine of sovereign immunity obviously serves to protect government policymaking prerogatives and the public fisc.
We recognize that some decisions of this Court may suggest that immunity is not squarely a jurisdictional matter. See, e.g., James J. Gory Mechanical Contracting, Inc. v. PHA, 579 Pa. 26, 38, 855 A.2d 669, 677 (2004) (distinguishing another decision because it "solely concerned whether [a government agency] was a Commonwealth
While more general clarification of the relationship between sovereign immunity and jurisdiction may be appropriate in the arena at large, for present purposes, we regard sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional concern vis-à-vis the Procurement Code. Our understanding, in this regard, is premised on the enactment's self-contained reaffirmation of sovereign immunity, see 62 Pa.C.S. § 1702(a), and its explicit, limited waiver of such immunity (among other specified and limited waivers) in connection with a coordinate allocation of "exclusive jurisdiction" to the Board of Claims over claims arising from certain contracts entered into by a Commonwealth agency, see id. §§ 1702(b), 1724(a)(1). In this respect, we agree with Appellants that — as a matter of jurisdiction — if the General Assembly has not specifically provided by statute for such nonmonetary relief in a claim arising from a contract entered into by a Commonwealth agency under the Procurement Code, then either the claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Claims or it is barred by sovereign immunity.
Based on the above, we conclude that the Commonwealth Court erred in interpreting Section 1724(d) so broadly as to sanction original jurisdiction actions in a judicial tribunal over nonmonetary claims against the Commonwealth. To the contrary, nonmonetary claims against the Commonwealth are cognizable only to the extent they fall within some "specific[ ]" waiver or exception to immunity. 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310. As explained, no such waiver or exception is found in Section 1724(d) of the Procurement Code, and neither the Commonwealth Court nor SGI has identified any other salient and specific waiver provision within which to bring SGI's claims.
As noted, SGI argues, in the alternative, that prohibitive injunctions function as an exception to sovereign immunity. See Fawber, 516 Pa. at 359-60, 532 A.2d at 433-34. Applying a distinction between prohibitive and mandatory injunctions, however, can be difficult, because the difference is ambiguous and malleable across a wide range of applications.
While SGI references the general axiom that equity will fashion a remedy where there otherwise may be none, this principle is not universally applicable in the statutory realm, particularly if it can be determined that the Legislature intended
Turning to SGI's argument that it is pursuing a statutory violation per Section 521 rather than a contract claim, we find as follows. The Legislature has deliberately excluded Section 521 cancellations from the scope of the right of protest. See 62 Pa.C.S. § 1711.1(a) (prescribing that bidders, offerors, and certain others "aggrieved in connection with the solicitation or award of a contract, except as provided in section 521 (relating to cancellation of invitations for bids or requests for proposals), may protest to the head of the purchasing agency in writing" (emphasis added)). Neither the Commonwealth Court panel nor SGI has offered a persuasive reason why the Legislature would have wished to foreclose protests to cancellations (which would be subject to the Commonwealth Court's appellate review, see id. § 1711.1(g)), while simultaneously sanctioning original jurisdiction actions in the Commonwealth Court to challenge such cancellations. It is far more plausible, in our view, and consistent with the statutory scheme, that the General Assembly wished to rely on the immunity reaffirmed in the Procurement Code to foreclose these challenges altogether. This approach avoids protracted litigation relative to abandonment of, or re-solicitation for, a public project, when the cancellation is believed by a Commonwealth agency to be in the best interests of the citizenry. See 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(c)(1), (4), (6) (authorizing consideration of the occasion for and object of the statute and consequences of its interpretation
If a contract between the Department of Revenue and SGI was consummated, the Procurement Code also establishes a remedial avenue through a claim process, subject to review in the Board of Claims. See 62 Pa.C.S. § 1712.1. SGI's arguments appear to suggest that there may be some narrow margin between "execution" of a contract, for purposes of Section 521, and attainment of "contractor" status, for purposes of Section 1712.1, and that those with claims falling within that category may invoke the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction for redress. In line with our analysis above, we conclude that the Legislature intended the protest, claims, and review procedures it prescribed to be the exclusive avenues available to those aggrieved in procurement controversies by a Commonwealth agency.
