GREENE, J.
On March 15, 2013, we vacated two Orders issued by the Honorable John Grason Turnbull, II, the Administrative Judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which related to the bifurcation or severance of claims and the reassignment of two cases pending in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. St. Joseph Medical Center v. Turnbull, 431 Md. 369, 65 A.3d 678 (2013). We remanded the cases, Weinberg v. Midei, et al., case number 03 C 10 12603, and Sullivan, et al. v. St. Joseph Medical Center, Inc., et al., case number 03 C 10 12624, to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. We vacated the Order to reassign the cases because the Administrative Judge's decision to reassign the cases appears to flow directly from his decision to review and vacate the trial judge's Orders bifurcating the Sullivan and Weinberg trials. In addition, we reinstated the Orders of Judge Nancy M. Purpura to bifurcate the Weinberg and Sullivan trials. The effect of our Orders is to restore these cases to the status quo just prior to the actions taken by Judge Turnbull. In addition, we vacated a previous Order of this Court which stayed proceedings, pending in the Circuit Court, in the Metzdorf case.
Petitioners, St. Joseph Medical Center, Inc., Mark G. Midei, M.D. and Midatlantic Cardiovascular Associates, P.A., filed in this Court a petition for writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition (collectively a "prerogative writ") to reverse the November 2 and 28, 2012 Orders of Judge Turnbull, Administrative Judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Respondent, Judge Turnbull, filed a response asking this Court to deny the petition. Carl and Dorothy Sullivan, Ronald Metzdorf and Glenn Weinberg, plaintiffs in the underlying cases, through counsels, also filed briefs as amici curiae asserting that we should not grant the petition. The Order of Judge Turnbull dated November 2, 2012 provided:
The question of bifurcation directly effects the case flow management of this Court, and as such the Motions to Bifurcate should have been forwarded by the Clerk's Office to the Administrative Judge for a ruling. It is apparent that the Clerk's Office, noting that the cases were specially assigned, forwarded these requests directly to the Trial Judge and not the Administrative Judge as is required. When dealing with issues involving case management, requests for a stay of a case, postponements, changes in scheduling orders and Motions to Bifurcate that directly effect the case flow shall be ruled upon by the Administrative Judge.
The Administrative Judge has reviewed the Motions to Bifurcate and the Opinions of Judge Purpura, and while this Court has the utmost respect for Judge Purpura, the Administrative Judge deems that a bifurcation is not necessary and will cause additional trials to be held which is not in the interest of judicial economy, and will adversely effect the case flow management.
Judge Turnbull also indicated in his Order that, "at the request of Judge Purpura ... these case[s] shall be reassigned to Judge Susan Souder for Trial."
Petitioners contend that by striking Judge Purpura's Orders in the Weinberg and Sullivan cases that the "trial[s] be bifurcated so that count 1 (medical negligence) is tried first and the remaining counts tried thereafter in a separate proceeding[,]" Judge Turnbull exceeded his administrative authority and further divested his coordinate trial judges and this State's appellate courts of their jurisdiction.
This case began when Glenn Weinberg, individually, and Carl and Dorothy Sullivan, his wife, in separate lawsuits, sued Dr. Midei and St. Joseph Medical Center
In the Sullivan case, Judge Purpura addressed the potential for unfair prejudice. She pointed out:
Judge Purpura also discussed the convenience to the trial court, jury and parties stating in the Sullivan case:
Judge Purpura further explained:
It is undisputed that Judge Purpura acted pursuant to Rule 2-503(b) in granting the motions to bifurcate the trial in the Weinberg and Sullivan cases. Section (b) of Rule 2-503 provides:
Pursuant to Rule 2-503(b), it is within a trial court's discretion to enter a severance order and direct that different phases of a single action proceed as "separate actions" for purposes of convenience or to avoid prejudice. See Blades v. Woods, 338 Md. 475, 476-77, 479, 659 A.2d 872, 872-73, 874 (1995) (The trial judge properly entered an order directing that two claims in a single case, a request for judicial review of a police department's decision to fire an employee and a claim for damages for an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "proceed as separate actions."). In Newell v. Richards, 83 Md.App. 371, 574 A.2d 370 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 323 Md. 717, 594 A.2d 1152 (1991), involving a medical malpractice case filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the defendants, Dr. George J. Richards, Jr., Greater Baltimore Medical Center (GBMC) and Richards, Hirschfeld & Associates, P.A., each filed a motion entitled "Motion for Separate Trials." 83 Md.App. at 374, 574 A.2d at 372. The trial judge granted the motions for separate trials, the effect of which was to separate the issues in the case of whether plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the merits of her medical malpractice claim. 83 Md.App. at 374, 386-87, 574 A.2d at 372, 378-79. The Court of Special Appeals held that to avoid prejudice and in the interest of "judicial economy" and "convenience" it was proper to bifurcate the issue of the merits from an initial determination of whether the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's claim. 83 Md.App. at 387, 574 A.2d at 379. Judge Rosalyn B. Bell summarized the law and its application to the Newell case:
Newell, 83 Md.App. at 387, 574 A.2d at 378-79 (citations omitted).
