BRANCH, Judge.
Following the loss of her job as a surgical technician at Floyd Medical Center, Mindy Howerton filed suit in Floyd County Superior Court against Harbin Clinic, LLC and one of its employees, Kenneth C. Sands, M.D. Howerton asserted claims against both defendants for tortious interference with her employment contract, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She also asserted a claim against Harbin Clinic for the negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of Sands. Howerton now appeals from an order of the trial court granting summary judgment to Harbin Clinic as to all of the claims Howerton asserted against it and granting summary judgment to Sands on all of Howerton's claims against him, other than assault and battery. For reasons explained more fully below, we find
On an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we review the record de novo, construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion. Wright v. IC Enterprises, 330 Ga.App. 303, 765 S.E.2d 484 (2014). Moreover, the unrefuted testimony or sworn pleadings of the party opposing summary judgment must "be taken as true for purposes of deciding that motion." Peach Blossom Dev. Co. v. Lowe Elec. Supply Co., 300 Ga.App. 268, 271, 684 S.E.2d 398 (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted). Additionally, where the record shows that one or more witnesses have offered conflicting testimony about a material fact, it is for the jury, and not the court, to resolve that conflict. Smith v. Tenet Health System Spalding, 327 Ga.App. 878, 879(1), 761 S.E.2d 409 (2014) (footnote omitted).
Viewed in the light most favorable to Howerton, as the non-movant, the record shows that Harbin Clinic, LLC, is a multi-specialty medical practice with locations in north Georgia, including Rome. From July 2006 through June 2011, Harbin Clinic employed Kenneth C. Sands, M.D., as an orthopedic surgeon in its Rome office. Harbin Clinic, in turn, had an agreement with Floyd Medical Center ("FMC") under which physicians employed by Harbin Clinic had surgical privileges at FMC.
From April 2008 until October 2012, Mindy Howerton was employed as a surgical technician at FMC. Howerton was hired to work FMC's first shift, and it was during this shift that Sands regularly performed his surgeries. In late 2008, Howerton was assigned to one of the two FMC surgical teams that worked with Sands and she remained on that team until approximately February 2011.
According to Howerton, the atmosphere in the operating room when Sands was performing surgery was overtly sexual, with Sands engaging in unprofessional conduct of a sexual nature. Sands behaved inappropriately towards Howerton almost immediately after they began working together, with Sands asking Howerton about her sex life and about the appearance of her breasts and her genitals. Sands groped Howerton's breasts while reaching for an instrument during surgery on at least one occasion; told Howerton he had gone into the operating room where she was undergoing a gynecological procedure following a miscarriage so he could take "a peek" at her genitals; and asked Howerton to his home to have a glass of wine and relax, explaining that his wife and children were out of town. According to Howerton, these incidents of harassment began to escalate in approximately December 2010. At about that time, following an operating room discussion about hair color, Sands, who has a shaved head, pulled down his scrub pants to expose his pubic hair and the top of his penis to Howerton, ostensibly to demonstrate that he had red hair. On one occasion between December 2010 and January 2011, Sands remarked that Howerton was so pale she would "glow in the dark in the bedroom." Sands then trapped Howerton in a corner of the scrub room and lifted her top so that he could examine her skin. Sands also lifted Howerton's shirt on a second occasion, this time so he could admire her flat stomach. Finally, in late January 2011, Sands started a conversation among the operating room staff as to whether any of them would cheat on their spouse with an ex-lover. After surgery that day, Sands followed Howerton onto the elevator where she was preparing to transport surgical instruments. When they were alone, Sands told
At some point during her employment at FMC, Howerton began filling in as a surgical technician on the second shift, and in early 2011 she began discussing with her superiors the possibility of transferring to the second shift full time. On January 27, 2011, Howerton had a telephone conversation with Lee Ford, the assistant director of FMC, in which she asked about the possibility of moving to a permanent position on second shift. During that same conversation, Howerton told Ford of several specific instances of Sands's sexually harassing conduct.
