DENISE K. LaRUE, United States Magistrate Judge.
This Cause is another challenge by James E. Lundeen, Sr. to the suspensions of his medical licenses in Ohio and Indiana.
Between September 2011 and May 2, 2012, Mr. Lundeen held a license to practice medicine in Indiana. In February 2012, the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana ("Indiana Board"), a subdivision of the Indiana Professional Licensing Agency, summarily suspended his license for a period of ninety days and, in May 2012, the Indiana Board conditionally suspended his license indefinitely. Both actions were taken in response to the December 2011 disciplinary permanent revocation of Mr. Lundeen's Ohio medical license by the State Medical Board of Ohio ("Ohio Board").
On May 11, 2011, the Ohio Board issued an emergency order summarily suspending
Upon learning of the Ohio Board's permanent revocation of Mr. Lundeen's medical license, the Attorney General of Indiana asked the Indiana Board to suspend Mr. Lundeen's license. On February 10, 2012, after notice and a pre-deprivation hearing, the Indiana Board found that "an emergency exists and that [Mr. Lundeen] represents a clear and immediate danger to the public health and safety if allowed to practice medicine in the State of Indiana," Summary Suspension Order [dkt. 1-2, p. 1], and placed Mr. Lundeen's Indiana medical license on summary suspension for ninety days, pursuant to Indiana Code § 25-1-9-10, id., p. 4.
Six days later, on February 16, 2012, Mr. Lundeen filed suit in Marion Superior Court in Marion County, Indiana, challenging the Indiana Board's ninety-day suspension. The court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, Amended Complaint ¶ 3.27, and Mr. Lundeen did not pursue an appeal.
On March 8, 2012, the Attorney General of Indiana filed a complaint against Mr. Lundeen's medical license with the Indiana Board, asserting that his conduct constituted a violation of Ind.Code § 25-1-9-4(a)(7)
On April 26, 2012, the Indiana Board held an administrative hearing on the amended complaint. Mr. Lundeen appeared in person. On May 2, 2012, the Indiana Board found Mr. Lundeen in violation of Ind.Code § 25-1-9-4(a)(7) based on the Ohio Board's permanent disciplinary revocation of his medical license. Pursuant to Ind.Code § 25-1-9-9(a)(2),
On May 22, 2012, Mr. Lundeen filed the present suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendant Executive Director of the IPLA, in his official capacity. A second suit that he filed in April 2013 against the same defendant, which also challenges the suspension of his license, was consolidated with the present suit.
On July 9, 2013, Mr. Lundeen filed an Amended Complaint [dkt. 52], which is the current operative complaint. In Count I, he alleges that the Indiana Board's indefinite suspension of his medical license was in retaliation for his suit in the Marion Superior Court to vacate the Board's summary suspension and, therefore, violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition for a redress of grievances.
Mr. Lundeen seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, he asks for an order declaring (1) that the Ohio Board's orders of immediate summary suspension and permanent revocation of his Ohio license are invalid, and (2) that the Indiana Board's May 2, 2012 indefinite suspension is void and vacated. He also seeks an order requiring the Indiana Board to remove all references to his case from the public record. Finally, he seeks a permanent injunction against Defendant taking any further disciplinary action against his medical license based on his practice of medicine in Ohio and from imposing any
Defendant argues that this action must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Mr. Lundeen's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, collateral estoppel, and the Eleventh Amendment. When reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), "the district court must accept the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff's favor." Transit Exp., Inc. v. Ettinger, 246 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir.2001). However, a court "may look beyond the allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted" to determine if it has subject-matter jurisdiction. Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir.2003). In this case, the Court takes judicial notice of the voluminous administrative and court records related to this action, including those referenced in the complaint and those available publically. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 556 (7th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases); In re Salem, 465 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir.2006) (citing cases).
Defendant argues that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action according to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The doctrine takes its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). "Those decisions hold that only the Supreme Court of the United States may set aside a state court's decision in civil litigation." Bergquist v. Mann Bracken, LLP, 592 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir.2010). Consequently, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to cases that are brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the federal district court proceedings commenced and that invite district-court review and rejection of those judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).
Defendant argues that Mr. Lundeen's injuries are "inextricably intertwined" with the Ohio court's actions and, therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction over his claims. Defendant is mistaken. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not applicable to this action. The Ohio trial court's judgment was rendered on June 28, 2012, after the complaint in this Cause was filed on May 22, 2012. See Lundeen, 2013 WL 209136, at *2.
