Judges: Per Curiam
Filed: Nov. 02, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted October 29, 2015* Decided November 2, 2015 Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge No. 15---1281 Appeal from the United States District Court for the ULYSSES SCOTT, Northern District of Illinois, Plaintiff---Appellant, Eastern Division. v. No. 14 C 6657 CITY OF
Summary: NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted October 29, 2015* Decided November 2, 2015 Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge No. 15---1281 Appeal from the United States District Court for the ULYSSES SCOTT, Northern District of Illinois, Plaintiff---Appellant, Eastern Division. v. No. 14 C 6657 CITY OF ..
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NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 29, 2015*
Decided November 2, 2015
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
No. 15-‐‑1281 Appeal from the United
States District Court for the
ULYSSES SCOTT, Northern District of Illinois,
Plaintiff-‐‑Appellant,
Eastern Division.
v.
No. 14 C 6657
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.
Defendants-‐‑Appellees.
Order
Ulysses Scott contends in this suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 that Chicago’s police offic-‐‑
ers violated his rights by stopping his car, arresting him without probable cause, search-‐‑
ing his car, and ransacking his business, destroying some items and stealing others (and
stealing his personal effects as well). Scott was held for 16 days (beginning February 1,
2012) before being released on bond. He was charged with drug and firearm crimes but
* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary.
See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).
No. 15-‐‑1281 Page 2
asserts, without contradiction from the defendants, that he was acquitted at a trial in
June 2014.
The problem in Scott’s case, the district judge held when dismissing it, lies in its tim-‐‑
ing. It was filed in August 2014, though all of the material events occurred in February
2012, more than two years earlier. The statute of limitations for §1983 litigation in Illi-‐‑
nois is two years. Moore v. Burge, 771 F.3d 444, 446 (7th Cir. 2014). Claims for wrongful
search or wrongful deprivation of property accrue at the time of the search or seizure,
and for wrongful detention when the person is “detained pursuant to legal process”—
meaning the date a judge determines that the custody is justified. Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 397 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2013); Fox v. Hayes, 600
F.3d 819, 846 (7th Cir. 2010); Lawshe v. Simpson, 16 F.3d 1475, 1480 (7th Cir. 1994). The
last of these dates is February 18, 2012, when Scott was released on bond and learned
that the police would not return the items that he now characterizes as stolen. The suit
is untimely, which makes it unnecessary to discuss other potential issues.
For clarity, however, we add that Scott’s attempt to evade the time limit by charac-‐‑
terizing the defendants’ conduct as a conspiracy is unavailing. A conspiracy between
private parties and state actors authorizes suit against the private parties in federal
court. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) (42 U.S.C. §1985(3)); Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 114, 149–52 (1970) (§1983); Dixon v. Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1447–48 (10th
Cir. 1990) (discussing the differences between §1983 and §1985 conspiracy liability). All
of the defendants in this suit, however, are public employees (plus their employer),
which means that a conspiracy claim has no role to play. See, e.g., Fairley v. Andrews, 578
F.3d 518, 526 (7th Cir. 2009).
The district court relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over Scott’s claims under
Illinois law, see 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3), and did not abuse his discretion in doing so. All of
Scott’s state-‐‑law claims remain open to litigation in state court.
AFFIRMED
