BOLGER, Justice.
The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board denied a death benefit claim filed by the decedent's same-sex partner because the death benefit statute grants benefits only to a worker's "widow or widower" as defined by statute. The Board construed these terms by applying the Marriage Amendment to the Alaska Constitution, which defines marriage as "only between one man and one woman," thus excluding a decedent's same-sex partner. Because this exclusion lacks a fair and substantial relationship to the purpose of the statute, we conclude that this restriction on the statutory definition of "widow" violates the surviving partner's right to equal protection under the law.
Kerry Fadely, a manager at the Millennium Hotel, was shot and killed at work in October 2011. Millennium agreed that the death occurred in the course and scope of Fadely's employment. Deborah Harris filed a workers' compensation claim for death benefits in March 2012 as Fadely's "dependant/spouse." Millennium filed an answer and notice of controversion denying benefits because it "ha[d] not received any documentation" that Harris was Fadely's wife or husband. Relying on Ranney v. Whitewater
Harris filed notice that she was challenging the constitutionality of the statutory provisions of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act that limit eligibility for death benefits to widows or widowers. Harris said she was the "surviving same-sex partner" of Fadely and noted that they were "precluded from marrying each other under Alaska law." Harris asked the Board to issue a final decision so that she could appeal the constitutional issue, given that the Board lacked the authority to determine whether the statute violated her equal protection rights. She attached documentary evidence as well as several affidavits to support her factual assertions and "preserve[ ] any factual context for later judicial review."
In Harris's affidavit, she described her relationship with Fadely as "an exclusive, committed, and financially interdependent relationship" that had spanned more than 10 years. For most of those years, the couple lived in Alaska. She said that she and Fadely had exchanged rings in 2005 and referred to each other as spouses or partners. Harris also stated that she and Fadely had joint credit cards and shared responsibility for household expenses, that they had raised their children from prior relationships together, and that they would have married if they had been able to. Harris attached an affidavit of domestic partnership that she and Fadely had completed in 2008 for another employer; completing the affidavit permitted Harris to be enrolled in Fadely's employer's medical and dental plans. In the affidavit, they attested that they met the requirements of domestic partnership as listed in the document as of June 1, 2002.
The parties submitted stipulated facts to the Board and asked the Board to make a decision without an oral hearing. Millennium acknowledged that Fadely's death was compensable, but it disputed Harris's claim that she and Fadely were "in a same-sex relationship that could justify a conferral of rights or benefits" and noted that the two were "not married to one another as required under the [Alaska Workers' Compensation] Act and as defined under Alaska law." The parties agreed that the Board did not need to consider Harris's evidence to decide her claim and also agreed that the Board lacked the authority to decide constitutional questions.
The Board decided that Harris was not entitled to benefits because at the time of Fadely's death "[Harris] and [Fadely] were not, and could not be married to one another in Alaska." The Board declined to address Harris's constitutional arguments because it lacked jurisdiction to do so.
Harris appealed to the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission, again asserting her constitutional claim but acknowledging that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional. The Commission agreed it lacked jurisdiction to resolve the constitutional question, but it affirmed the Board's decision that Harris was not entitled to death benefits because she did not qualify as a widow or widower as defined in the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act. The Commission also noted that Ranney precluded an award of benefits to unmarried cohabitants of deceased employees.
Harris appeals the Commission's decision to this court.
We apply our independent judgment when we interpret constitutional provisions and statutes.
Harris argues that the denial of death benefits to her violates her right to equal protection under both the Alaska and the United States Constitutions. She additionally argues that the denial of death benefits to her unconstitutionally infringes on her rights to liberty and privacy under both constitutions. With regard to the Alaska Constitution, she contends that Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State
Millennium argues that the Marriage Amendment
Our recent decision in State v. Schmidt addressed the question whether the Marriage Amendment barred a similar equal protection claim.
Just as the State argued in Schmidt, Millennium contends that the Marriage Amendment must be interpreted as prohibiting the State from offering to same-sex couples any benefits available to married couples. Millennium offers no legislative history for the amendment itself, relying instead on the history of the enactment of AS 25.05.013. Alaska Statute 25.05.013(b) provides: "A same-sex relationship may not be recognized by the state as being entitled to the benefits of marriage."
