Before MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and VRATIL,** District Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Plaintiff Kim McGough appeals an order of the district court affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to deny him Social Security disability benefits. Plaintiff argues that the Secretary's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) posed improper hypothetical questions to the vocational expert, and that the ALJ erred in relying on the grids in determining an absence of disability. We affirm.

At the time of the ALJ's decision, plaintiff was a forty year old male with a twelfth grade education and thirty-one hours of business college. He had previously worked as a census enumerator, concrete finisher, concrete truck driver, and lumber yard laborer. Plaintiff alleged disability since March 26, 1987, but the ALJ found that the date after which he must determine whether plaintiff was under a disability was July 28, 1989.2 Plaintiff alleges disability because of constant pain. Finding insufficient evidence of disabling pain, and finding plaintiff's testimony regarding his pain not credible, the ALJ refused to grant benefits. The Appeals Council denied review. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in the district court, a United States Magistrate issued a recommendation in favor of the Secretary, and the district court adopted the magistrate's findings.

Our review of the Secretary's decision is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the decision and whether the Secretary applied the correct legal standards. Gay v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 1336, 1338 (10th Cir.1993). We may neither weigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Cagle v. Califano, 638 F.2d 219, 220 (10th Cir.1981). Substantial evidence is such that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; substantial evidence is more than a scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).

The ALJ found that, even though plaintiff could not perform his past work, he could perform light or sedentary work. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ found plaintiff's complaints of pain severe enough to keep him from performing light or sedentary work not credible. " '[W]e generally treat credibility determinations made by an ALJ as binding upon review.' " Talley v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir.1990)(quoting Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 807 (10th Cir.1988)). Further, the medical evidence does not substantiate plaintiff's alleged inability to perform light or sedentary work. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the Secretary's decision was based on substantial evidence.

Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ posed narrow, incomplete, misleading, and conclusory hypothetical questions to the vocational expert and that reliance on the answers thereto constitutes error. The crux of plaintiff's complaint in this regard is that the ALJ asked the vocational expert:

Assuming that I should find from the evidence, including the testimony as well as the medical evidence, that Mr. McGough would be able to perform sedentary work as defined in the regulations. Are there sedentary jobs that he would be able to perform based on his age, education and past work experience?

....

Assuming that I should find that he could perform light work, are there light jobs he would be able to perform?

Appellant's App. at 56. Plaintiff argues that responses to these questions cannot constitute substantial evidence because the questions do not sufficiently relate plaintiff's pain allegations. We find no merit in plaintiff's contention of error because the ALJ found plaintiff's pain allegations incredible, and the ALJ was, therefore, under no obligation to include the pain factor in his hypotheticals to the vocational expert. See Jordan v. Heckler, 835 F.2d 1314, 1316 (10th Cir.1987)(ALJ's failure to include pain factor in hypotheticals was not inappropriate because there was not sufficient evidence that plaintiff's pain prohibited him from performing light or sedentary work).3

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the grids4 in light of plaintiff's alleged nonexertional pain allegation. Again, the ALJ was not persuaded by plaintiff's allegations of pain severe enough to render him disabled. Reliance on the grids was proper after the ALJ found plaintiff's pain allegations incredible. See Talley, 908 F.2d at 588.

The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.