Filed: Aug. 30, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 30, 2018 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 17-5117 (D.C. No. 4:17-CV-00501-GKF-JFJ) ALK ENTERPRISES, LLC, (N.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellee. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _ Before BACHARACH, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _ This appeal involves the relationship between two lawsuits concerning insurance coverage. The insu
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 30, 2018 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 17-5117 (D.C. No. 4:17-CV-00501-GKF-JFJ) ALK ENTERPRISES, LLC, (N.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellee. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _ Before BACHARACH, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _ This appeal involves the relationship between two lawsuits concerning insurance coverage. The insur..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 30, 2018
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 17-5117
(D.C. No. 4:17-CV-00501-GKF-JFJ)
ALK ENTERPRISES, LLC, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before BACHARACH, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
This appeal involves the relationship between two lawsuits
concerning insurance coverage. The insurer is Valley Forge Insurance Co.,
and the named insured is ALK Enterprises, LLC. Another insured,
Mr. Jason Klintworth, brought the first lawsuit against Valley Forge;
Valley Forge then brought a second lawsuit against ALK. The district court
*
Oral argument would not materially aid our consideration of the
appeal. Thus, we have decided the appeal based on the briefs. See Fed. R.
App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
But our order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value under
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
dismissed the second lawsuit, and Valley Forge brought this appeal. We
affirm.
1. ALK enters the first lawsuit.
The appeal largely turns on whether ALK is a party to the first
lawsuit. ALK says that it is; Valley Forge disagrees. The disagreement
arises from the way that ALK entered the first lawsuit. Mr. Klintworth
requested permission to amend his petition to add claims against Valley
Forge. The court granted leave to amend, and Mr. Klintworth filed an
amended petition.
The amended petition included claims by a new plaintiff, ALK,
which asserted its own claims against Valley Forge for breach of the
insurance contract and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Valley Forge then brought its own lawsuit for a declaratory judgment
against ALK.
2. The district court had discretion over whether to entertain the
declaratory-judgment lawsuit.
The district court enjoyed discretion on whether to entertain Valley
Forge’s lawsuit for a declaratory judgment. See State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Mhoon,
31 F.3d 979, 982 (10th Cir. 1994). In exercising that
discretion, the court had to decide which lawsuit provided the better
opportunity to resolve the issues. Predator Int’l, Inc. v. Gamo Outdoor
2
USA, Inc.,
793 F.3d 1177, 1190 (10th Cir. 2015). For this decision, the
court had to consider five factors:
[1] whether a declaratory action would settle the controversy;
[2] whether it would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal
relations at issue; [3] whether the declaratory remedy is being
used merely for the purpose of “procedural fencing” or “to
provide an arena for a race to res judicata”; [4] whether use of a
declaratory action would increase friction between our federal
and state courts and improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction;
and [5] whether there is an alternative remedy which is better or
more effective.
Mhoon, 31 F.3d at 982 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Our review is deferential.
Our review of the district court’s weighing of these factors is
deferential: “[We] will not engage in a de novo review of all the various
fact-intensive and highly discretionary factors involved. Instead, [we] will
only ask whether the trial court’s assessment of them was so unsatisfactory
as to amount to an abuse of discretion.”
Id. at 983.
4. The district court considered the five factors and decided not to
entertain the declaratory-judgment lawsuit.
In declining to entertain the declaratory-judgment lawsuit, the
district court evaluated the five factors.
For the first two factors, the court considered both lawsuits,
concluding that the declaratory-judgment lawsuit had raised issues that
were “central” to the first lawsuit and would “necessarily be adjudicated
3
therein.” Appellant’s App’x at 124–25. Thus, the court reasoned that the
first two factors supported dismissal.
The district court regarded the third factor as support for dismissal,
reasoning that Valley Forge’s issues in the declaratory-judgment lawsuit
were “substantially the same as most of ALK’s underlying claims” in the
first lawsuit.
Id. at 125. In light of the overlap in issues, the court
concluded that Valley Forge was using the declaratory-judgment lawsuit to
engage in procedural fencing or to race toward res judicata.
Id.
The district court concluded that the fourth factor—whether
exercising jurisdiction would create friction with state courts—did not tilt
either way: the first lawsuit was in federal court, but a motion was pending
for remand to state court.
Finally, the district court concluded that the fifth factor supported
dismissal, again relying on
the similarity of the issues in the two lawsuits and
the fact that the first lawsuit would necessarily resolve the
issues in the declaratory-judgment lawsuit.
Based on the five factors, the court concluded that the first lawsuit
would provide a superior forum and dismissed Valley Forge’s amended
petition for a declaratory judgment. Valley Forge contends that the
dismissal entailed an abuse of discretion.
4
5. The district court acted within its discretion.
Valley Forge argues that the district court misunderstood ALK’s
legal status in the first lawsuit. For this argument, Valley Forge points to
the amended petition, where ALK purported to add its own claims.
According to Valley Forge, ALK’s new claims are nullities because the
trial court did not grant permission for ALK to assert its own claims.
Therefore, Valley Forge argues that ALK is not actually a party to the first
lawsuit. And because ALK is not a party to the first lawsuit, Valley Forge
contends, the two lawsuits are distinct, involving different parties and
5
issues. Accordingly, Valley Forge argues that the district court abused its
discretion in
considering the lawsuits to be connected and
wasting judicial resources by ordering dismissal after deciding
the merits of the coverage dispute.
We reject both arguments.
A. The two lawsuits were connected.
Even if Valley Forge is correct and ALK is not a party to the first
lawsuit, both lawsuits would remain connected, for they involve similar
issues and the identical question of ALK’s status in the first lawsuit.
