ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Seaport Marine, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 11) and Odyssea Marine Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 14).1 Both Motions have been briefed and are now ripe.

I. Relevant Background.

Plaintiff, Wilbur Smith, for himself and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed a multi-count Complaint (doc. 1) against defendants, Seaport Marine, Inc. and Odyssea Marine, Inc. According to the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint, Smith is a seaman who entered into an Employment Placement Contract with defendant Seaport, pursuant to which Seaport provided employment placement services for Smith (i.e., it helped him find a job) in exchange for Smith authorizing Seaport to collect a recruitment fee and to recoup advances out of his resulting wages. (Doc. 1, ¶ 4, 6.) To facilitate that arrangement, Smith executed a Paycheck Mailing Agreement authorizing his employer to mail his payroll checks to Seaport until Seaport's "fee and advances were collected in installments," as well as a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Seaport to endorse and deposit those checks, collect an allotment from them, and mail the balance to Smith. (Id., ¶ 6.) Although the allegations of the Complaint center on defendant Seaport, they also relate to defendant Odyssea. Smith maintains that he was employed by Odyssea, that Odyssea was complicit in implementing the terms of the Paycheck Mailing Agreement, and that the result was an unlawful allotment of $3,640 from his wages. (Id., ¶ 14.)

Notably, the Complaint does not identify what contacts (if any) Odyssea has with the forum state in which this litigation was filed, or with the United States as a whole. Nor does the Complaint identify any nexus between Smith and the Southern District of Alabama, much less any explanation or allegation concerning venue, aside from the barest, most conclusory of statements that "Defendants [are] subject to service of process within this forum, vis-à-vis the purported contracting of business." (Id., ¶ 2.) Careful review of the Complaint in its entirety reveals no clues as to why Smith filed suit here, as opposed to some other forum having an articulable nexus to the parties and/or the dispute.2

Based on the limited factual allegations embedded in his cumbersome (and sometimes opaque) Complaint, Smith purports to bring claims against both Seaport and Odyssea for (i) "seaman's claim for wages" (on the theory that the wage assignments were non-binding, such that Smith is entitled to the balance of his wages allotted, forwarded to and retained by Seaport); (ii) conversion; (iii) conspiracy; (iv) equitable rescission of contract and restitution for money had and received; (v) legal restitution/breach of contract; (vi) breach of fiduciary duty; and (vii) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). Of these claims, Smith aims the equitable rescission, legal restitution/breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary claims solely at Seaport; however, the remaining claims (seaman's claim for wages, conversion, conspiracy and RICO) are brought against both defendants.

Seaport and Odyssey have independently filed overlapping Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, with Odyssey also advancing arguments under Rule 12(b)(2) to dismiss the Complaint for want of personal jurisdiction.

II. Analysis.

A. Personal Jurisdiction as to Defendant Odyssea.

In its Motion to Dismiss, Odyssea argues in general terms that the Complaint is insufficient to demonstrate that this Court has personal jurisdiction over it. Rather than affirmatively showing pertinent jurisdictional facts or circumstances, Odyssea is content to point out that "[n]o facts whatsoever are pled regarding the location where Smith purportedly was employed by Odyssea" and that "[n]o facts whatsoever are pled pertaining to Odyssea's contacts with the instant forum." (Doc. 14, at 5.) Because Odyssea is challenging the existence of personal jurisdiction, the Court will address this Rule 12(b)(2) component of its Motion to Dismiss before reaching the merits issues detailed in the Rule 12(b)(6) portion of the Motion. See, e.g., Koch v. Royal Wine Merchants, Ltd., 847 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1374 (S.D.Fla.2012) ("The general rule is that courts should address issues relating to personal jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a plaintiff's claims.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Daily Access Corp. v. Gaedeke Holdings, Ltd., 2012 WL 6728051, *2 (S.D.Ala. Dec. 7, 2012) (similar); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-25, 2012 WL 3940142 (M.D.Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) (similar).

