HECHT, Justice.
The district court appointed two attorneys from the Des Moines adult public defender's office to represent the defendant on a murder charge. After reviewing the State's list of expected witnesses, the two defense attorneys realized other attorney colleagues in their office had previously represented three of the State's witnesses on unrelated matters. The attorneys brought this potential conflict of interest to the district court's attention and requested a ruling whether a conflict of interest precludes them from representing the defendant. After the hearing, the district court concluded a conflict existed and disqualified all attorneys employed at the Des Moines adult public defender's office. Upon review, we conclude the potential conflict of interest shown under the circumstances presented in this record did not justify disqualification of the attorneys. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The State of Iowa charged Lavelle McKinley with first-degree murder following the death of Cynthia Rouse. The district court appointed two attorneys from the Des Moines adult public defender's office, Jennifer Larson and Heather Lauber, to represent McKinley. Long before trial was to begin, Larson and Lauber discovered other attorneys in their office had previously represented three potential witnesses for the State: Cheyenne Rouse, the decedent's husband who discovered the
Larson and Lauber requested a hearing and a determination whether a conflict of interest existed requiring their disqualification. The court scheduled a hearing and appointed independent counsel to represent each of the three potential witnesses. At the hearing, Larson and Lauber asserted their public defender colleagues' past representations of Rouse, Hickman, and Manuel on unrelated matters presents no conflict because those matters concluded well before McKinley was charged and therefore are not concurrent with the representation of McKinley. They contended the temporal separation between the current representation of McKinley and the previous concluded representations of the witnesses provides assurance against the risk of divided loyalties in continuing to represent McKinley.
Larson and Lauber assured the court they had no information about the matters for which their colleagues had previously represented Rouse, Hickman, and Manuel; they had not reviewed the existing files kept in the public defender's office pertaining to those matters; and they had already instituted measures preventing them from accessing such information and files during the pendency of this case. Therefore, they contended any potential conflict of interest arising from the prior representations of the three witnesses by other attorneys in the Des Moines office should not be imputed to them. Additionally, the hearing record included a colloquy with the court in which McKinley expressly acquiesced in any potential conflict of interest and indicated his desire to have Larson and Lauber continue representing him. After the hearing, McKinley filed a document confirming his acquiescence in any potential conflict and reaffirming his wish for continued representation by Larson and Lauber.
Rouse and Hickman informed the court through their counsel who were present at the hearing that they would neither waive any attorney-client privilege with the public defender's office nor consent to Larson and Lauber representing McKinley. Manuel's appointed attorney also attended the hearing and disclosed he had been unable to contact or consult with Manuel.
The conflict, the court explained, was based on the perception that Larson and Lauber's representation of McKinley was directly and materially adverse to Rouse, who had been represented in the past by other public defenders from the same office in connection with felony drug offenses.
McKinley applied for discretionary interlocutory review, and the State indicated it did not resist. We granted discretionary review and retained the appeal.
The question of whether a conflict exists is a mixed question of fact and law. Pippins v. State, 661 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Iowa 2003). When a defendant claims a violation of the constitutional right to counsel, our review is generally de novo. State v. Smith, 761 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Iowa 2009); State v. Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d 341, 345 (Iowa 2007).
"Whether the facts show an actual conflict of interest or a serious potential for conflict is a matter for trial court discretion...." Pippins, 661 N.W.2d at 548. We review these conflict-of-interest determinations for an abuse of discretion. Smith, 761 N.W.2d at 68. "We find an abuse of discretion only when the ... discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable." State v. Vanover, 559 N.W.2d 618, 627 (Iowa 1997); accord Smith, 761 N.W.2d at 68-69; Pippins, 661 N.W.2d at 548.
The parties are not directly adverse on the disqualification issue. McKinley urges reversal of the disqualification order, reinstatement of Larson and Lauber as defense counsel, and remand for trial. The State, couching its position in furtherance of promoting error-free trials and protecting the finality of convictions, agrees the district court may have erred — but not because the district court found Larson and Lauber were burdened by a conflict of interest. Rather, the State expresses concern that if McKinley is convicted, the verdict might be overturned on appeal because the district court accepted the county attorney's suggestion to override McKinley's choice of counsel. See Gary T. Lowenthal, Successive Representation by Criminal Lawyers, 93 Yale L.J. 1, 52 (1983) [hereinafter Lowenthal] ("Even when the court appoints counsel for an indigent defendant, it cannot discharge the lawyer over the defendant's objection absent compelling justification."). Thus, the State asks for guidance about the balance between conflict-of-interest rules and a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and requests
We conclude the circumstances of this case do not rise to the level of an actual conflict. We further conclude the present record evidences no serious potential conflict likely to divide Larson and Lauber's loyalties or otherwise compromise their duty to provide zealous representation for McKinley. Thus, the potential conflict presented in this factual scenario does not override McKinley's interest in continuing his attorney-client relationship with Larson and Lauber.
