ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:

Jesse Brannen, III, P.C., and Jesse Brannen, III, (collectively "Brannen"), appeal the dismissal of their complaint contending that the Department of the Treasury lacked statutory authority to promulgate regulations imposing a user fee. Specifically, Brannen challenged the Department's regulation's requirement that compensated tax return preparers obtain a Preparer Tax Identification Number ("PTIN") and its imposition of an annual fee for that number.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jesse Brannen is an attorney and certified public accountant in Georgia who prepares tax returns and refund claims for others for compensation. In 2010, in accordance with the new Treasury regulation, Brannen filed for and paid $64.25 to receive a PTIN. He then filed for a refund with the IRS, but it was rejected.

Brannen then filed this lawsuit as a purported class action. Brannen's complaint asserted that the Department's implementation of the fee exceeded its statutory authorization. Brannen argues that, while 26 U.S.C. § 6109 authorizes the issuance of an identifying number, it does not authorize a fee. The Government moved for dismissal of the complaint, and the court below granted its motion, holding that Brannen failed to set forth a viable claim.

II. DISCUSSION

Brannen's sole argument is that the Department of the Treasury exceeded its statutory authority when it began charging fees for issuing and renewing PTINs. He contends that no statute enacted by Congress has provided the Department with that power. According to Brannen, 26 U.S.C. § 6109 provides for PTINs to help the Department identify taxpayers and tax return preparers, and thus helps the Department in its tax collection efforts. He insists that merely issuing a PTIN to a tax return preparer is not enough to justify charging a user fee.

Under the Independent Offices Authorities Act, 31 U.S.C. § 9701, agencies are permitted to promulgate regulations that establish a charge for a service or thing of value that the agency provides. Those charges are required to be:

31 U.S.C. § 9701(b). Interpreting this statute's predecessor, the Supreme Court in National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 94 S.Ct. 1146, 39 L.Ed.2d 370 (1974), clarified that the Act permitted agencies to levy fees based on services rendered but not levy taxes, which is the exclusive domain of the legislature. Elaborating on this holding, the Court in Federal Power Commission v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 94 S.Ct. 1151, 39 L.Ed.2d 383 (1974), held that the citizen or company must receive a "special benefit" that is not received by the general public in order to justify the fee. There, the plaintiff utility companies challenged annual assessments the Commission imposed, which were intended to "recoup some of the remaining costs" incurred by the agency. Id. at 346, 94 S.Ct. at 1153. However, the Commission had described its regulatory activities as beneficial to consumers and added that its actions

Id. at 348, 94 S.Ct. at 1153 (quoting the Federal Power Commission Report, Order No. 427, 45 FPC 440, 445 (1971)). The Court noted that the Office of Management and Budget had issued a circular instructing that a reasonable charge "`should be made to each identifiable recipient for a measurable unit or amount of Government service or property from which he derives a special benefit.'" Id. at 349, 94 S.Ct. at 1154 (quoting Budget Circular No. A-25, Sept. 23, 1959).1 The circular also stated that no charge should be made for services when "`the ultimate beneficiary is obscure and the service can be primarily considered as benefitting broadly the general public.'" Id. at 350, 94 S.Ct. at 1154 (quoting Budget Circular No. A-25). Thus, because the Commission identified the public as the primary beneficiary of the services, and not the utilities who paid the assessments, the fees were not permitted by the fee-authorizing statute. Id. at 351, 94 S.Ct. at 1155.

Since 1976, the Department has had the power to require tax return preparers to include an identifying number on the returns they prepare. 26 U.S.C. § 6109(a)(4). Before the 2010 regulations, tax preparers were permitted by § 6109(d) to use either their social security numbers or obtain a free PTIN;2 however, in that same subsection, Congress expressly provided that the Secretary could by regulation require that a number other than the social security number be used. 26 U.S.C. § 6109(d).3 The Department promulgated such regulations in 2010, exercising this § 6109(d) authority and requiring that tax return preparers obtain and use a PTIN, rather than allowing use of a social security number." The same regulation exercised for the first time the Secretary's authority under 31 U.S.C. § 9701 to charge an annual user fee to tax return preparers in exchange for issuing the PTIN. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6109-2(a), (d).4

Thus, contrary to Brannen's argument, 31 U.S.C. § 9701 and 26 U.S.C. § 6109 provide statutory authority for the 2010 regulations. Section 6109(a)(4) provides:

26 U.S.C. § 6109(a)(4). This statutory provision does two things. First, it expressly grants authority to the Secretary to prescribe by regulation the particular identifying number required — that is, "such identifying number ... as may be prescribed [by the Secretary by regulation]."5 Second, § 6109(a)(4) also requires that "any return ... prepared by a tax return preparer shall bear such identifying number" as has been assigned to him/her by the Secretary. Because the term "tax return preparer" is defined by 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(36) as meaning any person who prepares tax returns for others for compensation, this requirement — that any return prepared by a tax return preparer bear his/her assigned identifying number — means that a tax return preparer cannot prepare tax returns for others for compensation without having the required identifying number.6 And because § 6109(a)(4) expressly authorizes the Secretary to assign such numbers, a person cannot prepare tax returns for another for compensation unless that person obtains from the Secretary the required identifying number. For this reason, when the Secretary assigns the identifying number (the preparer tax identification number or "PTIN"), the Secretary is conferring a special benefit upon the recipient, i.e. the privilege of preparing tax returns for others for compensation.

We readily conclude that, under the plain language of § 6109(a)(4), the PTIN is issued to tax return preparers for a special benefit. And we readily conclude that the benefit — the privilege of preparing tax returns for others for compensation — is the kind of "special benefit" that qualifies under New England Power. The user fee here clearly confers a benefit which is not received by the general public.

Our conclusion is reinforced by the explanation provided when the Secretary proposed the challenged regulations. When the Department proposed the regulations, it explained that:

75 Fed.Reg. 43,110, 43,112 (July 23, 2010). It further explained that the costs to be recovered were for

Id.7

Brannen also argues that the imposition of a fee after none had been charged previously violates the statute. We disagree. Brannen has cited nothing to support this argument, and we see nothing in the language of § 9701 that suggests that the authority to charge a user fee must be exercised at the first moment that Congress confers the authority. We know of no tradition of statutory construction that would indicate such an unusual interpretation. Nor is there anything in the language of § 9701, nor in logic, that would prohibit an agency from implementing a fee for services that it had previously provided for free. Moreover, as the above-mentioned explanations accompanying the proposed regulations suggest, the Department apparently contemplated enhanced services for tax return preparers upon the implementation of the regulations and the fee.

III. CONCLUSION

To summarize, 31 U.S.C. § 9701 provides authority to impose a user fee so long as the agency confers a special benefit. And 26 U.S.C. § 6109(a)(4) and (d) expressly provide authority for the Secretary to require that tax return preparers use the PTIN assigned by the Department, i.e. a number other than the preparer's social security number. And § 6109(a)(4) expressly provides that any return prepared by a tax return preparer shall bear the number assigned by the Department, meaning that a tax return preparer cannot prepare returns for others for compensation without such number. Because in exchange for the user fee the Department assigns a PTIN and confers a special benefit upon tax return preparers (i.e., they are thus privileged to prepare returns for others for compensation), we hold that the Department's user fee complies with § 9701.8 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.9

AFFIRMED.