As articulated in its Motion, Odyssea's Rule 12(b)(2) argument is firmly rooted in a traditional Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction analysis, which first looks to whether the forum state's long-arm statute provides jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant and, if so, then "requires that the defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state and that the exercise of jurisdiction not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Sloss Industries Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 925 (11th Cir.2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In response, Smith correctly points out that the typical Fourteenth Amendment framework gives way where, as here, the plaintiff brings a claim under a federal statute with a nationwide service of process clause. See Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 942 (11th Cir.1997) ("When a federal statute provides for nationwide service of process, it becomes the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction."). As noted, Smith has asserted a RICO claim against both defendants. RICO has a nationwide service of process provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) ("All other process in any action or proceeding under this chapter may be served on any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs."). "[I]t is well established that when, as here, a federal statute provides the basis for jurisdiction, the constitutional limits of due process derive from the Fifth, rather than the Fourteenth, Amendment." Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d at 942; Grail Semiconductor, Inc. v. Stern, 2012 WL 5903817, *3 (S.D.Fla. Nov. 26, 2012) ("[i]n this analysis, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause serves as the constitutional touchstone" because a federal statute provides the jurisdictional basis). Accordingly, the constitutional prong of Odyssea's Rule 12(b)(2) objection is governed by the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, not that of the Fourteenth Amendment.3

In performing a Fifth Amendment due process inquiry, courts "should balance the burdens imposed on the individual defendant against the federal interest involved in the litigation." Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d at 946. The Eleventh Circuit cautions, however, "that courts must engage in this balancing only if a defendant has established that his liberty interests actually have been infringed.... Only when a defendant challenging jurisdiction has presented a compelling case that would render jurisdiction unreasonable ... should courts weigh the federal interests favoring the exercise of jurisdiction." Id. (citation and internal marks omitted). Once the plaintiff shows that a defendant objecting to personal jurisdiction has "sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole," that defendant bears the "burden of establishing constitutionally significant inconvenience," which will be found only in "rare" and "highly unusual cases." Id. at 946-47. "The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the assertion of jurisdiction in the forum will make litigation so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he unfairly is at a severe disadvantage in comparison to his opponent." Id. at 948 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Odyssea has not come close to satisfying this daunting burden.4 At best, Odyssea complains in conclusory, non-specific terms in its reply brief (unsupported by affidavit, declaration or any other form of evidentiary showing) that it lacks contacts with Alabama and that Louisiana (where Odyssea would prefer to defend this litigation) would be a more convenient forum. (Doc. 24, at 6.) As Republic of Panama teaches, however, "a defendant's contacts with the forum state play no magical role in the Fifth Amendment analysis" because "state lines cannot provide an accurate measure of the burdens that would be imposed on a defendant by requiring him to defend an action in a particular forum." 119 F.3d at 946. Odyssea has presented literally nothing to show that defending its interests in this forum (as opposed to one a couple hundred miles away in Louisiana) would make litigation so gravely difficult and inconvenient that Odyssea would be placed at a severe disadvantage relative to Smith. Accordingly, this is not one of the "rare" or "highly unusual" cases where the inconvenience to Odyssea of defending itself in this forum would give rise to a cognizable Fifth Amendment due process concern.

Simply put, Odyssea has "presented no evidence that [its] ability to defend this lawsuit will be compromised significantly if [it is] required to litigate in" the Southern District of Alabama. Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d at 948; see also Grail Semiconductor, 2012 WL 5903817, at *5 (defendant's conclusory statements that it would be "extremely difficult" for him to litigate a case in Florida because he lives in California fail to meet burden because "they do not furnish the Court with anything substantive that would show why or how the burden on Stern would be of constitutional concern"); NCI Group, Inc. v. Cannon Services, Inc., 2009 WL 2411145, *6 (N.D.Ga. Aug. 4, 2009) (rejecting Rule 12(b)(2) motion where defendants merely argued that their ties were with Mississippi, not Georgia, without showing "that it would be `difficult' or `inconvenient' for them to adjudicate the case in this court"). Asserting jurisdiction over Odyssea would not offend constitutional notions of fair play and substantial justice; therefore, Odyssea's Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied.

B. Legal Standard for Rule 12(b)(6) Motions.

Both defendants move for dismissal of the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To withstand Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, plaintiffs must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," so as to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted). "This necessarily requires that a plaintiff include factual allegations for each essential element of his or her claim." GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1254 (11th Cir. 2012). Thus, minimum pleading standards "require[] more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, Twombly/Iqbal principles require that a complaint's allegations be "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir.2010) (citations omitted). "[I]f allegations are indeed more conclusory than factual, then the court does not have to assume their truth." Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir.2012); see also Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir.2011) ("Legal conclusions without adequate factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth.").

