Filed: Mar. 29, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted March 28, 2012* Decided March 29, 2012 Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge No. 11-2913 LATESHIA ZACHARY, Appeal from the United States District Plaintiff-Appellant, Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. v. No. 09 C 7879 ARAMARK CORRE
Summary: NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted March 28, 2012* Decided March 29, 2012 Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge No. 11-2913 LATESHIA ZACHARY, Appeal from the United States District Plaintiff-Appellant, Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. v. No. 09 C 7879 ARAMARK CORREC..
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NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 28, 2012*
Decided March 29, 2012
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge
RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 11‐2913
LATESHIA ZACHARY, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
v.
No. 09 C 7879
ARAMARK CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES, LLC, Charles R. Norgle, Sr.,
Defendant‐Appellee. Judge.
O R D E R
Lateshia Zachary appeals the denial of her motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) to reopen her suit for sex discrimination. We affirm.
Zachary sued Aramark Correctional Services, LLC, her former employer, for
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After Zachary and her
*
After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is
unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.
34(a)(2)(C).
No. 11‐2913 Page 2
attorney failed to appear at a status hearing, to respond to discovery, to communicate with
defense counsel, and to appear at a show‐cause hearing, the court dismissed the case for
failure to prosecute her complaint. Zachary’s attorney moved under Rule 59(e) to vacate the
judgment, and the motion was denied. Zachary did not appeal, and instead more than
seven months later filed a pro se motion to reopen the case, because her “extreme fatigue,
loss of memory and concentration, and crying fits” had kept her from pursuing the
litigation. The district court construed the motion as arising under Rule 60(b) and denied it,
noting that Zachary failed to explain why her personal difficulties prevented her from
informing the court or defense counsel of her situation.
On appeal, Zachary argues that the district court erred by dismissing her underlying
complaint for want of prosecution. In a prior order, however, we limited this appeal to a
review of her Rule 60(b) motion. Zachary may not use Rule 60(b) as a substitute for a timely
appeal of the underlying dismissal, see Kiswani v. Phoenix Sec. Agency, Inc., 584 F.3d 741, 743
(7th Cir. 2009); Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2000). To the extent that
Zachary’s brief can be construed to argue under Rule 60(b) that her nonfeasance was
“excusable neglect” based on medical circumstances beyond her control, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that she had not presented evidence of
exceptional circumstances to justify relief. See Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir.
2011); Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 547–48 (7th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.