SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 9], and Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Interim Class Counsel [Doc. No. 16]. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion is granted in part, and denied as moot in part, and Plaintiff's Motion is denied without prejudice.
Plaintiff Martin Taradejna brings this putative class action alleging violations under the Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act, the Minnesota Unlawful
As Plaintiff alleges, prior to 2007, Greek yogurt was not sold and distributed in large quantities in the United States. (Compl. ¶ 65 [Doc. No. 1-1].) Since that time, however, the production and distribution of Greek yogurt in this country has increased dramatically and is now one of the fast-growing segments of the yogurt market. (Id. ¶¶ 65-66.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants were unprepared for the popularity of Greek yogurt and possessed no facilities at which they could manufacture Greek yogurt using the straining process. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) Instead of constructing new facilities to manufacture strained Greek yogurt, Taradejna alleges that Defendants chose to use Milk Protein Concentrate ("MPC") when they entered the Greek yogurt market in 2010. A blend of dry dairy products, MPC is sold in a powdered form. (Id. ¶ 31.) It is a form of ultrafiltered milk that typically "retain[s] all protein components of milk." 70 Fed. Reg. 60751, 60752 (Oct. 19, 2005) (describing the ultrafiltration process in milk, as compared to mico and nanofiltration processes). Defendants' use of MPC in the manufacture of its Yoplait Greek yogurt results in a product with the thickness and protein content typical of Greek yogurt. (Compl. ¶ 28 [Doc. No. 1-1].) The labeling of Defendant's Yoplait Greek yogurt discloses MPC as an ingredient. (¶ 67.) Taradejna contends, however, that "Yoplait Greek yogurt is neither yogurt nor Greek, as those terms are used in the industry and as defined by regulation." (Id. ¶ 3.) Rather, Taradejna alleges that Yoplait Greek yogurt fails to comply "with legal and regulatory rules governing the labeling of food because it contains significant amounts of [MPC]." (Id.)
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., the Food & Drug Administration ("FDA") is authorized to create reasonable definitions and "standards of identity" for certain foods. 21 U.S.C. § 341. In 1981, the FDA promulgated such standards of identity for yogurt, 21 C.F.R. § 131.200, lowfat yogurt, 21 C.F.R. § 131.203; and nonfat yogurt, 21 C.F.R. § 131.206.
Defendants, however, contend that the FDA's position is that yogurt may contain MPC. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 15 [Doc. No. 13].)
M-I-04-10: Questions and Answers from a FY'04 Regional Milk Seminar, an Advanced Milk Processing Course, Dec. 27, 2004 (emphasis in original).
In 2009, the FDA issued a Proposed Rule which would allow for certain modifications to the standards of identity for yogurt, including "the use of reconstituted milk and whey protein concentrate as standard dairy ingredients." (Compl. ¶ 60 [Doc. No. 1-1]; 74 Fed.Reg. 2443 (Jan. 15, 2009) (2009 Proposed Rule)). The FDA noted that while the published standards do not permit the use of certain ingredients such as preservatives or a reconstituted dairy ingredient as a basic ingredient, "because of the stayed provisions, FDA has not taken enforcement action against the use of these ingredients in yogurt...." 74 Fed.Reg. at 2444. The FDA explained that, as of 2009, it had not held a public hearing to resolve these issues "due to competing priorities and limited resources." Id. at 2444. Therefore, the FDA stated that yogurt may "deviate from the relevant standards" as to the stayed provisions, which would include "milk-derived ingredients that may be used to increase the nonfat solids content" of yogurt. Id.
As background to the 2009 Proposed Rule, the FDA further described how the 1982 stay came about:
Id. at 2450.
In the 2009 Proposed Rule, the FDA also noted the current use and apparent safety of milk-derived ingredients in the manufacture of yogurt, stating
Id. The Agency concluded that "... it is appropriate to incorporate technological flexibility into standards so long as the basic nature and essential characteristics of the food are not adversely affected." Id. 2450-51. Therefore, the FDA proposed to permit
Id. at 2450-51. It appears that no public hearing has yet been held on the 2009 Proposed Rule.
