Filed: Aug. 17, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 17, 2016 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 16-7056 (D.C. No. 6:99-CR-00079-FHS-1) CHIP J.W. TEAGUE, (E.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. _ ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY* _ Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. _ Chip Teague seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district cour
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 17, 2016 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 16-7056 (D.C. No. 6:99-CR-00079-FHS-1) CHIP J.W. TEAGUE, (E.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. _ ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY* _ Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. _ Chip Teague seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 17, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 16-7056
(D.C. No. 6:99-CR-00079-FHS-1)
CHIP J.W. TEAGUE, (E.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
_________________________________
Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Chip Teague seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We deny a COA. Because the
district court lacked jurisdiction over Teague’s motion, we vacate and remand to the
district court with instructions to dismiss.
I
Teague was convicted on numerous drug and gun charges in 2000. We
affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See United States v. Teague, 12 F. App’x
759 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished). Teague filed a § 2255 motion in 2001, which
was denied. We rejected Teague’s request for a COA.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Teague filed a second § 2255 motion in April 2016, claiming that his
conviction and sentence are unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Johnson v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). The district court denied the
motion for failure to comply with a local procedural rule and did not issue a COA.
Teague now seeks a COA from this court.
II
When a district court denies a § 2255 motion on procedural grounds, a movant
may obtain a COA only if he shows “that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the [motion] states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and
that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). We conclude
that Teague has not shown he has a debatably valid claim. “[A] second or successive
§ 2255 motion cannot be filed in district court without approval by a panel of this
court.” United States v. Nelson,
465 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006); see also
§ 2255(h) (requiring authorization). Accordingly, a “district court does not even
have jurisdiction to deny the relief sought in” a second or successive motion.
Nelson,
465 F.3d at 1148. Because Teague filed his motion without authorization from this
court, the district court lacked jurisdiction.
But we may construe an appeal from the denial of a second or successive
motion as an application to file such a motion. See Spitznas v. Boone,
464 F.3d
1213, 1219 n.8 (10th Cir. 2006). A second or successive habeas motion will be
authorized if it is based on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
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cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”
§ 2255(h). Teague claims that his sentence is unconstitutional under Johnson, which
held that the residual clause of the definition of “violent felony” in the Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”) is unconstitutionally
vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (interpreting
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). This rule was made retroactive to cases on collateral
review in Welch v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016).
Teague states that he was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using or
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. A portion of the
definition of “crime of violence” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is similar to
ACCA’s residual clause. However, Teague was actually convicted of possessing a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime under § 924(c)—not a
“crime of violence.” Accordingly, even if Johnson extends to § 924(c), Teague’s
sentence is unaffected and he is not entitled to authorization.
III
We DENY a COA, VACATE the district court’s denial of Teague’s § 2255
motion, and REMAND to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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