Next, Defendant argues that, even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not divest this court of jurisdiction, then the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies as to any issues pertaining to the appropriateness of the Ohio courts' actions or the validity of their orders. In response, Mr. Lundeen argues that collateral estoppel does not apply because the Ohio Board's December 14, 2011 Entry of Order was rendered in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction by an incompetent tribunal and, thus, "does not support application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel anywhere, anytime or for any purpose." [Dkt. 59 at p. 13.]
The rule of issue preclusion (often called collateral estoppel) is that the resolution of an issue in previous litigation between the same parties normally is conclusive of that issue in subsequent litigation. DeGuelle v. Camilli, 724 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir.2013); Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. Four-U-Packaging, Inc., 701 F.3d 1093, 1098 (6th Cir. 2012). In this case, Defendant argues that collateral estoppel bars this Court from reconsidering issues previously determined by the Ohio state courts. "In determining when collateral estoppel applies [to a state-court's judgment] federal courts must look to state law and determine whether another state court would give preclusive effect to the prior proceeding." Kunzelman v. Thompson, 799 F.2d 1172 (7th Cir.1986). Unfortunately, neither party addresses Ohio's doctrine of collateral estoppel which is controlling as applied to the Ohio state-court judgments. "[T]he statute that implements the full faith and credit clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, ... requires federal as well as state courts to give state court judgments the same preclusive effect that the state courts that issued the judgments would give them." DeGuelle, 724 F.3d at 937. See also Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 80-88, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) (in context of § 1983 claim, state-court judgment has the same claim preclusive effect in federal court that the judgment would have in the state courts).
Ohio ex rel. Boggs v. City of Cleveland, 655 F.3d 516, 519-20 (6th Cir.2011).
That said, Defendant's arguments on collateral estoppel and Mr. Lundeen's responses bring up an obvious problem in this case. Mr. Lundeen cannot attack the decisions of the Ohio Board or the Ohio state courts in a meaningful way in this case because the sole defendant, the Executive Director of the IPLA, has nothing to do with the decisions of the Ohio Board or the Ohio state courts. He was not a party to those proceedings nor can he be expected to defend those decisions. Under these circumstances, this Court cannot grant Mr. Lundeen's request for a declaratory judgment finding that the Ohio Board's orders of summary suspension and permanent revocation of his Ohio license are invalid. That relief is well outside the scope of this civil action, which is purportedly a claim for prospective injunctive relief against the Executive Director of the IPLA.
Third, the Director argues that the Eleventh Amendment deprives this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Generally, the Eleventh Amendment deprives federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against a state. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Because suits against state officials in their official capacities are deemed to be against the state itself, they are barred as well. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Meadows v. State of Indiana, 854 F.2d 1068 (7th
As presented, the retaliation claim fails to allege "an ongoing violation of federal law" and, thus, the doctrine of Ex parte
Mr. Lundeen's equal-protection claim is difficult to follow. He states in his response to the motion to dismiss that he "has alleged equal protection (`EP') violations based on a class-of-one and on over-inclusion with those physicians against whom allegations of misconduct have been made and who have suffered related discipline." [Dkt. 59 at 27.] In addition, "Lundeen alleges that the Defendant inflicted an EP violation of a class-of-one type when the game changed after February 16, 2012, to `get Lundeen,' which occurred on March 8, 2012, after Lundeen's court filing in Marion County Superior Court a mere three weeks prior." Id. at 28.
In the Seventh Circuit, an individual may state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause if he can show that state government took an action that "was a spiteful effort to `get' him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective." Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir.1995). The Equal Protection Clause provides a remedy when a "powerful public official pick[s] on a person out of sheer vindictiveness." Id. at 178. This type of discrimination has been characterized as the creation of a "class of one." Indiana State Teachers Ass'n v. Board of School Comm'rs of the City of Indianapolis, 101 F.3d 1179, 1181-82 (7th Cir.1996). To succeed, a plaintiff must show that the government is treating unequally those individuals who are prima facie identical in all relevant respects, see
Mr. Lundeen has not alleged any facts making a prima facie showing that he was treated differently than other individuals who were identical to him in all relevant respects, i.e., that he was treated differently than other holders of Indiana medical licenses who had medical licenses from other states suspended or revoked. Further, there can be no dispute that Indiana has an interest in protecting its citizens from harm and that it has a rational reason for reciprocally suspending the medical licenses of doctors whose licenses in other states have been revoked. The United States Supreme Court has explained that a "statute which places all physicians in a single class, and prescribes a uniform standard of professional attainment and conduct, as a condition of the practice of their profession, and a reasonable procedure applicable to them as a class to insure [sic] conformity to that standard, does not deny the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." State of Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40, 43, 46 S.Ct. 384, 70 L.Ed. 818 (1926).