Before Howerton's transfer to the second shift could be completed, a confrontation occurred between Sands and Howerton's husband, Scott. Shortly after midnight on February 17, 2011, Sands began texting Howerton. Sands told Howerton that he needed to speak with her and asked if she could talk or if her husband was home. When Howerton responded that she could communicate by text, Sands replied that he wanted to speak with her and that he would call her the next day. At approximately 1:40 a.m., Scott Howerton texted Sands, identified himself, and told Sands that he had recorded the message Sands left on "the 27th";
During his deposition, Sands admitted that he may have told Scott he could have Howerton fired. He further testified that during their conversation Scott accused Sands of inappropriate conduct towards Howerton and that throughout his "rantings," Scott "kept coming around to why he sent [his wife] to the hospital with a tape recorder." Sands admitted that he never followed up with Howerton to determine whether she had used the tape recorder Scott referred to while at work and, if so, where she had used it.
As a result of his conversations with Scott, Sands contacted Gia Pyles, the charge nurse at FMC who was responsible for scheduling staff in the operating rooms and who served as Howerton's direct supervisor, at approximately 7:00 a.m. the morning of February 17. Sands told Pyles that he had learned that Howerton was recording conversations that were occurring in the operating room. Although Sands testified that he spoke only to Pyles about Howerton's allegedly making recordings in the operating room, Howerton produced evidence showing that Sands had contacted everyone on both of his operating room teams and told them that Howerton would no longer be working with them.
Also on the morning of February 17, Howerton received a call from Lee Ford, asking her to come to the hospital to fill out the paperwork necessary for Howerton to begin work on the second shift. When Howerton arrived for that meeting she found both Ford and Dr. Becky Lowrey, the FMC director of surgical services, waiting for her. Instead of discussing Howerton's transfer, however, both women questioned Howerton about what had happened with Sands. Lowrey also told Howerton that she had been informed that Howerton "was wearing a wire" in the operating room and that such conduct "was a HIPAA violation and grounds for termination." When she realized that Ford and Lowrey wanted to discuss the situation with Sands, Howerton called her husband to come to the meeting because she wanted him to explain his conversation with Sands. While they were waiting for Scott to arrive, Howerton asked if they could discuss her transfer to the second shift. Lowrey responded that she was unsure as to whether they could make the transfer, as FMC did not believe Howerton's skill level was "up to par." This was the first criticism Howerton had ever heard of her job skills. Ford also indicated that an additional reason for delaying the transfer was that FMC didn't know "how all this is going to work out ... with Dr. Sands." Lowrey then agreed that they did not know how the situation was "going to work."
Shortly after that meeting, Lowrey called Howerton and told her that the second shift position she had been promised was not currently available. To separate Howerton from Sands, however, FMC proposed moving Howerton to work on outpatient surgeries, as opposed to inpatient surgeries.
In February 2013, Howerton filed the current lawsuit against Harbin Clinic and Sands. She asserted claims against both Sands and Harbin Clinic for tortious interference with her employment contract, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
1. In her first enumeration of error, Howerton asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against her and in favor of Sands on her claim for tortious interference with her employment contract.
To prevail on her tortious interference claim against Sands, Howerton must prove that she had a valid employment contract with FMC; that Sands acted wrongfully and without privilege when he reported to Howerton's superiors that she was recording conversations in the operating room; that Sands acted deliberately and maliciously; that as a result of Sands's conduct, Howerton's employment with FMC was adversely affected; and that consequently, Howerton suffered damages. See Atlanta Market Ctr. Mgmt. v. McLane, 269 Ga. 604, 608(2), 503 S.E.2d 278 (1998).
(a) "To establish that a defendant acted without privilege, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was a stranger to the contract" with which he allegedly interfered; one who is not a stranger to a contract cannot be held liable for tortiously interfering with that agreement. Brathwaite v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 317 Ga.App. 111, 113(1), 729 S.E.2d 625 (2012) (citation omitted). In this case, the trial court found that Sands was not a stranger to Howerton's employment contract because he was an unintended third-party beneficiary of that contract. This holding was in error.
The rule that a third-party beneficiary of a contract is not a stranger thereto evolved from the law providing that an intended third-party beneficiary may sue to enforce a contract even though he is not a party to the agreement. "In order for a third party to have standing to enforce a contract, it must clearly appear from the contract that it was intended for his or her benefit." Boller v. Robert W. Woodruff Arts Ctr., 311 Ga.App. 693, 698(3), 716 S.E.2d 713 (2011) (punctuation and footnote, omitted; emphasis in original). See also OCGA § 9-2-20(b) ("[t]he beneficiary of a contract made between other parties for his benefit may maintain an action against the promisor on the contract"). To have standing to sue on a contract, "[t]he third-party beneficiary need not be specifically named [therein]; the dispositive issue is whether the [contracting] parties' intention to benefit the third party is shown on the face of the contract." Dillon v. Reid, 312 Ga.App. 34, 40(4), 717 S.E.2d 542 (2011) (citations and punctuation omitted). Thus, the mere fact that an individual would receive some incidental benefit from performance of a contract is insufficient to make them an intended third-party beneficiary of the agreement. Boller, 311 Ga.App. at 698(3), 716 S.E.2d 713.
