BOLGER, Justice.
The Anchorage Police Department identified Joshua Richardson as a suspect in a
Richardson argues that the statute of limitations should have been tolled due to his alleged mental incompetency and separation from his legal documents during unrelated incarceration, but we conclude there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to these issues. Nor was the superior court required to appoint Richardson an attorney or more liberally construe his pro se pleadings. We therefore affirm the dismissal of Richardson's suit before Judge Easter.
In the suit before Judge Rindner, however, there was credible evidence that Richardson filed his complaint—albeit with technical deficiencies—before the statute of limitations ran. This created a genuine issue of material fact. We therefore vacate the dismissal in that case and remand for further proceedings to determine when Richardson commenced his suit.
Richardson filed a complaint alleging that on July 7, 2010, the Anchorage Police Department responded to the theft of a laptop computer reported by a Best Buy employee. According to Richardson, this employee "conspired" with an Anchorage police officer to "present a fraudulent line up on or about July 8," at which Richardson was identified as a perpetrator. Richardson alleged that on July 8, this officer perjured himself by filing a false complaint against Richardson accusing him of third-degree theft. This theft charge against Richardson was ultimately dismissed. Richardson further claimed that this false complaint caused the Anchorage police to "de[s]cend upon [Richardson's] property and . . . [make] an unreasonable search and seizure[]."
Along with the Best Buy employee and the police officer who responded to the alleged theft, Richardson named the State of Alaska, the Anchorage Police Department, the Municipality of Anchorage, the "Dimond Center Best Buy," and the "Best Buy Corp[o]ration" as defendants.
Richardson filed a separate complaint based on events beginning late in the evening of July 13, 2010, when the Anchorage police allegedly arrived at Richardson's home. According to Richardson, the police initially arrived without a warrant and entered his residence without permission. Richardson claimed that the police obtained a warrant early the next morning and sent a police canine into the crawl space of the residence, where Richardson was hiding. By Richardson's account, he got into a "fist fight" with the canine, sustained dog bite injuries to his arms and legs, and was transported to the hospital for treatment. After being released from the hospital, Richardson was booked at the Anchorage Correctional Complex, but the
Richardson alleged the same causes of action as in his first complaint and similarly sought millions of dollars in damages. Richardson named the State of Alaska, the Municipality of Anchorage, the Anchorage Police Department, fifteen police officers who purportedly participated in his arrest, and "K-9 Jimmy Lee" as defendants.
Richardson was unrepresented throughout the proceedings in both cases, and he remains so on appeal.
Shortly after filing his first complaint, Richardson filed a request for appointed counsel. The superior court denied this request.
The Municipality and Best Buy moved to dismiss Richardson's complaint as untimely under the two-year statute of limitations,
In these motions and attached memoranda Richardson raised numerous arguments, only three of which are relevant to this appeal. First, Richardson claimed that his cause of action did not accrue until September 23, 2010, when his theft charge was dismissed. Second, Richardson appeared to argue that he was mentally incompetent to file suit due to his "mental disorder and eighth grade education." Finally, Richardson claimed that "the restrictions of imprisonment" and his pro se status prevented earlier filing of his complaint.
The superior court granted the Municipality's and Best Buy's motions to dismiss, finding that Richardson's cause of action accrued on July 14, 2010, "at the latest" and that Richardson filed his complaint on July 23, 2012.
Richardson filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. He then filed several other motions, including one that more specifically articulated his mental incompetency argument. The court did not rule on this motion, and it entered final judgment in the defendants' favor in June 2013.
The court accepted Richardson's second complaint for filing on July 30, 2012. Shortly
The Municipality filed a motion to dismiss based on the two-year statute of limitations, arguing that the alleged wrongs occurred on July 13, 2010, but that the complaint was not filed until July 30, 2012. Richardson filed an opposition arguing that his cause of action did not accrue until the theft charge against him was dismissed on September 23, 2010. The superior court granted the Municipality's motion to dismiss, finding that Richardson's claims involved acts occurring on July 13 and 14, 2010, but that the complaint was not filed until July 30, 2012.
After this dismissal Richardson filed two motions for reconsideration, arguing that he "met the [r]equirements to prove extenuating circumstance[s]" and invoking the discovery rule.
The superior court issued an order responding to these motions. The court recognized that Richardson was pro se and noted its acceptance of his untimely motion for reconsideration, but explained it could not "cut him some slack" as to the statute of limitations. The court noted that Richardson's claims involved acts occurring on July 13 and 14, 2010, and that Richardson filed his complaint on July 30, 2012. After explaining the relevant case law, the court rejected Richardson's invocation of the discovery rule. Richardson then filed several additional motions, including two that more expressly articulated his claim of mental incompetence. In one of its written orders, the superior court rejected Richardson's mental incompetence claim as "not adequately supported," noting that the emergency room records Richardson submitted showed he was fully "alert and oriented."
Richardson also filed a motion presenting a new statute of limitations argument, for the first time explaining that he attempted to file his complaint prior to the expiration of the statutory period on July 14, 2012. The issue of when Richardson commenced his suit touched off several months of further proceedings, successive requests for reconsideration, and seven more court orders.