C. Seaman's Claim for Wages (Count I).

Count I of Smith's Complaint, framed as a "Seaman's Claim for Wages," includes the following salient allegations: (i) Smith's assignment of wages before paid in favor of Seaport is non-binding pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 11109(b); (ii) Odyssea's collection and forwarding of Smith's payroll checks to Seaport in reliance on that non-binding assignment was wrongful and unlawful; and (iii) Smith is entitled to recover from Seaport and Odyssea the entire balance of his wages allotted, forwarded to, and retained by Seaport. In filings that overlap in some respects and diverge in others, both defendants seek dismissal of this claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

1. Seaport's Arguments for Dismissal of Count I.

According to Seaport, Count I should be dismissed because "Plaintiff has not and cannot allege facts to prove a violation of 46 U.S.C. § 11109." (Doc. 11-1, at 5.) Seaport contends that § 11109 applies only to persons employed "on a fishing vessel or any fish processing vessel." By Seaport's reckoning, Count I does not properly invoke § 11109 as a basis for relief because Smith "has failed to allege that he was seaman on a fishing or fish processing vessel, nor can he truthfully allege that he worked aboard a fishing or fish processing vessel." (Id. at 5-6.)

Seaport's position misconstrues and inaccurately circumscribes the scope of § 11109. That section has three subsections. Subsection (a) greatly limits circumstances under which "[w]ages due or accruing to a master or seaman" may be attached or arrested. Subsection (b) provides, in full, that "[a]n assignment or sale of wages or salvage made before the payment of wages does not bind the party making it, except allotments authorized by section 10315 of this title." 46 U.S.C. § 11109(b). And subsection (c) reads as follows: "This section applies to an individual employed on a fishing vessel or any fish processing vessel." 46 U.S.C. § 11109(c). Seizing on the text of subsection (c) in isolation, Seaport insists that it recites the universe of persons to whom § 11109 may apply. There are many flaws with this contention. First, Seaport's reading would improperly inject implied limiting language of "only" or "exclusively" into subsection (c) where no such terms exist.5 Second, Seaport's interpretation would needlessly create a contradiction between subsection (c) (which Seaport reads as providing that § 11109 applies only to persons employed on fishing vessels) and subsection (a) (which provides on its face that it applies to any "master or seaman," without regard to the type of vessel).6 Third, even if § 11109 were ambiguous as to its breadth (which the Court finds not to be the case), the legislative history obliterates all doubt in confirming that the section was intended to reach both seamen and employees of fishing vessels. The "Revision Notes and Legislative Reports" accompanying § 11109 confirm that "Section 11109 limits the attachment of a seaman's wages and establishes certain rules for the assignment of a seaman's wages. It also applies to fishermen on fishing vessels." Id. (emphasis added).7 And fourth, the Supreme Court interpreted the substantively similar predecessor statute to § 11109 as applying both to fishermen and to seamen, rather than merely to one or the other. See Blackton v. Gordon, 303 U.S. 91, 93, 58 S.Ct. 417, 82 L.Ed. 683 (1938) (explaining that 46 U.S.C. § 601, enacted in 1915, added "a provision to make it applicable to fishermen employed on fishing vessels as well as to seamen"). In light of these compelling arguments, considered individually and collectively, the Court rejects Seaport's legally unfounded contention that § 11109 is confined to the context of a fishing vessel or fish processing vessel, but instead finds it applicable to all seamen, as that term is defined at 46 U.S.C. § 10101(3).8

Next, Seaport maintains that even if § 11109(b) applies here, that section does nothing more than render the assignment non-binding. In that regard, Seaport reasons that "[t]he statute does not transform an assignment into an unlawful or unauthorized allotment and violation of that statute would not rise to the level of unlawful conduct." (Doc. 11-1, at 6.) Defendant is correct that, on its face, § 11109(b) provides only that an assignment such as Smith's is not binding on him, not that it is unlawful. Insofar as Seaport seeks dismissal of Count I on this basis, however, its argument falls short. Seaport eschews any cases or other authorities that construe this statute or discuss principles generally applicable to seamen's wages and statutes protecting them.9 More importantly, Seaport does not explain (by reference to any legal authorities or principles of maritime law) why violation of § 11109(b) cannot support a general maritime law claim for seaman's wages, but instead trades solely in abstractions of "unlawful conduct." There is support in the case law for utilizing § 11109(b) in furtherance of a general maritime law claim for wages, just as Smith does. See Jurich v. Compass Marine, Inc., 906 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1231, 2012 WL 5400046, *3 (S.D.Ala. Nov. 2, 2012) (rejecting similar argument and citing Supreme Court opinion showing that substantively similar predecessor statute to § 11109 "prevents the assignment or sale of a seaman's wages," that such statute is "to be liberally interpreted with a view to effecting the protection intended to be extended to" seamen, and that such statute "would be construed to include postjudgment proceedings in aid of execution"). Besides, Seaport's argument addresses the wrong question. Smith has not asserted a statutory claim against defendants under § 11109(b).10 Rather, he has brought a general maritime law claim for wages. The relevant issue is not whether a non-binding allotment under § 11109(b) is "unlawful" in some technical sense, but whether it can be used as a legal basis for general maritime law wage claims (as well as the other state-law claims asserted in the Complaint). Seaport has provided no convincing, legally supported explanation for why it could not, and has not connected its semantics-driven "unlawful" argument to a concrete analysis of any claim or causes of action propounded in the Complaint.

