The Secretary of Health and Human Services appeals a decision by the district court1 invalidating a regulation issued by the Secretary which orders the disregard of student status of a minor parent of dependent children in determining whether the family qualifies for assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Because we believe the district court correctly concluded that the regulation rests on a misreading of the statute it interprets and frustrates the congressional purpose in creating the AFDC program, we affirm.

Congress enacted the AFDC statutes, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 601-615 (1982 & West Supp.1985), to help the states provide financial assistance to needy, dependent children and the parents or relatives who live with and care for them. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 601 (1982). States that choose to participate in the program are required to comply with federal requirements, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602 (1982 & West Supp.1985), and in return are partly reimbursed for their costs. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 603 (1982 & West Supp.1985). The statutes do, however, leave considerable discretion to the states to determine the standard of need and the level of benefits. Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253, 94 S. Ct. 1746, 1750, 40 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1974).

To qualify for AFDC, a family must contain children who meet certain age and need requirements. The state is permitted some latitude in selecting the age requirement. Under the AFDC statutes, the state may limit program eligibility to needy children who are under 18 years of age. The state may, however, at its option, extend eligibility to needy children under the age of 19 who are full-time students in a secondary school. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 606(a)(2) (1982).2

In determining whether a child is needy, the statutes require the state to consider all available income and resources of the child and the relative who claims AFDC eligiblity along with the child. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(a)(7)(A) (1982 & West Supp.1985). This calculus, in the past, had been limited to funds available in fact to a child for current use and on a regular basis. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 555, 90 S. Ct. 1282, 1283-84, 25 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1970). With the passage of section 2640 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(a)(39) (1982 & West Supp.1985), the pool of funds deemed available in determining need was enlarged to include certain income of the dependent child's grandparents if the child's parent is a minor and if the family lives with the grandparents. For the purpose of this grandparent deeming provision, a parent is considered a minor if "under the age selected by the State" to determine who is eligible for dependent child status pursuant to section 606(a)(2). 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(a)(39).3

Following the enactment of the grandparent deeming statute, the Secretary announced a regulation to implement the statute, the validity of which is at issue here. The regulation, echoing the statute, provides that the income of grandparents be considered for AFDC purposes if the dependent child's parent is under the AFDC eligibility age selected by the state and therefore a minor within the meaning of the statute. The regulation further provides, however, that the age selected by the state be looked to without regard to school attendance.4 As a result, in states which opt to extend AFDC benefits to children under 19 who are full-time students, all parents under 19, regardless of their school attendance, are defined as minors for purposes of the grandparent deeming statute. Since grandparents' income is deemed available to the minor parent's children when the minor parent and the children live with the grandparents, some previously eligible families headed by parents between the ages 18 and 19 become ineligible for assistance under the AFDC program.

Stella Morrison, a Minnesota resident, is such a parent.5 She is an 18 year old mother of two children and not a student. The sole means of support for the Morrison family is an AFDC payment of $524 a month. At one time Morrison lived apart from her parents. Now, however, because of health problems that she and her younger child have suffered since that child's birth, the family lives with Morrison's parents.

Minnesota is a state that exercises the option offered in section 606(a)(2) to grant students younger than 19 eligibility for AFDC benefits. Because the Secretary's regulation interpreting the statute uses the state selection under section 606(a)(2) to determine who is a minor parent, but disregards student status, Morrison was defined as a minor parent and her parents' resources were deemed available to Morrison's children. As a result, the family was judged to be no longer eligible under the AFDC program, and assistance was terminated.

The Secretary argues that the language of the grandparent deeming statute, which refers to age but not to school attendance, its legislative history, and its underlying purpose, to curb government spending, clearly establish that the Secretary's interpretation, as reflected in the regulation, is correct. The Secretary thus charges that the district court's invalidation of the regulation is erroneous.

The district court, in a thoughtful opinion, Morrison v. Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 1485 (D.Minn.1985), soundly put to rest the Secretary's complaints:

A state may limit assistance to those who are 17 years of age or younger, or it may choose to offer assistance to 18 year old children who continue in school on a full-time basis and are expected to graduate before they reach the age of 19. A state may not, however, elect to provide AFDC to all 18 year old children who are needy. It may not ignore the school attendance requirement when opting to provide AFDC assistance to 18 year olds. By reference to section 06(a)(2), Congress clearly intended to limit the consideration of grandparent income to the dependent children of parents who met the 'age requirement' under the Act. School attendance is an inseparable part of this age requirement when states choose to provide AFDC benefits to 18 year olds. The Secretary's reading of the statute ignores the function of section 06(a)(2) and assumes the availability of a state option which does not exist.

Id. at 1488-89.

We conclude that the arguments made by the Secretary have been fully answered in the well-reasoned opinion of the district court. We further conclude that the arguments raised on this appeal do not pose issues that have not been fully and accurately resolved by the district court's opinion. We therefore affirm on the basis of that opinion. See 8th Cir.R. 14.