MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this court determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. Accordingly, this court previously entered an order honoring the parties' requests that the appeal be submitted without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

I. INTRODUCTION

This appeal presents a narrow legal question: Can the movant, Tony Washington, utilize the sentence-modification procedure set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to have this court decide an issue left unresolved on direct appeal? The Supreme Court's decision in Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010), coupled with the policy statements accompanying U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, compel a negative answer.

II. BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial, Washington was convicted on two drug charges: (1) conspiracy to distribute crack and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846; and (2) conspiracy to maintain a residence for the purpose of distributing those same drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 856. United States v. Washington, 399 Fed.Appx. 418, 421 (10th Cir.2010). As part of determining Washington's advisory sentencing range under the 2008 version of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court calculated Washington's base offense level. Id. at 424-25 & 424 n. 4; see also U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3), (c) (2008) (providing that base offense levels for the drug crimes like those at issue in this case are tied to the quantity of drugs for which a defendant is accountable).

Washington, 399 Fed.Appx. at 424.1 On direct appeal, Washington contended the district court attributed too large a quantity of crack to him, "challeng[ing]"2 two components of the district court's calculations: (1) the conversion of the $2600 into 85.05 grams of cocaine base; and (2) the estimation he and his coconspirators purchased 680.4 grams of cocaine base with their pooled money. Id. This court specifically declined to resolve Washington's challenge to the conversion of $2600 into 85.05 grams of cocaine base, noting: "Washington ... recognizes that only the challenge to the 680.4 grams can lower the drug quantity below 500 grams and thereby reduce his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4). We therefore confine our analysis to the 680.4 grams." Id. This court denied Washington's appeal, concluding the quantity of 680.4 grams was supported by sufficient evidence. Id. at 424-25.

In August 2011, Washington filed a pro se motion for sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 750 of the Sentencing Guidelines.3 Washington did not challenge the correctness of his base offense level. Instead, he made the legally erroneous argument that Amendment 750 allowed the district court to reconsider its previous decision to give him a sentence above the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range. But see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (providing a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) is not authorized unless, inter alia, a retroactively applicable Guideline has "the effect of lowering the defendant's ... guideline range"); Dillon, 130 S.Ct. at 2691-93 (affirming binding nature of the eligibility criteria set out in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10). Washington urged the district court to reconsider and impose a sentence of 262 months, the bottom of the Guidelines range applicable at the time he was sentenced. The district court denied his motion, concluding that because Amendment 750 did not reduce Washington's offense level, it was without power to alter his sentence:

Dist. Court Order, No. 2:07-cr-20090, Docket No. 292 (D. Kan. June 14, 2013) (footnote omitted).

In May 2013, Washington, now acting through appointed counsel, filed another § 3582 motion. Although he styled his pleading as a "Motion for Sentence Reduction Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)," he did not assert the district court had the power to modify his sentence. Rather, the motion set out the background history noted above and asked for the following relief:

The government responded by asking the district court to grant Washington's motion. In particular, it asserted as follows:

In a minute entry, the district court denied Washington's motion, ruling as follows: "ORDER sustaining in part [Docket No. 299] motion, which the Court construes as a motion for an order denying defendant a reduction in his sentence, for substantially the reasons stated in the motion and the government's response [Docket No. 300] as to Tony Washington."

Thereafter, Washington filed the instant appeal, asking this court to take up and decide the issue it declined to resolve on direct appeal: whether the district court erred in converting $2600 in cash found on his person into 85.05 grams of crack. In response, the government filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. In particular, the government argued this court lacks statutory jurisdiction because Washington's appeal does not fit within the four categories of allowed sentencing appeals under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

III. APPELLATE JURISDICTION

The government asserts this court lacks statutory jurisdiction because Washington's appeal does not implicate any of the four categories of allowed sentencing appeals set out in § 3742(a).4 It emphasizes Washington conceded the district court was without power to alter his sentence and specifically limited his requested relief to the denial of a sentence reduction. Thus, according to the government, Washington cannot argue on appeal that the district court's action in denying a sentence reduction resulted in a sentence "imposed in violation of law," "imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines," or "greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range." See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1)-(3).

In response, Washington argues his appeal falls within the purview of § 3742(a)(1)-(3) because the district court's § 3582(c)(2) eligibility decision (albeit a decision it was compelled to make) is tainted by his original sentence, which sentence is unlawful and/or based on an incorrect application of the sentencing Guidelines. In particular, Washington argues the government failed, at his original sentencing hearing, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that currency found in his possession was related to the drug conspiracy. Thus, according to Washington, the district court erred in calculating his original base offense level when it included in that calculation a quantity of cocaine base equivalent to the value of that currency. Washington further asserts the government is incorrect in arguing his § 3582(c)(2) motion requested the denial of a sentence modification. Instead, he asserts the motion merely recognized the district court was without power to grant him relief and asked the district court to resolve the motion in a timely fashion so he could proceed on appeal.

