MEMORANDUM OPINION

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.

Before the court is the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (the "Motion") (doc. 33), filed on May 29, 2012, by Defendants City of Alabaster, Alabama, City of Irondale, Alabama, and City of Leeds, Alabama.1 The Motion has been fully briefed by the parties (see docs. 38, 42). Additionally, the court heard oral argument on the Motion on July 10, 2012. Therefore, the Motion is under submission and ripe for the court's decision.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Originally, there were eleven (11) individual plaintiffs who jointly filed a Complaint (doc. 1) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on September 23, 2011, along with a Motion for Leave to Proceed Anonymously (doc. 3), which the court ultimately denied. (See Order dated April 26, 2012, Doc. 28). The court required repleader, ordering the previously unnamed plaintiffs to file an Amended Complaint that "must set out each Plaintiff's name and provide the necessary facts to meet notice pleading standards as to each claim against each Defendant," no later than May 14, 2012. (Id. at 16). More specifically, this court stated the following with respect to the Amended Complaint:

(Id.).

The First Amended Complaint was filed on May 14, 2012. (Doc. 29). Several motions to dismiss followed. Defendant City of Pelham, Alabama, filed its Motion To Dismiss First Amended Complaint on May 29, 2012. (Doc. 30).2 Defendants City of Alabaster, Alabama, City of Irondale, Alabama, and City of Leeds, Alabama, filed their Motion To Dismiss First Amended Complaint — the Motion presently pending before the court — on May 29, 2012. (Doc. 33). At the request of the parties (doc. 34), the court heard oral argument on the pending Motions To Dismiss. Counsel for the City of Pelham argued on behalf of all municipal defendants in light of the overlapping issues raised and arguments made in the defendants' briefing.

After hearing oral argument and putting the parties on notice of the court's views on the proper party-alignment of this case, the court entered an order sua sponte severing the claims of the individually named plaintiffs against the various municipal defendants. (Doc. 45). In its opinion and order, the court directed that "[t]he claim(s) of Plaintiff Cecilia Cano-Diaz will proceed in this action, numbered 2:11-cv-03448-VEH, against the City of Leeds, Alabama." (Id. at 8). Therefore, the court's analysis in this opinion concerns only the claims of Plaintiff Cano-Diaz against the City of Leeds, and the court will evaluate the pending Motion from that perspective.

B. Facts3

In light of the foregoing procedural history, the court focuses its statement of the facts solely on the claims of Plaintiff Cano-Diaz against the City of Leeds.

In the First Amended Complaint, Cano-Diaz is described as "a 22-year-old Hispanic woman who resides in Moody, Alabama in Jefferson County." (Doc. 29 ¶ 13). She "frequently visits or travels through municipalities where officers of the Defendant's police departments have been deployed and conduct traffic stops, frisks and make arrests." (Id.). Defendant City of Leeds is described as a "municipal corporation[] organized and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama" that is "authorized under the State of Alabama to maintain a police department, which act[s] as [its] agent[] in the area of law enforcement and for which [the City of Leeds] is ultimately responsible." (Id. ¶ 20).

Generally speaking,

(Id. ¶ 28).

The allegations specific to Cano-Diaz are stated as follows:

(Id. ¶ 21).

Based on these alleged facts, Cano-Diaz asserts five claims against the City of Leeds: Fourth Amendment violations brought by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause violations brought by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II); discrimination claims brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq. (Count III); claims for remedial relief predicated upon Defendants' past practices (Count IV); and claims for money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count V).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide "`a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).

While a plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, Rule 8 does not mandate the inclusion of "detailed factual allegations" within a complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. 99). However at the same time, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

"[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. (emphasis added). "Under Twombly's construction of Rule 8 ... [a plaintiff's] complaint [must] `nudge[] [any] claims' ... `across the line from conceivable to plausible.' Ibid." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950-51.

A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

III. ANALYSIS

The issues raised in this case have been thoroughly briefed. (See Docs. 33, 38, 42; see also Docs. 30, 31, 43).4 Moreover, the court held an extensive hearing on the pending Motion and issues raised therein. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the Motion is due to be granted.

A. Fourth Amendment Claim

In Count I of the First Amended Complaint, Cano-Diaz asserts that the City of Leeds violated her Fourth Amendment rights.5 She brings her Fourth Amendment claim by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The City of Leeds contends that Cano-Diaz's fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for any alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment. More specifically, the City of Leeds argues that the Fourth Amendment claim is due to be dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine to the extent that her underlying charges are pending, as alleged in her First Amended Complaint; alternatively, to the extent that she has already been convicted of the underlying charges, it argues that the claim is due to be dismissed under the Heck bar because she has not shown that the convictions have been invalidated. The court agrees.

