Filed: Jan. 19, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 19 2017 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT AMARJIT SINGH NIJJAR, No. 11-73467 Petitioner, Agency No. A072-136-816 v. MEMORANDUM* LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted January 17, 2017** San Francisco, California Before: KOZINSKI, PAEZ and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges. 1. We deny Nijjar’s petition for review of the agency
Summary: FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 19 2017 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT AMARJIT SINGH NIJJAR, No. 11-73467 Petitioner, Agency No. A072-136-816 v. MEMORANDUM* LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted January 17, 2017** San Francisco, California Before: KOZINSKI, PAEZ and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges. 1. We deny Nijjar’s petition for review of the agency’..
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FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JAN 19 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AMARJIT SINGH NIJJAR, No. 11-73467
Petitioner, Agency No. A072-136-816
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 17, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: KOZINSKI, PAEZ and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
1. We deny Nijjar’s petition for review of the agency’s denial of his
applications for asylum and withholding of removal because the agency’s adverse
credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence. See Farah v. Ashcroft,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
page 2
348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). He submitted three asylum applications
under an admittedly false alias and one subsequent asylum application with a
different date and location of entry into the United States. See
id. (upholding
immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding when it “went to key elements of
the asylum application, including identity . . . and date of entry in the United
States”).
Nor were the inconsistencies limited to Nijjar’s conduct while he was in the
United States. His testimony contained a material omission about his involvement
with a political organization. And his written applications were inconsistent as to
the number of times the Punjab police arrested him and the duration of each
detention. These discrepancies all went to the heart of the alleged claim, which is
required in this pre-REAL ID Act case. See Chebchoub v. I.N.S.,
257 F.3d 1038,
1043 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding in a pre-REAL ID Act case that inconsistencies
“about the events leading up to his departure and the number of times he was
arrested” were not minor), superseded by statute as stated in Shrestha v. Holder,
590 F.3d 1034, 1046 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. In light of the well-supported adverse credibility determination, Nijjar’s
Convention Against Torture (CAT) claim also fails because it is based on the same
page 3
set of factual circumstances as his asylum and withholding of removal claims. See
Farah, 348 F.3d at 1157 (affirming denial of asylum and CAT claims based on
adverse credibility determination where applicant pointed to no additional evidence
relevant to the CAT claim).
3. The agency properly denied Nijjar’s application for adjustment of status
because Nijjar failed to show that he was “inspected and admitted or paroled” into
the country. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Nijjar’s asylum applications, as well as his wife’s
visa petition on his behalf, indicated that he entered “without inspection.” He
blames the allegedly erroneous designation on the individuals who prepared his
petition and applications and argues that the government database printout he
obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request provides contrary evidence.
But the printout lists his manner of entry as “EWI,” meaning entry without
inspection.
4. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Nijjar gave
false testimony and, therefore, lacked the requisite good moral character to be
eligible for voluntary departure. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (stating that “one who
has given false testimony” is per se deemed to lack good moral character).
page 4
5. We lack jurisdiction to review Nijjar’s challenge to his deportability
because he failed to raise this issue to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Barron v. Ashcroft,
358 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2004).
DENIED.