Filed: Feb. 02, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 2, 2018 Elisabeth A. Shumaker TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court CLINTON T. ELDRIDGE, Petitioner - Appellant, v. No. 17-1253 (D.C. No. 1:16-CV-00690-MSK) J. OLIVER, Warden; U.S. PAROLE (D. Colo.) COMMISSION, Respondents - Appellees. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * Before PHILLIPS, McKAY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Clinton Eldridge seeks a certificate of appealability to appeal the distri
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 2, 2018 Elisabeth A. Shumaker TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court CLINTON T. ELDRIDGE, Petitioner - Appellant, v. No. 17-1253 (D.C. No. 1:16-CV-00690-MSK) J. OLIVER, Warden; U.S. PAROLE (D. Colo.) COMMISSION, Respondents - Appellees. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * Before PHILLIPS, McKAY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Clinton Eldridge seeks a certificate of appealability to appeal the distric..
More
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 2, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
CLINTON T. ELDRIDGE,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 17-1253
(D.C. No. 1:16-CV-00690-MSK)
J. OLIVER, Warden; U.S. PAROLE (D. Colo.)
COMMISSION,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before PHILLIPS, McKAY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Clinton Eldridge seeks a certificate of appealability to appeal the
district court’s dismissal of his § 2241 habeas corpus petition.
In 1984, Petitioner was convicted of several felony counts, including rape
and robbery, and was sentenced by the District of Columbia Superior Court to
consecutive prison terms totaling 40 to 140 years. In 2010, 2013, and 2016,
Petitioner was considered for parole by the United States Parole Commission,
which denied parole each time. Petitioner’s next parole hearing is scheduled for
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
February 2019.
In his § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenged the three denials of parole in
2010, 2013, and 2016. His main arguments were that (1) the Commission failed
to give adequate consideration to the positive things he had done in custody, such
as obtaining his GED and completing numerous educational and vocational
programs; (2) it was unfair for the Commission to consider old reports of
institutional misconduct, such as his sexual assault of a female correctional
officer in 2000 and his attempted extortion/blackmail of a female correctional
officer in 2004, without also crediting him for his contemporaneous and more
recent positive program achievements; and (3) the Commission erred in denying
parole based on his failure to participate in sex-offender treatment that had not
been recommended earlier, was not available in the facility where he is
incarcerated, and is not required under parole guidelines. He also argued that the
Commission violated his due process rights by failing to state its reasons for
denying parole with particularity, failing to give him advance notice of his need
to participate in sex-offender treatment, and issuing its written report on the
denial of parole after the hearing had been concluded, rather than before the
hearing.
After thoroughly reviewing the appellate record and Petitioner’s filings on
appeal, we conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of
the district court’s ruling. For substantially the same reasons given by the district
-2-
court, reasonable jurists would not debate that the Commission acted well within
its considerable discretion in weighing all of the pertinent factors and concluding
that parole was not appropriate at this time. Nor would reasonable jurists debate
whether Petitioner has shown a violation of his due process rights in the
Commission’s handling of his parole hearings. Finally, we conclude that
reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s decision to dismiss the
petition without first holding a hearing.
We therefore DENY Petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability
and DISMISS the appeal. Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
-3-