1. Application of the Younger abstention doctrine

Cano-Diaz avers that she was pulled over by a City of Leeds police officer and cited with two offenses: driving without a driver's license and failure to maintain her lane. (Doc. 29 ¶ 21). She further avers that she "has not been convicted of any of the offenses for which she was charged as of the date of filing hereof." (Id.). Thus, the clear implication of Cano-Diaz's complaint is that her charges are still pending.

The City of Leeds rightly observes that a district court may properly abstain from exercising jurisdiction and avoid interfering with pending state-level proceedings based on the Younger abstention doctrine. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). The Supreme Court in Younger held that the "state criminal proceeding offered a sufficient forum for the plaintiff to raise his constitutional defense, abstained from hearing the plaintiff's claim and stated the general rule that a federal district court must refrain from enjoining pending criminal state court proceedings except under special circumstances." Green v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n, 563 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir.2009); see Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971) ("The propriety of arrests and the admissibility of evidence in state criminal prosecutions are ordinarily matters to be resolved by state tribunals, subject, of course, to review by certiorari or appeal in this Court or, in a proper case, on federal habeas corpus." (internal citation omitted)).

"In order to decide whether the federal proceeding would interfere with the state proceeding, [the court] look[s] to the relief requested and the effect it would have on the state proceedings. The relief sought need not directly interfere with an ongoing proceeding or terminate an ongoing proceeding in order for Younger abstention to be required." 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1276 (11th Cir.2003) (citations omitted). As the Eleventh Circuit has put it: "The question ... is threefold: first, do [the proceedings] constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do the proceedings implicate important state interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." Id. at 1274 (quotation omitted).

Looking to the relief requested by Cano-Diaz, the court finds that the three elements are easily met based on the apparent pendency of the underlying state proceedings concerning the charged traffic offenses. Accordingly, this case presents an appropriate occasion for the court to apply the Younger doctrine, which raises ripeness as well as abstention concerns. See Gilam v. Harris, No. 4:11-cv-1005-VEH, 2012 WL 1568676, at *4 (N.D.Ala. Apr. 26, 2012) ("[Plaintiff] has not adequately shown how his federal lawsuit is fit for a judicial decision in light of the incompleteness of his criminal case. In particular, to proceed with evaluating [plaintiff]'s constitutional claims, the court would have to speculate as to the outcome of the state criminal proceedings against him and offer an impermissible advisory opinion about the merits of his federal case."); id. at *5 ("Because of the still pending nature of the state criminal case against [plaintiff], his request for a federal court to review it for constitutionally deficiencies is premature. Additionally, any hardship that [plaintiff] may suffer in withholding review is outweighed by the unfitness of this case for a judicial decision at this juncture."). Specifically, Cano-Diaz's Fourth Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of her stop can adequately be addressed in municipal court or in any appeal thereafter through the circuit court of the county. Accordingly, Cano-Diaz's Fourth Amendment claim is premature to the extent that it is still pending in state proceedings. Therefore, it is due to be dismissed without prejudice on this jurisdictional ground.

2. Application of the Heck bar

Even if Cano-Diaz's underlying charges are not still pending as alleged,6 they are still due to be dismissed. The City of Leeds persuasively argues that, to the extent Cano-Diaz's underlying charges have resulted in convictions, they are due to be dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) because they are not ripe for adjudication.

The Heck bar is implicated when a plaintiff seeks damages7 under § 1983 for alleged constitutional harms, such as Cano-Diaz's claim for an unlawful stop under the Fourth Amendment, brought by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.8 See 1 Nahmod, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983 § 5:22 (2011) ("[T]he Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Heck v. Humphrey has deep implications for those § 1983 damages actions that may implicate the validity of an existing criminal conviction." (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)). In Heck, the Supreme Court held as follows:

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (italics in original; underline added) (footnotes omitted).

In Heck, therefore, "the Supreme Court held that § 1983 actions that necessarily call into question the validity of a conviction or sentence do not accrue until the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid by a tribunal authorized to make such a finding." Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1006 (11th Cir.1998) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364). Accordingly, if a plaintiff files a claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial, then "it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). "If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal." Id. at 394, 127 S.Ct. 1091; see Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 649, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997); Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364.