Millenium's contention here is substantially similar to an argument presented and rejected in Schmidt. As we stated in Schmidt, the ballot measure "said nothing about denying or limiting benefits" and "did not refer to, quote, or paraphrase AS 25.05.013(b)."
In an equal protection challenge under the Alaska Constitution, the party seeking to show a violation must "show either that facially neutral state action has a discriminatory purpose or that the state action
We next consider whether "the challenged law treats similarly situated persons differently."
Ranney involved a constitutional challenge to the death-benefits provisions of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act by a woman who for four years had cohabited with, but never married, her boyfriend.
Ranney does not control the result in this case: The classes that we are comparing are different and are treated differently. Just as in ACLU and Schmidt, here "the proper comparison is between same-sex and opposite-sex couples" rather than between married and unmarried couples.
Harris argues that she and Fadely were financially interdependent and in a personally committed relationship, just like a married couple. Millennium does not directly contest this assertion. We considered and accepted similar arguments in ACLU and Schmidt, noting that many same-sex couples have "the same level of love, commitment, and mutual economic and emotional support" as married couples and "would choose to get married if they were not prohibited by law from doing so."
Under Alaska's equal protection analysis, we next consider "what weight should be afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged enactment."
We have previously applied minimum scrutiny to workers' compensation benefits in equal protection challenges because they are economic benefits.
After identifying the nature of the constitutional interest, we consider "the purposes served by [the] challenged statute."
The next step is "an evaluation of the state's interest in the particular means employed to further its goals."
Harris argues that there is no substantial relationship between means and ends in her case. She identifies cost savings, administrative efficiency, and promoting marriage as purposes for the exclusion of same-sex couples from workers' compensation death benefits. In response, Millennium contends that the purpose of the act is not limited to compensating injured workers and their dependents, and that we should also recognize that the statute is intended to promote the quick and efficient delivery of benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost.
In Ranney, we said that "compensating dependents is not the act's singular purpose,"
Harris argues that the administrative burden and actual costs related to determining whether a surviving partner in a same-sex couple should get workers' compensation death benefits will be low simply because (1) there are not as many same-sex couples as there are opposite-sex couples and (2) work-related deaths are relatively infrequent. While arguing that cost savings are not a valid reason to deny equal treatment, she concludes that "the cost of equality is minimal in this context." Millennium responds by arguing that requiring marriage as a condition of eligibility for death benefits is permissible legislative line-drawing and by pointing out that Ranney recognized the cost to employers as a legitimate interest that we should consider. Millennium does not otherwise identify how denial of benefits to same-sex couples who are barred by law from marriage bears a substantial relationship to the statutory purposes identified in Ranney.
We agree with Harris that the interests we identified and discussed in Ranney were substantially similar to the interests we discussed in ACLU: cost savings and administrative convenience, although the focus in Ranney was on administrative convenience. In Ranney we observed that the legislature could have required an individualized inquiry in every workers' compensation death-benefits case but chose instead to use marriage as "an adequate proxy for the more particularized inquiry concerning whether a relationship is serious enough or the partner is sufficiently dependent to justify awarding benefits."
Acknowledging that marriage may serve as an adequate proxy for opposite-sex couples, Harris contends that it cannot serve as a proxy for same-sex couples because same-sex couples are absolutely prohibited from marrying under Alaska law. We agree with Harris that for same-sex couples marriage cannot serve as the way to determine whether their relationships are "serious enough"
The other governmental interest that the parties discuss is cost savings. Permitting surviving partners involved in an intimate, committed, financially interdependent same-sex relationship to apply for workers' compensation death benefits may increase costs. By increasing the number of potentially eligible dependents, the costs to employers could increase both because the pool of people who potentially qualify for benefits may expand and because there may be more contested hearings. But we held in Schmidt that "cost savings alone are not sufficient government objectives under our equal protection analysis."
Harris provided affidavits and other documentary evidence to provide a factual context for purposes of appeal, but the Board has not yet considered this evidence because Harris was not lawfully married to Fadely at the time of Fadely's death. We therefore remand this case for further proceedings.
Based on the foregoing, we VACATE the decision of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission denying Harris's claim for death benefits and REMAND to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