In July 2013 Richardson filed his final motion for reconsideration, which the court denied, concluding that "[b]ased on the current record before the court there is no basis for further review."
"This court exercises its independent judgment when interpreting and applying statutes of limitation."
"The decision to appoint counsel for a civil litigant is a procedural decision, which we review for abuse of discretion. . . . `Reversal is warranted only if we are left with a definite and firm conviction . . . that a mistake has been made.'"
"In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we generally do not consider matters outside the complaint. . . . When parties present additional materials outside of the pleadings in connection with a motion to dismiss, the superior court must expressly exclude the materials or convert the motion into a motion for summary judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 56. . . ."
In both proceedings Richardson submitted a number of motions—along with accompanying evidence—that could be considered supplemental responses to the defendants' motions to dismiss. In granting the Municipality's and Best Buy's motions to dismiss in the first case, Judge Easter listed these various motions and noted which she was denying. We therefore assume the court considered these materials, and accordingly review the decision under the summary judgment standard. In the case before Judge Rindner, the court expressly excluded materials outside the pleadings in granting the defendants' motions to dismiss. But the court issued six subsequent orders responding to Richardson's requests for reconsideration, three of which referenced evidence outside of the pleadings. Therefore, we also review the decision in the second case as if the Municipality's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) had been converted to a motion for summary judgment.
This court "review[s] a grant of summary judgment de novo, `affirming if the record presents no genuine issue of material fact and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'"
"A cause of action accrues when a party knows or should know that he has a claim. Ordinarily, this is the date on which the injury occurs."
In both of Richardson's suits, the superior court concluded that Richardson's cause of action accrued no later than July 14, 2010, when Richardson was allegedly arrested at his home and injured by the police canine. Although Richardson argued below that his cause of action did not accrue until the theft charges against him were dismissed on September 23, he abandons this argument on appeal, stating in his opening briefs that "the incident that started [his] injuries . . . happened on July 14, 2010—what amounts to a false arrest."
Richardson does, however, appear to invoke the discovery rule on appeal for the proposition that his cause of action accrued after July 14. Citing Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska v. Does 1-6, he states that
Under Alaska Civil Rule 3(a), "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." Here, Richardson's complaint was not accepted for filing by the superior court until July 30, 2012—more than two years after his cause of action accrued on July 14, 2010. But Richardson argues that his complaint was nonetheless timely because it was first received by the court—admittedly with technical deficiencies
Renewing an argument he made before the superior court, Richardson claims that he mistakenly filed his complaint in district court rather than superior court and that his complaint was returned to him with a deficiency notice dated July 12, 2012. Richardson attached this deficiency notice to one of his several motions for reconsideration.
The superior court concluded that "[t]his might be proof that Mr. Richardson's effort to litigate the case should be considered timely." (Emphasis in original.) But the court found it "[could not] decide this on the record before it," particularly given that Richardson had filed another case involving similar allegations. The court therefore asked Richardson to provide a copy of the complaint he had tried to file in district court, in order to show that the July 12, 2012 deficiency notice was indeed issued in the suit pending before Judge Rindner. Richardson never produced a copy of his complaint, and explained that he no longer had his original complaint because he fixed the deficiency by altering the first page of the complaint and mailing it back to the clerk. But Richardson attested in an affidavit that the complaint he initially filed in district court was the one pending before Judge Rindner.
The superior court also considered a "legal mail report" from the Wildwood Correction Center, where Richardson was incarcerated. According to this report, Richardson mailed items addressed to the "AK Court System, Clerk of Court—Anch" on July 3 and July 19 and received mail from "AK Court System, Anchorage Trial Court" on July 13. These dates are consistent with Richardson's account of events: he claims that he signed his original complaint and placed it in prison mail on July 2, received his complaint back on July 13 with a deficiency notice dated July 12, and mailed the corrected complaint on July 19. But the superior court concluded
Because we are treating the Municipality's motion to dismiss as if it had been converted to a motion for summary judgment,
Richardson argues that the statute of limitations should have been tolled due to a mental disability that prevented him from filing his complaint earlier. Under AS 09.10.140(a),
The "general test" for mental incompetency is "whether a person could know or understand his legal rights sufficiently well to manage his personal affairs."
We have emphasized that this test does not measure whether a litigant did understand his or her legal rights, but whether he or she is capable of understanding them.
We find Hernandez-Robaina to be the closer analogy to Richardson's allegations of mental incompetence. In both of his suits, Richardson filed a "Motion for Tolling the Statute of Limitations and [for] Receiving Equitable Tolling" raising a number of arguments related to the statute of limitations. In an attached affidavit, he made the following statements: 1) that "being held falsely in prison for charges he did not commit . . . caused him mental anguish"; 2) that his cell mate committed suicide three days after Richardson's arrest; 3) that Richardson was being treated by "[Department of Corrections] mental health to this day, for PTSD, and depression that he lives with everyday"; 4) that he has an "eighth grade education"; and 5) that he "is mentally hand[i]capped, from head trauma." In addition, Richardson referenced his "mental handicaps" in a subsequent
When Judge Easter granted the defendants' motions to dismiss in the first suit and denied Richardson's subsequent motion for reconsideration, there was no other evidence in the record regarding Richardson's mental incompetency. Because Best Buy's and the Municipality's motions had been effectively converted to motions for summary judgment, Richardson was required "to set forth specific facts showing that he could produce evidence reasonably tending to dispute or contradict the movant's evidence and thus demonstrate that a material issue of fact exists."