Seaport's final argument for dismissal of Count I is that "Plaintiff has not and cannot truthfully allege facts that prove a violation of 46 U.S.C. § 10315(c)." (doc. 11-1, at 6.)11 In this regard, Seaport reasons that this section is found in Chapter 103, whose application is limited to United States vessels that are either (i) on a voyage between a United States port and a foreign port, or (ii) on a voyage between a U.S. port on the Atlantic Ocean and a U.S. port on the Pacific Ocean. See 46 U.S.C. § 10301(a)(1)-(2). Those circumstances are not alleged to be present here, so Seaport is correct that § 10315(c) cannot apply. Once again, however, Seaport appears engaged in an exercise of erecting strawmen only to tear them down. The Complaint does not allege a cause of action for violation of § 10315(c). Neither Count I nor any other claim set forth in the Complaint is presented as a statutory claim for violation of § 10315(c). As such, whether § 10315(c) would have afforded Smith a basis for relief against Seaport had Smith sought to pursue a claim under that section is of little consequence.12

2. Odyssea's Arguments for Dismissal of Count I.

In its separate Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, Odyssea raises various arguments of its own that Smith's seaman claim for wages must fail. Certain of these contentions are redundant of those identified by Seaport. For example, Odyssea argues that Smith cannot bring a statutory claim under § 11109(b), that § 11109 applies only to persons employed on fishing vessels or fish processing vessels, and that Smith cannot prove a violation § 10315. These arguments have been explored at length supra, and no constructive purpose would be served by revisiting them.

That said, Odyssea raises two unique arguments for dismissal of Count I. First, Odyssea contends that § 11109 is unavailable to plaintiff because "Smith has failed to plead sufficient facts to bring him within the definition of a `seaman'" for purposes of a Twombly/Iqbal analysis. (Doc. 14, at 6.) The Court disagrees. The applicable statutory definition provides that "seaman" means "an individual (except scientific personnel, a sailing school instructor, or a sailing school student) engaged or employed in any capacity on board a vessel." 46 U.S.C. § 10101(3) (emphasis added).13 The well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint identify Smith as a seaman (doc. 1, 4) who earned wages serving as a crew member aboard an Odyssea vessel (id., 16). Matching these (admittedly limited) factual allegations to the statutory definition, the Court readily concludes that Smith has pleaded sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that he falls within the ambit of § 11109. No further, more detailed pleading is required. See, e.g., Speaker, 623 F.3d at 1380 (confirming longstanding rule that "a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations" to satisfy Rule 8 pleading requirements, even in the wake of Twombly/Iqbal) (citation omitted).

Second, Odyssea advances the peculiar argument that Smith's "voluntary decision to have his paychecks sent to Seaport will not suffice to support an allegation that Odyssea violated section 11109 when it complied with Smith's written request." (Doc. 14, at 7.) Section 11109 itself draws no distinction between voluntary and involuntary assignments. Indeed, the sole authority identified by Odyssea for the proposition that § 11109(b) is confined to involuntary assignments of wages is In re Williams, 20 B.R. 154 (Bankr.E.D.Ark. 1982). The Williams opinion includes a cursory remark that a predecessor statute to § 11109 was "designed to prevent involuntary court ordered garnishments and attachments and not the prevention of voluntary deductions." Id. at 154. Williams cites no authority and offers no rationale for this determination, which appears never to have been adopted by any court anywhere. As this Court recently explained, "even if Williams has any persuasive capacity in the context of Section 11109(a), it has none under Section 11109(b). By its terms, Williams is limited to the former context, and ... it appears likely that a voluntary-involuntary distinction would make no sense under Section 11109(b)." Jurich, 906 F.Supp.2d at 1229, 2012 WL 5400046, at *2. Fundamentally, the Court does not perceive — and Odyssea does not explain — how a voluntary/involuntary dichotomy would be workable for a statute providing that "[a]n assignment ... of wages ... made before the payment of wages does not bind the party making it." 46 U.S.C. § 11109(b). How would a seaman make an involuntary assignment of wages before they are paid? Odyssea does not explain, but would apparently have this Court inject such an "involuntary" modifier into the text of § 11109(b) in a manner that "might well read the provision out of practical existence." Jurich, 906 F.Supp.2d at 1229, 2012 WL 5400046, at *2. This the Court will not do, particularly where Odyssea offers nothing but adherence to Williams (which did not explain its reasoning, did not relate to § 11109(b), and appears never to have been followed by any court in 30+ years) as a basis for same.