Although not recognized by the parties, the government's motion to dismiss for lack of statutory jurisdiction implicates a circuit split. The Sixth Circuit has held that § 3742(a) is the sole source of jurisdiction to review the denial of a § 3582(c)(2) sentence modification. United States v. Bowers, 615 F.3d 715, 722 (6th Cir.2010). The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has held that the much broader grant of jurisdiction set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over final district court orders applies to modification determinations pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). Compare United States v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151, 1156-58 & 1158 n. 5 (9th Cir.2013), with id. at 1160-63 (O'Scannlain, J., specially concurring) (agreeing binding Ninth Circuit precedent established § 1291 as the jurisdiction basis to review such determinations, but asserting the Sixth Circuit's decision in Bowers is correct). In published opinions with no analysis or discussion of the issue, this court has stated that § 3582(c)(2) determinations are appealable under § 1291. United States v. Hodge, 721 F.3d 1279, 1279 (10th Cir.2013); United States v. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833, 834 (10th Cir.2008).5 Given the lack of analysis of the basis for jurisdiction in Hodge and Rhodes, however, they are not particularly helpful. See United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952) (holding a court "is not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned and was passed sub silentio").

We need not delve too deeply into this issue because nearly a decade ago this court, sitting en banc, held that § 3742(a)(1) does not displace § 1291's broad grant of appellate jurisdiction over appeals from final sentencing orders. United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1320-22 (10th Cir.2004) (en banc). But see id. at 1339-42 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (expressing doubt about the soundness of the Hahn majority's analysis of statutory jurisdiction). In rejecting the notion that the only types of allowed sentencing appeals were those four types set out in § 3742(a)(1), this court noted as follows:

Id. at 1320-21 (citations and footnotes omitted). Thus, this court has statutory jurisdiction over Washington's appeal without regard to whether the arguments he seeks to advance fall within one of the four categories set out in § 3742(a)(1).6

Although not couched as such, it is possible to read the government's jurisdictional arguments as relating to Article III jurisdiction. Cf. United States v. Battles, 745 F.3d 436, 447 (10th Cir.2014) ("It is axiomatic that we are obliged to independently inquire into the propriety of our jurisdiction."). That is, in arguing this court lacks statutory jurisdiction over this appeal, the government seems to suggest Washington is not aggrieved by the district court's order because he obtained the relief he requested (i.e., he asked the district court to deny him a sentence reduction and the district court did so). See United States v. Ramos, 695 F.3d 1035, 1046 (10th Cir.2012) ("To have standing, one must be aggrieved by the order from which appeal is taken." (quotation omitted)). The government's assertions in this regard are based on an improperly narrow reading of Washington's § 3582(c)(2) motion. Washington's motion did not request the denial of a sentence modification. Instead, it merely conceded the district court lacked power to modify Washington's sentence and asked the district court to so rule so the matter could be appealed to this court, the tribunal Washington believed could provide him relief. In contrast to the government's assertions, it is not remotely unusual for a litigant to concede an argument is foreclosed by binding law, while simultaneously preserving that issue for further review. Cf., e.g., United States v. Antonio-Agusta, 672 F.3d 1209, 1211 n. 1 (10th Cir.2012) (conceding claim of error failed because panel was bound by existing Tenth Circuit precedent, but preserving issue for challenge to correctness of that precedent); Lowery v. Cnty. of Riley, 522 F.3d 1086, 1092 (10th Cir.2008) (same); Brown v. Sirmons, 515 F.3d 1072, 1091 (10th Cir.2008) (same); United States v. VanDam, 493 F.3d 1194, 1198 n. 2 (10th Cir.2007) (same). That being the case, Washington is aggrieved by the district court order denying him a sentence modification and this court has Article III jurisdiction over his appeal.

IV. ANALYSIS

That this court has jurisdiction to review the district court's final order denying Washington's motion does not speak to the question whether Washington can utilize the sentence-modification procedure set out in § 3582(c)(2) to have this court resolve an issue left unresolved on direct appeal. In answering that question, we begin by recognizing the modification procedure set out in § 3582(c)(2) is carefully constrained. It applies only "in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In determining whether a movant satisfies that baseline eligibility criterion,7 courts must act "consistent[ly] with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Id.; see also United States v. McGee, 615 F.3d 1287, 1292 (10th Cir.2010) (holding courts must begin process by "follow[ing] the Commission's instructions in [U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.10 to determine the prisoner's eligibility for a sentence modification" (quotation omitted)). The relevant policy statements explain that § 3582(c)(2) proceedings "do not constitute a full resentencing of the defendant." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(3). Instead, a district court must begin by determining "the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in subsection (c) had been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1). "In making such determination, the court shall substitute only the [retroactively applicable amendments] for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected." Id.