Similarly, in Myers v. Celotex Corp., 88 Md.App. 442, 594 A.2d 1248 (1991), the Court of Special Appeals affirmed that bifurcation of the issues at trial, where a finding in favor of the defendants on the first issue eliminated the need to present evidence regarding the remaining issues, proved to be a convenience to the court, the jury and the parties. Myers, 88 Md. App. at 448-50, 594 A.2d at 1251-52 (holding that the trial judge's bifurcation of the trial into stages was proper because it served the two components of Rule 2-503(b): convenience and to avoid prejudice); see also Corinaldi v. Columbia Courtyard, Inc., 162 Md.App. 207, 228-29, 873 A.2d 483, 495 (2005) (noting that bifurcation of the liability and penalty phases of a trial between separate juries was within the court's discretion).
In the present case, we hold that the trial judge, Judge Purpura, acted within the scope of her authority in ruling on
In In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988), this Court said, "we may issue a prerogative writ if we believe the interests of justice require us to do so in order to restrain a lower court from acting in excess of its jurisdiction, otherwise grossly exceeding its authority, or failing to act when it ought to act." 312 Md. at 307, 539 A.2d at 677. In other words, "[a]n extraordinary writ is appropriate only when judicial power has been usurped or if there is a clear abuse of discretion." 312 Md. at 327, 539 A.2d at 687 (citation omitted). We determined that there was no basis to issue a writ in In re Petition because the State had the burden to persuade us to grant the writ but failed to do so where the trial judge "granted a motion for a new trial in a criminal case, an action he had the power to take[,]" he weighed the evidence, and he acted to prevent "injustices[.]" 312 Md. at 329, 539 A.2d at 688.
Unlike the case of In re Petition, in Philip Morris v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 752 A.2d 200 (2000), we found on the facts of that case a basis to issue a prerogative writ. In Angeletti, a group of "tobacco manufacturers and related entities" requested that we issue a writ directing the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to vacate its certification of two classes as plaintiffs in a large three-phased lawsuit. 358 Md. at 699, 702, 752 A.2d at 205, 207. Petitioners in that case maintained that the trial judge "grossly abused" his discretion in violation of both Md. Rule 2-231 and their constitutional rights, and also asserted that irreparable harm would result to them and the judicial system if they were "required to await end-of-the-case appeal." 358 Md. at 704, 752 A.2d at 208. The tobacco companies, therefore, urged this Court "to compel the Circuit Court to decertify the classes as an exercise in aid of our appellate jurisdiction or, in the alternative, as an execution of this Court's superintendency, whether inherent or bestowed, over the lower courts of this State." Id.
We concluded that "Petitioners have demonstrated the lack of other available, adequate relief as well as the existence of a paramount public and judicial interest that, together, override the preference for the final judgment rule and justify the issuance of mandamus, in order to protect the integrity of the judicial system in this State." 358 Md. at 714, 752 A.2d at 213. In addition, we held:
