MURDOCK, Justice.

The issues raised by this petition for a writ of mandamus are: (1) whether law-enforcement activities and litigation pursued by attorneys and other officers who are otherwise appropriately authorized by the governor to do so are "nullities" without the approval of the attorney general or the local district attorney and (2) whether the attorney general has the right to assume control of such activities and litigation. Because we answer both questions in the negative, we grant the petition and issue the writ of mandamus.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc. ("Cornerstone"), obtained a license from the Town of White Hall in Lowndes County to conduct games of bingo. The basis for Cornerstone's license was a local constitutional amendment that authorizes charity bingo games. Amendment No. 674, Ala. Const. 1901 (Local Amendments, Lowndes County, § 3, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.Recomp.)), states: "The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in The Town of White Hall...." Purportedly on the basis of its license and this local amendment, Cornerstone opened and operated what is known as the White Hall Entertainment Center ("the EC").

In December 2008, Governor Bob Riley issued Executive Order No. 44 creating the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Gambling ("the Task Force"). In part, Executive Order No. 44 states:

(Emphasis added, other than as indicated.) See Ala.Code 1975, § 36-13-9 (governor's power to issue executive orders).

By letter dated December 29, 2008, Governor Riley appointed former Jefferson County District Attorney David Barber as commander of the Task Force. The letter of appointment to Barber stated:

In March 2009, agents of the Task Force obtained a search warrant relating to the alleged illegal gambling operations at the EC, executed a search at the EC, and confiscated approximately 105 electronic-gaming machines, the computer servers to which those machines were attached, over $500,000 in proceeds from the games played at the EC, and various records kept by Cornerstone.3

A few hours after the execution of the warrant began, Cornerstone filed an action ("the declaratory-judgment action") in the Lowndes Circuit Court against Governor Riley, in his official capacity; Barber, as supernumerary district attorney and special prosecutor for the Task Force; Emory Folmar, as administrator of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board; and Colonel Christopher Murphy, as director of the Department of Public Safety (collectively "the Riley defendants"). Cornerstone sought, among other things, a declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief regarding the Task Force's seizure of the electronic-gaming machines. Specifically, Cornerstone requested a judgment declaring that those machines and the enterprise being conducted at the EC were permitted under Amendment No. 674, Ala. Const.1901. Cornerstone requested a preliminary injunction restraining the Task Force from any further interference with its operation at the EC during the pendency of the action and directing the Task Force to return all the seized machines, servers, and records based on its belief that the machines are legal under Alabama law. The Riley defendants filed a counterclaim seeking a judgment declaring that under Alabama law the machines at issue were illegal gambling devices.

Freedom Trail Ventures, Ltd. ("FTV"), subsequently filed a motion to intervene in the declaratory-judgment action, alleging that it owned at least some of the machines seized by the Task Force and that it had leased those machines to Cornerstone. The trial court granted FTV's motion.

After conducting a hearing on Cornerstone and FTV's request for a preliminary injunction, the trial court granted that request and entered an order purporting to require the Riley defendants to return all property seized as a result of the execution of the March 2009 search warrant. The trial court also ordered the Riley defendants to refrain from interfering with Cornerstone's operation at the EC during the pendency of the declaratory-judgment action.

The Riley defendants appealed to this Court from the trial court's order issuing the preliminary injunction.

In April 2009, Barber, as supernumerary district attorney, filed a forfeiture proceeding ("the forfeiture proceeding") on behalf of the State of Alabama in the Lowndes Circuit Court. The State sought forfeiture of the items seized during the execution of the March 2009 warrant on the EC. The State's petition in the forfeiture proceeding alleged that Cornerstone and FTV claimed an interest in the property at issue.4 The trial court entered an order consolidating the declaratory-judgment action and the forfeiture proceeding.

In November 2009, this Court reversed the trial court's judgment granting Cornerstone and FTV a preliminary injunction in the declaratory-judgment action. Consistent with the legal authority cited by Governor Riley in Executive Order No. 44, we held that the game of bingo authorized by the local amendment was that game commonly and traditionally known as bingo, and we provided a nonexhaustive list of characteristics of that game. Based on our legal conclusion as to the meaning of the term "bingo," we determined that the trial court's award of a preliminary injunction was in error because there was no reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. Barber v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc., 42 So.3d 65, 87 (Ala.2009).

Barber thereafter resigned as commander of the Task Force. In January 2010, Governor Riley issued an order amending Executive Order No. 44. The amending order states:

Thereafter, Governor Riley issued a letter appointing Mobile County District Attorney John M. Tyson, Jr., as commander of the Task Force. The appointment letter states:

Tyson, Martha Tierney, an assistant district attorney for Mobile County whom Governor Riley also appointed to serve as special prosecutor and counsel for the Task Force pursuant to § 12-17-184(10), and Edgar W. Greene, a supernumerary district attorney whom Governor Riley appointed to serve with the Task Force pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 12-17-216, filed notices of appearance in the declaratory-judgment action and the forfeiture proceeding.

Cornerstone and FTV filed motions to dismiss the State's forfeiture proceeding on the grounds that the State and its prosecutors lacked the legal authority to pursue it.

On March 5, 2010, Governor Riley appointed Supernumerary District Attorney Tim Morgan to the Task Force. The letter appointing Morgan states:

(Footnote and citations omitted.)