In Dillon, the Supreme Court emphasized the limited nature of a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding and noted that "[b]y its terms, § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a sentencing or resentencing proceeding." 130 S.Ct. at 2690. District courts do not "impose a new sentence in the usual sense," but merely reduce an otherwise final sentence in certain limited circumstances. Id. at 2690-91. Consistent with its "narrow view" of the sentence-modification procedure set out in § 3582(c)(2), Dillon specifically held that district courts cannot recalculate aspects of a sentence that are unaffected by a retroactively applicable amendment to the Guidelines. See id. at 2694. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Freeman v. United States noted a "district court's authority under § 3582(c)(2) is subject to significant constraints." ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2685, 2693, 180 L.Ed.2d 519 (2011) (plurality opinion). Citing § 1B1.10(b)(1), the Court stated that "[a]ll Guidelines decisions from the original sentencing remain in place, save the sentencing range that was altered by retroactive amendment." Id.

As these precedents make clear, the eligibility component of the sentence-modification procedure set out in § 3582(c)(2) is intended to be limited and streamlined. Nothing in those procedures contemplates the use of such a motion in the way contemplated by Washington. That is, nothing in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 authorizes a movant to (1) bypass a district court (even one admittedly constrained by the law-of-the-case doctrine) and then, on appeal, (2) ask this court to make the relevant eligibility determination in the first instance by reopening the movant's previously resolved direct appeal. Moreover, contrary to Washington's suggestion, this court's decision in United States v. Battle, 706 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir.2013), does not support such an approach.

Battle adopts a procedure by which to account for the limited nature of the baseline eligibility determination in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings when, at the original sentencing, the district court did not make a necessary finding:

Battle, 706 F.3d at 1318 (citation omitted); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(h)(3)(B) (empowering district courts to bypass resolution of contested matters if, inter alia, the "matter will not affect sentencing"). Battle began by surveying the existing precedents:

Id. at 1318-19. This court then adopted the narrow reconciliation procedure set out in the cited cases:

Id. at 1319.

Washington contends his appeal represents nothing more than an appellate analog to the procedure adopted for district courts in Battle. That is, in Battle, this court allowed the district court to resolve in the context of a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding a contested quantity issue the district court previously declined to resolve at sentencing because it would not affect Battle's sentence. Id. at 1315-16. Washington contends this court should likewise resolve, in the context of the instant § 3582(c)(2) appeal, a contested quantity issue we declined to resolve on direct appeal because it would not affect his sentence. Although Washington's appellate arguments have superficial appeal, they do not survive close scrutiny.

What Washington is asking this court to do on appeal bears no meaningful resemblance to the procedure this court approved for district courts in Battle. As the lengthy exposition of Battle set out above makes clear, the procedure contemplated therein is carefully tailored to flow directly from the original district court record, sentencing memoranda, and previously made factual findings. Id. at 1318-19 (consistently referring to use of the original record, original filings, and original findings-of-fact to make "supplemental" factual findings). The issue Washington asks this court to address, on the other hand, does not flow from a legal determination made on direct appeal. If this appeal were truly an appellate analog of Battle, it would raise a legal question that could be resolved by reference to legal rulings this court previously made on direct appeal. Washington challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court's conclusion $2600 found on his person was related to his underlying drug-conspiracy conviction. He does not assert in this appeal, however, that this issue can be resolved by reference to any of the legal determinations made by this court on direct appeal. Furthermore, although this court did resolve an evidence-sufficiency challenge to the district court's drug-quantity calculation on direct appeal, that resolution does not necessarily speak to whether a separate part of the district court's drug-quantity calculation is supported by sufficient evidence.

Likewise, Washington does not ask this court to resolve the propriety of the district court's conversion of $2600 to cocaine base by reference to his original briefing in this court on direct appeal. Those briefs are not part of the record in this appeal and Washington has not asked the court to take judicial notice of them.8 Instead, Washington's brief in this appeal addresses anew the merits of the sufficiency issue.9 As a consequence, it is easy to conclude Washington's appeal does not fit within the contours of his imagined appellate analog to Battle. Instead, what Washington seeks is a brand new direct appeal, something utterly at odds with the limited and streamlined eligibility determination envisioned in § 3582(c)(2), U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, and Dillon.10

V. CONCLUSION

The issue Washington seeks to raise on appeal falls outside the procedures established by the Sentencing Commission to implement the baseline eligibility requirement in § 3582(c)(2). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. Consequently, this court has no power to address the matter. The order of the district court denying Washington a sentence modification is hereby affirmed. The government's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of statutory jurisdiction is denied.