358 Md. at 722, 752 A.2d at 218.
In reaching these conclusions, we noted that "[t]he litigation plan approved by the Circuit Court in th[at] case necessarily involves the commitment of such an extraordinary amount of the judicial and other resources of the busiest trial court in this State that any subsequent appellate review of the lower court's Class Certification Order is rendered inadequate and ineffective." 358 Md. at 714, 752 A.2d at 213. Given the complex nature of the large lawsuit at issue in Angeletti, an opportunity to challenge the class certification on appeal would not occur until a significant amount of time and expense would be spent. 358 Md. at 714-16, 752 A.2d at 213-15. We determined in that case that "[r]elief by mandamus is appropriate where it will prevent a needless, expensive trial and an ultimate reversal." 358 Md. at 717, 752 A.2d at 215 (citations and quotation omitted). Therefore, we concluded that "[g]iven the judicial and other resources that would be irrevocably wasted should the Circuit Court's Class Certification Order not be overturned until after a Phase II or Phase III judgment, we will not permit this case to proceed that far if we are convinced presently that reversal of the Class Certification Order is mandated." 358 Md. at 717, 752 A.2d at 215.
Further focusing on the public interest and the extraordinary nature of the Angeletti case, we pointed out that "[b]oth the public interest and our responsibility in exercising the supreme judicial authority of this State thus compel the exercise of this Court's discretion in this extraordinary case." 358 Md. at 718, 752 A.2d at 215. We determined that the magnitude of the case "may significantly impact or divert the public resources earmarked for the judiciary for the next several years[.]" 358 Md. at 718, 752 A.2d at 216. Additionally, we stated that, although in Keene Corp. v. Levin, 330 Md. 287, 294, 623 A.2d 662, 666 (1993), we concluded that the costs and delay of waiting for an appeal did not warrant the issuance of an extraordinary writ, the "extraordinary circumstances" of the Angeletti case were such that if expenses were incurred because of the Circuit Court's erred class certification "they would be losses as monumental in their unfairness as in their sheer amount." 358 Md. at 720, 752 A.2d at 217 (citation omitted). Finally, we noted that:
358 Md. at 721, 752 A.2d at 217 (citations omitted).
In the present case, Respondent challenges the propriety of our issuing a writ because, in his view, "this matter does
As to Respondent's first two assertions, that Petitioners seek immediate review of a discretionary interlocutory order and that Petitioners "insist on assignment of a case or motion to a certain judge and [] complain if another judge revisits the matter[,]" we disagree with Respondent's characterization of the relief sought. A prerogative writ is sought in the current case because Judge Turnbull has, without the authority to do so, acted as an appellate court reviewing Judge Purpura's decision to bifurcate the cases and has unilaterally taken the authority from all other trial judges sitting on the Baltimore County Circuit Court to rule on bifurcation motions on the theory that such motions directly "effect the case flow."
Article IV, Section 1 of the Maryland Constitution provides that "[t]he Judicial power of this State is vested in a Court of Appeals, such intermediate courts of appeal as the General Assembly may create by law, Circuit Courts, Orphans' Courts, and a District Court." Md. Const. art. 4, § 1. As we have stated, "[i]n this State, all judicial authority is only such as is provided for by Article 4 of the Maryland Constitution, and it has been decided that only judicial functions can be exercised which find their authority in that Article...." Dal Maso v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of
The Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 21(b), requires that "[t]here shall be at least four circuit court judges resident in each circuit, and at least one circuit court judge shall be resident in each county." Md. Const. art. 4, § 21(b). As the constitutionally required representative of the circuit court, a judge, when acting in his or her judicial capacity, generally has the authority vested by the Constitution in the circuit courts, or in other words, acts as the "circuit court." Cf. State v. Wiegmann, 350 Md. 585, 593-95, 714 A.2d 841, 845-46 (1998) (citations and quotations omitted) (expressing that unlike a judge, a master is not a "judicial officer" and therefore: (1) a master does not have "any judicial powers[;]" (2) "a judge may never delegate away a part of the decision making function to a master — a non-judicial officer[;]" and (3) "a master is not the trial judge ... [and] does not replace her or him" and therefore, may not issue a warrant, an action requiring "judicial power[]").