Yet, a right to choose one's appointed counsel is different from "a right to choose to continue an ongoing attorney-client relationship." Janet C. Hoeffel, Toward a More Robust Right to Counsel of Choice, 44 San Diego L. Rev. 525, 549 (2007) (emphasis added). Several commentators have suggested that although indigent defendants cannot choose their initial appointed attorney, they should at least have the right to continuity of representation after an attorney has been appointed. See, e.g., id.; Lowenthal, 93 Yale L.J. at 52; Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant's Right to Counsel, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1213, 1249 (2006) [hereinafter Poulin] ("[C]ourts should recognize that indigent defendants have a constitutionally protected right to have the initially appointed attorney continue to represent them and that this right can be overcome only under limited circumstances."). One scholar has observed that "[a] defendant's relationship with counsel may be critical to the quality and effectiveness of the representation the defendant receives." Poulin, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. at 1258.
Courts are split on the importance of continuity of the relationship between indigent defendants and their appointed attorneys. Some have concluded there is no right to continuity of appointed counsel. See United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 324-25 (4th Cir.2009); Daniels v. Lafler, 501 F.3d 735, 738-39 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. Parker, 469 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir.2006); State v. Reeves, 11 So.3d 1031, 1065-66 (La.2009). On the other hand, several courts have concluded once an attorney is appointed, the court should be just as hesitant to remove them as it would be to remove a privately-retained attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 294 F.3d 203, 206 (1st Cir.2002) ("Once a court appoints an attorney to represent an accused ... there must be
We adopt the latter view and hold that once an attorney is appointed, they should not be removed "absent a factual and legal basis to terminate that appointment." Harlan, 54 P.3d at 878. Trust and good communication are crucial features of an attorney-client relationship. This is true when a client has resources and privately retains a lawyer; and it is no less true when a client is indigent and obtains counsel appointed by the court. In both instances, opportunities for establishing trust and effective communication are generally enhanced over time through interpersonal contact. Once established, the interest in maintaining a relationship of trust with counsel is of no less importance to an indigent client than to one with ample resources to hire counsel.
Yet, solicitude for a client's preference for retaining their court-appointed attorney does not preclude disqualification when circumstances require it. "The right to counsel of choice — either initially or continued representation — is not absolute... either for indigent or nonindigent defendants." Lane, 80 So.3d at 295; see also Vanover, 559 N.W.2d at 626-27 (noting "a presumption in favor of the accused's counsel of choice" can be rebutted (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 255 (Iowa 1979) ("[T]he right to choice of counsel by both indigent and non-indigent defendants is limited ...."). The court can still disqualify the defendant's preferred attorney if the circumstances present an actual conflict or a serious potential for conflict. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162-63, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1699, 100 L.Ed.2d 140, 150-51 (1988) (giving courts this power when one attorney represents codefendants); accord Smith, 761 N.W.2d at 73; Vanover, 559 N.W.2d at 626-27.
The definition of "actual conflict" has been expressed in various ways. In State v. Watson, we stated an actual conflict occurs when "`an attorney is placed in a situation conducive to divided loyalties.'" 620 N.W.2d 233, 239 (Iowa 2000) (quoting Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir.1991)); see also Pippins, 661 N.W.2d at 548 (repeating the "divided loyalties"
Later, the Supreme Court defined actual conflict under the Sixth Amendment as "a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 n. 5, 535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1244 n. 5, 152 L.Ed.2d 291, 305 n. 5 (2002); see Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d at 347 (adopting the Mickens definition in Iowa). We applied the "adverse effect" formulation in Smitherman where the trial court had conducted an inquiry into the conflict in advance of trial. Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d at 347 (concluding the claimed conflict did not require reversal of Smitherman's conviction because he failed to establish the conflict had an adverse effect on trial counsel's representation).
