KIM R. GIBSON, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Sterling Yazmin Long-Payton's Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained as a Result of an Unlawful Search and Seizure with Accompanying Citation of Authority (hereinafter Defendant Payton's "Motion to Suppress") (Doc. No. 28) and Defendant Charles J. Gooch, Jr.'s Motion to Suppress Evidence (hereinafter Defendant Gooch's "Motion to Suppress") (Doc. No. 110), both of which the Government opposes. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Venue is proper pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18. For the reasons that follow, the Court will
On March 12, 2008, Defendants were indicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute a quantity of 3, 4-methylenedioxyamphetamine, commonly known as ecstasy, a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Doc. No. 1.) The Indictment charges that on or about May 25, 2007, in the Western District of Pennsylvania, Defendants did knowingly, intentionally and unlawfully possess with intent to distribute a quantity of a Schedule I controlled substance commonly known as ecstasy. (Id.) Defendants pleaded not guilty. (See Doc. No. 16; Doc. No. 65.)
On July 7, 2009, Defendant Sterling Yazmin Long-Payton (hereinafter "Defendant Payton") filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained as a Result of an Unlawful Search and Seizure with Accompanying Citation of Authority. (Doc. No. 28.) The United States filed a response opposing this Motion on November 18, 2009. (Doc. No. 48.) On May 2, 2011, Defendant Charles J. Gooch, Jr. (hereinafter "Defendant Gooch") filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence. (Doc. No. 110.) The United States filed a response opposing this Motion on June 30, 2011. (Doc. No. 121). Defendant Payton twice moved to supplement her Motion to Suppress (Doc. No.
Through their Motions Defendants seek to suppress all evidence obtained by law enforcement officials as a result of an automobile stop by Corporal Robert F. Johnson
The Court makes the following findings of fact based on the evidence presented at the July 19, 2011 Suppression Hearing.
On May 25, 2007, Corporal Robert F. Johnson of the Pennsylvania State Police was working a midnight shift with Sergeant Anthony DeLuca and Corporal Vincent Mock along the Pennsylvania Turnpike near the eastern side of the Allegheny Tunnel. (Doc. No. 133 at 3, 5-6, 38-39). At the time of the event, Corporal Johnson was a fifteen year veteran of the Pennsylvania State Police with over ten years of experience in highway interdiction work as a trooper and was assigned to the Bureau of Emergency and Special Operations as a canine handler. (Id. at 3-6.) As a canine handler, Corporal Johnson was responsible for assisting state, local, and federal agencies with drug investigations that required a narcotic detection canine. (Id. at 28.) When Corporal Johnson did not have such an assignment, he engaged in routine traffic enforcement, including drug interdiction. (Id. at 28-29, 74.)
During the course of this shift, Corporal Johnson parked his vehicle in the crossover area outside the eastbound side of the Allegheny Tunnel perpendicular to the two-lane westbound roadway, an estimated 15 to 20 feet from the edge of the westbound lane of traffic and an estimated 50 to 80 feet from the entrance of the tunnel. (Id. at 5-6, 39, 42-43, 48.) Corporal Johnson was familiar with this stretch of highway, having spent a "vast majority" of his days in the area and having conducted several hundred vehicle stops around the area. (Id. at 5.) The lighting at the time and place in question was dark, with some overhead lighting provided by tall street lamps that illuminated the tunnel but which was not very overwhelming or strong and lighting provided by the headlights of Corporal Johnson's patrol car. (Id. at 6.)
From this location, at approximately 3:30 a.m., Corporal Johnson observed a dark-in-color sedan, which he later discovered was driven by Defendant Payton and occupied by Defendant Gooch, pass his location in the right-hand lane at approximately 50-60 miles per hour.
Upon exiting the tunnel, Corporal Johnson pulled behind the dark sedan driven by Defendant Payton, at which point Corporal Johnson observed that the vehicle displayed Indiana registration plates. (Id. at 9, 10, 52-53.) Corporal Johnson activated his emergency lights and Defendant Payton quickly pulled over to the side of the highway in compliance with Corporal Johnson's signal to stop. (Id. at 52-53; see Government Exhibit 1.) Defendant Payton parked her vehicle
Corporal Johnson subsequently inquired where Defendants were traveling from, to which Defendant Gooch, now visibly awake, responded "New Jersey." (Id. at 16, 10.) Corporal Johnson then informed Defendants Payton and Gooch that he had stopped the vehicle because of the vehicle's tinted windows and stated that he intended to give Defendant Payton a written warning, but would then "get [Defendants] on [their] way." (Id. at 16; Government Exhibit
Corporal Johnson returned to his patrol car with Defendant Payton's license and registration to prepare a written warning. (Id. at 16-17, 62.) After entering his patrol car, Corporal Johnson stated "I think I got one" while speaking on his radio, which broadcast to Corporal Mock and Sergeant DeLuca, and proceeded to describe the circumstances which led Corporal Johnson to believe that he had stopped a vehicle containing contraband. (Id. at 17-18, 63, 87; Government Exhibit 1.) Specifically, Corporal Johnson remarked that Defendant Payton complained about pregnancy related cramps upon his arrival at the vehicle while the passenger was "passed out on the seat," questioned "Don't you think if she was having some kind of problem, the, the passenger would have known?," stated that the driver of the vehicle pulled over very close to the white fog line, and explained that he noticed a lack of luggage in the passenger compartment of the vehicle. (Doc. No. 133 at 17-18, 62-63; Government Exhibit 1.) During the course of this conversation, and in response to a question posed by one of the officers with whom Corporal Johnson was communicating by radio regarding the appearance of Defendant Payton, Corporal Johnson acknowledged that Defendant "may be pregnant." (Government Exhibit 1.) Corporal Johnson further noted that Defendant Payton was "doing everything, you know, [that] they [meaning seminars about criminal interdiction] historically say they do." (Doc. No. 133 at 55-56.)
Despite Corporal Johnson's observation that there was "nothing in the back seat at all.... There's no luggage, no nothing," one bag was present in and later removed from the back seat of the vehicle. (Id. at 64; Government Exhibit 1.) While in his vehicle, Corporal Johnson checked Defendant Payton's license and ran a criminal background check on Defendant Payton, including a check for violations of narcotics laws and weapons violations. (Doc. No. 133 at 18-19, 65-66, 89-90.) As a result of these checks, Corporal Johnson learned that Defendant Payton had a valid driver's license, was not a wanted person, and had a criminal history consisting of a prior charge for an assault or battery. (Id. at 19, 66, 89-90.) Corporal Johnson also learned that Defendant Payton was not the owner of the vehicle. (See id. at 19-20.)