Pursuant to a judge's constitutionally-based authority, when acting in his or her judicial capacity as, for example, a trial judge presiding over a trial, this Court has recognized the discretion and responsibility our judicial system places in him or her. In City of Bowie v. MIE Props., Inc., 398 Md. 657, 922 A.2d 509 (2007), we pointed out:
398 Md. at 684, 922 A.2d at 525 (quotation omitted). In State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 604 A.2d 489 (1992), we further took note of "[t]he principle that the overall direction of the trial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge...." 326 Md. at 277, 604 A.2d at 493 (quotation omitted). In another context, Judge Harry Cole, writing for this Court, "reaffirm[ed]" that "[w]e place[] the responsibility on the trial judge to weigh and balance the rights, interests, and reasons of the parties ..." and "the trial judge, on the scene, will
Article IV, Section 18 of the Maryland Constitution: (1) "provides, inter alia, that the Chief Judge of [this Court] is the administrative head of the State's Judicial system[;]" (2) "requires that the Court of Appeals `shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of ... the other courts of this State[;]'" and (3) "states that the authority of all courts of the State over practice, procedure, and administration `shall be subject to the rules and regulations adopted by the Court of Appeals....'" Strickland v. State, 407 Md. 344, 356, 965 A.2d 887, 893-94 (2009). Although there is no provision in the Maryland Constitution specifically establishing County or Circuit Administrative Judges, Maryland Rule 16-101, adopted by this Court "pursuant to the mandate contained in Article IV § 18, of the [Maryland] Constitution[,]" Strickland, 407 Md. at 356, 965 A.2d at 894, provides for the appointment of Circuit and County Administrative Judges who serve at the pleasure of the Chief Judge of this Court. See Md. Rule 16-101(c); Md. Rule 16-101(d).
As both parties acknowledge, Judge Turnbull serves as both the Circuit Administrative Judge for the Third Judicial Circuit and as the County Administrative Judge for Baltimore County. Provisions within Title 16 of the Maryland Rules delineate the authority of Administrative Judges, namely to oversee the "internal management" and administration of the courts. See Strickland, 407 Md. at 361, 965 A.2d at 896. Maryland Rules 16-101(c) and 16-101(d) provide that a Circuit and County Administrative Judge, respectively, in his or her role as such, is "responsible for the administration" of "justice" and "the courts" in his or her circuit or county. Rule 16-101(d) further enumerates the duties of the Administrative Judge,
A judge of the circuit court, whether he or she is a trial judge, a chambers judge, or an Administrative Judge, carries out various responsibilities, some of which are administrative and some of which are
Although it has the potential to affect the internal management of the court, bifurcation of a trial is not a decision primarily affecting the administration of the circuit court. Rather, the decision whether to bifurcate a case is a judicial decision requiring consideration of the rights of the litigants in the case, and it is generally within the discretion of a trial judge presiding over a trial in his or her judicial capacity. See Myers, 88 Md.App. at 448-49, 594 A.2d at 1252; Newell, 83 Md.App. at 387, 574 A.2d at 378. When considering whether to bifurcate a case pursuant to Rule 2-503(b), a trial court considers both convenience and prejudice as either factor can provide a basis to bifurcate the issues in a trial. See Myers, 88 Md.App. at 449-50, 594 A.2d at 1252; Newell, 83 Md.App. at 387, 574 A.2d at 378. Judge Purpura's decision to grant bifurcation in the Sullivan and Weinberg cases was, in large part, related to the potential for prejudice faced by Petitioners. A trial judge ordinarily will be asked during trial to make determinations addressing potential prejudice to a litigant. See Md. Rule 5-403 (giving trial judges the authority to exclude evidence that "[a]lthough relevant ... may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice..."); see also Hawkins, 326 Md. at 278, 604 A.2d at 493 ("The fundamental rationale in leaving the matter of prejudice vel non to the sound discretion of the trial judge is that the judge is in the best position to evaluate it.").