On March 8, 2010, the trial court entered an order in which it noted that neither Attorney General Troy King nor a member of his staff had participated in the execution by the Task Force of the search warrant on the EC and that Lowndes County District Attorney John Andrews likewise had not participated. The trial court also noted that Andrews had submitted an affidavit in which he stated that he had inspected the gaming machines at the EC before it opened, that he had "exercised [his] prosecutorial judgment and discretion in deciding not to bring any criminal charges relating to such games," and that he had never been contacted by the Task Force to discuss investigating or closing the EC. The order went on to state:

The Riley defendants and the State filed with this Court a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its March 8 order on the grounds that a district attorney or supernumerary district attorney serving at the governor's direction can pursue the interests of the State in litigation without the approval of the attorney general.

The Riley defendants and the State also filed a motion in the trial court requesting that it stay its March 8 order pending a decision on their petition. In their motion, they argued, in part, that the gubernatorially appointed attorneys for the Riley defendants and the State had authority to appear in the actions, that the order "raises substantial separation-of-powers issues and directs the Attorney General to perform an act he has discretion not to perform," and that if a justiciable conflict existed between the attorney general and governor, the governor would have the right to direct the litigation in the actions. Also, the Riley defendants and the State noted:

On March 16, 2010, the trial court issued an order ruling on the motion to stay. The order states:

On March 19, 2010, we granted the motion of the Riley defendants for an order staying the March 8 order, the March 16 order, and all proceedings in the actions at issue pending our decision on the petition filed by the Riley defendants and the State.

Attorney General King subsequently filed a motion with this Court in which he purports to appear "on behalf of the State and each State officer sued in his official capacity in the underlying litigation" and in which he requests dismissal of the mandamus petition based on "his authority outlined in Ex parte Weaver, 570 So.2d 675, 679-80 (Ala.1990)." Attorney General King further requests that "[s]hould this Court deem dismissal unavailable, ... this Court deny the [p]etition on the ground that the [State and the Riley defendants] have no clear legal right to the relief requested."

On March 23, 2010, Cornerstone and FTV filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Mandamus as Moot and Unripe, or, in the Alternative, to Stay Pending the Joinder of the Attorney General as a Necessary Party." We denied the motion and ordered the parties to brief the issue whether the activities of the Task Force or its members are dependent upon prior approval of the Attorney General.

Also, Attorney General King filed a notice of appearance in the trial court and has thereby purported to "assume[] responsibility for representing the interests of the State of Alabama and the State officers sued in their official capacities" in that court. Attorney General King sent letters directing District Attorney Tyson "to gather and turn over all of the evidence amassed by the Task Force [in various counties] over the past fourteen months" and purporting to relieve District Attorney Tyson, Assistant District Attorney Tierney, Supernumerary District Attorney Greene, and Supernumerary District Attorney Morgan from any further involvement in the Task Force or in litigation associated with the Task Force. By letter of March 22, 2010, Attorney General King also "advised" Colonel Murphy (director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety) and Administrator Folmar (Alcoholic Beverage Control Board) to "conduct no raids until further notice," though he acknowledged that the agencies and officers of the Department and the Board "answer to the Governor." Attorney General King asserted to Colonel Murphy and Administrator Folmar that the State

(Emphasis added.)

District Attorney Tyson responded by letter to Attorney General King's directive. He informed Attorney General King that the evidence at issue was not in his possession, but in the possession of the Department of Public Safety and the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, which were not under the authority of the Attorney General. See notes 1 and 2, supra. District Attorney Tyson further opined that handing over the evidence obtained by the Task Force so that Attorney General King could pursue civil proceedings would compromise the criminal investigation and prosecution. Also, District Attorney Tyson took the position that Attorney General King could not countermand the directives of Governor Riley as to the Task Force, and he refused to step down from the Task Force.

Likewise, Colonel Murphy and Administrator Folmar responded by letter to Attorney General King. They stated, in part:

By letter dated April 7, 2010, Governor Riley also responded to Attorney General King's attempt to relieve various members of the Task Force of their responsibility and to interfere with Governor Riley's directives to the Task Force officers. The April 7, 2010, letter states, in part:

As a consequence of the foregoing, a standoff now exists between Governor Riley and Attorney General King concerning the control of the forfeiture proceeding and the control of the present petition.8

II. Issues

As noted above, Supernumerary District Attorney Barber filed the forfeiture proceeding on behalf of the State; he has been replaced as commander of the Task Force by District Attorney Tyson, who is prosecuting that action. Supernumerary District Attorney Morgan signed the present petition for a writ of mandamus on behalf of the State; Morgan, District Attorney Tyson, and Assistant District Attorney Tierney are listed as counsel, and Governor Riley, through his personal counsel, Henry T. Reagan, is shown as joining in the petition. Attorney General King asserts that he has entered his appearance for the State; that he has authority to cause the dismissal of the petition; and that he is "invok[ing] that right." As noted, Attorney General King has purported to relieve District Attorney Tyson, Assistant District Attorney Tierney, Supernumerary District Attorney Greene, and Supernumerary District Attorney Morgan

Attorney General King argues as follows in his motion to dismiss:

The issues before us are whether Attorney General King or District Attorney Andrews must approve the actions of the attorneys and other officers who have been authorized by Governor Riley to act, and whether, under the foregoing circumstances, the law authorizes Attorney General King to countermand Governor Riley's exercise of authority to call upon such persons to initiate and prosecute actions on behalf of the State.

In essence, Attorney General King's argument is that the law governing the executive branch is that the attorney general has absolute power over legal matters involving the interests of the State, including those that concern the limits, if any, of the attorney general's power, and specifically those undertaken at the express direction of the governor. We reject this argument. We therefore also reject the assertion by Attorney General King that the issues raised by the trial court's March 2010 orders are now moot.