Corporal Johnson subsequently returned to the vehicle to hand back Defendant Payton's license and registration cards and issue the written warning. (Id. at 19, 92.) Upon doing so, Corporal Johnson inquired into the location of the owner of the vehicle. (Id. at 19.) Defendant Payton confirmed that she was not the owner of the vehicle and informed Corporal Johnson that the owner of the vehicle was her aunt, who was not present. (Id. at 19-20.) Corporal Johnson then informed the occupants that the incident was being audibly and visually recorded, presented Defendant Payton with a written warning for the vehicle's tinted windows and partially operable center brake light, and asked Defendant Payton to sign the warning citation. (Id. at 93); Government Exhibit 1; Defendant's Exhibit C.) As Defendant Payton was signing the written warning, Corporal Johnson asked Defendant Gooch to refrain from lighting a cigarette
After taking approximately two to three steps and reaching the rear wheel of the vehicle, Corporal Johnson turned and re-approached the front passenger side of the vehicle. (Doc. No. 133 at 68, 93-94; Government Exhibit 1.) Corporal Johnson initiated a conversation by asking the occupants where they had been in New Jersey and inquiring as to the length of their stay. (Doc. No. 133 at 68, 70, 94; Government Exhibit 1.) Defendant Payton responded that Defendants had been in Newark, New Jersey and that she had left Indianapolis the previous day, travelled to Newark to drop off her daughter, and was returning home. (Doc. No. 133 at 70, 94; Government Exhibit 1.) Corporal Johnson believed that the distance from Indianapolis, Indiana to Newark, New Jersey was about 750 miles and required 12 hours of travel time. (Doc. No. 133 at 23.) Corporal Johnson then informed the Defendants that Pennsylvania was having a big problem with guns, drugs, and large sums of money on the Turnpike and asked Defendants if there was anything like that in the vehicle. (Doc. No. 133 at 69, 94-95; Government Exhibit 1.) Defendant Payton replied that there was not. (Doc. No. 133 at 95.) Corporal Johnson then asked Defendant Payton if she had any belongings or luggage-type items with her, to which she responded "just my, uh, book bag in the trunk." (Id. at 94-95; Government Exhibit 1.)
Hearing this, Corporal Johnson replied: "Just your book bag ... I'll tell you what, do you have any problem with me taking a quick peek and then we'll get you on your way?" (Doc. No. 133 at 69, 95, 97; Government Exhibit 1.) When Defendant Payton responded that she did not, Corporal Johnson replied "Okay, you want to step out and show me that?" (Doc. No. 133 at 95, 97; Government Exhibit 1.) Defendant Payton responded by promptly popping open the trunk's hood from the driver's seat and exiting the vehicle. (Doc. No. 97-98; Government Exhibit 1.) Corporal Johnson inquired as to whether Defendant Gooch had any identification (Government Exhibit 1) and then approached the trunk from the passenger's side of the vehicle, where he met Defendant Payton who was approaching the trunk from the driver's side of the Buick. (Doc. No. 98-99; Government Exhibit 1.) Defendant Payton extended her arm and index finger toward an object in the trunk and stated "that's my book bag...." (Doc. No. 133 at 98-99; Government Exhibit 1.) As she did so, Corporal Johnson instructed her to stand to the passenger side of the vehicle, away from the book bag, so that she would not be injured by vehicles on the Turnpike and so that he could inspect the bag. (Doc. No. 133 at 99; Government Exhibit 1.) Defendant Payton complied, standing adjacent to the rear corner of the passenger side of the vehicle, and remained there while Corporal Johnson searched the book bag and performed a visual search of the interior of the trunk. (See Doc. No. 133 at 21-22; 101-03; Government Exhibit 1.)
As Defendant Payton stood at the rear of the trunk, she fidgeted and shifted her weight from side to side. (Id.) During the search, Corporal Johnson inquired whether Defendant Payton was okay. (Id.; Doc No. 133 at 102.) Defendant Payton stated that she was and "just [had] to pee." (Doc. No. 133 at 101-02; Government Exhibit 1.) As Corporal Johnson examined Defendant Payton's book bag, he also visually inspected the trunk compartment. (See Doc. No. 133 at 21-22.) In so doing, Corporal Johnson observed that the trunk liner on the right side of the trunk interior was smooth, as if it had come from the factory, while the left inside corner was loose and looked like it "had been worked." (Id. at 22, 113.) Corporal Johnson further observed that a small piece of plastic bag was sticking up from behind the trunk liner.
Corporal Johnson then returned to Defendant Payton who was visibly upset and stating that she knew nothing about the ecstasy, needed to use restroom, and wanted to go home. (Id.; Doc. No. 133 at 106.) Corporal Johnson attempted to reassure Defendant Payton and told her not to worry. (Government Exhibit 1.) In response to a statement by Defendant Payton, Corporal Johnson informed Defendant Payton that he did not want her to "get on the
(Id.) Defendant Payton stated that she believed she understood her rights and began to answer questions posed by Corporal Johnson. (Id.) Corporal Johnson did not specifically inform Defendant Payton that an attorney would be provided for her if she could not afford one. (See id.) Defendant Payton was handcuffed and Defendants Payton and Gooch were thereafter removed from the scene and taken to the Pennsylvania State Police barracks. (Id.; Doc. No. 133 at 23, 119.) At the barracks, Defendant Payton was again advised of her rights by Trooper Jeffrey Brautigam. (Doc. No. 133 at 119.) Defendant Payton executed a written "Rights Warning and Waiver" form, which included a statement informing Defendant Payton that an attorney would be appointed to represent her if she could not afford to hire one and which was witnessed and signed by Trooper Volk. (Doc. No. 133 at 23, 119; Government Exhibit 2.)
At some time after the arrest, photographs were taken of the Buick. (Doc. No. 133 at 115-16.) These photographs were admitted into evidence at the Suppression Hearing as Defendant's Exhibits F, G, H, and I. (Id. at 114-16.) The photographs, which depict the vehicle and its windows, were taken during the daytime while the car was parked in a lot. (See id. at 115-17.) Of the four exhibits, only Exhibit F shows the driver's side of the vehicle — the side observed by Corporal Johnson on May 25, 2007 prior to stopping Defendants' vehicle. (Id. at 116-18.) Exhibits G, H, and I depict the passenger side of the vehicle at varying angles and distances. (Id.; Defendant's Exhibits G, H, I.)