In this case, the district court properly held a hearing on the conflict issue early in the pretrial stage of the proceedings. The court's analysis of the nature and gravity of the alleged conflict was therefore primarily forward-looking rather than a retrospective assessment of whether the public defenders' prior representation of the witnesses had any adverse effect on Larson and Lauber's representation of McKinley. The forward-looking assessment at the pretrial stage of this case required an assessment of the likelihood that a potential conflict might blossom into an actual conflict during either the pretrial stage or the trial stages of McKinley's case. See Smith, 761 N.W.2d at 72; see also Lowenthal, 93 Yale L.J. at 58 ("In most cases the court can only assess the risk that a conflict will occur....").
This type of prospective analysis applies the "serious potential for conflict" standard. A serious potential for conflict occurs when the record indicates an actual conflict is likely to arise. See United States v. Johnson, 131 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1099 (N.D.Iowa 2001). We turn to a discussion of the nature of the potential conflict at issue in this case and our reasons for concluding that the risk it will adversely affect Larson and Lauber's representation of McKinley is insufficient to countermand McKinley's interest in maintaining his attorney-client relationship.
1. Rule 32:1.7. Rule 32:1.7 prohibits an attorney from representing two clients when a concurrent conflict of interest exists. Iowa R. Prof'l Conduct
Because the terms are listed separately, "another client" and "former client" cannot mean the same thing. We presume statutes or rules do not contain superfluous words. See Sallee v. Stewart, 827 N.W.2d 128, 153 (Iowa 2013); State v. Soboroff, 798 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2011). Thus, "another client" means another current client. Rouse, Hickman, and Manuel were no longer current clients of the public defender's office when Larson and Lauber began defending McKinley. Accordingly, no concurrent conflict of interest exists under rule 32:1.7(a)(1).
Thus, if there is any concurrent conflict of interest here, it occurs because Larson and Lauber "will be materially limited" by their responsibilities to the public defender's former clients Rouse, Hickman, and Manuel. See Iowa R. Prof'l Conduct 32:1.7(a)(2). The comments to the rules suggest a material limitation occurs when a "lawyer's ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action" is hampered. Id. r. 32:1.7 cmt. [8]. Put another way, the conflict formulation under rule 32:1.7(a)(2) is consistent with the definition we applied in Watson: a conflict arises when a danger of divided loyalties burdens or impedes the attorneys' defense strategy. Watson, 620 N.W.2d at 240-41; see also Lech, 895 F.Supp. at 590.
In Smith, we stated concurrent representation of a defendant and a witness on unrelated matters by separate attorneys from the same private law firm did not meet the material limitation standard when counsel for the defendant did not personally represent the witness, had no knowledge of the witness's confidential information, and had taken measures to screen himself from the law firm's personnel and files with such information. Smith, 761 N.W.2d at 75. In this case, we conclude other public defenders' past representation of the witnesses on matters unrelated to the crime charged against McKinley also presents no risk of materially limiting Larson and Lauber's representation of McKinley. Indeed, on this record we find no significant likelihood that Larson and Lauber will be foreclosed from formulating or implementing any particular defense strategy as a consequence of their colleagues' former representation of the witnesses. Accordingly, we conclude on this record Larson and Lauber are not materially limited by a concurrent conflict prohibiting their representation of McKinley under rule 32:1.7.
2. Rule 32:1.9. Rule 32:1.9 addresses duties owed by attorneys to former clients. The rule states that a lawyer cannot represent a subsequent client "in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client." Iowa R. Prof'l Conduct 32:1.9(a). The district court concluded Larson and Lauber's colleagues' former representation of the three witnesses is substantially related to the defense of McKinley because Larson and Lauber will likely use the witnesses' prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Accordingly, it ruled Larson and Lauber could not continue representing McKinley without informed consent from the witnesses. On review, we conclude the district court's interpretation of the phrase "substantially related" was clearly untenable.
The record reveals the witnesses have prior criminal convictions. Notably, however, these histories are not confidential facts. As one commentator explains:
Jeff Brown, Disqualification of the Public Defender: Toward a New Protocol for Resolving Conflicts of Interest, 31 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1996) [hereinafter Brown] (footnotes omitted). Therefore, Larson and Lauber's use of the witnesses' prior convictions for impeachment purposes could materially benefit McKinley's defense, but it would not reveal a client confidence or secret. Iowa R. Prof'l Conduct 32:1.9 cmt. [3] ("Information that has been disclosed to the public ... will not be disqualifying.").