In the context of a tortious interference claim, the category of third-party beneficiaries excluded from the so-called "`stranger doctrine' has been expanded to
In this case, Sands argued, and the trial court found, that Harbin Clinic has an agreement with FMC for the use of its operating rooms; that this agreement requires FMC to employ qualified personnel to work in the operating room during surgeries performed by Harbin Clinic physicians; and that because Sands could not perform surgery without FMC employees, he had a direct economic interest in FMC's contracts with its individual employees, including Howerton. This reasoning is inconsistent with the applicable law.
Our cases make clear that to qualify as an unintended third-party beneficiary of a contract, a party must have a direct economic interest in the subject of the specific contract at issue. For example, in Disaster Services, 228 Ga.App. 739, 492 S.E.2d 526, a corporate entity known as ERC had contracted to buy a building in which Eastern Airlines ("EAL") had a leasehold interest. Id. Thus, the sale of the building also involved a separate contract for the buyout of EAL's leasehold interest. Before the sale could be completed, however, and while EAL was still in possession of the building pursuant to its lease, the building suffered significant fire damage. Id. EAL, who bore responsibility for repairing the damage, contracted with Disaster Services, Inc. ("DRI") to repair the building in three phases. Id. After the first phase of repairs was completed, ERC asked that EAL delay any further repairs "so that ERC could negotiate a purchase of the fee simple interest in the building ... and have total ownership and control of the building." Id. ERC thereafter negotiated for the purchase of the building "as-is." Id. at 740, 492 S.E.2d 526. EAL then assigned its rights under the lease to ERC and this "final agreement relieved EAL of any duty to have the building repaired and assigned to ERC any rights to the [fire] insurance proceeds." Id. Following this transaction, EAL exercised its right to cancel the repair contract with DRI. DRI then sued ERC for tortious interference with its contractual and business relationship with EAL. The trial court granted summary judgment to ERC and this Court affirmed, finding that ERC was not a stranger to the repair contract because it was an unintended third-party beneficiary of that agreement. Specifically, we held that ERC had a direct financial interest in the repair contract, because the subject of that contract was a building which ERC had agreed to purchase. Id. at 740-741, 492 S.E.2d 526.
Similarly, in Jefferson-Pilot Communications Co., Jefferson-Pilot contracted with Phoenix City to purchase a radio station that was being built by Phoenix City. After a dispute arose between the parties as to who would bear certain construction costs, Jefferson Pilot wrote a letter to Phoenix City's
Unlike the defendants in Jefferson-Pilot and Disaster Services, Sands has not demonstrated that he has a direct economic interest in Howerton's personal employment contract with FMC. The record shows that three separate contracts resulted in Howerton and Sands working together: Harbin Clinic's contract with FMC; Harbin Clinic's contract with Sands; and FMC's contract with Howerton. Unlike the contracts at issue in Disaster Svcs. and Jefferson-Pilot, however, these three agreements do not constitute "a comprehensive interwoven set of contracts." Jefferson-Pilot, 205 Ga.App. at 60(1), 421 S.E.2d 295. Specifically, the contracts at issue in Disaster Svcs. and Jefferson-Pilot, although separate, each involved the same subject matter, namely a specific building. Each of the three contracts at issue in this case, however, addresses a specific subject that is separate from and independent of the subject addressed by the other two contracts. Specifically, one contract sets forth the terms for the use of FMC's operating rooms by Harbin Clinic physicians; one sets forth the terms of Harbin Clinic's employment of Sands; and one sets forth the terms of Howerton's employment with FMC.