At the Suppression Hearing, Defendant Gooch called Mr. Richard Villa to testify about the whereabouts of the Buick that was driven by Defendant Payton on May 25, 2007. (Doc. No. 133 at 121.) Mr. Villa testified that the vehicle had been salvaged and crushed. (Id. at 121.) Defendant Gooch also called Mr. David Michalak to testify regarding acceptable levels of vehicle window tint. (Id. at 123, 149-52.) Mr. Michalak is an ASE master level certified automotive technician with extensive experience in window tinting testing and inspection but with no training or experience in the enforcement of the vehicle code relative to window tinting violations. (Id. at 124-29, 131-46, 149.) Following voir dire, Mr. Michalak was permitted to testify as an expert on window tint testing and inspection. (Id. at 149-52.) In his testimony, Mr. Michalak opined that the Buick's windows were not tinted beyond the level of tint installed by the original manufacturer and that the vehicle was in compliance with Pennsylvania's window tint rules and regulations. (Id. at 160, 163.) Mr. Michalak based his testimony on Government Exhibit 1, the audio and video recording of the event at issue, and Defendant's Exhibits F, G, H, and I — photographs of the Buick taken in daylight — because the Buick had been salvaged and crushed and was not available for Mr. Michalak's direct review. (Id. at 120-22, 148, 151-57, 168-70.)
Evidence obtained from an illegal search or seizure is subject to suppression under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Defendants advance several arguments in support of their motions to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop and search of Defendants' vehicle on May 25, 2007. In brief, Defendants raise the following arguments: (A) the initial stop of Defendants' vehicle was not supported by probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion, (B) the Pennsylvania window tint statute, 75 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 4524(e), that served as the basis for the traffic stop violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, (C) Defendants were unlawfully detained following the issuance of the written warning, (D) any consent to search given by Defendant Payton was invalid and, even if such consent was valid, Corporal Johnson's search exceeded the scope of any consent given, and (E) Corporal Johnson's search of the trunk of the vehicle was not supported by probable cause and therefore is not justified pursuant to the automobile exception. Defendant Payton additionally argues as follows: two sets of statements made by Defendant Payton must be suppressed because the Miranda warnings given to Defendant Payton at the scene were inadequate (F), and all evidence obtained from Defendant Payton's cell phone as a result of the execution of the search warrant(s) must be suppressed (G). The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
Defendants contend that the evidence must be suppressed because the initial stop of Defendants' vehicle was unsupported by probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion of a motor vehicle code violation.
A routine traffic stop is constitutional when it is supported by reasonable suspicion.
In this case, Corporal Johnson allegedly stopped Defendants' vehicle for a perceived violation of the Pennsylvania statute governing window tinting, 75 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 4524(e), and for driving a vehicle with a partially inoperable rear deck break light, apparently in violation of 75 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 4303(b). (See Doc. No. 133 at 13-14, 57; Doc. No. 187 at 3.) Despite the Government's assertion that Corporal Johnson observed that the Defendants' vehicle's rear deck brake light was only half operable prior to stopping Defendants' vehicle and that this vehicle code violation provided a justification for the stop (see Doc. No. 187 at 3, 11), the record is unclear regarding precisely when Corporal Johnson observed a problem with Defendants' vehicle's rear deck brake light. (Compare Doc. No. 133 at 13-14, 57:6-9 with Doc. No. 133 at 11, 57:18-21,
Title 75, Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, Section 4524(e) governs vehicle windshield obstructions. In relevant part, it provides:
75 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 4524(e).
Here, Corporal Johnson, a trooper with over ten years of experience in highway interdiction, personally observed Defendants' vehicle travelling along a familiar stretch of highway. (See Doc. No. 133 at 3-6.) Corporal Johnson observed the driver's side windows of the Defendants' vehicle for one to three seconds as it passed his location while travelling within the speed limit. (See id. at 48-49, 75-77.) Although nighttime, some lighting was provided by very tall street lamps and additional lighting was provided by the headlights of Corporal Johnson's patrol car. (See id. at 6.) Corporal Johnson testified that from his location, he observed that the windows of the vehicle were "heavily tinted" and that the window tint was significant to the point that — from his vantage point — one could not see into the vehicle, even with the lighting above. (See id. at 8.) Corporal Johnson further testified that, based on his experience, the tint of the vehicle's window was greater than that permitted by Pennsylvania law and "was on the verge of extreme window tinting." (See id. at 8-11.)
At the Suppression Hearing, Defendant Gooch offered testimony of David Michalak to cast doubt on Corporal Johnson's observations regarding the level and type of tint on the vehicle's windows. An expert on window tint testing and inspection, Mr. Michalak opined that the tint on the vehicle's windows was in compliance with Pennsylvania's window tint rules and regulations. (See id. at 124-29, 131-46, 149.) While the Court finds that Mr. Michalak is a credible witness, Defendants' arguments fail to persuade the Court that Corporal Johnson did not have an articulable and reasonable suspicion, or even probable cause, to believe that the vehicle's tinted windows violated the law. Although Mr. Michalak has considerable experience in window tinting testing and inspection, Mr. Michalak has no training or experience in the enforcement of the vehicle code relative to window tint violations. (See id. at 140, 142-43.) Additionally, the observations upon which Mr. Michalak based his opinion were made under vastly different circumstances than the circumstances under
Defendants also argue that the alleged window tint violation does not provide a legal basis for the stop because there was no suggestion that the tint on the vehicle's windows was not installed by the manufacture and therefore Corporal Johnson lacked sufficient cause to suspect a violation of 75 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 4524(e). (See Doc. No. 150 at 22.) In United States v. Hall, 270 Fed.Appx. 123, 126 (3d Cir.2008), the defendant similarly argued that the tint on his windows did not provide the reasonable suspicion needed to effect the traffic stop because "the officers had no way of knowing at the time of the stop whether the tint was part of the original equipment or was applied after the vehicle was manufactured." The Third Circuit found that the tint on the windows of the defendant's vehicle, which prevented anyone from viewing the interior of the vehicle, was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that the defendant had violated a traffic ordinance, and "[t]he officers' inability to determine at the time of the stop whether [the defendant]'s windows were tinted by the [vehicle]'s manufacturer does not mean that the stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion." Id. at 126. This Court similarly finds that Corporal Johnson's lack of knowledge regarding the source of the window's tint does not mean that the stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
Finally, Defendants argue that Corporal Johnson's testimony that he did not observe any luggage in the vehicle's back seat proves that an individual could see through the vehicle's side windows, thereby demonstrating compliance with 75 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 4524(e) and demonstrating that the stop was not reasonable. The Court finds that this argument is premised upon the assumptions that Corporal Johnson observed the back seat through the vehicle's rear passenger side window,
Defendants contend that the evidence recovered must be suppressed because Pennsylvania's window tint statute, 75 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 4524(e), which served as the basis for the traffic stop in this case, violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. (See Doc. No. 150 at 23-24; Doc. No. 176 at 26-32.) This argument is unavailing. When an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a validly enacted statute, the exclusionary rule does not apply even if the statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349, 354-55, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987). This is because:
Id. at 349-50, 107 S.Ct. 1160.