If the matters for which prior representation was provided are not the same as, or substantially related to, the matters for which the current representation is provided, the current representation can continue without the former client's consent. See Iowa R. Prof'l Conduct 32:1.9(a); see also Lowenthal, 93 Yale L.J. at 56 (concluding a witness's opposition to defense counsel's representation of the defendant is important if "the court finds a substantial relationship between the earlier representation and the defendant's case"). We find no evidence in this record tending to establish a substantial relationship between the crime charged in this case and the matters for which attorneys in the public defender's office previously represented
Because we conclude there is no actual conflict or serious potential for conflict in this case, we need not decide whether a potential conflict arising from Eimermann and Russell's past representations of the three witnesses must be imputed to Larson and Lauber.
Further, no attorney employed in the same public defender's office concurrently represented McKinley and the three witnesses listed by the State. Instead, the public defenders' representations of the witnesses and McKinley is successive. Thus, this case is much different from Smith, in which two different attorneys from the same firm represented the defendant and a witness at the same time. See Smith, 761 N.W.2d at 66 (noting the witness "was at that time represented by ... Montgomery's colleague" (emphasis added)). The fact there is no temporal overlap or attorney overlap in this case bolsters our conclusion that on this record, no conflict is likely to arise and McKinley's choice of counsel should be given effect.
Indeed, this case is analogous in important respects to our decision in Nichol v. State, 309 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Iowa 1981). There, we said:
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Flynn, 87 F.3d at 1001 ("The mere fact that a trial lawyer had previously represented a prosecution witness does not entitle a defendant to relief."); Pippins, 661 N.W.2d at 546 ("[The attorney]'s earlier representation of the witness, Hillman, was not a `conflict'...."). As in Nichol, we conclude on this record the public defenders' prior representations of Rouse, Hickman, and Manuel on unrelated matters raises no serious possibility of conflict precluding Larson and Lauber from representing McKinley.
We also find support for our conclusion in numerous cases from other courts in which an attorney's colleague previously represented a witness and the court found
The district court's decision disqualifying Larson and Lauber based primarily on an erroneous application of provisions of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct constitutes an untenable ground for the court's exercise of discretion. Under the relevant caselaw and our rules of professional conduct, the prior representations of witnesses in unrelated matters by other members of the public defender's office did not present an actual conflict or a serious potential for conflict that justifies the order disqualifying Larson and Lauber and countermanding McKinley's interest in continuing an attorney-client relationship.
All justices concur except WATERMAN and MANSFIELD, JJ., who concur specially.
WATERMAN, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the result of the majority opinion reversing the district court order that disqualified the entire Des Moines adult public defender's office from representing Lavelle McKinley on his murder charge. I agree there is no conflict or potential conflict arising from the fact several witnesses had previously been represented on unrelated charges by other public defenders in this office with screening procedures in place to prevent misuse of confidential information. I write separately because the majority misses the opportunity to settle the recurring legal issue: whether an individual public defender's conflict of interest is automatically imputed to the entire public defender's office. The answer to that question should be "no."
Public defenders represent most felony defendants in this state. Witnesses and victims often have their own criminal histories. The public defenders are salaried state employees and experienced trial lawyers who exercise individual independent judgment defending their clients. The district court erred by automatically imputing conflicts from one public defender to the entire office, including the two experienced attorneys McKinley wanted to retain. The automatic imputation issue was decided below and briefed by the State on appeal.
This issue requires analysis of the interplay between several of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, patterned after the American Bar Association model rules.