D. RICO Claim (Count VII).

In Count VII of the Complaint, Smith claims that both defendants violated RICO because they were in a fiduciary relationship with Smith and they conspired together to defraud Smith to make unauthorized and unlawful allotments (i.e., to have him enter into the Paycheck Mailing Agreement) and to take such unauthorized and unlawful allotments from his wages. According to the Complaint, Seaport and Odyssea engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity "by misleading [Smith] and committing frauds upon confidence bestowed by concealing the unauthorized and unlawful nature of allotments resulting from the unauthorized allotment notes." (Doc. 1, ¶ 46.) Importantly, Smith alleges in his pleading that "[b]y reason of the violations of 18 USC § 1962(c) committed by Seaport Marine and [Odyssea], [Smith was] injured in the amount of the allotments, retained by Seaport Marine within the meaning of 18 USC § 1964(c)." (Id., ¶ 56.)

To maintain a cognizable civil RICO claim under federal law, Smith must satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), which requires him to show an injury to business or property that occurred "by reason of the substantive RICO violation." Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir.2006). The "by reason of" requirement "implicates two concepts: (1) a sufficiently direct injury so that a plaintiff has standing to sue; and (2) proximate cause." Id. at 1287. As to proximate cause, the law is clear that "in RICO cases there must be `some direct relation' between the injury alleged and the injurious conduct." Id. at 1288. Odyssea's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion challenges whether the Complaint satisfies the "by reason of" prerequisite for a viable RICO cause of action.

This objection has merit. The Eleventh Circuit has explained that "courts should scrutinize proximate causation at the pleading stage and carefully evaluate whether the injury pled was proximately caused by the claimed RICO violations," focusing on "whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff's injuries." Williams, 465 F.3d at 1287. Smith's RICO claim, as pleaded, does not satisfy this "by reason of" requirement. As an initial matter, the Complaint's blanket, conclusory statement that "[b]y reason of the violations of 18 USC § 1962(c) ... [Smith was] injured in the amount of the allotments, retained by Seaport" (doc. 1, ¶ 56), is not sufficient to discharge plaintiff's pleading burden. See, e.g., Chandler v. Secretary of Florida Dep't of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir.2012) ("the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions") (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937).

As pleaded in the Complaint, the substantive RICO violation here was that Seaport and Odyssea schemed and plotted to defraud Smith, with the grand deception being that they did not tell him the Paycheck Mailing Agreement he executed was non-binding under applicable law.14 The injury of which Smith complains in his RICO claim is that allotments were taken from his wages pursuant to the Paycheck Mailing Agreement, and were used to pay Seaport the recruiting fees that Smith had voluntarily incurred in connection with Seaport's placement services. The appropriate "by reason of" inquiry for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes, then, is whether the Complaint adequately pleads that the substantive RICO violation (i.e., failure to disclose the non-binding nature of the Paycheck Mailing Agreement) led directly to the RICO injury (i.e., loss of the allotments to Seaport). Facts alleged in the Complaint support no such direct causal relationship. For example, the Complaint does not specify what Smith would have done had he known the Paycheck Mailing Agreement (which he signed voluntarily) to be non-binding on him pursuant to § 11109(b). If he had refused to honor such Agreement, then presumably Seaport would have either (i) canceled the placement, in which case Smith would not have gotten a job with Odyssea and would have received no wages at all; or (ii) made arrangements to collect payment from Smith via other means, in which case Smith would still have been out the placement fees and so on that he owed Seaport. The direct relationship between the alleged fraudulent scheme and the alleged loss simply is not adequately pleaded in the Complaint to withstand "by reason of" scrutiny on a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion.15

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the RICO cause of action, as presently pleaded, fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted against either Seaport or Odyssea. Accordingly, the Motions to Dismiss are granted with respect to Count VII.