This exception to the application of the exclusionary rule is not without limitation, however.
Id. at 355, 107 S.Ct. 1160.
Even if 75 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 4524(e) is repugnant to the Constitution, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to this case. Here, Corporal Johnson effected the vehicle stop pursuant to his belief that the vehicle's windows violated a validly enacted Pennsylvania statute. Corporal Johnson's reliance on this statute in carrying out his duty was objectively reasonable. Title 75, Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, Section 4524(e) is "a commonplace automotive equipment safety regulation of the kind which fits neatly into the traditional `police power' of state and local governments to regulate the health, safety, welfare, and morals of the community[,]" see United States v. Moreno, 43 Fed.Appx. 760, 766-67 (6th Cir.2002) (characterizing a Memphis City Code section regulating window
Defendants contend that they were unlawfully detained following the conclusion of the traffic stop. (See Doc. No. 150 at 25-28; Doc. No. 176 at 12-26; Doc. No. 191 at 5-6.) Specifically, Defendants contend that the encounter that ensued between Defendants and Corporal Johnson after the written warning was issued (hereinafter the "second encounter") constituted a seizure, and not a consensual encounter,
Before addressing Defendants' arguments that the alleged continued detention of Defendants Gooch and Payton was unsupported by reasonable suspicion, the Court must decide whether a seizure occurred. See United States v. Crandell, 554 F.3d 79, 84 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Williams, 413 F.3d 347, 352 (3rd Cir.2005) ("The first analytical step a court takes to evaluate the issues involved in this type of motion to suppress is to determine whether and when a citizen-police encounter implicates the Fourth Amendment.
"[A] person is `seized' only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). "[A] traffic stop may become a consensual encounter, requiring no reasonable suspicion, if the officer returns the license and registration and asks questions without further constraining the driver by an overbearing show of authority." United States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382, 386-87 (3rd Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir.2000)). "[T]he test for existence of a `show of authority' is an objective one: not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person." California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). Circumstances that might indicate a seizure include the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870. Ultimately, the relevant inquiry is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, "a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter....'" United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 951 (3rd Cir.1994); see also Wilson, 413 F.3d at 386-87.
Here, neither Defendant argues that the alleged seizure occurred by use of actual physical force and the record is devoid of such evidence. Thus, the Court must decide whether Defendants were seized by means of a show of authority such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Defendants assert that Corporal Johnson manifested a "personal show of authority" and that this, combined with the surrounding circumstances, "did not amount to a ... situation where `a reasonable person would feel free to go about his business....'" (See Doc. No. 176 at 16 (quoting Kim, 27 F.3d at 951)). The Court disagrees with Defendants' interpretation of the facts. Defendants assert that, during this period, "the vocal tone of Corporal Johnson shifted between cordial and authoritative." (See id. at 13.) The Court, however, after reviewing the evidence, finds that the vocal tone of Corporal Johnson remained cordial up until the time the ecstasy tablets were discovered. (See Government Exhibit 1.) While Corporal Johnson did, at times, raise the volume of his voice to enable himself to be heard over the sounds of passing traffic, the tone used between the time he re-approached Defendant's vehicle and the time the ecstasy tablets were discovered was casual and stands in stark contrast to the clearly authoritative tone later used by Corporal Johnson when ordering Defendant Gooch out of the vehicle. (See id.) Additionally, Corporal Johnson did not fire a series of "rapid-fire questions" at Defendants, as Defendants claim. (See id.; Doc. No. 176 at 14.) In fact, as demonstrated by Government Exhibit 1 and Defendant Gooch's recitation of a portion of the dialogue that occurred during the second encounter in his Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (see Doc. No. 176 a 14), Corporal Johnson paused and fumbled over his words at least once during the brief conversation identified by Defendants (see id. at 14-15).
In arguing that this interaction was not a consensual encounter, Defendants place
Defendants argue that, in addition to Corporal Johnson's alleged show of authority, the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop were not those where one would feel free to leave. (See Doc. No. 176 at 16.) That the second encounter took place on the side of the highway, while a factor to be considered, does not transform the event into a seizure. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ("Where the encounter takes place is one factor, but it is not the only one."); Wilson, 413 F.3d at 387. Here, the second encounter took place on the berm of the roadway after Corporal Johnson bid the Defendants goodbye and began to return to his patrol car. (See Doc. No. 133 at 53, 93-95.) This is true of many traffic stops. See Wilson, 413 F.3d at 387 (stating that the fact that a defendant is isolated on the side of a highway while an officer questions him is "true of many traffic stops;" finding that the record showed no circumstances so intimidating that they would have caused a reasonable person to perceive he was not free to leave where defendant was isolated on the side of a highway while officer questioned him after traffic stop, and that isolation on side of highway was not sufficient to distinguish the case from United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002), where no seizure occurred). Upon his return to Defendant's location, Corporal Johnson reengaged Defendants in dialogue with a conversational tone. (See Doc. No. 133 at 68, 70, 93-94; Government Exhibit 1.) Defendants were free to decline to answer Corporal Johnson's questions and Corporal Johnson was under no obligation to inform Defendants that they were free to go when he began inquiring into their travel plans. See United States v. Walker, 719 F.Supp.2d 586, 595 (W.D.Pa.2010) (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (holding that a lawfully seized individual need not be informed that he or she is free to go for a consent to search to be recognized as voluntary)). The lights which remained activated on Corporal Johnson's patrol car while Corporal Johnson and Defendants engaged in conversation following the conclusion of the traffic stop were not related to the second encounter between Corporal Johnson and the Defendants. The Court finds that a reasonable person would understand that these lights were a vestige of the prior stop and would not have been so intimidated by these circumstances that she would not have felt free to leave or otherwise terminate the encounter. See United States v. Birt, 120 Fed.Appx. 424, 427 (3rd Cir.2005) (finding that a reasonable person would not have been so intimated by the circumstances of an encounter
Additionally, during the course of the second encounter, Corporal Johnson's statements took the form of questions and requests rather than demands. After Defendant Payton agreed to Corporal Johnson's request to take a look at her book bag, the voluntariness of which is discussed infra, Corporal Johnson asked Defendant Payton if she would step out and show him the item and inquired as to whether Defendant Gooch had any identification. (See Doc. No. 133 at 95, 97; Government Exhibit 1.) Corporal Johnson and Defendant Payton continued to engage in light question-and-answer style conversation about Defendant Payton's pregnancy and her relation to Defendant Gooch while Corporal Johnson executed his search of Defendant Payton's book bag at the rear of the vehicle and asked if Defendant Payton understood that she was not under arrest. (See Doc. No. 133 at 101-03; Government Exhibit 1.) Although Corporal Mock arrived on the scene and was present while Corporal Johnson and Defendant Payton conversed at the rear of the vehicle, the presence of multiple troopers on the scene does not automatically transform an encounter into a seizure. See Escobar, 2006 WL 1149248, at *5, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29735, at *15 (citing Drayton, 536 U.S. at 198, 205, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (finding that no seizure had occurred when three officers boarded a commuter bus to search for illegal narcotics)). In light of surrounding circumstances, including the cordial tone used by Corporal Johnson, the lack of some physical touching or force or the threat of such touching or force and the lack of any display of a weapon, the Court concludes that the second encounter between Corporal Johnson and the Defendants was not a seizure, notwithstanding the presence of both Corporal Johnson and Corporal Mock.