The fact that there was no direct relationship between Harbin Clinic's contract with FMC and Howerton's individual employment contract is further demonstrated by the fact that the agreement with Harbin Clinic merely required FMC to staff its operating rooms with qualified personnel; it did not require FMC either to employ particular individuals or to assign specific employees to particular operating rooms. Rather, the contract between FMC and Harbin Clinic gave FMC control over which of its employees were assigned to a specific operating room. Thus, Howerton's assignment to Sands's operating room was a coincidental, rather than a direct, result of Harbin Clinic's contract with FMC. It was also a coincidental result of Howerton's employment contract with FMC, as FMC could and did assign Howerton to operating rooms other than Sands's. Given these facts, nothing in the record supports the conclusion that Sands, as an employee of Harbin Clinic, had a direct economic interest in the contracts FMC had with its individual employees, including Howerton.
Additionally, in analyzing Sands's claim that he was not a stranger to the contract at issue, the trial court neither acknowledged nor applied those cases that have addressed claims of tortious interference with an employment contract. Those cases show that Georgia has long recognized that even an at-will employment contract "is a valuable contract right, which may not be unlawfully interfered with by a third person without such authority." Moore v. Barge, 210 Ga.App. 552, 553(1), 436 S.E.2d 746 (1993), citing Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613(2), 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978). Under Georgia law, therefore, an employee has a cause of action for tortious interference where "a party with no authority to discharge [the employee], being activated by an unlawful scheme or purpose to injure and damage the employee, maliciously and unlawfully persuades the employer to breach the contract with the employee." Moore, 210
Brathwaite serves as an example of just how broadly Georgia's courts have defined "strangers" to an employment contract. The defendant in that case, Quinn, had supervised Brathwaite in her job as a coding specialist at Grady Hospital. 317 Ga.App. at 112, 729 S.E.2d 625. After learning of allegations that Quinn had engaged in misconduct in her prior job, Brathwaite reported this information to Quinn's supervisor and following an investigation, Quinn was forced to resign. Id. After her resignation, however, Quinn maintained contact with the hospital's CFO, who eventually re-hired Quinn. Id. After being reinstated, Quinn fired Brathwaite and Brathwaite sued, asserting a claim against Quinn for tortious interference with her employment contract. The trial court dismissed this count of the complaint, concluding that because Quinn was Brathwaite's supervisor and had the authority to fire Brathwaite, she was not a stranger to the employment contract. This Court reversed, noting that the complaint "alleged that, while not employed by Grady, Quinn took actions to tortiously interfere with Brathwaite's employment contract with Grady by soliciting and obtaining an agreement with [the hospital's CFO] to terminate Brathwaite after Quinn was re-hired." Id. at 114(1), 729 S.E.2d 625. Thus, because "[t]hese allegations concerned actions taken by Quinn when she was a stranger to the employment contract" (i.e., when Quinn was without the authority to supervise and terminate Brathwaite's employment), Quinn could be held liable for that conduct. Id.
In this case, Sands was not even a co-employee of Howerton, as they worked for two separate entities. Although a contractual relationship of some kind existed between these two entities, there is no evidence showing that any such agreement authorized Sands, as an employee of Harbin Clinic, to fire FMC's employees or recommend their termination. Indeed, Sands testified that he was without authority even to remove Howerton from the team that staffed his operating room; rather, he had to ask FMC to remove her.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, Sands was neither a party to Howerton's employment contract nor an intended third-party beneficiary thereof. Additionally, Sands had no direct economic interest in Howerton's employment contract. Given
(b) Sands argues that even if he was not a stranger to Howerton's employment contract, he is nevertheless entitled to summary judgment on the tortious interference claim because it is "undisputed" that he did not act with malicious intent. With respect to tortious interference claims, the term "malice" is "to be given a liberal meaning; malicious or maliciously means any unauthorized interference, or any interference without legal justification or excuse." Renden, Inc. v. Liberty Real Estate Ltd. Partnership III, 213 Ga.App. 333, 334(2), 444 S.E.2d 814 (1994) (citations omitted). Here, Sands contends that Howerton cannot prove malice because he was required by law to report her HIPAA violation. At the hearing on Sands's summary judgment motion, the trial court rejected this argument, finding that Sands had failed to show any knowledge on his part that Howerton's recordings violated HIPAA. Specifically, the trial court noted that the evidence failed to demonstrate that Sands knew that Howerton had recorded confidential patient information; rather, it showed only that Sands was aware that Howerton had recorded his allegedly inappropriate comments. Accordingly, the trial court found that there was at least a factual question as to whether Sands had actual knowledge of a HIPAA violation. We agree.