As applied to a § 1983 claim for a Fourth Amendment search and seizure violation, the Heck bar would not necessarily be invoked in every case. For instance, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that "[b]ecause an illegal search or arrest may be followed by a valid conviction, a successful § 1983 action for Fourth Amendment search and seizure violations does not necessarily imply the validity of a conviction. As a result, Heck does not generally bar such claims." Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n. 7, 114 S.Ct. 2364) (footnotes omitted). However, that scenario would present an exception to Heck's general rule — an exception to be applied based on the particular facts of each case: "[N]ot all Fourth Amendment claims fit the exception to Heck, and courts `must look both to the claims raised under § 1983 and to the specific offenses for which the § 1983 claimant was convicted.'" Vickers v. Donahue, 137 Fed.Appx. 285, 290 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1160 n. 2); see also Weaver v. Geiger, 294 Fed. Appx. 529, 533 (11th Cir.2008) ("We have previously held that [Fourth Amendment claims premised on invalid warrants] can be brought even without proof that the underlying conviction has been called into question. However, we have also determined that Heck would still preclude those claims that `if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction because they would negate an element of the offense.'" (quoting Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1160 n. 2)).

The facts of this case demonstrate that the Heck bar is properly invoked. In view of the facts surrounding the traffic stop, as alleged by Cano-Diaz, the Heck bar is triggered because her Fourth Amendment claim, if successful, would necessarily implicate the validity of the underlying state charges. More specifically, Cano-Diaz alleges that she was "was stopped by an officer of the Leeds Police Department for allegedly crossing outside the fog line multiple times." (Doc. 29 ¶ 21). She further alleges that the "traffic stop was pretextual and was effected solely in order to harass or intimidate the Plaintiff because of her ethnicity, Hispanic, and improperly to enforce Alabama's Immigration Act." (Id.) (emphasis added). Accordingly, her denial of any basis for the reason she was pulled over — allegedly, her failure to maintain her lane — implicates the validity of her failure-to-maintain-lane citation. Additionally, if Cano-Diaz were to prevail on her claim that she was pulled over and detained without the requisite probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine would apply to invalidate or expunge the second offense she was charged with, driving without a license. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) ("[T]his Court held nearly half a century ago that evidence seized during an unlawful search could not constitute proof against the victim of the search. The exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such invasions." (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1913)). This is so because any evidence obtained during the stop that she was driving without a license would necessarily be excluded in light of the unlawful stop.9 See id.

Therefore, Cano-Diaz's Fourth Amendment claim in Count I is due to be dismissed under Heck because "a judgment in [her] favor on this claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of h[er] underlying convictions." Hawthorne v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., 212 Fed.Appx. 943, 947 (11th Cir.2007); see also Tuff v. Wright, No. CV 311-108, 2012 WL 1167729, at *3 (S.D.Ga. Mar. 15, 2012) (applying Heck to bar § 1983 claim for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation on the basis that the plaintiff's "§ 1983 claims ... would imply that he was indicted based purely on knowingly falsified information, which is tantamount to implying that his conviction was invalid."); Spencer v. Deluca, No. 3:10-cv-65-KAP, 2010 WL 2076912, at *2 (W.D.Pa. May 21, 2010) ("A claim that the arresting officer totally fabricated probable cause for an arrest which led to the discovery of the sole evidence [upon which the charge was based] is one that cannot accrue until the dismissal of the charges." (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364)). Cano-Diaz's Fourth Amendment claim is not ripe under Heck because she has not pointed to a "conviction or sentence reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Therefore, she does not have a cognizable § 1983 claim at this time for her alleged Fourth Amendment violation.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

In Count II, Cano-Diaz asserts that the City of Leeds violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Like her Fourth Amendment claim, she brings her Fourteenth Amendment claim by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. And, like her Fourth Amendment claim, her Fourteenth Amendment claim is likewise due to be dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine to the extent her charges are still pending, and under Heck to the extent she has been convicted of those charges.

1. Application of the Younger abstention doctrine

For the same reasons stated supra concerning her Fourth Amendment claim, Cano-Diaz's Fourteenth Amendment claim for racial profiling is due to be dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine to the extent that any charges brought against her due to the allegedly discriminatory and unlawful stop are still pending. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. 746; 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1274-76. In addition to the general reasons stated above concerning Cano-Diaz's ability to address her constitutional grievances before a state tribunal, a number of courts across the country have considered the specific issue of whether Younger applies to Fourteenth Amendment racial profiling claims and have concluded that abstention is appropriate. (See Doc. 31 at 10-11 (citing cases)).10

Accordingly, Cano-Diaz's Fourth Amendment claim will be dismissed without prejudice as premature to the extent that her underlying state charges are still pending.

2. Application of the Heck bar

Just as the Heck bar applies to dismiss Cano-Diaz's Fourth Amendment claim, see analysis supra, it applies similarly to dismiss her Fourteenth Amendment claim to the extent her charges have resulted in a conviction.