A concurrent conflict exists if:
Id. r. 32:1.7(a)(1)-(2). Rule 32:1.9 prohibits an attorney "who has formerly represented a client in a matter [from] represent[ing] another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client." Id. r. 32:1.9(a). The rule also provides:
Id. r. 32:1.9(b)(1)-(2). Rule 32:1.10 is Iowa's imputation requirement, providing that
To automatically impute the conflict of one public defender to the entire public defender's office requires two determinations: (1) the public defender's office is a "firm" under rule 32:1.10, and (2) a public defender is not "a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee" under rule 32:1.11. Neither determination should be made here. The better-reasoned decisions have rejected the automatic imputation of the conflicts of one public defender to the entire office. See United States v. Reynoso, 6 F.Supp.2d 269, 271-72 (S.D.N.Y.1998) ("[I]t does not make sense to apply to the Federal Defender Division[] the same standards for disqualification that would apply to a private law firm" and noting "[t]he American Law Institute has also recognized that imputed disqualification... should not automatically apply to public defender offices"); People v. Shari, 204 P.3d 453, 459 & nn. 5-6 (Colo. 2009) (holding that a public defender's office is not a firm under the imputation rule and that public defenders are government attorneys); Anderson v. Comm'r of Corr., 127 Conn.App. 538, 15 A.3d 658, 664 (2011) (holding that a public defender's office is not a firm and that "the plain language of rules 1.10 and 1.11 supports the respondent's contention that [public defenders are government attorneys]"); State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414, 426-27 (2009) (holding that a public defender's office is not a firm for purposes of imputation and adopting a case-by-case approach); People v. Miller, 79 Ill.2d 454, 38 Ill.Dec. 775, 404 N.E.2d 199, 202 (1980) (rejecting "the notion that a public defender's office is to be treated as a law firm or `entity' in considering a conflict of interest claim"); Bartley v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 714, 719-20 (Ky.2013) (utilizing a case-by-case approach to determine whether a conflict should be imputed within the public defender's office); State v. St. Dennis, 358 Mont. 88, 244 P.3d 292, 298 (2010) (holding that a public defender's office is not equivalent to a firm and adopting case-by-case approach); State v. Bell, 90 N.J. 163, 447 A.2d 525, 528-29 (1982) (noting the differences between firms and public defender's offices); Asch v. State, 62 P.3d 945, 953 (Wyo.2003) (rejecting "automatic disqualification of assistant public defenders" because the public defender's office is not equivalent to a firm).
Other courts apply an automatic-imputation rule to public defenders. See, e.g., Okeani v. Super. Ct., 178 Ariz. 180, 871 P.2d 727, 729 (1993) ("The conflict of interest is not alleviated by the fact that defendant and the victim were represented by different lawyers within the Public Defender's Office."); Bouie v. State, 559 So.2d 1113, 1115 (Fla.1990) ("As a general rule, a public defender's office is the functional equivalent of a law firm."); In re Formal Advisory Op. 10-1, 293 Ga. 397, 744 S.E.2d 798, 799-800 (2013) (per curiam) (concluding "that Rule 1.10(a) applies to a circuit public defender office as it would to a private law firm," but noting imputing conflicts "imposes real costs on Georgia's indigent defense system"); In re Hoang, 245 Kan. 560, 781 P.2d 731, 735-36 (1989) (noting the disqualifying conflict of one public defender was imputed to an entire office); Duvall v. State, 399 Md. 210, 923 A.2d 81, 95 (2007) (stating that "at a minimum, each district office of the public defender should be treated as a private law firm for conflict of interest purposes"); Richards v. Clow, 103 N.M. 14, 702 P.2d 4,
In an unpublished opinion, our court of appeals applied the automatic-imputation rule:
State v. Ibarra, No. 12-0330, 2013 WL 530558, at *8 (Iowa Ct.App. Feb. 13, 2013) (footnote omitted). The Ibarra court did not address Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.11 or survey the decisions from other jurisdictions. Our court should decide the question in a precedential opinion.
Courts take different paths to the conclusion that an individual public defender's conflict should not be automatically imputed to the entire office. Some courts arrive at this outcome by explicitly refusing to equate public defender's offices to firms under ABA Model Rule 1.10 without addressing the government lawyer issue. Others reach both issues. I will address each issue in turn.
Ellen J. Bennett, et al., Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 178 (2011) [hereinafter Bennett]. The commentators omitted public defender offices or any government office or agency from the enumerated organizations falling under the definition of "firm." The same comment, with the same omission, accompanies the Iowa
The Montana Supreme Court distinguished public defender's offices from private law firms as follows:
St. Dennis, 244 P.3d at 297-98 (citation omitted). The Wyoming Supreme Court elaborated on the differences between public defenders and lawyers in private law firms:
Asch, 62 P.3d at 953 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court reached the same conclusion:
The automatic-imputation rule also increases the burden on taxpayers. When an entire public defender's office is disqualified, private contract attorneys must be paid at hourly rates or a distant public defender must be brought in with attendant travel time and expense. The Asch court observed:
62 P.3d at 953-54. The same court also addressed the concern that substitute counsel may be less experienced and less competent:
Id. at 953 (quoting People v. Robinson, 79 Ill.2d 147, 37 Ill.Dec. 267, 402 N.E.2d 157, 162 (1979)).