Sands testified at his deposition that Scott informed him via text message that Howerton had been taping conversations that occurred in the operating room to obtain evidence of Sands's sexual harassment; that he was so stunned by this revelation that he "wrote down the texts `verbatim'"; and that he had maintained his handwritten copy of Scott's texts. In his supplemental interrogatory responses,
With respect to information he obtained during his telephone conversation with Scott, Sands testified that Scott accused him of acting inappropriately towards Howerton and that Scott "kept coming around to why he sent [his wife] to the hospital with a tape recorder." Sands did not testify, however, that Scott told him specifically that Howerton was recording conversations in the operating room. Finally, Sands also acknowledged that he never discussed with Howerton what she had recorded or where she had recorded it.
We agree with the trial court that this evidence shows that a jury question exists not only as to Sands's knowledge of a HIPAA violation, but also as to Sands's motive and intent in reporting any such violation. In
(c) Sands further argues that Howerton's tortious interference claim must fail because there is no evidence that his report regarding Howerton's alleged HIPAA violation induced FMC to take action with respect to Howerton's employment contract. Construed in favor of Howerton, however, the record shows that prior to Sands's report, Howerton had received an offer of employment on the second shift;
In light of the foregoing, we find that Sands was not entitled to summary judgment on Howerton's tortious interference claim. Specifically, the evidence shows that Howerton had a valid employment contract with FMC and that Sands was a stranger to that contract. The evidence further shows that questions of fact exist as to whether Sands acted deliberately and maliciously in reporting Howerton's alleged HIPAA violation; whether Sands's conduct adversely affected Howerton's employment with FMC; and whether and to what extent Howerton suffered damages as a result of Sands's alleged conduct.
2. Howerton further contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Sands on her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
(a) Conduct that can be characterized as merely vulgar, tasteless, rude, or insulting will not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Troncalli v. Jones, 237 Ga.App. 10, 15(3), 514 S.E.2d 478 (1999). See also Ashman v. Marshall's of MA, 244 Ga.App. 228, 229(1), 535 S.E.2d 265 (2000) ("[a]ctionable conduct does not include insults, threats, indignities, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other vicissitudes of daily living but must go beyond all reasonable bounds of decency"). Rather, the conduct on which an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is based must be so abusive or obscene that reasonable people would naturally assume that the target of such conduct would experience "intense feelings of humiliation, embarrassment, fright or extreme outrage." Jones v. Fayette Family Dental Care, 312 Ga.App. 230, 232, 718 S.E.2d 88 (2011) (physical precedent only). See also Mears, 225 Ga.App. at 641(2)(b), 484 S.E.2d 659. As we have explained previously, "[t]he rule of thumb in determining whether the conduct complained of was sufficiently extreme and outrageous is whether the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse her resentment against the defendant so that she would exclaim `Outrageous!'" Ashman, 244 Ga.App. at 229(1), 535 S.E.2d 265 (footnote omitted).
In assessing whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, we have found that conduct which occurs in the context of the victim's employment "`may produce a character of outrageousness that might otherwise not exist.'" Fayette Family Dental Care, 312 Ga.App. at 232, 718 S.E.2d 88, quoting Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 176 Ga.App. 227, 230(1), 335 S.E.2d 445 (1985). This rule results from the fact that the workplace "presents a hierarchy of structured relationships which cannot easily be avoided" and thereby "provides a captive victim who may fear reprisal for complaining, so that the injury is exacerbated by repetition." Coleman v. Housing Auth. of Americus, 191 Ga.App. 166, 169(1), 381 S.E.2d 303 (1989) And where a defendant has engaged in a series of acts or a pervasive pattern of conduct allegedly causing emotional distress, we must view the defendant's acts cumulatively, rather than individually, when assessing
Here, the record shows that Sands engaged in at least two specific instances of conduct that would support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. These include Sands's allegedly telling Howerton that he had gone into the operating room while she was undergoing a gynecological procedure following her miscarriage in order to view her genitals. Howerton testified that not long after the procedure, Sands told her he had gone into the operating room "while my legs were up in the stirrups ... and got a peek." He made this comment in front of other staff members, while Howerton was assisting in Sands's operating room. Sands then proceeded to question one of those other staff members, who had also assisted in Howerton's procedure. According to Howerton, Sands asked this staff member "what [Howerton] looked like down there. If I shaved, what color my carpet was. Did I have a landing strip.... If I had big lips...." We think that an average member of the community, upon hearing of this conduct, would respond with outrage.