III. Analysis

In the present case, we have the unusual circumstance of the governor of this State making a judgment that the laws concerning illegal gambling were not being enforced in certain counties in this State during the tenure of the current attorney general, that the lack of enforcement in these counties has "produced serious confusion about which activities are lawful and which are not," and that the confusion is "being exploited by gambling promoters to expand and entrench illegal gambling activity in Alabama." In an attempt to fulfill his charge to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," therefore, Governor Riley has directed certain law-enforcement officers who have been placed at his disposal by law to investigate and prosecute alleged gambling activity.

With this in mind, we turn now to an examination of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions.

Article V of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 creates and defines the "executive department" of government. Section 112 of that article provides: "The executive department shall consist of a governor, lieutenant governor, attorney-general, state auditor, secretary of state, state treasurer, superintendent of education, commissioner of agriculture and industries, and a sheriff for each county." The very next provision of that article states as follows: "The supreme executive power of this state shall be vested in a chief magistrate, who shall be styled `The Governor of the State of Alabama.'" Ala. Const.1901, § 113 (emphasis added). Section 120 of that article then provides that "[t]he governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Ala. Const.1901, § 120 (emphasis added). As hereinafter discussed, these express constitutional provisions, all of which are of course unique to the office of governor, plainly vest the governor with an authority to act on behalf of the State and to ensure "that the laws [are] faithfully executed" that is "supreme" to the "duties" given the other executive-branch officials created by the same constitution. See generally Black's Law Dictionary 970 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a "magistrate" as "[t]he highest-ranking official in a government, such as the king in a monarchy, the president in a republic, or the governor in a state.—Also termed chief magistrate; first magistrate"). See also Opinion of the Justices No. 179, 275 Ala. 547, 549, 156 So.2d 639, 641 (1963): "The laws of the state contemplate domestic peace. To breach that peace is to breach the law, and execution of the laws demands that peace be preserved. The governor is charged with the duty of taking care that the laws be executed and, as a necessary consequence, of taking care that the peace be preserved."

The authority of the governor relative to the other executive offices created by Article V is further corroborated by other express provisions of that article. Section 121 of Article V provides:

Commenting on comparable provisions in that state's constitution, the Supreme Court of Maine explained:

State v. Simon, 149 Me. 256, 263-64, 99 A.2d 922, 925 (1953) (emphasis added).

Moreover, § 131 of Article V provides as follows:

Commenting on § 131, this Court stated in Opinion of the Justices No. 179, 275 Ala. at 550, 156 So.2d at 642: "[T]he architects of our Constitution provided that the governor may call out those forces to execute the laws and suppress insurrection. If the governor may employ the military forces, certainly he may employ the civil forces to keep the peace." This Court also has stated that "[i]t is the governor whom the people have charged to `take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' Ala. Const. 1901, § 120.... `[T]he core power of the executive branch' is the enforcement of those laws. Opinion of the Justices No. 380, 892 So.2d 332, 335 (Ala.2004)." McInnish v. Riley, 925 So.2d 174, 179 (Ala.2005) (emphasis omitted).

The Supreme Court of Kansas put it well we think when it considered similar provisions of that state's constitution:

State ex rel. Stubbs v. Dawson, 86 Kan. 180, 187-88, 119 P. 360, 363 (1911) (emphasis added; citation omitted).

In a case that addressed the employment of that state's militia by the governor, rather than the mere deployment of prosecutorial resources, the Supreme Court of Mississippi considered the meaning of language similar to that in our constitution:

State v. McPhail, 182 Miss. 360, 374, 180 So. 387, 389-91 (1938).

Based on the foregoing, we reach two preliminary conclusions. First, if our constitution's grant of "supreme executive authority" to the governor and its charge that the governor "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" mean anything in relation to a matter for which another constitutional officer is also given responsibility, they at least mean as follows: when the governor determines that, whether due to inaction or inadequate action by the other official, it is necessary for him to act lest the law go unenforced, he may act.9

Second, the aforesaid authority to act derives from the constitution itself, not from any statutory grant of authority by the legislature. That is, it is authority that exists even in the absence of a specific grant of authority by the legislature. In Opinion of the Justices No. 179, this Court stated:

275 Ala. at 550, 156 So.2d at 642-43 (emphasis added). Again, "`[w]hen a Constitution gives a general power, or enjoins a duty, it also gives, by implication, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one, or the performance of the other.'" Dawson, 86 Kan. at 188, 119 P. at 363 (quoting Field v. People, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 79, 83 (1839)).10

In this instance, however, it is not necessary to rely solely upon the authority implied from the express provisions of the constitution. Numerous statutory provisions and decisions of this Court authorize the governor to bring suit in the name of the State.

It is not surprising, for example, given the governor's position as "chief magistrate," that Alabama law recognizes the governor's power to direct the filing of civil actions on behalf of the State. See Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-1(b) ("The district attorney of the circuit in which an action by the state is pending must attend to the same on the part of the state, and the Governor of the state may employ assistant counsel if he deems it necessary. The written direction of the Governor to the attorney of record is sufficient authority for commencing such an action, and the trial judge may determine the amount of compensation."); State v. Stacks, 264 Ala. 510, 514, 88 So.2d 696, 699 (1956) ("We are ... constrained to hold that the Attorney General must file the suits in question under [the predecessor statutes to § 6-5-1 and § 6-5-4, Ala.Code 1975,] when directed by the Governor to do so."); see also, e.g., State ex rel. Haskell v. Huston, 21 Okla. 782, 97 P. 982 (1908) ("The right of the Governor to bring suit in the name of the state, in matters publici juris, has been conceded by the courts of last resort throughout this Union ever since the early days of this republic." 21 Okla. at 784, 97 P. at 983. "14 Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 1100, lays down the general rule: `The Governor, as special guardian of the state's rights, is the proper party to initiate necessary litigation. His right to do so is indeed a part of his general power of supervision over the property and welfare of the state.'" 21 Okla. at 787, 97 P. at 984. "The right of the Governor to bring suit in the name of the state, in all matters publici juris, is placed upon the high ground of his duty, under the Constitution of the state, to cause the laws to be faithfully executed, and not upon any statutory ground." 21 Okla. at 790, 97 P. at 985.). See also Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-2 (providing that the governor may direct that actions be commenced in the name of the State in foreign jurisdictions and he may employ counsel for the same); Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-4 (providing that the governor may "cause actions to be commenced" to recover property of the State that is lost by neglect or default, wrongfully disbursed, or wrongfully used by a public officer and to employ counsel for the same).