In the suit before Judge Rindner, the superior court considered additional evidence not taken under advisement in Richardson's first suit. In particular, Richardson filed a motion expressly arguing that AS 09.10.140(a)(2) should be invoked because his "mental disability caused [him] confusion, personal[i]ty changes, [and] disorganization that [led him to file] bankruptcy and caused [him] not to communicate effectively with [his] attorney at trial." And in an attached affidavit, Richardson stated: "[My arrest] caused me to be traumatized to the point of me not being in my proper state of mind for many months to come. It took me until October [2010] before I was even made aware that I could file a [l]awsuit [against the] Anchorage Police Department. . . ." Perhaps most notably, Richardson submitted medical records from July 21, 2010, just a week following his arrest.
The evidence that Richardson himself submitted illustrated an ability to understand his legal rights. In particular, one medical record notes, "[Patient] states falsely accused & attacked by police dogs." Another doctor's notation reads:
Richardson's apparent ability to relay what had happened to him and communicate the alleged wrongfulness of the police's conduct undermines his mental incompetency claim. It also distinguishes this case from Cikan, where there was credible evidence that "the picture of the [plaintiff's] symptoms . . . did not become evident to either [the plaintiff] or her physicians until a number of years after the accident."
In each of his appeals, Richardson argues that the statute of limitations should have
As we explained in Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey, "[t]he doctrine of equitable tolling `relieve[s] a plaintiff from the bar of the statute of limitations when he has more than one legal remedy available to him'. . . ."
In the proceedings below, Richardson argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled because he had "exhausted administrative remedies" by sending a complaint to Anchorage Police Department Risk Management and cooperating with the Muncipality's investigation. But on appeal, he neither recounts these efforts nor argues that his pursuit of an alternative remedy served to toll the statute of limitations.
Richardson also seems to be arguing for equitable tolling based on "extraordinary circumstances." Some jurisdictions apply this doctrine to equitably toll a plaintiff's claims "where extraordinary circumstances outside the plaintiff's control make it impossible for the plaintiff to timely assert his or her claim"
Instead, Richardson's equitable tolling arguments on appeal are based solely on his alleged separation from his legal documents as a result of his incarceration, in addition to his claim of mental incompetence. In federal habeas cases, a prisoner's separation from legal documents will sometimes serve as an "extraordinary circumstance"
In both appeals, Richardson argues that the superior court "was in error when it failed to construe liberally the motions of a pro-se litigant." In particular, he asserts that "[t]he court should have construed liberally [his] motions and other filings where he indicated he was on 23 hour lockdown at Anchorage Jail for 6 days when his cell mate had committed suicide and everything in [his] cell was held as evidence. . . ." It is true that neither Judge Easter nor Judge Rindner expressly addressed this precise issue. But as we conclude above, separation from legal papers does not provide a basis for equitably tolling the statute of limitations under Alaska law. Accordingly, Richardson was not prejudiced by any failure to more liberally construe his pleadings.
Similarly, Richardson appears to argue that in both cases, the court should have more liberally construed his motions regarding his alleged mental incompetence. But because Richardson failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his mental competency, a more liberal construction of his motions would not affect the ultimate disposition of his case.
"There is no general right to counsel in civil cases under the United States or Alaska Constitutions,"
Under this well-established precedent, Richardson had no right to appointed counsel in this case, and neither superior court erred by denying his request.
As this court has explained, "the task of interpreting and applying a statute of limitations traditionally falls within the province of the courts; so when a factual dispute precludes entry of summary judgment the dispute must ordinarily be resolved by the court at a preliminary evidentiary hearing in advance of trial."
We conclude that further proceedings were indeed necessary in the case before Judge Rindner on the disputed issue of when Richardson commenced his second suit. Because Judge Rindner correctly rejected Richardson's other arguments regarding the statute of limitations, however, no evidentiary hearing was required on these issues. Because Richardson failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact countering the statute of limitations defense in his case before Judge Easter, the court was not required to grant Richardson an evidentiary hearing in that suit.
The State argues that Richardson fails to raise any argument regarding the State's dismissal from his suits, and we agree. In both proceedings below, the State moved to dismiss on the grounds that Richardson failed to allege any facts in his complaints relating to the State's conduct. On appeal, Richardson neither addresses this argument nor mentions any aspect of the State's alleged conduct. He therefore fails to properly raise this issue on appeal.
In the case before Judge Easter, we AFFIRM the order dismissing Richardson's case in its entirety.
In the case before Judge Rindner, we VACATE the order granting the Municipality's motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings regarding Richardson's date of filing. On all other issues, including the dismissal of the State, we AFFIRM.
If a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in this chapter is at the time the cause of action accrues . . . imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under sentence of a court for a term less than the person's natural life, the time of the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
Former AS 09.10.140 (1986).