E. Claims Against Odyssea Predicated on Principal/Agent Relationship.

Odyssea also seeks dismissal of the Complaint "[t]o the extent Smith's claims are predicated upon an alleged agency relationship between Odyssea, as principal, and Seaport as actual and/or apparent agent." (Doc. 14, at 12.) In all candor, it is unclear from the Complaint which (if any) of Smith's claims against Odyssea rely on such an agency relationship, and the extent of such reliance. To be sure, the Complaint repeatedly mentions the existence of an agency relationship between the two entities; however, it is not apparent that any of Smith's claims against Odyssea rest exclusively on such alleged principal/agent status. Certainly, Odyssea does not argue that any particular counts of the Complaint must be dismissed in their entirety for failure to plead agency with sufficient specificity to satisfy Twombly/Iqbal.

For his part, plaintiff admits that "the pleadings do not so specifically allege" facts showing that the elements of apparent agency under general maritime law are satisfied. (Doc. 22, at 9.) To remedy that deficiency, "Plaintiff requests a reasonable time to amend the complaint, if necessary." (Id. at 9-10.) The parties appearing to be in agreement that agency has not been satisfactorily pleaded in the Complaint, the Court will grant Odyssea's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion insofar as any of Smith's claims are predicated on such an agency relationship. As for plaintiff's request to amend the Complaint, he may file an appropriate motion, provided that (i) the motion comports with Rule 15, Fed.R.Civ.P.; (ii) a proposed amended pleading is appended to the motion; and (iii) the motion is filed in a timely manner, with due regard to applicable scheduling order deadlines. Of course, the Court expresses no advisory opinion as to the ultimate fate of any such motion that plaintiff might file.

F. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Against Seaport (Count VI).

In Count VI of the Complaint, Smith brought a claim against Seaport for breach of fiduciary duty. That claim alleged that the Special Power of Attorney (under which Smith assented to make Seaport his attorney-in-fact to deposit his payroll checks into its bank account for allotment, collection and repayment, before forwarding the balance to Smith) "gives rise to a fiduciary duty between [Smith] and Seaport Marine." (Doc. 1, 35.) According to the Complaint, Seaport breached this fiduciary duty by using that Special Power of Attorney "to accomplish unauthorized and unlawful allotments;" by engaging in "fraudulent concealment and/or non-disclosure to [Smith] of the unauthorized and unlawful nature of the unauthorized allotment note [and] [Smith]'s statutory rights;" and by not disclosing its "conflict of interest in serving two principals — Plaintiffs and the employers." (Doc. 1, 37.)

In its principal brief, Seaport articulates two (and only two) arguments against Smith's claim for breach of fiduciary duty. First, it maintains that the "ward of the court" doctrine does not apply "to an arm's length transaction between a seaman and an employment service that helps the seaman find work aboard a vessel owned by the employer." (Doc. 11-1, at 7-8.) But nothing in Count VI would appear to predicate liability against Seaport on a "ward of the court" principle. Rather, by its express terms, Count VI is focused on an alleged fiduciary duty created by the Special Power of Attorney contract between Seaport and Smith. Seaport offers no explanation why the "ward of the court" doctrine has any bearing on alleged fiduciary duties accruing to it from the Special Power of Attorney. Accordingly, Count VI as pleaded would remain in play, regardless of whether Seaport is correct or incorrect about the applicability of "ward of the court" notions to a non-employer. Rule 12(b)(6) relief is not warranted on this basis.

Second, Seaport maintains in conclusory fashion that "Plaintiff has asserted no basis for any assumption that he should not be presumed to know the law" and has not "alleged any sufficient basis for his assertion that Seaport owed a duty to inform him of the applicability of" § 11109. (Doc. 11-1, at 8.) But the Complaint on its face sets forth the basis for Smith's contention that Seaport owed a fiduciary duty to him to disclose (and not conceal) "the unauthorized and unlawful nature of the unauthorized allotment note [and] [Smith]'s statutory rights." (Doc. 1, 37.) If Seaport deems that legal basis to be insufficient, then it is incumbent on Seaport (as Rule 12(b)(6) movant) to explain why. The Court cannot and will not accept movant's conclusory assertion of insufficiency. Neither will it endorse Seaport's attempt to shift the burden on its Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to require Smith to prove that Count VI does state a claim, rather than requiring Seaport to establish that it does not.

Seaport's Motion to Dismiss is denied with respect to Count VI.16

III. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows: