OPINION AND ORDER

KENNETH A. MARRA, District Judge.

This cause is before the Court upon Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss Complaint (DE 6). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. The Court has carefully considered the motion and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

I. Background

On May 10, 2012, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal of Plaintiffs James Kissinger and Marie Colbert's ("Plaintiffs") one count Complaint brought pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (Notice of Removal, DE 1; Compl., DE 1-2.) According to the allegations of the Complaint, Plaintiffs own a home in Broward County, Florida. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Defendant is a creditor as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g). (Compl. ¶ 4.) Defendant hired American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. ("AHMSI") to service the subject loan. (Compl. ¶ 6.) AHMSI serviced the loan obligation owned by Defendant and secured by a mortgage on Plaintiff's home. (Compl. ¶ 7.)

On or about February 8, 2011, AHMSI received a written request to identify the owner of Plaintiffs' promissory note. (Compl. ¶ 12; Feb. 8, 2011 letter, Ex. A, DE 1-2.) The letter requested, among other things, the "full name, address and telephone number of the owner or master servicer of the original mortgage note." (Feb. 8, 2011 letter.) On or about March 16, 2011, AHMSI responded, stating in pertinent part:

(Mar. 16, 2011 letter, Ex. B, DE 1-2.)

This response only provided the name of the owner of the obligation, and not the address or telephone number, in violation of TILA. (Compl. ¶¶ 15-20.) As its servicer, AHMSI is the agent of Defendant and Defendant is responsible for its failure to respond properly. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-22.)

Defendant seeks to dismiss the Complaint on the following grounds: (1) the allegations of the Complaint demonstrate Defendant complied with TILA because AHMSI acted as a master servicer and TILA requires Defendant to provide information regarding either the owner or the master servicer; (2) TILA's statutory language does not support vicarious liability for Defendant (as creditor), for AHMSI's, (as servicer), failure to respond to Plaintiff's request and (3) TILA is unconstitutionally vague as to vicarious liability and should therefore be stricken as unconstitutional.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires "a short and plain statement of the claims" that "will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). The Supreme Court has held that "[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations omitted).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quotations and citations omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Thus, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 1950. When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief could be granted. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).

III. Discussion

TILA is a consumer protection statute that seeks to "avoid the uninformed use of credit" through the "meaningful disclosure of credit terms," thereby enabling consumers to become informed about the cost of credit. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). Besides imposing criminal liability, TILA creates a private cause of action for actual and statutory damages for certain disclosure violations. 15 U.S.C. § § 1611 (criminal liability), 1640(a)1 (civil liability).

Section 1641 of TILA provides in pertinent part:

15 U.S.C. § 1641(f).

15 U.S.C. § 1641(g).

A "master servicer" is defined as "the owner of the right to perform servicing, which may actually perform the servicing itself or may do so through a subservicer." 24 C.F.R. § 3500.21. A subservicer does not own the right to perform the servicing, but does so on behalf of the master servicer. Id. TILA does not impose liability on servicers, but rather on creditors who fail to comply with various requirements under TILA. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).

With this in mind, the Court begins by disposing of Defendant's argument that the allegations of the Complaint demonstrate full statutory compliance with TILA. Although the letter sent to Plaintiffs provided AHMSI's name, address and telephone number, the letter failed to state that AHMSI is the master servicer or identify the name, address and telephone number of the owner. Nonetheless, Defendant claims the letter provided Plaintiffs with adequate information to allow them to conclude that AHMSI is the master servicer on their loan. This argument, however, is a defense that may be raised by Defendant but, at this early stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot resolve this issue as a matter of law

Next, the Court will address Defendant's other basis for dismissal; namely, that the statutory language of TILA does not support vicarious liability for creditors. According to Defendant, as the creditor of Plaintiffs' mortgage, it cannot be held vicariously liable for damages under section 1602(f)(2) for the alleged failure of AHMSI to respond properly to Plaintiffs' request for information about the owner of their mortgage. In support, Defendant relies on Holcomb v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., No. 10-81186-CIV, 2011 WL 5080324 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 26, 2011).

In Holcomb, the borrowers on a mortgage sued the owner of their note and mortgage for violations under TILA. The basis of the claim was the failure of the loan servicer to respond properly to the borrowers for the identity of the owner of the note and mortgage. Id. at *1. The borrowers argued that the owner of the note and mortgage was liable for the servicer's failure because the servicer was its agent. In addressing this argument, the Holcomb court stated, "TILA presents an apparent conundrum by imposing an obligation on servicers to provide information on request but also absolving servicers of any liability under TILA where the servicers are not also the owners of the obligations." Id. at *6. The Holcomb court noted that other courts have "attempted to rectify this issue by allowing for the possibility of agency liability under TILA." Id. (citing Consumer Solutions REO, LLC v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 EMC, 2010 WL 144988, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 8, 2010)).

