Filed: Aug. 23, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit August 23, 2011 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 10-4199 v. (D.C. No. 2:04-CR-00170-DB-3) (D. Utah) BRIAN B. TUCKER, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. Brian B. Tucker, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s order that characterized his motion for return of funds
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit August 23, 2011 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 10-4199 v. (D.C. No. 2:04-CR-00170-DB-3) (D. Utah) BRIAN B. TUCKER, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. Brian B. Tucker, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s order that characterized his motion for return of funds a..
More
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 23, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 10-4199
v. (D.C. No. 2:04-CR-00170-DB-3)
(D. Utah)
BRIAN B. TUCKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Brian B. Tucker, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s order that
characterized his motion for return of funds as a second or successive motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and denied relief. Although we conclude that the court
should have construed the motion as one for the return of property under Rule
41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, we agree that there is no relief
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
that can be afforded to Mr. Tucker under Rule 41(g), because the government no
longer possesses the funds and sovereign immunity bars a claim for monetary
relief.
Background
This case is before us again after we previously considered several appeals
by Mr. Tucker concerning his plea agreement and sentence arising from two bank
robberies in 2004. The details are outlined in four previous appeals. United
States v. Tucker, 363 F. App’x 643 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Tucker, 332
F. App’x 484 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Tucker, 298 F. App’x 794
(10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Tucker, 253 F. App’x 718 (10th Cir. 2007).
Most recently, Mr. Tucker filed on June 28, 2010, a “Motion for Return of
Improperly Seized Funds,” R. Vol. 1 at 947, in which he sought the return of
$7,834 that was seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from his
bank accounts at Zions Bank, one of the victims of the bank robberies. In March
2006, following Mr. Tucker’s guilty plea, the money was released to Zions Bank
and applied towards his restitution. But according to Mr. Tucker, the government
should not have released the funds because they were subject to the third-party
claims of “George Tucker, Conrad Tucker, and Shersta Tucker.”
Id. at 948. He
claimed that the government should “return them to [him][] [o]r in the alternative
to order an evidentiary hearing in order to establish the validity of 3 rd party claims
to the funds and return said to their rightful claimant.”
Id. at 950. The
-2-
government objected on various grounds, including the fact that it no longer had
the funds and Mr. Tucker had no authority to file third-party claims. 1 The district
court characterized the motion as “essentially a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motion,”
id. at 1024, and dismissed it because it failed to meet the requirements
for filing a second request for habeas relief. This appeal followed.
Analysis
The government concedes that the district court erred in construing
Mr. Tucker’s motion for return of the funds as a second or successive request for
relief under § 2255. Although Mr. Tucker’s motion failed to mention Rule 41(g),
the gist of the requested relief was the return of the funds either to himself or
others. Under the liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings, we construe
Mr. Tucker’s motion as having been filed under Rule 41(g). Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Van Deelen v. Johnson,
497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1
(10th Cir. 2007).
Under different circumstances, we might be compelled to remand the case
for further proceedings. However, it is unnecessary to do so in this case because
it is undisputed that the government no longer possesses the funds. As such, there
is no relief available to Mr. Tucker under Rule 41(g). See Clymore v. United
1
On September 10, 2010, Mr. Tucker’s father, Thomas Conrad Tucker, filed
a “Notice of Third Party Claim on Funds and Request for Hearing or Return.” R.
Vol. 1 at 1016. The district court has not ruled on this notice, and we express no
opinion on the merits.
-3-
States,
415 F.3d 1113, 1120 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that “sovereign immunity
bars monetary relief in a Rule 41[(g)] proceeding when the government no longer
possesses the property”). As such, the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to consider the motion.
This case is REMANDED to the district court with instructions to vacate its
previous order and enter an order of DISMISSAL for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
-4-