In further support of their argument that the second encounter constituted a seizure, both Defendants argue that Corporal Johnson "did not intend to let Ms. Payton or Mr. Gooch leave...." (Doc. No. 191 at 5.) However, Corporal Johnson's subjective intent is irrelevant to this analysis. See Crandell, 554 F.3d at 85 (explaining that, when analyzing whether a citizen-police encounter resulted in a seizure, "[t]he subjective intent underlying an officer's approach does not affect the seizure analysis."); United States v. Hanton, 418 F.Supp.2d 757, 759-60, 763 (W.D.Pa. 2006) (holding that the interaction between Defendant and Trooper following the conclusion of a lawful traffic stop was consensual encounter even though, at the time the Trooper asked if he could ask Defendant a few question, the Sergeant who had subsequently arrived at location possessed an unvoiced intention to keep the vehicle parked and not let the Defendant drive it away). Because the record is devoid of evidence of coercion or a show of authority sufficient to transform the "second" encounter into a seizure, the Court finds that once the traffic stop was completed, Corporal Johnson and the Defendants engaged in a consensual encounter during which the Fourth Amendment was not implicated, and that this consensual encounter lasted from the completion of the traffic stop to the discovery of the ecstasy tablets.
The Government argues that Corporal Johnson lawfully discovered the ecstasy tablets in Defendant's vehicle pursuant to Defendant Payton's valid consent to search, the scope of which included the area behind the trunk liner where the ecstasy tablets were found. (See Doc. No. 187 at 18-24.) Defendants assert that the consent to search given by Defendant Payton was invalid and, irrespective of the validity of Defendant Payton's consent, Corporal Johnson's search exceeded the scope of any consent given by Defendant Payton.
Defendant Payton contends that her consent was not valid for two principle reasons. First, Defendant Payton argues that her consent was invalid because it was obtained through the use of a "ruse" allegedly perpetrated by Corporal Johnson. (See id. at 29-33.) Second, Defendant Payton argues that her consent was invalid because Defendant Payton's physical condition undermined the voluntariness of her consent. (See id. at 33.) Defendant Gooch joins Defendant Payton in this argument. (See Doc. No. 191 at 6-7.)
It is well settled that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is "per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). "It is equally well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent." Id.; see also United States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d Cir.2003)).
"[A] driver of a vehicle has the authority to consent to a search of that vehicle." United States v. Morales, 861 F.2d 396, 399 (3d Cir.1988). When an officer relies on a suspect's consent to justify a search, the government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was freely and voluntarily given. United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 277 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968)); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1081 (3d Cir.1989). Whether consent to a search "was in fact `voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion ... is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The critical factors comprising a totality of circumstances inquiry generally include: "the setting in which the consent was obtained, the parties' verbal and non-verbal actions, and the age, intelligence, and educational background of the consenting [party]." Wilson, 413 F.3d at 388 (quoting Givan, 320 F.3d at 459); see also United States ex. rel. Harris v. Hendricks, 423 F.2d 1096, 1099 (3rd Cir.1970).
In support of Defendant Payton's first argument, that her consent was obtained through the use of a "ruse," Defendant Payton asserts that Corporal Johnson falsely led her to believe "that the investigation only involved a motor vehicle violation when in fact the investigation was clearly predicated on something more." (See Doc. No. 150 at 31.) This contention is directly contradicted by the audio and video evidence in this case. Immediately before requesting consent to search Defendant Payton's belongings, Corporal Johnson explained that Pennsylvania had been having problems with drugs, weapons, and large sums of money on the Pennsylvania Turnpike and asked Defendants whether there was anything "like that in the car this evening." (See Doc. No. 133 at 69, 94-95; Government Exhibit 1.) Defendant Payton therefore knew or reasonably should have known that, if granted consent to search, Corporal Johnson intended to search for guns, drugs, and money. Further, the Court finds no evidence that any of Corporal Johnson's acts or statements during the second encounter were designed to create — or reasonably could create — the impression that the investigation of Defendant Payton's belongings only involved a motor vehicle violation. Rather, Corporal Johnson clearly and specifically indicated that he was looking for guns, drugs, and money. Because Corporal
Alternatively, Defendant Payton, joined by Defendant Gooch, argues that her consent was invalid because of Defendant Payton's physical condition. (See Doc. No. 150 at 33; Doc. No. 191 at 6-7.) Specifically, Defendants assert that Defendant Payton's consent was not voluntarily rendered because, at the time the consent was given, Defendant was eight months pregnant and was "visibly in distress because of her need to use the bathroom." (See Doc. No. 150 at 33; Doc. No. 191 at 6-7.) Defendant argues that, in light of this condition, her ability to consent to the search "was undermined and she would have consented to anything to expedite the situation if it would have allowed her to get to a bathroom." (Doc. No. 150 at 33.) Despite the Government's contention that this proposition is "incredulous," (see Doc. No. 187 at 20) it is plausible that — under appropriate circumstances — the discomfort of having to use the restroom, coupled with other factors, may indeed provide the type of coercive environment that United States ex. rel. Harris v. Hendricks, 423 F.2d 1096 (3rd Cir.1970), and its progeny caution against. However, under the facts of this case and upon consideration of the dearth of additional evidence suggesting that Defendant Payton's consent was not voluntarily given, the Court finds that Defendant Payton's pregnancy and need to use the restroom did not render her consent not voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances.