We also note a number of statutes that expressly give the governor the authority to direct the attorney general in certain litigation matters. See Ala.Code 1975, § 36-11-4 (the governor can "direct" the attorney general to file impeachment proceedings against constitutional officers, and he can direct the district attorney to file impeachment proceedings against county or municipal officers); Ala.Code 1975, § 15-22-20(e) (the governor can "direct" the attorney general to institute an inquisition proceeding as to a member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles); Ala. Code 1975, § 40-12-269(c) (the governor can "direct" the attorney general to file impeachment proceedings against a probate judge); Ala.Code 1975, § 41-15B-2(i) ("Any conflicting prior law notwithstanding, the Governor, or the Attorney General with the consent of the Governor, shall file any litigation necessary to effectuate the compelling interest of the State of Alabama to recover tobacco-related damages incurred by the state or pursue any other legal cause of action in which the state has an interest. The Governor may institute or participate in any civil litigation in which the state has an interest. When initiated by the Governor, such litigation shall be brought in the name of the Governor acting in his official capacity; when the Governor intervenes in existing litigation, he shall do so in the name of the Governor, also acting in his official capacity. In the unlikely event that the Attorney General fails or refuses to bring litigation requested by the Governor, the Governor may bring such litigation `on relation of' the state and shall appoint counsel for such litigation.").11

More specifically for purposes of the present case, Ala.Code 1975, § 12-17-184(10), provides:

(Emphasis added.)

Likewise, § 12-17-216, Ala.Code 1975, specifically provides:

(Emphasis added.).

Further, Ala.Code 1975, § 36-13-2, states that

See State ex rel. Troy v. Smith, 187 Ala. 411, 416, 65 So. 942, 943 (1914) ("It is thus seen that by [the language used in what is now § 36-13-2 that] the Governor is empowered to employ ... an attorney or attorneys to advise him in his official capacity, as well as to institute, conduct, or appear in any civil or criminal case in which the state is interested, in any court." (emphasis added)).12

On their face, §§ 12-17-184(10) and -216, if not also § 36-13-2, authorize the governor to act as Governor Riley has in this case. Moreover, all statutes concerning the rights and powers of the governor must be read in the context provided by §§ 113 and 120 of the constitution. See City of Birmingham v. Emond, 229 Ala. 346, 349, 157 So. 64, 66 (1934) (applicable statutes considered in pari materia with pertinent constitutional provisions). Under the constitution, it is the governor who is the "chief magistrate" with "the supreme executive power" to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." The legislature has expressly provided that the governor can direct a district attorney or a supernumerary district attorney to represent the interests of the State in the trial court and in this Court, as applicable.

The trial court here and Attorney General King, as well as District Attorney Andrews, contend that constitutional authority is held by the attorney general that impinges upon the governor's ability to act as aforesaid. In this regard, however, we first note that, in contrast to the governor, the attorney general has no direct and express power under the constitution.

Nonetheless, Attorney General King asserts that his status as an independently elected executive officer requires us to conclude that he has the right to take over the prosecution at issue and to dismiss the petition to this Court filed by the State and the Riley defendant. As Attorney General King, Cornerstone, and FTV note, the attorney general is indeed an independently elected executive officer, Ala. Const.1901, § 114 (Off.Recomp.), and the delegates to the 1901 Constitutional Convention expressly rejected a proposed amendment that would have allowed the governor to appoint the attorney general. Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Alabama, Vol. 1, at 220, 506-10 (June 11, 1901). In so doing, however, the delegates did not make the governor subservient to the attorney general, and they did not authorize the attorney general to prevent the governor from exercising or fulfilling the authority and obligations given by the constitution or otherwise by law. To conclude otherwise necessarily would mean that the delegates created a second executive officer who has supreme executive power within some sphere assigned to him and that the governor is only the supreme executive with respect to matters in some different sphere. Obviously nothing in the text of the constitution supports such a notion, and such a notion is plainly contrary to the position of the governor expressed in §§ 113 and 120 of the constitution.

Unlike the provisions of the constitution that single out the governor and expressly and directly vest him with the "supreme executive power" and, as a corollary, authorize him to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," § 137 of the constitution addresses the duties of all the other executive branch officials created by the constitution as a group. Further, it merely delegates to the legislature the authority to prescribe "duties" for all these officers:

Ala. Const. 1901, § 137 (Off.Recomp.)(emphasis added).