In rejecting this approach, the Holcomb court observed that Congress has taken its "own approach to rectifying the problem, which has not been to apply agency principles to TILA but rather to add provisions imposing an affirmative duty on transferees — including assignees — to notify borrowers in writing of the transfer." Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)). Based on this 2009 amendment, the Holcomb court stated that "[t]his approach ensures access to information without increasing the risk that some [creditors] would use information requests under (f)(2) as a means to gain leverage rather than an attempt to gain information" despite the "disastrous effects failure to disclose can have on a [creditor's] ability to exercise rights under TILA." Id. (quoting In re Carlton, No. 10-40388-JJR-13, 2011 WL 3799885 (Bkrtcy. N.D.Ala. Aug. 6, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Based on this interpretation of TILA, the Holcomb court held that the creditor could not be held liable for the servicer's failure under TILA.

In responding, Plaintiffs note that other decisions have since disagreed with Holcomb and applied vicarious liability to circumstances similar to the instant case. Plaintiffs urge the Court to adopt the reasoning of those cases, pointing out that "TILA is a consumer protection statute, and as such must be construed liberally in order to best serve Congress' intent." Ellis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 707 (11th Cir.1998). Plaintiffs emphasize that the Court must look to TILA as a whole. United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122, 8 How. 113, 12 L.Ed. 1009 (1850) ("[i]n expounding a statute, [courts] must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy."). Plaintiffs state that adopting the rationale of Holcomb would result in Plaintiffs having no remedy at law for Defendant's failure to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(2), and would be contrary to TILA's remedial purpose of protecting consumers. See Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., 374 F.3d 1060, 1068 (11th Cir.2004) (TILA has a strong remedial purpose and will be construed liberally in the consumer's favor). (Resp. at 6-8.)

With respect to the amendment that added a private cause of action, Plaintiffs point out this amendment "was in part, a reaction to the continuing concern that, lacking a private right of action, section 1641(f)(2) had failed to protect homeowners from harms associated with nondisclosures." Davis v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-2719-CC-LTW, 2011 WL 7070221, at *3 (N.D.Ga. Mar. 1, 2011) report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part on other grounds, 2011 WL 7070222 (N.D.Ga. Sept. 19, 2011) (citing 155 Cong. Rec. S5173-74 (daily ed. May 6, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see In re Meyer, 379 B.R. 529, 553-554 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.2007) (describing situation where consumers attempted to exercise rescission rights pursuant to TILA, servicer refused to reveal identity of note holder, and statute of limitations for the cause of action expired). (Resp. at 8.)

As noted by Plaintiffs, several cases have disagreed with Holcomb's reasoning, finding instead that agency principles apply to section 1641(f)(2). For example, in Consumer Solutions REO, LLC v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 EMC, 2010 WL 1222739 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 24, 2010), the court rejected the theory relied upon in Holcomb; namely, that Congress amended TILA to include section 1641(g) as a way to impose liability on a creditor.2 Id. at *4. Instead, the Hillery court found there was "no clear Congressional intent to preclude creditor liability" under section 1641(f)(2). Id. Looking at other cases, the Hillery court noted that "liability based on an agency relationship is generally cognizable under TILA." Id. (citing Roach v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 598 F.Supp.2d 741, 753 (E.D.Va.2009); In re Bumpers, No. 03 C 111, 2003 WL 22119929 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 11, 2003)). The Hillery court believed this approach particularly appropriate, given TILA's broad remedial purpose. Id. at *5.

Likewise, in Davis, the court also applied agency principles to section 1641(f)(2):

Davis, 2011 WL 7070221, at *4 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Other courts have also applied vicarious liability to TILA. See, e.g., Galeano v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., No. 12-61174-CIV, 2012 WL 3613890, at *5 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 21, 2012); Khan v. Bank of New York Mellon, 849 F.Supp.2d 1377, 1382 (S.D.Fla.2012); Rinegard-Guirma v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 3:10-cv-01065-PK, 2012 WL 1110071, at *9 (D.Or. Apr. 12, 2012); Johnson v. Multi-Solutions, Inc., No. 08-5134(AET), 2011 WL 3667554 at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2011).

This Court chooses to follow the reasoning of the courts finding vicarious liability. There is no question that Congress created a cause of action as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). At the same time, Congress mandated that servicers would not be liable for a TILA violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f). As such, the Court concludes that Congress intended the servicer's agent to be liable; otherwise, Congress created a cause of action with no one to sue for relief.

Lastly, the Court rejects Defendant's contention that TILA is unconstitutionally vague and must be stricken. To begin, civil statutes, regulating economic activities, are subject to a less strict vagueness test than criminal statutes. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep. of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 507 (5th Cir.2001).3 Moreover, the burden for this Court to strike a statute for vagueness is high. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has noted that federal courts should interpret federal statutes to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770 (1953) (quoting Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 346, 48 S.Ct. 194, 72 L.Ed. 303 (1928); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974)). Lastly, the Court does not accept that different rulings by different courts on the interpretation of vicarious liability under TILA mandates a finding of vagueness. This is especially the case, where as here, there is only one court which held that TILA does not support a finding of vicarious liability for a creditor. Thus, the Court concludes that TILA should not be stricken for vagueness.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint (DE 6) is DENIED.