The Government asserts, without citation, that at the time of the event at issue Defendant Payton was twenty-three years old, was able to read, write, understand, and speak English. (See Doc. No. 187 at 18.) However, the evidence demonstrates that on March 12, 2008, Defendant Payton was of a sufficient age to possess a valid Indiana state driver's license
Defendants correctly assert that Defendant Payton's non-verbal actions support her assertion that she needed to use a restroom during her encounter with Corporal Johnson. (See id.; Doc. No. 150 at 33.) These non-verbal actions — and Defendant's need to use the restroom — however, do not compel the conclusion that Defendant Payton's condition undermined her ability to consent. The evidence demonstrates that Corporal Johnson specifically asked Defendant Payton whether she was okay on multiple occasions throughout the transaction. (See Doc. No. 133 at 61, 102; Government Exhibit 1.) For example, upon observing the non-verbal actions of Defendant Payton as she stood near the trunk of the vehicle while the search was being executed, Corporal Johnson asked Defendant Payton, with convincing inflection regarding his concern for her well-being, "you okay?" (See Doc. No. 133 at 102; Government Exhibit 1.) In response to these inquires, Defendant did not indicate that she was in severe discomfort or otherwise express any desire to terminate the encounter. (See Doc. No. 133 at 21, 102; Government Exhibit 1.) Instead, Defendant merely responded that she did not need an ambulance and, later, calmly replied: "Yeah, I just gotta pee." (See Doc. No. 133 at 102; Government Exhibit 1.) Defendant Payton's response and demeanor is inconsistent with Defendants' argument that Defendant Payton was in so much pain or discomfort due to her need to use the restroom that she would have consented to anything in order to alleviate her discomfort. Defendant Payton did not request to terminate or postpone the encounter so that she could use a restroom, nor did Defendant Payton complain of her condition at any point during the second encounter prior to the discovery of the ecstasy tablets. (See Government Exhibit 1.) Rather, Defendant Payton waited patiently while Corporal Johnson asked questions and meticulously searched her book bag. (See id.)
Defendants assert no other reason, apart from Defendant Payton's pregnancy and need to use the restroom, to support their argument that Defendant Payton's consent was not voluntary and, upon review of the evidence, the Court finds no other evidence suggesting such. Because the Court finds that Defendant Payton's consent was not based on a "ruse" and that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's physical condition alone is not sufficient to render her consent not voluntary, the Court finds that Defendant Payton's consent to search was valid. The Court next turns to the scope of the consent given by Defendant Payton.
Defendants contend that, even if Defendant Payton consented to a search, her consent was limited to Corporal Johnson's search of her book bag and did not extend to Corporal Johnson's act of bending down the trunk liner and search of that area. (See Doc. No. 150 at 35-37; Doc. No 191 at 7.) By contrast, the Government contends that Defendant Payton consented to the search of the trunk by opening the trunk without being asked prior to exiting the vehicle. (See Doc. No. 187 at 24.) The Government further calls attention to the fact that no limitations upon the search of the trunk were provided by Ms. Payton either at the time she voluntarily popped the hood of the trunk open or at the time Corporal Johnson began searching the trunk. (See Doc. No. 187 at 24.)
Reviewing the circumstances of this case, the Court concludes that a reasonable person would have understood the exchange between Corporal Johnson and Defendant Payton to provide Corporal Johnson with consent to search Defendant Payton's book bag and not the entirety of the trunk area. The Court therefore concludes that Defendant Payton's consent extended only to a search of her book bag and that Defendant Payton relinquished her expectation of privacy only in her book bag and the areas of the trunk that Defendant Payton willingly exposed to the public and Corporal Johnson in the course of permitting a search of her book bag.
Here, Defendant Payton informed Corporal Johnson that the only belonging or luggage-type item that she had with her was her book bag. (See Doc. No. 133 at 94-95.) In asking for Defendant Payton's consent to search, Corporal Johnson stated "Just your book bag ... I'll tell you what, do you have any problem with me taking a quick peak and then we'll get you on your way?" (Doc. No. 133 at 69, 95, 97; Government Exhibit 1.) Because Corporal Johnson's request to search was immediately proceeded by the statement "Just your book bag ...," a reasonable person likely would have interpreted Corporal Johnson's next question — asking to take a quick peek inside — to extend only to that one specific item and not to some larger, unidentified area, such as the trunk or entire vehicle. While it is conceivable that a reasonable person would have understood Corporal Johnson to have asked, and Defendant Payton to have consented, to take a "quick peak" at the trunk where Defendant Payton stated her bag was located rather than at the bag itself, this understanding loses force upon Corporal Johnson's subsequent request for Defendant Payton to "step out and show me that" (emphasis added). Corporal Johnson's use of the demonstrative "that" implies reference to Defendant Payton's book bag; it would be both an unusual use of this demonstrative to refer to the trunk generally and an unusual understanding of Corporal Johnson's request to construe his statement to encompass this area. Indeed, in the report Corporal Johnson filled out following this incident Corporal Johnson recounted "I then asked her if she would step out and show me that, meaning the bag, and she immediately did so without objection or delay and even went as far as popping the trunk without being asked to do so." (See Doc. No. 133 at 95-97; Defendant's Exhibit D.) While the scope of Defendant Payton's consent does not turn on Corporal Johnson's subjective understanding of the scope of Defendant Payton's consent, Corporal Johnson's understanding that he requested Defendant Payton's consent to search her bag, rather than the entirety of the trunk, provides support for the conclusion that a reasonable person would understand the exchange this way.
Having concluded that Defendant Payton did not consent to Corporal Johnson's search of the entire trunk through
In reaching this conclusion, the Court finds United States v. Coates, 462 Fed. Appx. 199 (3rd Cir.2012), persuasive. In Coates, id., the Third Circuit, in a non-precedential opinion, affirmed a District Court's decision denying a motion to suppress evidence of child pornography discovered on the defendant's phone pursuant to a search for certain text messages contained in the phone. The defendant was seeking a police officer's assistance in connection with threatening text messages he had received. Id. at 201. When the officer asked if he should look at the text messages, the defendant said yes and handed his phone to the officer in a closed position without providing the officer any instructions on how to manipulate the phone. Id. at 201-03. The officer, who was unfamiliar with the model of the defendant's phone, manipulated the phone while looking at and conversing with the defendant. Id. at 201, 204. Upon looking down at the phone, the officer saw an image depicting child pornography, after which time the officer did not search the phone any further. Id. In upholding the District Court's conclusion that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in and consented to a search of his phone, the Court explained that, by telling the police that the text message existed and handing his phone to the officer but not navigating to the text message for the officer or instructing the officer how to reach it, "[a] reasonable person would have understood [the defendant] to have given consent to navigate his phone to reach the text message, which is precisely what [the officer] did." Id. at 203-204. Emphasizing that the officer was not paying attention to the phone while navigating through its menus, the Court went on to hold that the officer's inadvertent viewing of the pornographic image, which was in plain view when he looked at the phone, did not exceed the scope of consent. See id. at 204.