Merely because bifurcation could affect the internal management of the circuit court does not authorize an Administrative Judge to unilaterally strip a trial judge of discretion over the bifurcation decision. Numerous judicial decisions have the potential to affect the internal management of the circuit courts, but discretion over those judicial decisions usually
In short, as Administrative Judge, Judge Turnbull had the authority to make administrative decisions concerning the day-to-day management of the Circuit Court. As Administrative Judge, however, he did not have the authority to either review and vacate Judge Purpura's decisions to bifurcate the Sullivan and Weinberg trials or unilaterally take the discretion over the bifurcation of cases that allegedly affect "case flow" away from the trial judges of the Baltimore County Circuit Court. Authority over the "internal management" of the court is not the equivalent of authority over any judicial decision that affects case flow. Cf. Brutley v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Ky.1998) ("The Chief Judge, being this Court's delegate, has considerable discretion in administrative decisions, however no other District Judge has the authority to `bind the hands' of another District Judge by issuing any order which limits the discretionary ruling of another judge."); Sims v. Ryan, 125 N.M. 357, 961 P.2d 782, 784 (1998) (Where a local ordinance gave the "Presiding Judge" authority to establish judicial polices, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that "[a]lthough judicial policymaking authority allows a Presiding Judge to set schedules, make rules of court, assign duties, and generally administratively run the court, the Presiding Judge may not strip a duly elected judge of the inherent powers associated with the position, including the power to sentence."); State ex rel. Skinner v. Dostert, 166 W.Va. 743, 278 S.E.2d 624, 634-35 (1981) (Concluding
Pursuant to Rules 16-101 and 16-103, Judge Turnbull had the authority both to assign the Sullivan and Weinberg cases to a trial judge and to reassign the cases in the ordinary course of the administrative management of the court. See Strickland, 407 Md. at 358, 965 A.2d at 895. And, if the case had been reassigned, the judge hearing the case in place of Judge Purpura would likely not have been bound by her rulings, including the ruling on whether to bifurcate the cases. In other words, the issue of bifurcation could be reconsidered. See State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 449, 470 A.2d 1269, 1283 (1984) (citations omitted) ("As a general principle, one judge of a trial court ruling on a matter is not bound by the prior ruling in the same case by another judge of the court; the second judge, in his discretion, may ordinarily consider the matter de novo."); see also Scott v. State, 379 Md. 170, 183-85, 840 A.2d 715, 722-23 (2004); Gertz v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 339 Md. 261, 273, 661 A.2d 1157, 1163 (1995). The new trial judge, in his or her capacity as a trial judge, would, like Judge Purpura, have the inherent authority to address bifurcation. Similarly, Judge Turnbull currently serves as a judge on the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and, therefore, he could have assigned the case to himself in the ordinary course of business. See Strickland, 407 Md. at 358, 965 A.2d at 895 ("[T]he assignment of Circuit Judges for trials or hearings is entirely within the province of Circuit and County Administrative Judges, subject only to the supervisory authority of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and the administrative rules adopted by the Court of Appeals."); Maryland Judiciary, Judges Currently Serving in the State of Maryland, available at http://mdcourts. gov/hr/pdfs/judges_list_external.pdf. If he was presiding over the cases in his capacity as a trial judge, Judge Turnbull would not have been bound by Judge Purpura's prior decisions, but would have the authority, like any other trial judge presiding over a case, to rule on bifurcation. Nothing in the record, however, indicates that Judge Turnbull assigned the two trials to himself and, acting in his judicial, rather than administrative, capacity, ruled on the issue of bifurcation.
As noted above, granting a writ of mandamus or prohibition is an extraordinary measure, and we exercise our discretion to grant such a writ with "great caution." In re Petition, 312 Md. at 305, 539 A.2d at 676 (quotation omitted). Judge Turnbull's extraordinary actions, vacating Judge Purpura's Orders and requiring that all motions for bifurcation be sent to him, however, persuaded this Court to exercise its discretion and grant the writ. "The exercise of this Court's authority to issue an extraordinary writ was justified by the potential irreparable harm to the moving party and by the need to maintain the integrity of the legal system." Angeletti, 358 Md. at 711, 752 A.2d at 212.
