Filed: Nov. 08, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 8, 2016 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court MARK ALAN LANE, Petitioner - Appellant, v. No. 16-3287 (D.C. No. 5:16-CV-03105-JWL) CLAUDE MAYE, Warden, (D. Kan.) Respondent - Appellee. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _ Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. _ Mark Alan Lane appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 application and moves for leave to proceed in
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 8, 2016 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court MARK ALAN LANE, Petitioner - Appellant, v. No. 16-3287 (D.C. No. 5:16-CV-03105-JWL) CLAUDE MAYE, Warden, (D. Kan.) Respondent - Appellee. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _ Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. _ Mark Alan Lane appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 application and moves for leave to proceed in ..
More
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 8, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MARK ALAN LANE,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 16-3287
(D.C. No. 5:16-CV-03105-JWL)
CLAUDE MAYE, Warden, (D. Kan.)
Respondent - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Mark Alan Lane appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241
application and moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“ifp”). Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Lane is a prisoner at the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas.
He was previously confined in the Federal Correctional Institution Schuylkill (“FCI
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may
be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Schuylkill”) in Minersville, Pennsylvania, where he attempted to mail a letter on August
31, 2015 to an Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) in Indiana. The prison’s
Special Investigative Services (“SIS”) examined the letter, which stated in part:
I like it when Guards say,” “IF” you run I will show you how good I can
shot. “IF” the warden, and you go past January 25, 2016. I can’t write,
what I’m going to do!!! Fax SIS now, you scum bag. . . . Somebody will
pay for your sins, That a given. . . . Don’t call, Unless you have a Million
dollars. I don’t work for free!!! You tried to play me, and “IF” they take
you into trial, it will cost you 2 Million.
ROA, Vol. I at 10.
The same day, SIS Lieutenant Raup wrote an incident report charging Mr.
Lane with threatening another with bodily harm or any other offense in violation
of Bureau of Prison (“BOP”) Code 203, codified at 28 C.F.R. § 541.3 tbl.1. Mr.
Lane received a copy of the incident report later that afternoon.
On September 14, 2015, Disciplinary Hearing Officer Bittenbender held a
hearing on the Code 203 charge. Officer Bittenbender continued the hearing and
asked Lieutenant Raup to rewrite the incident report. Lieutenant Raup rewrote the
report the next day and replaced the Code 203 charge with a Code 204 charge for
extortion. Mr. Lane received the new incident report on September 15, 2015.
On September 22, 2015, Officer Bittenbender held a hearing on the Code
204 charge. Ms. Feger, from the prison’s education department, testified on behalf
of Mr. Lane and explained the meaning of the word “if.” No other witnesses were
called and Mr. Lane did not present any other evidence. Mr. Lane asserts Officer
Bittenbender denied his request to call Lieutenant Raup and Warden Perdue.
-2-
Officer Bittenbender found Mr. Lane guilty of violating Code 204 and imposed
sanctions that included loss of good-time credits.
Mr. Lane filed a § 2241 application for a writ of habeas corpus in the
district court,1 arguing (1) Officer Bittenbender lacked sufficient evidence to find
him guilty, and (2) Officer Bittenbender’s refusal to allow testimony from
Lieutenant Raup and Warden Perdue violated his due process rights. The district
court denied relief on both grounds and denied Mr. Lane’s motion to alter or
amend the district court’s judgment.2
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Background
A § 2241 application attacks the execution of a sentence rather than its validity.
Brace v. United States,
634 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2011). In other words, it
challenges “the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement and seeks the remedy of
immediate release or a shortened period of confinement.” McIntosh v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n,
115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotations omitted). A federal prisoner
may use a § 2241 application to restore good-time credits that were lost as a result of a
prison disciplinary hearing lacking due process. Brown v. Smith,
828 F.2d 1493, 1495
1
Because he was confined in Leavenworth when he filed his § 2241 application,
he filed it in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas.
2
“A federal prisoner is not required to obtain a certificate of appealability to seek
review of a district court’s denial of a habeas application under § 2241.” Hale v. Fox,
829 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 2016).
-3-
(10th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). “When reviewing the denial of a habeas petition under
§ 2241, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and accept its factual
findings unless clearly erroneous.”
Hale, 829 F.3d at 1170.
“Any procedure depriving a federal prison inmate of earned statutory good time
credits must comport with the due process requirements of the Constitution.”
Brown, 828
F.2d at 1494 (alterations omitted). Nevertheless, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are
not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such
proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
Under Wolff, the prisoner must receive “(1) advance written notice of the
disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and
correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense;
and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for
the disciplinary action.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S.
445, 454 (1985) (citing
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67). The Supreme Court has also added
that “revocation of good time does not comport with the minimum requirements of
procedural due process unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported
by some evidence in the record.”
Hill, 472 U.S. at 454 (citation and quotations omitted).
B. Analysis
1. Sufficient Evidence
Mr. Lane first argues that Officer Bittenbender did not find him guilty for
violating Code 203, which prohibits threatening another with bodily harm. At the
hearing on the Code 203 charge, Officer Bittenbender continued the hearing and
-4-
instructed Lieutenant Raup to rewrite the incident report. Lieutenant Raup rewrote the
report and replaced the Code 203 charge with a Code 204 charge for extortion. Officer
Bittenbender held a second hearing and found Mr. Lane guilty. Mr. Lane does not
challenge Officer Bittenbender’s finding of guilt for the Code 204 charge. And Officer
Bittenbender’s report explaining his finding of guilt contains enough evidence to comport
with minimum due process requirements. See
Hill, 472 U.S. at 454 (stating revocation of
good-time credits must be “supported by some evidence in the record”). The district
court did not err in rejecting Mr. Lane’s first ground for relief.
2. Witnesses
Mr. Lane next argues Officer Bittenbender deprived him of due process by not
allowing him to call Lieutenant Raup and Warden Perdue to testify at the hearing. Before
the second hearing, Mr. Lane received a form that directed him to list proposed
witnesses. He listed only Ms. Feger. The record also shows that, before the hearing, Mr.
Lane had sent handwritten “statements” to the prison’s United Disciplinary Committee
and Officer Bittenbender requesting that Lieutenant Raup and Warden Perdue testify at
the hearing. The statements say Lieutenant Raup could testify that (1) “in the event of a
third . . . Indictment it takes an [sic] conspiracy to testify at trial on co-defendant,” ROA,
Vol. I at 25, and (2) a particular AUSA “never asked or sent an email [or] ‘Fax’ to
investigate the offense of extortion,” ROA, Vol. I at 27. The statements also say Warden
Perdue could testify that he had never been extorted by Mr. Lane. Even assuming the
proffered testimonies were improperly denied, the denial would be harmless because
neither testimony would have been relevant to Mr. Lane’s Code 204 charge that was
-5-
based on the 2015 letter extorting the AUSA. See Grossman v. Bruce,
447 F.3d 801, 805
(10th Cir. 2006) (“[E]rrors made by prison officials in denying witness testimony at
official hearings are subject to harmless error review.”).
The district court did not err in denying Mr. Lane’s second ground for relief.
3. IFP
Mr. Lane requests to proceed ifp. We deny the request because he fails to show “a
financial inability to pay the required fees.”
McIntosh, 115 F.3d at 812.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Lane’s § 2241
application and deny his request to proceed ifp.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
-6-