Similarly, a jury could also conclude that Sands's alleged conduct in exposing his pubic hair and the top of his penis to Howerton to demonstrate that he did, in fact, have red hair was so "abusive or obscene as naturally to humiliate, embarrass, frighten, or extremely outrage" Howerton. Troncalli, 237 Ga.App. at 15(3), 514 S.E.2d 478 (citation and punctuation omitted). See Fayette Family Dental Care, 312 Ga.App. at 233, 718 S.E.2d 88 (conduct of plaintiff's employer in exposing himself and masturbating in the workplace could be considered extreme and outrageous); Mangrum v. Republic Indus., 260 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1256(III)(D) (N.D.Ga.2003) (supervisor's alleged exposure of his penis to an employee could constitute sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under Georgia law). Finally, the jury could also view the fact that Sands's engaged in a pervasive pattern of harassing behavior and that he did so in Howerton's workplace as evidence of the extreme and outrageous nature of his conduct. Ferman, 292 Ga.App. at 291(2)(a), 664 S.E.2d 285.
(b) "Emotional distress includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea." Jones v. Warner, 301 Ga.App. 39, 42-43(3), 686 S.E.2d 835 (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted). To recover for such distress, however, it must be extreme. Id. To demonstrate that the emotional distress she suffered was severe, a plaintiff must show, at the very least, that physical and/or mental manifestations of that distress required her to seek medical or psychological treatment. See Troncalli, 237 Ga. App. at 11-12, 514 S.E.2d 478 (affirming jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where the evidence showed that as a result of the defendant's behavior, she "developed shingles, experienced nausea and vomiting, became frightened and depressed, and sought psychological counseling"); Coleman, 191 Ga. App. at 168-169(1), 381 S.E.2d 303 (emotional distress suffered by plaintiff as a result of sexually harassing conduct was sufficiently severe to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; evidence showed that she suffered "physical manifestations (headaches, crying, chest pains) as well as mental and emotional symptoms (upset,
According to Howerton, Sands's conduct made her feel "angry," "distressed," "humiliated," "upset," and "disturbed." She further testified that the stress she felt as a result of working with Sands prompted her to seek treatment from her family physician for these symptoms. Howerton's medical records show that she visited her family physician at least three times during the last six months she worked with Sands. On June 10, 2010, Howerton made a "new patient" visit to her family physician. On this visit, Howerton reported experiencing alopecia (hair loss), stress, anxiety, migraines, sleep difficulties, and fatigue. Her physician put her on a "trial" prescription of an antidepressant (Lexapro), and Howerton testified that she took this medication for approximately two months. At her follow-up visit two weeks later, Howerton's physician prescribed an anti-anxiety medication and a sleep aid, and it appears he renewed those prescriptions in December 2010. At that December visit, Howerton again reported suffering from alopecia and anxiety. This evidence, which shows that Howerton suffered physical and mental manifestations of her alleged emotional distress severe enough to require medical treatment, suffices to allow her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to survive summary judgment.
As the foregoing demonstrates, Howerton presented sufficient evidence to allow reasonable jurors to conclude that Sands's alleged conduct was extreme and outrageous and that she suffered severe emotional distress as a result of that conduct.
3. Finally, Howerton contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Harbin Clinic on her claim for negligent supervision.
"For an employer to be held liable for negligent supervision, there must be `sufficient evidence to establish that the employer reasonably knew or should have known of an employee's tendencies to engage
Furthermore, Harbin Clinic produced evidence showing that it did a thorough background check on Sands before hiring him, and that check revealed no indication that Sands had ever engaged in any kind of improper conduct, sexually harassing or otherwise, prior to his employment with Harbin Clinic. Given the evidence of record, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Harbin Clinic on Howerton's negligent supervision claim. See Doe I v. Young Women's Christian Assn. of Greater Atlanta, 321 Ga.App. 403, 408(2), 740 S.E.2d 453 (2013) (affirming grant of summary judgment to employer on claim for negligent supervision where the record was "devoid of evidence" that the employee in question had ever engaged in similar behavior); Leo, 298 Ga.App. at 842(2), 681 S.E.2d 258 (same).
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Sands on Howerton's claim for tortious interference with her employment contract and her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Harbin Clinic as to all of Howerton's claims against it.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
MILLER, J., concurs. ANDREWS, P.J., concurs in Divisions 1 and 3 and in the judgment.