Here, Defendant Payton opened the trunk as a means of accessing the bag she consented to have Corporal Johnson inspect. Unlike in Coates, where the defendant handed his phone over to the police and permitted the officer to find the message, see id. at 204, here Defendant Payton did not turn custody of her trunk over to the Corporal Johnson, by, for example, handing Corporal Johnson the key to her trunk, nor did she permit Corporal Johnson to rummage through the trunk to find the item she agreed to allow him search. Instead, Defendant Payton specifically identified the object Corporal Johnson requested to see by pointing to her bag and stating "that's my book bag ...." (Doc. No. 133 at 99; Government Exhibit 1.) This act eliminated the need for Corporal Johnson to navigate through the vehicle's trunk to access her book bag, as the
Although the evidence does not show that Defendant Payton placed any explicit limitations on Corporal Johnson's search, the absence of explicit limitations on Corporal Johnson's search does not mean that Defendant Payton consented to a search of the entire trunk area — an area this Court has determined to be otherwise outside the scope of consent. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788 ("When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given."); Tarburton, 610 F.Supp.2d at 273, 275 (finding that consent to search premises for the purpose of checking on welfare of son did not provide justification for further warrantless search after initial sweep had concluded, even where Detective stated she would be returning to the residence to "look around" and homeowners silently acquiesced). This is not a case where the consequence of Defendant's failure to delimit the scope of a search created a reasonable understanding that her consent to extended to a particular area. Unlike cases where a suspect's failure to provide explicit limitations on his consent to search certain areas or containers found within a larger space for which the suspect provided a general consent to search and this failure would lead a reasonable person to believe the suspect's general consent extended to a search of the areas or containers found within the larger space, see e.g., Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52, 111 S.Ct. 1801 (holding that the scope of suspect's consent to search included a closed paper bag found on floor of car when the suspect generally consented to a search of his car); United States v. Hernandez, 872 F.Supp. 1288, 1291, 1298, (D.Del.1994) (finding that the scope of suspect's consent to search vehicle extended to containers found within the vehicle where the consent form signed by defendant authorized a "complete" search of the
Therefore, in sum, the Court concludes that Defendant Payton's consent to search extended only to her book bag, which was the focus of the discussion between Corporal Johnson and Defendant Payton when consent to search was requested and granted. The Court further concludes that Corporal Johnson lawfully conducted a visual inspection of those areas of the trunk that Defendant Payton exposed by popping the hood of the trunk and leaving it open. Corporal Johnson's act of pulling down the trunk liner from the area where the ecstasy tablets were extracted, however, exceeded the scope of Defendant's Payton consent because a reasonable person would not understand the exchange between Corporal Johnson and Defendant Payton to provide consent to search the trunk as a whole, nor did Defendant Payton's act of remotely popping the trunk open give Corporal Johnson implied consent to search areas of the trunk not exposed to Corporal Johnson's view. Because Defendant Payton did not relinquish her expectation of privacy in the area behind the trunk liner, to succeed, the Government must establish that Corporal Johnson's search of the area behind the trunk liner is justified pursuant to a different legal doctrine.
In its final attempt to justify Corporal Johnson's search of the area behind the trunk liner, the Government asserts that the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applies to the contested trunk search. (See Doc. No. 187 at 24-27.) Defendants argue that the automobile exception does not apply because Corporal Johnson's search of the trunk of the vehicle was not supported by probable cause. (See Doc. No. 150 at 37-38; Doc. No. 176 at 26-27; Doc. No. 191 at 7-8.)
"The automobile exception to the warrant requirement permits law enforcement to seize and search an automobile without a warrant if `probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.'" United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 100 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996)). While probable cause requires more than mere suspicion, it does not require that the officers have evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Burton, 288 F.3d at 98 (quoting Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482-83 (3rd Cir.1995)). "Probable cause exists when, viewing the totality of the circumstances, `there is a
In support of its argument that Corporal Johnson had probable cause to believe Defendants' vehicle contained contraband, the Government points to the following facts: (1) Corporal Johnson is an experienced officer trained in highway drug interdiction (Doc. No. 133 at 3-6), (2) in complying with Corporal Johnson's signal to pull off the highway, Defendant Payton parked in very close proximity to the white fog line (id. at 17, 52-54; Government Exhibit 1), (3) Defendant Payton began complaining of pregnancy-related cramps immediately upon Corporal Johnson's arrival at the passenger side window of the vehicle during which Defendant Gooch continued to sleep (Doc. No. 133 at 14-16; 63-64), (4) Defendant Payton was driving at approximately 3:30 a.m. while eight months pregnant (Doc. No. 133 at 15, 38), (5) Corporal Johnson observed a curious lack of luggage or indicia of travel for Defendants' stated travel plans (id. at 18, 64), (6) Defendant Payton ceased complaining of cramps after she was informed she would receive a written warning and be on her way (id. at 16-63-64),
After a thorough review of relevant caselaw, this Court has discovered no decisions in the Third Circuit addressing a factual scenario analogous to this case. However, both the Tenth and Fifth Circuits have repeatedly held that evidence of a hidden compartment within a suspect's automobile can contribute to, and, under appropriate circumstances, may even single-handedly establish, a finding of probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Concepcion-Ledesma, 447 F.3d 1307, 1317 (10th Cir.2006) (stating a two-part test to determine whether probable cause to search a vehicle can be based on evidence of a hidden compartment; explaining that United States v. Jurado-Vallejo, 380 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir.2004), "stands for the proposition that visual evidence of a hidden compartment, without more, may provide probable cause to conduct or expand a search"); United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1261 (10th Cir.2006) ("It is well established that evidence of a hidden compartment can contribute to probable cause to search."); United States v. Mercado, 307 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1066 (10th Cir. 1997) (same; finding that evidence gas tank had been tampered with, combined with other suspicious circumstances, furnished probable
In United States v. Concepcion-Ledesma, 447 F.3d 1307, 1317 (10th Cir.2006), the Tenth Circuit confronted a factual pattern similar to that of the instant case. In Concepcion-Ledesma, during a consensual encounter following a lawful traffic stop, the officer asked the occupants of the vehicle if he could "take a minute to look back there? Just your bag and stuff," to which the occupants responded affirmatively. Id. at 1311, 1315. Upon opening the back doors of the van where the occupants' bags were located, the officers noticed suspicious signs of alterations to the interior of the vehicle