Although there is no express mention of common-law powers in the constitution, in Ex parte Weaver, 570 So.2d 675 (Ala.1990), this Court concluded that the language in the first sentence of § 137 granted the attorney general the powers that were held by the attorney general at common law. 570 So.2d at 684. In a well reasoned dissenting opinion, Justice Houston questioned whether the conclusion of the main opinion was correct. 570 So.2d at 688 (Houston, J., dissenting).13

Nevertheless, the year after the Court released its decision in Ex parte Weaver the legislature enacted Ala.Code 1975, § 36-15-1.1, which states:

Thus, at a minimum, the attorney general now possesses common-law powers because they have been prescribed for him by the legislature pursuant to its authority to do so under § 137.

Such common-law powers of the attorney general do not conflict with the supreme executive power of the governor, however. As the Weaver Court itself recognized, at common law the attorney general was "`the sovereign's primary legal representative, with considerable power subject to limitation only by the King'" i.e., the chief magistrate. 570 So.2d at 677 (quoting Note, Tice v. Department of Transportation: A Declining Role for the Attorney General? 63 N.C.L.R. 1051, 1053 (1985)) (emphasis added). See also VI William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 466-67 (2d ed. 1937)(explaining that, as chief legal representative of the king, the common-law attorney general was subject to the wishes of the crown); Black's Law Dictionary 872 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a "king" as "[t]he sovereign, ruler, or chief magistrate of a state or nation whose constitution is of the kind called `monarchical.' ... The word expresses the idea of one who rules singly over a whole people or has the highest executive power; but ... the sovereignty of the king may or may not be absolute, according to the constitution of the country."). Although we recognize that the governor obviously is not a king and thus does not have the power to appoint and remove the attorney general (or any other constitutional officer) at his pleasure, by constitutional designation he is the "chief magistrate" of the State of Alabama.

In the present case, Governor Riley concluded that the criminal law of Alabama regarding gambling devices and gambling enterprises had gone unenforced in certain counties and that, without action on his part and on the part of those he authorized to act, that law would continue to go unenforced in those counties during Attorney General King's tenure. He employed certain officers placed at his disposal to enforce those laws with respect to machines and operations against which those statutes clearly were not being enforced, either by Attorney General King or by local law enforcement (including, in the case of the EC, District Attorney Andrews).

Attorney General King now claims a "common-law" procedural prerogative to control the litigation initiated and authorized by Governor Riley based on his determination that there was a lack of enforcement of the laws on Attorney General King's watch. Now, after the trial court has entered an order concluding that the forfeiture proceeding cannot proceed absent affirmative approval by Attorney General King and/or District Attorney Andrews (indeed, that the seizure of the machines and the filing of the forfeiture proceeding are "nullities" for lack of advance approval by Attorney General King), Attorney General King has attempted to take over the litigation, to dismiss the Task Force members who are prosecuting the litigation, and to abandon the State and the Riley defendants' argument questioning the trial court's conclusion as to the requirement that Attorney General King be involved; a conclusion that, if correct, calls into question the validity of every action that is being prosecuted and has been prosecuted by the Task Force and its members. Under such circumstances, Governor Riley's express constitutional and statutory power is clearly what is at issue. We conclude that the common-law powers that have been "prescribed" to the attorney general do not include the right to countermand the "chief magistrate" where the chief magistrate is acting within the bounds of the power given to him.14

Attorney General King also relies upon a number of statutes by which he claims authority to countermand the action of Governor Riley and the attorneys Governor Riley has authorized to act. We first note that we do not view these statutes on their face in the same manner as does Attorney General King.

Attorney General King points us to § 36-15-1, Ala.Code 1975, which states:

Clearly the middle two of the above-quoted paragraphs do not require the conclusion urged by Attorney General King. Those provisions merely describe "duties" the legislature has "prescribed" to the attorney general in keeping with § 137 of the constitution. They contain no express provision purporting to limit the power and rights of the governor. The same can be said of the provisions of other statutes urged in support of Attorney General King's position, namely Ala.Code 1975, § 36-15-12 ("The Attorney General is authorized to institute and prosecute, in the name of the state, all civil actions and other proceedings necessary to protect the rights and interests of the state."); Ala. Code 1975, § 36-15-14 ("The Attorney General, either in person or by one of his assistants, may at any time he sees proper, either before or after indictment, superintend and direct the prosecution of any criminal case in any of the courts of this state. The district attorney prosecuting in such court shall assist and act in connection with the Attorney General or his assistant in such case."); and Ala.Code § 36-15-15 ("The Attorney General shall give the district attorneys of the several circuits any opinion, instruction or advice necessary or proper to aid them in the proper discharge of their duties, either by circular or personal letter, and may direct any district attorney to aid and assist in the investigation or prosecution of any case in which the state is interested, in any other circuit than that of the district attorney so directed. Such district attorney shall have and exercise in such other circuit all the powers and authority imposed by law upon the district attorney of such other circuit, but this section shall not abridge any authority which may have been or which may be vested in the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court...."15).

As for the last quoted paragraph of § 36-15-1, we again note that under § 12-17-216

The import of the above-emphasized passages is self-evident.16 Thus, even assuming that the last paragraph of § 36-15-1 was deemed to be otherwise restrictive of the governor's authority, the governor can still utilize, as he has, the services of Supernumerary District Attorneys Morgan and Greene without violating that provision. For the other reasons hereinafter discussed, however, we disagree with the reading of the last paragraph of § 36-15-1 as otherwise restrictive of the governor's authority.

