Petitioner-appellant Ronald R. Ernst appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.1983 suit against two state-court judges. The district court dismissed this suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.1915(d). We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and affirm.

Mr. Ernst claims that two state-court judges violated his constitutional rights during the course of forfeiture proceedings following his arrest. His assertion that the defendants failed to meet state statutory deadlines, however, does not constitute a valid cause of action under 1983. A valid claim for purposes of 1983 requires the plaintiff to allege that the defendant deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by federal law while acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970); Hill v. Ibarra, 954 F.2d 1516, 1520 (10th Cir.1992). Mr. Ernst's argument fails to clear this hurdle.

Moreover, the doctrine of judicial immunity operates to bar this action. When acting in an official capacity, a judge enjoys absolute immunity from civil rights suits for damages, the exception being when the judge acts in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.1994). As instructed in Sparkman, we assess whether a judge performed a "judicial" act or acted "in the clear absence of jurisdiction" by examining "the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and [ ] the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." 435 U.S. at 362. A review of the record reveals that both defendants performed functions normally associated with judging and that Mr. Ernst dealt with them in their judicial capacities at the time they allegedly violated his civil rights. The defendants therefore are immune from Mr. Ernst's suit.

AFFIRMED.