WINFREE, Justice.
A recycling company requested rebates under a municipal ordinance providing reduced fees for disposing solid waste residue at the municipal landfill. The municipal department dispersing the rebates construed the ordinance as resulting in lower rebates than the company expected. The company sued the municipality, and the superior court ruled in the municipality's favor. The company appeals. Although the ordinance language is imperfect, legislative intent more strongly supports the municipality's interpretation. We therefore affirm the superior court's decision.
Central Recycling Services, Inc. recovers post-consumer materials for reuse, mainly from construction and demolition waste. These materials include cardboard, glass, steel, aluminum, copper, asphalt, concrete, tires, and lumber. Entities primarily engaged in recycling are entitled to reduced fees at the Anchorage municipal landfill when disposing solid waste residue generated from recyclable materials.
Between 2010 and 2014 Central Recycling submitted 12 rebate requests to SWS. Central Recycling apparently received its first rebate in 2012 and, believing it was entitled to a larger rebate, began disputing SWS's application of the ordinance. Specifically, Central Recycling disagreed with SWS's interpretation that the fee reduction applies only to waste residue from materials expressly listed in the ordinance.
In January 2014 Central Recycling brought suit against the Municipality of Anchorage, asserting that SWS's ordinance interpretation was incorrect and seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for unpaid rebates. The Municipality moved for summary judgment in January 2015, maintaining that the ordinance allows the rebate only for waste residue from the seven listed materials. Central Recycling opposed, arguing that the list is not exhaustive of the materials generating qualifying residue and that the Anchorage Assembly intended to incentivize recycling to divert waste from the landfill. At oral argument the superior court agreed with the Municipality, explaining that "the plain language of the code ... said what it said, and that these were the list[ed] ... things that you['ve] got to recycle." The court granted the Municipality summary judgment on the declaratory remedy, which was dispositive of the action, and entered final judgment against Central Recycling in July 2015.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.
Whether construing a statute or municipal ordinance "[w]e apply the same rules of interpretation."
Under AMC 26.80.055(A) municipal landfill disposal fees are conditionally reduced for a recycling entity's solid waste residue:
Eligible solid waste residue must result directly from the recycling operation and be no more than 25% of the recovered recyclable material's weight.
The parties dispute the meaning of the provision's first sentence. The Municipality contends that a business recycling any of those seven items with other materials is entitled to a fee rebate for residue generated only from those seven specific items. The Municipality asserts that the list is exclusive and that residue produced from other recyclable materials is ineligible for the rebate.
It is not clear whether Central Recycling's primary contention is that the list merely reflects types of materials an eligible business might recycle — and therefore is illustrative and not operative — or whether, at minimum, an entity must recycle listed materials, regardless of other materials it recycles, to produce eligible residue. But the plain language does not suggest the list is only representative of recyclable materials generally; as the Municipality observes, under Central Recycling's argument "the list of seven items could simply be removed from the ordinance," rendering its presence meaningless. And "[w]hen we interpret a statute, we presume that no words or provisions are superfluous and that the legislature intended `every word, sentence, or provision of a statute to have some purpose, force, and effect.'"
The fee reduction under AMC 26.80.055(A) is restricted to "[b]usinesses or organizations engaged in recycling of paper, plastic, glass and steel, aluminum, copper and brass."
Central Recycling contends that the relevant language identifies eligible businesses — those recycling listed materials — rather than eligible materials or residue. And the ordinance's language neither expressly limits rebates to residue from listed materials nor addresses unlisted materials. Central Recycling recycles cardboard, plastic, glass, steel, aluminum, and copper, along with additional items not listed. As a "business ... engaged in recycling" listed materials, Central Recycling would meet the threshold requirement under its interpretation.
The second part of the first sentence also supports Central Recycling's interpretation because it does not associate discount eligibility with the residue generated only from the seven listed items. Rather, AMC 26.80.055(A) explains that the rebate shall be granted "for solid waste residue resulting from the recycling operation." (Emphasis added.) The Anchorage Assembly could have limited rebate eligibility by referring back to the listed materials,
Finally, Central Recycling notes that AMC 26.80.055(A)'s second sentence defines "recycling operation" broadly as an operation "that recovers post-consumer solid waste materials for use in new consumer products" without referencing the listed materials. That provision could be plainly read — as Central Recycling asserts — as providing the fee reduction for residue resulting from any operation recovering post-consumer solid waste materials for use in new consumer products, not just operations recycling the listed materials and not just waste produced from the listed materials.
Despite Central Recycling's arguments, tools of statutory construction also support the Municipality's contention that the seven-item list is exhaustive of the materials for which a recycling operation may receive the fee reduction. A natural reading of AMC 26.80.055(A)'s initially restricting clause could indicate that "the recycling operation" (emphasis added) refers back to the entity's "recycling of" the explicit seven materials; therefore, the "residue resulting" from that operation would mean residue produced from recycling only those seven materials.
Interpreted this way, the first sentence effectively would describe "the recycling operation" as a business or organization recycling the seven listed items. This definition would be at odds with AMC 26.80.055(A)'s second sentence, expressly defining "recycling operation" in more general terms as "one that recovers post-consumer solid waste materials for use in new consumer products." But the Municipality argues that when one statutory provision "deals with a subject in general terms and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way" — and the conflicting provisions cannot be harmonized — then "the specific section will control over the general."
Following this interpretation, if the eligible "residue resulting" were only the residue corresponding to the listed materials, then the Municipality's assertion that expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies has force. Expressio unius operates when "a statute expressly enumerates the things or persons to which it applies."
"Reason, practicality, and common sense"
The Anchorage Assembly adopted the ordinance in April 1996.
The proposal's initial policy goals probably were best expressed by its main sponsor, who introduced the reduced disposal fee ordinance proposal because recycling businesses and organizations provide a twofold "invaluable service" to the community by (1) accepting waste materials otherwise destined for the municipal landfill and (2) processing those materials to remove recyclables for use in new consumer products.
The Municipality concedes that the ordinance's stated rationale was diverting recyclable waste from the landfill, but argues that the seven-item list was later added to limit the waste residue accepted for reduced fees. Although "[s]tatements made by a bill's sponsor during legislative deliberations are relevant evidence when the court is trying to determine legislative intent,"
The language at issue was recommended by the City Mayor and SWS. The mayor explained:
Although this explanation is not entirely clear, we agree with the Municipality that it reasonably demonstrates the list was added to limit eligibility to residue from the listed materials. The mayor's statement at first merely suggests that the list was added to "better define" what is "traditionally" — or typically — recycled, rather than to limit eligible materials. Similarly, suggesting that the list helps "better define" what is meant by "recycling" may imply the list is not exhaustive of what is recyclable or what residue qualifies.
Finally, Central Recycling's interpretation partly, and incorrectly, relies on the Assembly's post-enactment ordinance description. When the Assembly amended AMC 26.80.055 in 2000 to eliminate its sunset clause, an Assembly member who had been a sponsor of the original enactment explained that the ordinance "came about to reduce the bulk that is placed in the landfill."
We therefore conclude that the legislative history supports the Municipality's view: AMC 26.80.055(A) provides an exclusive list of the materials whose recycling generates residue eligible for the disposal fee reduction.
We AFFIRM the superior court's decision.
(first quoting Marathon Oil Co. v. State, Dep't of Natural Res., 254 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Alaska 2011); then quoting Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Kenai Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 896, 903 (Alaska 1987)).
The parties do not dispute whether Central Recycling meets these eight additional requirements.