Judge Turnbull's actions threatened the integrity of the judicial system, the authority of trial judges to preside over cases before them, and the public's trust in the courts. First, as noted above, bifurcation is a judicial decision affecting the rights and interests of litigants, and, as such, it is generally within the discretion of trial judges to rule on the matter. As noted above, the authority of circuit court judges is derived from the Maryland Constitution. See Md. Const. art. 4, §§ 1, 20, 21. And as indicated at oral argument before this Court, Judge Turnbull in his capacity as Administrative Judge, could not, through his November 2 Order, trump the Maryland Constitution's grant of authority to circuit court judges to make judicial decisions in cases over which they preside. Judge Turnbull's usurpation of this authority threatened the integrity of the judicial system and is arguably the quintessential
Additionally, as noted above, Maryland Rule 2-503(b) provides that a trial may be bifurcated for convenience or to avoid prejudice. When bifurcating both the Sullivan and Weinberg trials, Judge Purpura addressed both of these factors. In Weinberg, Judge Purpura indicated that the trials were to be bifurcated because a "single unified trial" would both be "unwieldy" and would prejudice the defendant, Dr. Midei. Similarly, in her opinion bifurcating the trial in Sullivan, Judge Purpura indicated that bifurcation was "appropriate to avoid unfair prejudice to the Defendants[,]" and would "serve the convenience of the [c]ourt, the parties and the jury." When Judge Turnbull vacated Judge Purpura's bifurcation Orders he expressed that he did so "in the interest of judicial economy," and to prevent bifurcation from "adversely effect[ing] the case flow management." Nothing in Judge Turnbull's Order indicates that prejudice to the parties was a consideration. His actions, therefore, sent a message to litigants that the internal management of the court trumps a trial judge's determination to bifurcate a trial pursuant to Rule 2-503(b).
Moreover, Judge Turnbull's actions undermined the authority of trial judges in the Circuit Court. As Respondent notes, in general, bifurcation may be challenged on appeal after a final judgment in the case. Here, Judge Turnbull prevented the bifurcated trials from going forward, as contemplated, to final judgment in the Sullivan and Weinberg cases. In his capacity as the Administrative Judge, Judge Turnbull sua sponte reviewed Judge Purpura's
Judge Turnbull's actions further injured the integrity of the judicial system by usurping appellate authority and undermining the proper review of a grant or denial of bifurcation. By reviewing Judge Purpura's grant of bifurcation and vacating her Orders, Judge Turnbull effectively acted as an appellate court in this context. Nothing in the Maryland Constitution, statutory law, or the Maryland Code authorizes an Administrative Judge to act as an appellate court in this context. Additionally, when properly brought on appeal, a trial judge's ruling on whether to grant or deny bifurcation is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. See Myers, 88 Md.App. at 448, 594 A.2d at 1251-52; see also Md. Green Party v. State Bd. of Elections, 165 Md.App. 113, 142, 884 A.2d 789, 806 (2005). When, in effect, acting as an appellate court to consider Judge Purpura's ruling, Judge Turnbull did not consider whether Judge Purpura abused her discretion but rather overruled Judge Purpura's Orders because, in his view, bifurcation "[was] not necessary," "[was] not in the interest of judicial economy," and because it would "adversely effect the case flow management."
Additionally, Judge Turnbull's actions could potentially expend significant time, money and resources, and leave Petitioners and others similarly situated without an adequate legal remedy. Respondent argues that Petitioners could get relief by challenging that Judge Turnbull did not have the authority to overrule Judge Purpura and that Judge Turnbull erred in denying bifurcation through the normal appellate process. We disagree. Although, generally, the additional costs to litigants waiting to challenge a judicial ruling or order on appeal does not warrant the extraordinary writ of mandamus, see Keene, 330 Md. at 294, 623 A.2d at 666, the present matter, not unlike Angeletti, involves "extraordinary circumstances." See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 720, 752 A.2d at 217. As one of the Amici noted, there were "nearly 300" stent cases "active" in the Baltimore County Circuit Court. Judge Turnbull's actions, ordering that the Administrative Judge will decide all bifurcation issues even when he lacks the power to delegate exclusive authority to himself could require appeals and a new trial not only in the Sullivan and Weinberg cases, but in many of those nearly 300 pending cases. For both the judicial system and Petitioners, who are defendants in many of those cases, this would result in a substantial expenditure of time, money and resources. "Should such expenses have been endured on account of" the Administrative Judge acting beyond the scope of his authority, "they would be losses as monumental in their unfairness as in their sheer amount." Angeletti, 358 Md. at 720, 752 A.2d at 217 (citations omitted).
McDONALD, J., dissents.
Mostly Concurring and a Tiny Bit Dissenting Opinion by HARRELL, J.
Although I joined the Court majority as regards most of its Order of 15 March 2013, I declined to join that part of the Order that overturned Judge Turnbull's reassignment of the affected cases from Judge Purpura to Judge Souder. Necessarily then, I join the Court's opinion, except for its attempted justification for reinstating the assignment of the cases for trial to Judge Purpura.