In the declaratory-judgment lawsuit, Valley Forge seeks a judgment
stating that
ALK lacks a cognizable claim under the insurance policy,
Valley Forge has not breached the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, and
if there had been a breach, it would not support punitive
damages.
In the first lawsuit, Mr. Klintworth had raised similar issues.
As the district court discussed, both lawsuits address whether Valley
Forge has breached the insurance contract and the duty of good faith and
fair dealing. Thus, a ruling on these issues in either lawsuit would likely
affect the other lawsuit. This relationship between the lawsuits supports
the dismissal of Valley Forge’s lawsuit for a declaratory judgment. See
6
Kunkel v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,
866 F.2d 1269, 1276 (10th Cir. 1989) (“A
federal court generally should not entertain a declaratory judgment action
over which it has jurisdiction if the same fact-dependent issues are likely
to be decided in another pending proceeding.”); see also Mid-Continent
Cas. Co. v. Vill. at Deer Creek Homeowners Ass’n,
685 F.3d 977, 982 n.3
(10th Cir. 2012) (“Especially relevant [to the first two factors] may be
whether the [pending] action would necessarily resolve the issues in the
declaratory judgment action.”). 1
In addition, the question of ALK’s legal status in the first lawsuit is
itself pending in both lawsuits. After Mr. Klintworth filed the amended
petition in the first lawsuit, Valley Forge filed an answer, challenging
ALK’s status as a party in the first lawsuit on the ground that ALK had
been added without leave of court, rendering its amended petition void
1
Valley Forge argues that if the district court in the
declaratory-judgment lawsuit were to decide that ALK is not an “insured,”
the issues in the first lawsuit would not be affected, eliminating the
overlap between the two cases. We rejected a similar argument in Mid-
Continent Casualty Co. v. Village at Deer Creek Homeowners Ass’n,
685
F.3d 977 (10th Cir. 2012). There we reasoned that the district court need
not have assumed what the outcome would have been in the second lawsuit.
See 685 F.3d at 983. So too here, where the district court need not have
assumed whether the court in the first lawsuit would have allowed ALK to
pursue its own claims against Valley Forge.
7
under Oklahoma law. In the first lawsuit, the court has not yet decided
ALK’s status. The significance of this history is twofold.
First, this history means that the question of ALK’s legal status in
the first lawsuit is itself an issue that overlaps between the two cases. This
overlap supports the district court’s ruling.
Second, this history means that entertaining the declaratory-judgment
lawsuit would require the district court to draw multiple assumptions about
future rulings in the first lawsuit. Valley Forge does not dispute that if
ALK is a proper party in the first lawsuit, the issues in the two cases would
overlap. Therefore, Valley Forge’s argument assumes that ALK will never
be considered a party in the first lawsuit.
This argument would require the district court in the declaratory-
judgment lawsuit to assume that the court in the first lawsuit will
agree with Valley Forge and determine that ALK was not
validly added to that lawsuit and
refuse to grant leave for ALK to join the lawsuit through proper
procedural channels.
These twin assumptions about the outcome of the first lawsuit rest on
surmise, and the district court could reasonably decline to assume this
uncertain chain of events. See Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Vill. at Deer
Creek Homeowners Ass’n,
685 F.3d 977, 983 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding
that the district court acted reasonably in declining to assume an uncertain
outcome that would eliminate the concerns weighing against consideration
8
of the declaratory-judgment lawsuit). 2 Accordingly, Valley Forge’s
argument fails.
B. The dismissal did not waste judicial resources.
Valley Forge also asserts that the district court resolved the
declaratory-judgment lawsuit on the merits. Thus, according to Valley
Forge, the decision not to exercise jurisdiction over the case wasted
judicial resources. We disagree.
As Valley Forge suggests, the district court discussed the merits and
concluded that “ALK does not appear to be an ‘insured’ under the plain
language of the Oklahoma Uninsured Motorists Coverage endorsement.”
Appellant’s App’x at 123. But the ruling’s full sentence reads:
Although, ALK does not appear to be an “insured” under the
plain language of the Oklahoma Uninsured Motorists Coverage
endorsement, this court leaves the ultimate resolution of that
question up to the court handling the First-Filed Action,
concluding in this case only that Valley Forge’s complaint for
2
Valley Forge also argues that the district court “erred by assuming
ALK was party to the Klintworth Lawsuit.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 12.
Valley Forge is perhaps referring to the district court’s evaluation of the
third and fifth factors, where the court referred to “ALK’s underlying
claims” and “ALK’s claims” in the first lawsuit. Appellant’s App’x at 125–
26. But the district court did not abuse its discretion by relying on the
claims as they were framed in the amended petition; the court had no need
to assume that ALK and its claims would be excluded from the first
lawsuit.
(continued)
9
Declaratory Judgment [Doc. No. 2] states a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
Id.
Valley Forge’s argument hinges on a misreading of the district
court’s ruling; the court did not “completely resolve[] the coverage dispute
between the two parties.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 17. Rather, the court
concluded only that Valley Forge’s amended petition stated a valid claim. 3
The court added some preliminary observations on the underlying issue of
coverage but ultimately declined to decide that issue. Therefore, we reject
Valley Forge’s argument.
6. Conclusion
We cannot conclude that the district court’s assessment of the five
factors “was so unsatisfactory as to amount to an abuse of discretion.”
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon,
31 F.3d 979, 983 (10th Cir. 1994).
Accordingly, we affirm.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
3
Valley Forge provides no authority for the proposition that a district
court abuses its discretion by declining to entertain a declaratory-judgment
lawsuit—based on an analysis of the five factors—solely because
resolution of the merits would save judicial resources.
10