Filed: Mar. 23, 2010
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit March 23, 2010 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 09-6245 v. (D.C. Nos. 09-CV-00681-R and 5:06- CR-00116-R-1) DERRICK A. BURKLEY, (W.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Before KELLY, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. Defendant-Appellant Derrick A. Burkley, a federal inmate appearing pro se, seeks a certifica
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit March 23, 2010 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 09-6245 v. (D.C. Nos. 09-CV-00681-R and 5:06- CR-00116-R-1) DERRICK A. BURKLEY, (W.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Before KELLY, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. Defendant-Appellant Derrick A. Burkley, a federal inmate appearing pro se, seeks a certificat..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 23, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 09-6245
v. (D.C. Nos. 09-CV-00681-R and 5:06-
CR-00116-R-1)
DERRICK A. BURKLEY, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Derrick A. Burkley, a federal inmate appearing pro se,
seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) allowing him to appeal the denial of
his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Because Mr. Burkley has not made a “substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right” required to obtain a COA, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see Slack
v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000), we deny a COA and dismiss the
appeal.
On August 16, 2006, a jury convicted Mr. Burkley of three counts: (1)
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (2) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); and (3) possession of firearms
and ammunition by a controlled substance user, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(3).
1 Rawle 107-08, 133. The district court sentenced Mr. Burkley to a total
of 120 months in prison: terms of 60 months each on the first and third counts, to
run concurrently, and 60 months on the second count, to run consecutively to the
concurrent 60 month terms imposed on the first and third counts.
1 Rawle 134. He
was also sentenced to three years’ supervised release, all counts to run
concurrently.
1 Rawle 135. On direct appeal, this court affirmed. United States v.
Burkley,
513 F.3d 1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 2979
(2008).
Mr. Burkley filed a timely § 2255 petition raising eight grounds for relief,
all claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
1 Rawle 168, 180-92. The district
court denied Mr. Burkley’s petition in a thorough memorandum.
1 Rawle 217-27. On
appeal, Mr. Burkley pursues two issues. He argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective because: (1) he did not effectively use the facts of his case in pursuing
a motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle; and (2) he failed to certify
questions of state law to the Oklahoma courts before the trial rather than on
appeal. Application for Certificate of Appealability at 2; Aplt. Br. at 4-13. To
obtain a COA, Mr. Burkley must show that reasonable jurists would find it
debatable whether his motion stated a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right. See
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
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Reasonable jurists would not debate whether his counsel’s performance was
deficient or prejudicial. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Both claims of ineffective assistance of counsel essentially reargue the legality of
the search of his car that turned up guns and drugs. That Mr. Burkley could
imagine a handful of arguments his counsel might have made does not render his
counsel’s performance deficient. Nor was Mr. Burkley’s counsel required to
anticipate the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant,
129 S. Ct. 1710
(2009), a year and a half before the Court granted a writ of certiorari,
128 S. Ct.
1443 (2008). The district court’s rejection of the certification argument is not
reasonably debatable. As the district court noted, “whether municipal law or state
law applied was irrelevant to assessing the validity of the traffic stop.”
1 Rawle 221.
Moreover, this court already held that reasonable suspicion supported the stop
based upon a suspected violation of state law.
Burkley, 513 F.3d at 1187.
Therefore, there can be no debate whether counsel’s failure to seek certification
was deficient or prejudicial. In the absence of any error, a cumulative error
analysis is not warranted. United States v. Rivera,
900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (1990)
(en banc).
We DENY a COA, GRANT IFP, and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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