These decisions are persuasive and should be followed. The concerns outlined by these state supreme courts are raised in the case before us. McKinley, facing life in prison, chose to continue with his trial lawyers from the Des Moines adult public defender's office rather than proceeding with a lawyer from the juvenile public defender's office. Moreover, in many areas of the state, disqualification of the resident public defender's office requires appointment of private contract attorneys or public defenders located farther away and at greater expense.
The best way to ensure that defendants receive conflict-free counsel while preventing the unnecessary disqualification of public defenders is by adopting a screening process sufficiently thorough to protect against the concerns giving rise to the imputation requirement. The Shari court outlined Colorado's screening process, which the court found sufficient to assuage "any concerns regarding the communication of confidential information from the public defenders who previously represented the prosecution's witnesses ...." 204 P.3d at 459. There is no reason screening
204 P.3d at 459 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Shari's facts mirror the case before us.
Like Colorado, Iowa excludes from imputation "a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee." Iowa R. Prof'l Conduct 32:1.11. Using the plain language of Iowa provision, it is evident that public defenders are included within this definition. Public defenders are salaried employees paid by the state. Accordingly, a public defender is a "lawyer currently serving as a public ... employee." Compare Colo. R. of Prof'l Conduct 1.11, with Iowa R. of Prof'l Conduct 32:1.11(d). As such, they are governed by Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.11 and excluded from the imputation requirements of rule 32:1.10.
It is disappointing the majority today fails to take the opportunity to settle this recurring legal question. Until the automatic-imputation issue is resolved by court decision or rule amendment, our trial courts will continue to struggle case-by-case with public defender intraoffice conflicts.
MANSFIELD, J., joins this special concurrence.
Our research reveals courts confronting this question in other states are divided. For example, Colorado public defenders are deemed government lawyers under the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, conflicts of interest are not imputed throughout an entire office in that jurisdiction. See People v. Shari, 204 P.3d 453, 459 (Colo.2009). Similarly, in Connecticut, public defenders are not considered "members of the same firm." See Anderson v. Comm'r of Corr., 127 Conn.App. 538, 15 A.3d 658, 665 (2011). On the other hand, Georgia and Maryland treat each public defender office for a particular circuit, county, or district as a private firm. In re Formal Advisory Op. 10-1, 293 Ga. 397, 744 S.E.2d 798, 799 (2013) (per curiam); Duvall, 923 A.2d at 93-95. Additionally, some states eschew a per se rule in favor of a flexible case-by-case approach, evaluating the facts of each case individually when determining whether the public defenders involved in the case work in a firm or as government lawyers. See, e.g., State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414, 421, 426-27 (2009); Bolin v. State, 137 P.3d 136, 145 (Wyo.2006). Notably, both McKinley and the State expressly asserted we should resolve this case on grounds other than whether Larson and Lauber are properly classified as government lawyers under rule 32:1.11. Accordingly, because we conclude there is no actual conflict or potential conflict requiring the disqualification of Larson and Lauber in this case, we accept the parties' suggestions and leave this issue for another day.
Furthermore, given our conclusion that the potential conflict does not require or justify disqualification under the circumstances presented here, it is appropriate to defer a decision on whether public defenders are government attorneys under our conflict-of-interest rules until we confront a case in which it might be dispositive. State v. Mark, 123 Haw. 205, 231 P.3d 478, 516 (2010) (concluding that because the court found no conflict at all, "the question of whether [the office of the public defender] acted as `a single firm' for purposes of this case need not be addressed"); see also State v. Sustaita, 183 Ariz. 240, 902 P.2d 1344, 1347 & n. 2 (1995) (recognizing "[i]t can be argued that ... imputed disqualification[] does not apply to the public defender's office," but declining to reach the issue because there was no conflict necessitating withdrawal or disqualification); cf. Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d at 348 n. 7 (finding a waiver issue moot in light of our ultimate conclusion).