We note that, just as those statutes detailing specific authority to the governor have been enacted by the legislature in the context of § 113 and § 120, Ala. Const. 1901, so has § 36-15-1 been enacted in the context of § 137, Ala. Const.1901. Just as we see nothing on the face of § 137 that contemplates any limit on the express constitutional grant of authority and power to the governor in earlier provisions of the constitution, we do not see on the face of the last paragraph of § 36-15-1 an express attempt to limit other persons, particularly the governor, from representing the interests of the State. Properly read in the context of the aforesaid constitutional provisions and the balance of the statute itself, the last paragraph of § 36-15-1 refers to an affirmative duty given the attorney general to ensure that counsel he uses to represent the interests of the State are properly authorized to act. It is included in a statute concerning the duties of the attorney general. In addition, to read the last paragraph of § 36-15-1 as suggested by Attorney General King would mean that not even a district attorney could appear in a trial court on behalf of the State unless he or she also was appointed as a deputy attorney general or an assistant attorney general. This would lead to the conclusion that the legislature intended the language at issue to abrogate not only the statutes in favor of the power of the governor under § 12-17-184(10), § 12-17-216, and § 36-13-2, but also those in favor of the power of the district attorneys throughout the state, e.g., § 12-17-184. See Walker County v. White, 248 Ala. 53, 55, 26 So.2d 253, 255 (1946) (recognizing that statutes should be construed to avoid conflict and to form a harmonious whole).

To a large degree, the same observations apply to Ala.Code 1975, § 36-15-21, Ala.Code 1975, which states:

We also note that the tension between the powers of the governor and the statutory authority of the attorney general to prosecute "all" cases finds an analogue in the juxtaposition of authority granted the attorney general and that granted district attorneys. Thus, in Graddick v. Galanos, 379 So.2d 592, 594 (Ala.1980), this Court found no conflict between the attorney general's authority in § 36-5-14 to superintend criminal cases, on the one hand, and "the duty of every district attorney and assistant district attorney, within the circuit, county, or other territory for which he is elected or appointed: ... (2) to draw up all indictments and to prosecute all indictable offenses." § 12-17-184(2) (emphasis added). This Court reasoned that the latter language merely describes the powers of the district attorney and is not a limitation on the powers of the attorney general.

In other contexts this Court has expressly rejected the argument that § 36-15-21 means "only the Attorney General can litigate the interests of the State and its various departments." Britnell v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 374 So.2d 282, 285 (Ala.1979) (taxpayer standing); see also Zeigler v. Baker, 344 So.2d 761, 764 (Ala.1977) (noting that one of the bases for a taxpayer's standing to file a petition attacking an allegedly wrongful government expenditure is that the attorney general has not filed such a petition).

More generally, we conclude for two reasons that the statutes relied upon by the Attorney General serve neither to invalidate the Governor's actions and the continued actions of those whom he has employed nor to authorize the Attorney General to countermand those actions. First, the statutes concerning the governor's right to direct the institution and prosecution of litigation on behalf of the State through district attorneys and supernumerary district attorneys, i.e., § 12-17-184(10) and § 12-17-216, are specific to the situation in which the governor perceives the need to call upon such persons to pursue one or more particular matters. These statutes contemplate that when the governor has exercised his power in such a situation, the district attorney or supernumerary district attorney he has called upon will prosecute the matter as requested by the governor. In contrast, the last paragraph of § 36-15-1 and § 36-15-21 reflect general rules. We cannot conclude that what the legislature specifically intended to provide the governor on the one hand, it intended to authorize the attorney general to withdraw from him on the other hand through the general provisions of § 36-15-1 and § 36-15-21.17 See, e.g., Ex parte E.J.M., 829 So.2d 105, 108-09 (Ala. 2001) ("`Our cases, without conflict, give emphasis to the well defined rule that "`"special provisions relating to specific subjects control general provisions relating to general subjects"'"; and "`"when the law descends to particulars, such more special provisions must be understood as exceptions to any general rules laid down to the contrary."'"'" (quoting Geter v. United States Steel Corp., 264 Ala. 94, 97, 84 So.2d 770, 773 (1956), quoting in turn other cases)); Crawford v. Springle, 631 So.2d 880, 882 (Ala.1993) ("Where statutes in pari materia are general and specific, the more specific statute controls the more general statute.").

Second, the numerous statutes prescribing the authority and duties of the governor and the attorney general as hereinabove discussed must be read in pari materia with one another and, a fortiori, with the governing constitutional provisions. It is clear from a comparison of the constitutional and statutory provisions concerning the governor and those concerning the attorney general that the governor is the superior officer. Generally, where the governor is authorized to act he is not subject to any other executive officer. Further, provisions such as the last paragraph of § 36-15-1 and § 36-15-21 obviously contemplate those suits or appeals in which the State or some department or official thereof is in need of representation, and it is not surprising that the legislature would assign those duties to the attorney general. So understood, the statutes obviously have a very large field of operation. It is not necessary to construe them as being in conflict with those constitutional and statutory provisions giving the governor the supreme executive authority and authorizing him to retain counsel and call upon district attorneys and supernumerary district attorneys, see, e.g., Decatur Lab., Inc. v. Sizemore, 564 So.2d 976, 977 (Ala. Civ.App.1990) ("It is well settled that, where possible, statutes should be construed to be constitutional."). Were we required to do so, any such conflict would have to be decided in favor of the governor and the constitution's direct and explicit grant to him of the supreme executive power.