In her Fourteenth Amendment claim, brought by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Cano-Diaz asserts that "suspicionless stops have been and are predominantly conducted on Black and Latino or Hispanic individuals or those that have physical characteristics belonging to such races or ethnicities on the basis of racial and/or ethnic profiling." (Doc. 29 ¶ 36). She further contends that "[a]s a result, the police department policy, practice, and/or custom of suspicionless stops violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (Id. ¶ 37). The facts specific to Cano-Diaz allege that she was pulled over, arrested, and incarcerated, based on a "pretextual" traffic stop that "was effected solely in order to harass or intimidate the Plaintiff because of her ethnicity, Hispanic." (Id. ¶ 21).

Applying Heck, the court must again analyze whether Cano-Diaz's § 1983 claim, if successful, will necessarily imply the invalidity of any outstanding conviction against her at the state or municipal level. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364. If so, the court must dismiss her claim, "unless [Cano-Diaz] can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Id. Analysis of Cano-Diaz's Fourteenth Amendment racial profiling claim reaches an even clearer result than her Fourth Amendment claim. Consistent with the persuasive analysis and conclusion of numerous other courts (see Doc. 31 at 13 n. 3 (citing multiple district court cases)), the court finds that, if Cano-Diaz prevailed on her § 1983 claim for Equal Protection violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, it would "necessarily imply" the invalidity of any outstanding conviction against her at the state or municipal level for the offenses charged during her traffic stop. More specifically, if Cano-Diaz proved that the City of Leeds officer who pulled her over did so for purely discriminatory motives based on her race or ethnicity, such proof of the illegality of the stop would invalidate any convictions resulting therefrom. See, e.g., Cook v. Layton, 299 Fed.Appx. 173, 174 (3d Cir.2008) ("Heck ... applies to allegations of a violation of equal protection, because a successful claim of racially discriminatory enforcement of the law would invalidate the resulting conviction and sentence."); Sanders v. Fayetteville City Police Dep't, 160 Fed.Appx. 542, 543 (8th Cir.2005) (affirming dismissal pursuant to Heck of a § 1983 claim arising from an alleged racially motivated vehicle stop from which a conviction resulted); Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep't of Law, 411 F.3d 427, 441 (3d Cir.2005) (holding that the Heck bar was applicable "[b]ecause a successful claim of selective enforcement under the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause would have necessarily invalidated ... [the underlying] conviction ...").11

Moreover, Cano-Diaz has not shown that her "conviction ... [has been] reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Accordingly, Cano-Diaz's Fourteenth Amendment claim in Count II is not ripe under Heck and is due to be dismissed under Heck to the extent that her pending underlying state charges have become convictions.

C. Title VI Claim

Cano-Diaz also asserts, in Count III, that the City of Leeds unlawfully discriminated against her in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq.12 Specifically, she pleaded that the law enforcement activities "had a disparate impact on minorities, particularly Blacks and Latinos." (Am. Compl., Doc. 29 ¶ 43) (emphasis added). The City of Leeds contends that Cano-Diaz fails to state a claim under Title VI because she is not entitled to a private right of action to enforce disparate impact treatment. The court agrees.

It is clear under Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001), that there is no private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 285, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (holding that there is no private right of action to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations); see also Title VI Legal Manual, U.S. Dep't of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/vimanual.php (Jan. 11, 2001) (recognizing that "Sandoval foreclosed private judicial enforcement of Title VI disparate impact regulations"). Therefore, Cano-Diaz's Title VI claim is due to be dismissed with prejudice because it is not cognizable under the law.

D. Damages Claims

In Counts IV and V, Cano-Diaz asserts claims for remedial relief predicated upon the Defendant's past unconstitutional practices and claims for money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Neither of these claims can stand without a cognizable underlying § 1983 claim to support them. See generally Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ("As we have said many times, § 1983 `is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides `a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)).

E. Class Action Allegations

Likewise, because Cano-Diaz has not stated a maintainable cause of action on any of her alleged claims, the putative class allegations necessarily must fail.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the court concludes as follows:

1. Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, brought by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I and II) are due to be dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine to the extent that the underlying state charges are still pending as alleged. Alternatively, Counts I and II are due to be dismissed to the extent that the underlying charges have become convictions because they are not ripe — and thus "not cognizable" — under Heck. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364 ("A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983." (italics in original; underline added). Under either reasoning, Counts I and II are due to be dismissed without prejudice.

2. Plaintiff's Title VI claim (Count III) is due to be dismissed with prejudice because it is not a cognizable claim.

3. Because Plaintiff has not stated a maintainable cause of action on any of her substantive claims, Plaintiff's claims for remedial relief (Count IV) and for damages under § 1983 (Count V) are due to be dismissed.

4. Because Plaintiff has not stated a maintainable cause of action on any of her alleged claims, the putative class allegations necessarily must fail.

5. With no remaining claims, this case is due to be dismissed. A separate order dismissing the case will be entered.