The reason I departed from the Majority as to this part of the "remedy" fashioned by the Court is that Judge Turnbull, as the Administrative Judge for the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, has the authority to assign and reassign cases for trial. The Majority concedes this. See Majority op. at 280-81, 68 A.3d at 836 ("Pursuant to Rules 16-101 and 16-103, Judge Turnbull had the authority both to assign the Sullivan and Weinberg cases to a trial judge and to reassign the cases in the ordinary course of the administrative management of the court." (citations omitted)). That Judge Turnbull improperly and without apparent authority overruled Judge Purpura's ruling on bifurcation (and regardless of whether he reassigned the cases to himself — constructively or actually — to accomplish that purpose) does not impair or eliminate his conceded right to reassign the cases to Judge Souder, for whatever or no reason. Thus, while I am in agreement with the Majority that it is correct for this Court to vacate the portions of Judge Turnbull's orders regarding bifurcation, I can find no authority or reason for us to overrule his reassignment of the cases to Judge Souder. There is no indication on this record that Judge Turnbull's reassignment of the cases to Judge Souder was taken with any ulterior motive or to frustrate the proper trying of the cases. As the Majority also concedes, Judge Souder could reconsider Judge Purpura's re-instated disposition of the bifurcation request, but is not compelled to do so or to change the outcome. See Majority op. at 281, 68 A.3d at 836 ("[I]f the case had been reassigned, the judge hearing the case in place of Judge Purpura would likely not have been bound by her rulings, including the ruling on whether to bifurcate the cases. In other words, the issue of bifurcation could be reconsidered.").
Dissenting Opinion by McDONALD, J.
In the Court's consideration of this matter, three distinct issues have become entangled: (1) the merits of the decision to bifurcate the trials in these cases; (2) the direction — or lack of direction — that our rules provide as to the powers and duties of an Administrative Judge; and (3) the standard of review that this Court applies when considering a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The first issue is not actually before us; the second question is a key to our decision here, but not adequately addressed; and the third issue counsels against the action we took.
In my view, when a case is specially assigned, the decision whether to bifurcate the trial to avoid prejudice to a party, as
But I would not have granted the petition. Mandamus is reserved for extraordinary circumstances in which it is clear that the lower court has committed legal errors or abused its discretion when no other remedy is available.
Maryland Rule 16-202 directs an Administrative Judge to develop a "case management plan" to manage the work flow in a circuit court and to adopt administrative procedures to carry out that plan — procedures that, among other things, are to address the disposition of motions and preliminary matters. The rule provides, in pertinent part:
(emphasis added).
While the Differentiated Case Management Plan of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, adopted pursuant to section (b) of the rule, does not address motions to bifurcate, that court apparently has written administrative procedures, presumably developed to comply with section (a) of the rule, that allocate various matters and decisions to certain judges (and, indeed, recognize that certain decisions are the province of a judge specially assigned to a case). Those written procedures designate the Administrative Judge as the judge to decide "motions to bifurcate." At least one other circuit court appears to direct motions to bifurcate to its Administrative Judge for decision. See http://www6. montgomerycountymd.gov/cibtmpl.asp? url=/Content/CircuitCourt/Court/ AdministrativeAides/AdministrativeAides. asp (listing motions to bifurcate among
On its face, Rule 16-202 thus appears to allow for the allocation of bifurcation motions — or at least some subset of them
This matter invited us to clarify the appropriate function of an Administrative Judge — an invitation we have not accepted. For example, it is not clear whether the majority opinion is stating that the decision of a motion to bifurcate is necessarily reserved to a trial judge, see Majority Op. at pp. 277-80, 68 A.3d at 834-35, or is conceding that such motions can be directed to an Administrative Judge under a Differentiated Case Management Plan, see Majority Op. at p. 280 n. 10, 68 A.3d at 836 n. 10. Perhaps it is incumbent upon this Court to provide some guidance on the duties of an Administrative Judge with respect to motions to bifurcate, by rule amendment or otherwise.
At the time this matter came to us, the case had already been re-assigned to another judge, a decision that petitioners conceded was a prerogative of the Administrative Judge.