For these reasons, Count III of the Amended Complaint fails to allege "an ongoing violation of federal law" and, thus, the doctrine of Ex parte Young does not apply and the Eleventh Amendment bars Mr. Lundeen's equal-protection claims.
The Due Process Clause is triggered when a government deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property, Kentucky Depart. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989), and requires the government to follow certain procedures before, during, or after the government deprives the individual of his life, liberty, or property, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127-130, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (U.S.1990).
Mr. Lundeen alleges that the Indiana Board deprived him of procedural due process by: (1) failing to strictly comply with Indiana statutory requirements, specifically by failing to have, and to state on the record that it had, a certified copy of the Ohio Board's disciplinary actions (Count IV); (2) failing to have record evidence that the Ohio Board's disciplinary revocation order, which stated that it would become effective upon mailing, had, in fact, become effective by having been mailed (Count V); and (3) suspending his license based on the Ohio Board's revocation order which was void for failure to follow Ohio state-law procedural requirements regarding the manner of mailing (Count VI). Mr. Lundeen contends that he can challenge the validity of the Ohio Board's
None of these counts, as pled and argued by Mr. Lundeen, state a violation of due process. The procedural requirements of Fourteenth Amendment due process are independent of procedures mandated by state law; in other words, the federal Due Process Clause does not enforce compliance with state procedures. Mann v. Vogel, 707 F.3d 872, 882 (7th Cir.2013); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1216, 1217 (7th Cir.1988);
The Amended Complaint's Counts IV and V allege only Defendant's failure to follow Indiana state-law requirements and Mr. Lundeen's response to the present motion to dismiss argues only the same. Neither the Amended Complaint nor Mr. Lundeen's arguments identify, or provide any legal authority for, any pre — or post-deprivation procedures mandated by the Due Process Clause that were not afforded to him. Count VI alleges that the Ohio Board's revocation of Mr. Lundeen's Ohio license was invalid for failure to follow Ohio state-law requirements and, therefore, the Indiana Board lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke his Indiana license under the pertinent Indiana statutes. Neither Count VI nor Mr. Lundeen's arguments in response to the present motion articulate or suggest any procedure mandated by due process that Indiana or Ohio failed to afford him. In addition, as noted above, Mr. Lundeen's challenges to the validity, under Ohio law, of the Ohio Board's revocation have received final adjudication in the Ohio state courts and an appeal therefrom lies to the United States Supreme Court, not to this Court. Because Counts IV, V, and VI do not identify due-process violations, they fail to state plausible, viable claims.
Because the Amended Complaint fails to identify an ongoing violation of federal law, it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and fails to state a claim and will be dismissed. In addition, Mr. Lundeen's second motion for a preliminary injunction [dkt. 64] is
Because Mr. Lundeen is proceeding pro se in this Cause, he is afforded one opportunity to file a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint that corrects the deficiencies addressed herein
Applying this test, the Court usually has held that the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.
In some circumstances, however, the Court has held that a statutory provision for a postdeprivation hearing, or a common-law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation, satisfies due process.
This is where the Parratt rule comes into play. Parratt and Hudson [v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984)] represent a special case of the general Mathews v. Eldridge [424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)] analysis, in which postdeprivation tort remedies are all the process that is due, simply because they are the only remedies the State could be expected to provide. In Parratt, a state prisoner brought a § 1983 action because prison employees negligently had lost materials he had ordered by mail. The prisoner did not dispute that he had a postdeprivation remedy. Under state law, a tort-claim procedure was available by which he could have recovered the value of the materials. This Court ruled that the tort remedy was all the process the prisoner was due, because any predeprivation procedural safeguards that the State did provide, or could have provided, would not address the risk of this kind of deprivation. The very nature of a negligent loss of property made it impossible for the State to predict such deprivations and provide predeprivation process. The Court explained:
In Hudson, the Court extended this reasoning to an intentional deprivation of property. A prisoner alleged that, during a search of his prison cell, a guard deliberately and maliciously destroyed some of his property, including legal papers. Again, there was a tort remedy by which the prisoner could have been compensated. In Hudson, as in Parratt, the state official was not acting pursuant to any established state procedure, but, instead, was apparently pursuing a random, unauthorized personal vendetta against the prisoner. The Court pointed out: "The state can no more anticipate and control in advance the random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employees than it can anticipate similar negligent conduct." Of course, the fact that the guard's conduct was intentional meant that he himself could "foresee" the wrongful deprivation and could prevent it simply by refraining from his misconduct. Nonetheless, the Court found that an individual state employee's ability to foresee the deprivation is "of no consequence," because the proper inquiry under Parratt is "whether the state is in a position to provide for predeprivation process."
Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127-130, 110 S.Ct. 975 (citations and footnotes omitted).