Even if we could conclude that the "scale" otherwise tilted in favor of the Attorney General's view of the foregoing statutes, we could not act on that conclusion here. The Governor has determined that action on his part is necessary to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. If the governor's "supreme executive power" means anything, it means that when the governor makes a determination that the laws are not being faithfully executed, he can act using the legal means that are at his disposal.18

Attorney General King, Cornerstone, and FTV argue, however, that for this Court to agree with Governor Riley's position would be to make "absolute"—as against other constitutional officers—his discretion to perform tasks in areas for which such officers have responsibility. Unlike the federal government, Alabama does not have a unitary executive branch. Instead, the Alabama Constitution of 1901 creates an executive branch that includes several independently elected executive officers. In providing for those officers other than the governor, the constitution means more than just that these are to be officials elected directly by the people of Alabama, rather than appointed by the governor. Section 137 obviously contemplates that the officers other than the governor are each to have their own spheres of authorities and duties. In this vein, Cornerstone and FTV assert:

This argument is without merit. First, it fails to apprehend the fact that the Governor is acting here pursuant to specific grants of authority by the legislature. More fundamentally, the above-quoted argument does not correctly reflect the constitutional juxtaposition of the other executive officers in relation to the governor in the absence of express statutory authority so construed.

Addressing the respondents' concern more specifically in the context of the present case, it is true that the Governor's argument in this case contains no suggestion of a bad-faith or other limitation on his authority to decide that the law is going unenforced in an area for which another executive officer has responsibility. To decide this dispute between two constitutional officers over their respective spheres of authority, however, it is not necessary for us to decide whether the governor's discretion to make such a decision and act upon it is indeed "absolute" in relation to the other official, the concern expressed by the respondents. We are clear to the conclusion that, at least under circumstances such as those presented here, Governor Riley acted consistently with his constitutional authority.

The Governor has taken the position that the term "bingo" in the local amendments is a reference to the game traditionally known as bingo, i.e., a game that is not played by or within the electronic or computerized circuitry of a machine, but one that is played on physical cards (typically made of cardboard or paper) and that requires meaningful interaction between those who are playing and someone responsible for calling out the randomly drawn designations corresponding to designations on the players' cards. There is no meaningful dispute that the machines and operations at issue here do not fall within that description. Further, the Governor's position that the term bingo is a reference to the game traditionally known as bingo is consistent with at least three Alabama appellate decisions. See City of Piedmont v. Evans, 642 So.2d 435, 436 (Ala.1994); Foster v. State, 705 So.2d 534, 537-38 (Ala.Crim.App.1997) (treating the mere term "bingo" in a local constitutional amendment that uses the term the same way as do the amendments at issue here as simply a reference to the "ordinary game of bingo"); Barrett v. State, 705 So.2d 529, 531-32 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) (to like effect).

It also is undisputed that for a substantial period before the creation of the Task Force in the spring of 2009 and the appointment at that time of Barber under § 12-17-216, neither Attorney General King nor District Attorney Andrews were engaged in any effort to enforce against the machines and operations in question the criminal statutes of this State prohibiting gambling devices and slot machines.19 The briefs and other materials before us indicate likewise that, since the creation of the Task Force and Governor Riley's request that Barber undertake certain duties pursuant to § 12-17-216, Attorney General King has not attempted to enforce those statutes against the machines and operations in question. Nor does it appear that Attorney General King has attempted to pursue the "different course" of civil declaratory-judgment actions he proposed in his letter to Colonel Murphy and Administrator Folmar. Even if Attorney General King were now to take action of either nature, it would come too late. We are unwilling to conclude that Governor Riley cannot, without exceeding any discretion on his part, insist that that which he found it necessary to initiate with the appointment of Barber, Tyson, Tierney, Morgan, and Greene continue to its conclusion under the direction of those officials, rather than by Attorney General King, if it is to serve the stated purpose of ensuring the faithful execution of the laws.20

In this regard, we also take cognizance of the number of cases, including, but not limited to this one, that have been appealed to this Court during the course of the last year and that concern disputes over the necessity for law-enforcement action with respect to so-called electronic or computerized "bingo" machines and related operations. See, e.g., Etowah Baptist Ass'n v. Entrekin, 45 So.3d 1266 (Ala. 2010); Tyson v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., 43 So.3d 587 (Ala.2010); Barber v. Houston County Econ. Dev. Ass'n, [Ms. 1090444] (on rehearing); Surles v. City of Ashville, [Ms. 1080826, Jan. 29, 2010] (Ala.2010)*; Barber v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc., 42 So.3d 65 (Ala.2009). Compare State v. McPhail, 182 Miss. 360, 368-69, 180 So. 387, 388-89 (1938):

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the statutes discussing the powers and duties of the attorney general do not authorize the attorney general to interfere with or to direct and control litigation being pursued by officers who are acting pursuant to directions from the governor under § 12-17-184(10), § 12-17-216, and/or § 36-13-2.

Attorney General King, Cornerstone, and FTV argue that this Court's decision in Weaver supports their position. Because that decision is inconsistent with the reasoning and conclusions we express today, we hereby overrule Weaver.21

In Weaver, some subscribers of health-insurance benefits filed a class action against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama seeking declaratory relief and a refund of what they considered to be excess reserves. The subscribers later amended their complaint to add the Alabama Insurance Department as a defendant.

