Filed: Aug. 02, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Appeals Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _ August 2, 2019 Elisabeth A. Shumaker M. JAMES NASUTI, Clerk of Court Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 19-1128 (D.C. No. 1:19-CV-00509-RM-KMT) WHOLE FOODS MARKET, a/k/a (D. Colo.) WFM-WO, INC., Defendant - Appellee. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _ Before MATHESON, McKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. _ This appeal involves the relationship between two suits in district court. The first suit grew out o
Summary: FILED United States Court of UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Appeals Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _ August 2, 2019 Elisabeth A. Shumaker M. JAMES NASUTI, Clerk of Court Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 19-1128 (D.C. No. 1:19-CV-00509-RM-KMT) WHOLE FOODS MARKET, a/k/a (D. Colo.) WFM-WO, INC., Defendant - Appellee. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _ Before MATHESON, McKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. _ This appeal involves the relationship between two suits in district court. The first suit grew out of..
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FILED
United States Court of
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Appeals
Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
August 2, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
M. JAMES NASUTI, Clerk of Court
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 19-1128
(D.C. No. 1:19-CV-00509-RM-KMT)
WHOLE FOODS MARKET, a/k/a (D. Colo.)
WFM-WO, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, McKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
This appeal involves the relationship between two suits in district
court.
The first suit grew out of Mr. James Nasuti’s unsuccessful efforts to
obtain a job with Whole Foods Market. After twelve failed employment
applications, Mr. Nasuti sued in state court, identifying the defendant as
*
Oral argument would not materially help us to decide this appeal, so
we have decided the appeal based on the briefs. See Fed. R. App. P.
34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
“Whole Foods Market, a/k/a WFM-WO, Inc., a Collective Trade Name for
Others Whose Ident[it]ies are Unknown.” Whole Foods Market removed
the action to federal court and moved for dismissal based on the failure to
state a valid claim. Mr. Nasuti moved for a remand to state court, and the
district court stayed during the pendency of Whole Foods Market’s motion
to dismiss and Mr. Nasuti’s motion to remand.
Mr. Nasuti feared that the stay might ultimately doom his suit if he
had sued the wrong Whole Foods entity, 1 and he expected the stay to eat up
the time that he would otherwise have to fix this defect. R. at 267. So he
filed a new suit.
Id. (“Plaintiff has, in just the last few days, discovered a
way to evade the discovery ban and creatively name other likely
Defendants using Colorado law.”); see also
id. at 305 (Mr. Nasuti’s
statement that the stay of further discovery and filing of motions prevented
him from amending his pleadings, leaving him no other choice than to file
a new suit in state court). The district court dismissed the second suit
without prejudice, viewing it as repetitive with the first suit and an abusive
effort to circumvent the stay in the first suit. Mr. Nasuti appeals the
dismissal of the second suit, and we affirm.
1
In the first amended complaint, he stated that he could not be sure
“which Whole Foods entity(s) discriminated against him.” R. at 47.
2
I. Repetition of the Two Actions
The district court did not err in viewing the second suit as repetitive.
On this issue, we apply the abuse-of-discretion standard. Katz v. Gerardi,
655 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2017). In applying this standard, we
consider the district court’s reasoning. The district court reasoned that the
second suit had grown out of the same core of facts underlying the first
suit. In both suits, the court reasoned, Mr. Nasuti was alleging age
discrimination based on his unsuccessful employment applications with
Whole Foods.
The court was concerned that Mr. Nasuti had tried to “split” the same
claims into two separate suits. Given this concern, the court ordered Mr.
Nasuti to address the issue. R. at 545–48. Mr. Nasuti responded, but the
response didn’t address the court’s concern. Mr. Nasuti instead attacked
the integrity of the judge, accusing him of trying to “bury” Whole Foods
Market’s “racketeering scandal.”
Id. at 549. 2
We focus on the substance of the issue, not Mr. Nasuti’s personal
attack on the judge. The court had a legitimate interest in trying to prevent
a claimant from filing two virtually identical complaints to circumvent a
2
Mr. Nasuti called his response “Plaintiff’s Bewildered Response to
the Court’s Sua Sponte, Ex Parte ‘Bury the Scandal’ Sanctions Order
Thing.” R. at 549.
3
restriction on amending a complaint. Hartsel Springs Ranch of Colo., Inc.
v. Bluegreen Corp.,
296 F.3d 982, 985 (10th Cir. 2002).
Mr. Nasuti does not deny that the second suit is repetitive. He
instead argues that he needed to file the second suit because of the stay in
the first suit. Rather than file a repetitive suit, however, Mr. Nasuti could
have moved to lift the stay, sought a writ of mandamus, appealed an
adverse ruling, or moved to amend the complaint (and argued that the
amendment should relate back to the original complaint for purposes of the
limitations period). Thus, the district court acted within its discretion in
dismissing the second suit as repetitive.
II. Sanction for Trying to Circumvent the Stay
The district court also dismissed the second suit as a sanction for
trying to circumvent the stay in the first suit. For this rationale, we again
apply the abuse-of-discretion standard. Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E.
Agents, at Arapahoe Cty. Justice Ctr.,
492 F.3d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir.
2007).
Though Mr. Nasuti is an attorney, 3 he is acting pro se. Irrespective of
his pro se status, he must comply with the same procedural rules applicable
to other litigants. Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer,
425 F.3d 836,
3
He states that he does not currently practice law, but adds in the first
amended complaint that he is “in good standing, with extensive experience
in labor law, contracts, management, and safety issues.” R. at 46.
4
840 (10th Cir. 2005). 4 The district court had the authority to enforce its
stay order in the first suit, with or without a motion by one of the parties.
Olsen v. Mapes,
333 F.3d 1199, 1204 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003) (discussing the
court’s authority to act sua sponte under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)).
Mr. Nasuti protests that he had no choice because the limitations
period was about to expire on a claim against another Whole Foods entity
if he had mistakenly named the wrong party. But if the limitations period
had been about to expire, he had other options (as discussed above).
For the sake of argument, we might assume that the district court
could have credited Mr. Nasuti’s explanation for his filing of the second
suit. Even with this assumption, however, our issue is whether the district
court abused its discretion. In our view, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in the face of Mr. Nasuti’s admission that he had filed the
second suit to bypass the stay entered in the first suit.
III. Request for an Injunction
Mr. Nasuti asks us to enjoin Whole Foods Market from further
violations of RICO, arguing that we can act sua sponte to prevent a fraud
on the court or to issue a writ of mandamus. But Mr. Nasuti has not
4
We ordinarily interpret pro se filings with greater liberality than is
afforded to filings by counselled parties. Comm. on the Conduct of
Attorneys v. Oliver,
510 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 2007). But when the
pro se party is an attorney, we interpret his or her filing just as we would
in a counselled case.
Id.
5
presented evidence of a fraud on our court or explained how we could
enjoin RICO violations as a remedy for such a fraud. Nor has he shown
how we could issue a writ of mandamus to prevent a party from violating
RICO. We thus deny Mr. Nasuti’s request for an injunction.
Affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
6