SHARON L. GLEASON, District Judge.
Before the Court at Docket 635 is Defendant John Pearl Smith, II's Motion to Prohibit the Jury Clerk from Automatically Disqualifying Jurors Who Answer "Yes" to Question 6 on the Summons. The government did not file a response.
Last week, the Court mailed 1,200 summonses to prospective jurors in this case. The mailings each included the standard Juror Qualification Questionnaire created by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Question 6 of the Juror Qualification Questionnaire asks prospective jurors: "Have you ever been convicted of or sentenced for a state or federal crime for which punishment could have been more than one year in prison or jail (a felony)?"
Procedurally, the Jury Clerk has been designated the primary responsibility for reviewing prospective jurors' returned Qualification Questionnaires and is authorized to disqualify prospective jurors if they answer "yes" to Question 6 and "no" to Question 7.
Mr. Smith "asks this Court to order the Jury Clerk to keep individuals in the venire even if they have answered `yes' to question 6 on the Juror Summons and Qualification."
The Court has reviewed Mr. Smith's motion and exhibits and finds that the State of Alaska's automatic restoration of jury-service rights after unconditional discharge following a felony conviction may cause some prospective jurors with prior felony convictions to incorrectly answer Question 7.
By a separate order, the Chief Judge of the District of Alaska has appointed the undersigned as the supervising judge for purposes of implementing all aspects of the Jury Plan in this case.
In light of the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the motion at Docket 635 is granted as follows:
(1) The Jury Clerk shall identify and maintain a separate list of the prospective jurors who answered "yes" to Question 6, but shall not disqualify any prospective juror based solely on that response;
(2) Each party may file with the Court under seal any "competent evidence" regarding the eligibility of prospective jurors who answer "yes" to Question 6 by
(3) The status of each of these prospective jurors will be addressed at the
(4) If the Court is unable to determine the eligibility of a prospective juror from the Qualification Questionnaire and any submitted evidence, a party may ask the Court to inquire as to a specific prospective juror's restoration status by including this topic in the party's proposed voir dire due
The Court of Appeals of Alaska has interpreted this definition "in accordance with the statute's plain meaning. So interpreted, unconditional discharge requires completion of any sentence of imprisonment, discharge from parole or probation, and release from any other restriction directly imposed as part of the judgment of conviction. Restoration of collaterally affected rights or privileges is not required." Singleton v. State, 921 P.2d 636, 638 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (footnote omitted).
The district court found that the juror had not been dishonest but had made an "innocent mistake" in understanding Question 6 to ask whether he actually had been sentenced to more than one year in prison instead of whether his convictions could have resulted in a sentence of more than one year. The court noted that "jurors are not necessarily experts in English usage. Called as they are from all walks of life, many may be uncertain as to the meaning of terms which are relatively easily understood by lawyers and judges." Schmidt, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 1075-76 (quoting McDonough Power Equip. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 555 (1984)).