570 So.2d at 676-77.

The commissioner of insurance argued, among other things, that the governor was the supreme executive and that the governor had the right to hire counsel other than the attorney general to represent the Department of Insurance. After analyzing various precedents from this State and other states concerning the powers of the attorney general, this Court concluded:

570 So.2d at 684 (footnotes omitted).

Justices Houston, Steagall, and Maddox dissented from the main opinion in Weaver. Justice Steagall, joined by Justice Maddox, offered the following opinion, which we find meritorious:

570 So.2d at 690.

In a similarly well reasoned, but more thorough dissent, Justice Houston stated:

570 So.2d at 684-85. After a lengthy discussion of constitutional and statutory provisions concerning the governor, the attorney general, and the Department of Insurance, Justice Houston concluded:

570 So.2d at 688-89 (emphasis added, other than as indicated).

We cannot agree to extend § 36-15-21 or any other statute concerning the power and duties of the attorney general in a manner that effectively negates the authority under which the Governor has acted here. The fact that Weaver announced a position inconsistent with our conclusion today does not detract from this Court's obligation to properly ascertain and apply the law. See Ex parte Marek, 556 So.2d 375, 382 (Ala.1989) (doctrine of stare decisis does not render the courts helpless to correct their past errors); Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392, 404 (Ala.2000) (plurality decision) ("We cannot, in blind obedience to the doctrine of stare decisis, continue to accept an expansive application of caselaw characterizing as a discretionary function conduct remote from the execution of governmental policy; to do so would perpetuate an erroneous construction of the Constitution."); Marsh v. Green, 782 So.2d 223, 232 (Ala.2000) ("[W]hen the Constitution is misinterpreted, the doctrine of stare decisis is not entitled to the deference it otherwise receives.").22

As all the parties before us note in their respective briefs, Attorney General King discussed the meaning of the governor's explicit constitutional authority and duties in his brief to this Court in State ex rel. King v. Morton, 955 So.2d 1012 (Ala.2006). That brief stated:

Our decision today is consistent with the fundamental but simple notion that "there is a constitutional hierarchy within the executive branch and one office—the Governor—is at its top." The "supreme executive power" is more than a "mere verbal adornment" of the office of Governor.23

IV. Conclusion

A writ of mandamus will be issued where there is "(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So.2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995). Based on our discussion above, we hold that the actions of the attorneys and other officers authorized by Governor Riley to act in this case are not "nullities," despite the lack of approval by the Attorney General and the District Attorney, and that the Attorney General may not take over or countermand the litigation efforts of those officers in either the trial court or in this Court. The counsel authorized by the Governor have the right to represent the State in this case and to see it through to completion. Also, Cornerstone and FTV have no right to complain in any event. McCain v. City of Montgomery, 38 Ala. App. 568, 571, 92 So.2d 678, 680 (1956) ("So long as the conduct of [a] special prosecutor comports to due and orderly procedure a defendant is in no position to complain as to who conducts the prosecution.").

Based on the foregoing, Attorney General King's motion to dismiss is denied; the State and the Riley defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus is granted; and the trial court's March 8, 2010, and March 16, 2010, orders are vacated. Further, the trial court is ordered to expedite consideration of the forfeiture proceeding.

MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED; PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

WOODALL, STUART, SMITH, BOLIN, PARKER, and SHAW, JJ., concur.

LYONS, J., concurs specially.

COBB, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.

LYONS, Justice (concurring specially).

I concur in all aspects of the main opinion except note 22, describing "a contradiction inherent in" Ex parte Weaver, 570 So.2d 675 (Ala.1990), as to which I express no opinion.

The Chief Justice's special writing refers to "the fact that the attorney general has the right—some might say the duty—to intervene in a civil action in the event that his opinion of the law, as applied to the facts, differs from the governor's." (Emphasis added.) Whether such status is indeed a fact or a duty is a matter not before us in this proceeding. The extent to which the supremacy of the governor may be frustrated by a discordant voice from the attorney general beyond use of the attorney general's bully pulpit in the arena of public opinion must await another day.

COBB, Chief Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result).

I agree with the majority's decision to overrule Ex parte Weaver, 570 So.2d 675 (Ala.1990), because had I been on the court when that case was decided I would have dissented. I also agree with most of the majority's detailed analysis comparing and contrasting the positions and responsibilities of the governor and the attorney general. To me, the analysis can be condensed to a simple concept: Governor Riley is the governor. He is the leader of the executive branch. For our democratic form of government in our State to work as intended, someone must have the final say. The Alabama Constitution makes it clear that that person, for the executive branch, is the governor.

The majority "conclude[s] that the statutes discussing the powers and duties of the attorney general do not authorize the attorney general to interfere with or to direct and control litigation being pursued by officers who are acting pursuant to directions from the governor" under the governor's statutory authority. 57 So.3d at 736. Thus, Attorney General King may not interfere with Governor Riley's direction and control over the persons and agencies carrying out Governor Riley's directions in this case, and he may not assume direction or control of Governor Riley's counsel and legal positions.

In this case, Attorney General King has intervened in an attempt to displace Governor Riley's control over Governor Riley's case, his lawyers, and his legal positions. Thus, this is not a case addressing the attorney general's right to intervene in a case and to present his own legal positions without assuming control of the governor's case, and the parties have not pointed us to any constitutional or statutory authority that excludes that possibility. Accordingly, nothing in our opinion today addresses the fact that the attorney general has the right—some might say the duty— to intervene in a civil action in the event that his opinion of the law, as applied to the facts, differs from the governor's.24

The attorney general's right and duty to form his own legal opinions and, if necessary, to resolve any difference of opinion with the governor on legal matters in the courts does not call into question the separation-of-powers doctrine. It is the duty of the executive to faithfully carry out the laws; it is the courts' "`job to say what the law is.'" Munnerlyn v. Alabama Dep't of Corr., 946 So.2d 436, 439 (Ala.2006) (quoting DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So.2d 270, 275-77 (Ala. 1998)). See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So.2d 107, 110 (Ala.1993); Ex parte Weaver, 570 So.2d at 685 (Houston, J., dissenting) ("Black's Law Dictionary, at 511 [(5th ed. 1979)], defines `executive powers': `Power to execute laws.... The executive powers vested in governors by state constitutions include the power to execute the laws, that is, to carry them into effect, as distinguished from the power to make the laws and the power to judge them.'").