The Procurement Code establishes administrative processes to address disputes arising in the procurement setting. On account of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, contractors, bidders, and offerors have limited recourse and remedies. Relative to controversies in matters arising from procurement contracts with Commonwealth agencies, the Board of Claims retains exclusive jurisdiction (subject to all jurisdictional prerequisites), which is not to be supplanted by a court of law through an exercise of original jurisdiction.
As to challenges to cancellations of solicitations asserted under Section 521 of the Procurement Code, the Legislature did not implement any waiver of sovereign immunity and afforded no remedy to aggrieved bidders and offerors which have not yet entered into an executed contract with a Commonwealth agency. For those attaining the status of contractor — which we find should be deemed to occur at the time a contract is executed by all parties (as that event is also understood for purposes of Section 521) — the remedial procedure is via Section 1712.1, subject to review within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Claims. Our holding in this case is limited to the Procurement Code arena, in which the scenario before us has arisen.
The order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for dismissal, consistent with this opinion.
Justice ORIE MELVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Chief Justice CASTILLE, Justice EAKIN and BAER, Justice TODD and Justice McCAFFERY join the opinion.
While issues concerning the effect of the notation "[Signature Affixed Electronically]" have limited bearing on the jurisdictional matter presented here, the circumstances related in the text of our opinion below certainly appear to have bearing on various collateral suggestions by SGI that the notation should be taken as evincing execution of the contract on behalf of the Commonwealth. Compare Brief for SGI at 9, 10, 33-34 ("It cannot reasonably be disputed that `signature affixed electronically' was typed into every signature line of the written agreement when it was delivered to SGI and that this had the same force and effect as hand-signing the document under the Electronic Signatures Act."), with infra.
As an aside, in his dissent in Hanover Insurance, then-Judge (now President Judge) Pellegrini cited our decision in Meyer v. Community College of Beaver County, 606 Pa. 539, 2 A.3d 499 (2010), for the proposition that "sovereign immunity simply does not apply to contracts." Hanover Ins., 35 A.3d at 861 (Pellegrini, J., dissenting). However, the sovereign immunity available to the Commonwealth per Section 1702 of the Procurement Code and Section 2310 of Title 1 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes simply was not in issue in Meyer. Rather, the decision concerned local government immunity, as prescribed in the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541 (providing, subject to enumerated exceptions, that "no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person" (emphasis added)). Thus, contrary to Judge Pellegrini's suggestion, Meyer in no way conflicts with Shovel Transfer on the salient point that sovereign immunity extends into the contract arena, unless specifically waived by the General Assembly.
We also recognize SGI's position that waivers and/or jurisdictional allocations implicated by Section 1724(d) may be scarce or even nonexistent among the Laws of Pennsylvania, thus suggesting that Section 1724 was meant to be read more broadly. In this regard, however, we have recognized that "in the process of legislative drafting, the General Assembly is faced with a complex landscape of existing statutes, many of which are amenable to differing interpretations by litigants and have yet to be finally interpreted or construed by the courts." Germantown Cab Co. v. PPA, 614 Pa. 133, 156-57, 36 A.3d 105, 119 (2012). In crafting an exception for a specific waiver and/or jurisdictional allocation, we do not hold the General Assembly to identifying a specific present or future example, nor do we deem it necessary to look for one, particularly in light of the clear purport of the sovereign-immunity overlay to the Procurement Code.
Tri-State Asphalt, 135 Pa.Cmwlth. at 416, 582 A.2d at 57-58 (internal citations omitted).
Above, we conclude only that the design of the Procurement Code evidences the legislative intent to immunize cancellation decisions within the scope of Section 521.
With regard to SGI's invocation of taxpayer status, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity to permit either SGI or any other taxpayer to challenge a Section 521 cancellation on the terms SGI has advanced. SGI is not suing a state official to restrain a constitutional violation, as in the Fawber case which it cites. See Fawber, 516 Pa. 352, 532 A.2d 429. Rather, it has sued Commonwealth agencies under a statutory regime attended by a specific grant of sovereign immunity and explicit remedial procedures. Again, we find that the Legislature intended to permit recourse to those procedures — and none others — relative to breach of contract, to include disavowal of execution for purposes of Section 521.
Finally, there is no issue before us concerning a Commonwealth agency's failure to abide by the remedial procedures, such as was the case in GTECH Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 965 A.2d 1276 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009); therefore, our opinion should not be taken, in any fashion, as addressing such scenario.