Plaintiff, an Illinois resident, filed the Complaint in the instant case on March 30, 2012, in Minnesota State Court. (Compl.[Doc. No. 1-1].) On April 20, 2012, Defendants removed the matter to this Court. (Notice of Removal [Doc. No. 1].) In the Complaint, Taradejna alleges that in March 2012, he "purchased a serving of Yoplait Greek yogurt, which brandished the label developed and approved by Defendants" at a Chicago grocery store. (Compl. ¶ 78 [Doc. No. 1-1].) Taradejna, who paid $1.89 for the product, alleges that
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint. Defendants contend that Taradejna's claims fail as a matter of law for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff's claims are based on a mistaken premise and should be dismissed because the federal standard of identity for yogurt allows it to contain MPC; (2) Plaintiff's claims are preempted, to the extent that he attempts to use Minnesota law to create new requirements for yogurt; (3) primary jurisdiction bars Plaintiff's claims; and (4) Plaintiff's claims fail on the merits. (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 10-11 [Doc. No. 13].)
Arguing that his claims are adequately pled, Taradejna responds, arguing that: (1) Yoplait Greek yogurt is misbranded, as it fails to comply with the standard of identity; (2) any informal statement by FDA personnel which conflicts with yogurt's standard of identity is not entitled to deference; (3) Plaintiff's claims are not preempted by federal law; (4) the FDA should not have primary jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims; (5) the Court should reject any argument that Illinois law applies, and Plaintiff has properly pled a violation of Minnesota's consumer protection statutes; and (6) Plaintiff had adequately alleged deceptive conduct and injury. (Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. at 8-9 [Doc. No. 23].)
When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court assumes the facts in the Complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
"Primary jurisdiction is a common-law doctrine that is utilized to coordinate judicial and administrative decision making." Access Telecomms. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 137 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir.1998). Although there is no fixed formula for deciding whether to apply the doctrine, id., the doctrine "applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body." Alpharma, Inc. v. Pennfield Oil Co., 411 F.3d 934, 938 (8th Cir.2005) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Agency expertise is the most common reason that courts apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Access Telecomms., 137 F.3d at 608. In addition, courts apply the doctrine to promote uniformity and consistency within the particular field of regulation. Id. However, courts "should be reluctant to invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which often, but not always, results in added expense and delay to the litigants where the nature of the action deems the application of the doctrine inappropriate." United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 220, 224 (8th Cir.1984). When the primary jurisdiction doctrine applies, the "district court has discretion either to [stay the case and] retain jurisdiction or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, to dismiss the case without prejudice." Access Telecomms., 609 (internal quotation and citation omitted, alteration in original).
Defendants argue that this Court may rule on their Motion to Dismiss and need not defer to the Agency's authority, however, they acknowledge that referring the matter to the FDA is an appropriate alternative course of action. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 26 [Doc. No. 13].) Although Defendants' primary arguments in support of dismissal are generally persuasive, the Court finds that the reasons for applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine are present in this case. The underlying issue here is whether MPC is a proper, permitted ingredient in yogurt. The resolution of this question falls squarely within the competence and expertise of the FDA, pursuant to the authority granted to the Agency by Congress. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, et seq. As Defendants note, issues of food labeling are sufficiently complex that they "are best left to FDA for consideration prior to judicial review." (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 27 [Doc. No. 13] (citing Lever Bros. Co. v. Mauer, 712 F.Supp. 645, 651 (S.D.Ohio 1989); Heller v. Coca-Cola Co., 230 A.D.2d 768, 769-70, 646 N.Y.S.2d 524 (N.Y.App. Div.1996).) The current standard of identity for yogurt, the stayed 1982 limitations, the Agency's subsequent public statements about the standard, and the 2009 Proposed Rule do not constitute a model of clarity. The FDA is in the best position to resolve any ambiguity about the standard of identity for yogurt — a matter requiring scientific
Moreover, the FDA's ultimate decision on the permitted ingredients in yogurt will ensure national uniformity in labeling, utilizing the Agency's special expertise in this regard. The Agency's unique role in ensuring such consistency and uniformity is particularly significant here, as several recently-filed yogurt lawsuits throughout the country involve the same or similar issues as found in the instant suit.
Finding that the primary jurisdiction doctrine is applicable here, the Court grants Defendants' motion in part, dismisses this case without prejudice, and directs the parties to initiate the proper proceedings with the FDA. In light of this ruling, the Court does not address Defendants' other arguments in support of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), and therefore denies them as moot. Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Interim Class Counsel is denied without prejudice.