Similarly, in United States. v. Price, 869 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir.1989), the Fifth Circuit determined that border patrol agents who conducted a visual inspection of the outside of a vehicle, which was in plain view, and thereby discovered a hidden compartment in the vehicle had probable cause to search the compartment itself. Again, in United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 719, 723-24 (5th Cir.1994), the Fifth Circuit determined that it was reasonable to believe that a vehicle contained
This Court finds the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Concepcion-Ledesma and the Tenth and Fifth Circuits' analogous holdings persuasive and concludes that Corporal Johnson developed probable cause to search the area behind the trunk liner during the consensual search of Defendant Payton's book bag and the lawful visual inspection of those areas of the trunk that were plainly visible and voluntarily exposed to Corporal Johnson's (and the public's) view as he searched Defendant Payton's bag. The Court finds that Corporal Johnson's observation of the loose trunk liner and piece of plastic bag would lead a reasonable officer of Corporal Johnson's training and experience to conclude that the vehicle contained a hidden compartment. While the circumstances observed by Corporal Johnson prior to his observation of the loose trunk liner, standing alone, likely would not have persuaded a reasonable officer that there was a "fair probability" that drugs or other evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle, the Court finds that the evidence of a hidden compartment, in conjunction with the other facts of this case — which include the suspicious nature of Defendant Payton's travel plans, Defendant Payton's act of parking close to the white fog line, the lack of luggage in the vehicle in relation to the length of Defendants' journey, and Defendant's use of a borrowed vehicle — would lead an objectively reasonable police officer to conclude that there was at least a "fair probability" that contraband would be found under the lining of Defendants' trunk. Because Corporal Johnson had probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the place to be searched, the search of the area behind the trunk liner did not violate the Fourth Amendment pursuant to the "automobile exception" and the seized contraband is admissible.
Defendant Payton also argues that her statements must be suppressed. (See Doc. No. 150 at 48.) At issue are two sets of statements: statements made on the scene following oral Miranda warnings given by Corporal Johnson and statements made at the Pennsylvania State Police barracks after Defendant Payton was again advised of her rights and executed a written "Rights Warning and Waiver" form. (See id. at 46-48; Doc. No. 133 at 119; Government Exhibit 2.) Defendant Payton argues that both sets of statements must be suppressed because the Miranda warnings given to Defendant Payton by Corporal Johnson at the scene were inadequate. (See Doc. No. 150 at 46-48.) The Government maintains that both sets of statements are admissible. (See Doc. No. 187 at 27-30.) The Court will address the admissibility of each set of statements in turn.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court "established certain procedural safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing custodial interrogation." Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 201, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). In the absence of other fully effective
It is uncontested that Defendant Payton's statements were made during a custodial interrogation. Defendant Payton's statements were made after she was in custody and in response to express questioning by Corporal Johnson. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682 ("the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent"). (See Government Exhibit 1.) Both the Government and Defendant Payton agree that in warning Defendant Payton of her rights at the scene, Corporal Johnson stated as follows:
(See Doc. No. 28 at 9 n. 10; Doc. No. 187 at 27-28; Government Exhibit 1.)
The Government correctly points out that "no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy [Miranda's] strictures." California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981). However, in order for the statements of a suspect subject to custodial interrogation to be admissible during the prosecution's case in chief, the warnings given to the suspect must reasonably convey to the suspect his rights, whether by using the formulation of the warnings set out in Miranda or some fully effective equivalent. See Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203, 109 S.Ct. 2875 ("The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda." (internal citations omitted)); Prysock, 453 U.S. at 359-60, 101 S.Ct. 2806; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. 1602. These rights include the right to have counsel appointed if the suspect is indigent. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473, 86 S.Ct. 1602. In Miranda, the Supreme Court explained:
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
The problem with the Miranda warnings given to Defendant Payton at the scene "is not one of form or phrasing, but of substance and omission." United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1312 (2006). Corporal Johnson's omission of any reference to Defendant Payton's right to have an attorney appointed for her prior to any questioning in the event that she cannot afford one and desires to have one present, a right necessary to fully "apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system," Miranda 384 U.S. at 473, 86 S.Ct. 1602, renders the oral Miranda warnings Corporal Johnson gave Defendant Payton at the scene inadequate. The statements following this oral warning must therefore be suppressed unless and until the inadequacy of the oral warnings given at the scene were sufficiently cured.
Defendant Payton contends that her second set of statements made at the Pennsylvania State Police barracks must also be suppressed because of the Miranda violation that occurred. (See Doc. No. 150 at 48.) The Government argues that even if the initial set of warnings given by Corporal Johnson at the scene were insufficient, the warnings read to Defendant Payton at the Pennsylvania State Police barracks and included in the executed waiver from are sufficient, thereby rendering statements made following the second administration of Defendant's Miranda warnings and Defendant's execution of the written waiver admissible. (See Doc. No 187 at 30.)
Where a suspect is properly Mirandized and makes one or more incriminating statements only after making similar unwarned statements
Therefore, as stated in the accompanying Order, the Court grants Defendant Payton's Motion to Suppress the statements made by Defendant Payton following the oral Miranda warnings given at the scene by Corporal Johnson up until the time Defendant Payton was again warned of her Miranda rights at the Pennsylvania State Police barracks. The Court will defer ruling on the admissibility of the statements made by Defendant Payton following the Miranda warnings given at the Pennsylvania State Police barracks until after the matter is addressed at the supplemental suppression hearing and through the parties' supplemental Proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law.
Lastly, Defendant Payton argues that all evidence obtained from Defendant Payton's cell phone as a result of the execution of the search warrant(s) must be suppressed because "a warrant obtained after an illegal search and seizure is invalid if it is based upon the facts obtained in the illegal entry or if it would not have been sought or obtained hat it not been for the illegal entry." (See Doc. No. 150 at 49.) In light of the Court's finding that the search of the Buick was lawful, this argument is without merit.
For the above-stated reasons, the Court will
United States v. Concepcion-Ledesma, 447 F.3d 1307, 1311 (10th Cir.2006).
