MURDOCK, Justice.
John and Judith Valloze and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company ("Nationwide"); State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company ("State Farm"); Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation ("Freightliner"); Freightliner, Allison Transmission, Inc. ("Allison Transmission"); and Cummins Atlantic, LLC ("Cummins"), separately petition this Court for writs of mandamus directing the Franklin Circuit Court to dismiss the declaratory-judgment actions filed against them by Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc. ("Tiffin"). We grant the petitions and issue the writs.
Tiffin manufactures and sells custom-made motor homes. Its principal place of business is Red Bay, Franklin County, Alabama. Before us are four petitions for a writ of mandamus regarding two declaratory-judgment actions filed by Tiffin in the Franklin Circuit Court. The first action concerns a motor home purchased from Tiffin by the Vallozes, case no. CV-12-005 ("the Valloze action"), and the second concerns a motor home purchased from Tiffin by Karen Katnich, case no. CV-12-0026 ("the Katnich action").
In its complaint in the Valloze action, Tiffin alleged that the Vallozes, who reside in Florida, purchased from Tiffin in Florida a Tiffin Allegro Red motor home that was manufactured by Tiffin in Red Bay. The sales contract between the Vallozes and Tiffin contained a forum-selection clause, which provided that the Vallozes and Tiffin
On January 5, 2012, Tiffin filed a complaint in the Franklin Circuit Court against the Vallozes, Nationwide, Freightliner, Allison Transmission, and Cummins. The complaint described Allison Transmission and Cummins as manufacturers of component parts for Tiffin, "specifically the engine/mechanical portion of the motor home where the fire at issue is alleged to have originated." The complaint stated that Freightliner sold Tiffin the chassis used in the subject motor home. Tiffin alleged that all of these corporations are foreign corporations that have sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Alabama so that including them as defendants comports with due process. In the complaint, Tiffin noted that "Nationwide has put Tiffin on written notice of a potential claim in this matter arising from the subject fire loss." As a result of this notice, Tiffin alleged that "[a] real, present justiciable controversy exists between the parties to this action as to the issues of the cause and origin of the subject fire, which party or parties is at fault and liable for the subject fire loss, and the amount of damages arising from said fire loss." Tiffin requested that the trial court "take jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the Alabama Declaratory Judgment Act" and that it "proceed to adjudicate the respective rights and liabilities of all the parties hereto."
On February 15, 2012, Cummins filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as to it in the Valloze action. On March 15, 2012, the Vallozes and Nationwide filed a motion to dismiss. On the same date, Allison Transmission filed a motion to dismiss. Freightliner filed a motion to dismiss on March 21, 2012. All of those motions were based on an allegation of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis, they asserted, that a "bona fide justiciable controversy" did not exist because no action had been filed by Nationwide against any defendant based on the subject fire loss. On May 9, 2012, the Vallozes and Nationwide filed an amended motion to dismiss in which they argued, in addition to the ground stated in their first motion, that the trial court lacked in personam jurisdiction over the Vallozes because the Vallozes lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Alabama.
Tiffin filed a response to these motions on May 9, 2012,
The trial court held a hearing on the motions on June 7, 2012. The following day the trial court entered orders denying the motions to dismiss filed by Nationwide, the Vallozes, Cummins, and Allison Transmission. On June 21, 2012, the trial court entered an order denying Freightliner's motion to dismiss. The trial court did not provide reasons for its rulings.
In its complaint in the Katnich action, Tiffin alleged that Karen Katnich purchased a 2011 Tiffin Phaeton motor home from Tiffin in Virginia. On June 1, 2011, in or near the city of Dudley, North Carolina, the motor home caught fire and allegedly suffered a total loss. The sales contract between Tiffin and Katnich contained a forum-selection clause identical to the one in the Vallozes' sales contract. On January 23, 2012, an attorney for State Farm sent Tiffin a letter that states, in pertinent part:
On February 14, 2012, Tiffin filed a complaint in the Franklin Circuit Court against State Farm, Custom Automated Services, Inc. ("Custom"), Waterway, Inc. ("Waterway"), ABC Warehouse ("ABC"), Maxzone Auto Parts Corporation ("Maxzone"), and Freightliner. Tiffin alleged that Custom, ABC, and Maxzone had furnished component parts that were used in the "tail light apparatus on the motorhome, which was then installed on the motorhome by Defendant Waterway. Said tail light apparatus is the location on the motorhome at which the fire is presently
On March 20, 2012, Freightliner filed a motion to dismiss Tiffin's complaint in the Katnich action. Custom filed a motion to dismiss on March 26, 2012, adopting Freightliner's motion to dismiss. On April 6, 2012, State Farm filed a motion to dismiss. All of those motions were based on an allegation of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because, the movants asserted, a "bona fide justiciable controversy" did not exist since no action had been filed by State Farm against any defendant based on the subject fire loss.
On June 7, 2012, Tiffin filed a response to the motions to dismiss the Katnich action that tracked almost verbatim its response to the motions to dismiss filed in the Valloze action.
The trial court entered an order on June 8, 2012, in the Katnich action in which it denied the defendants' motions to dismiss. The trial court did not provide reasons for its ruling.
Nationwide and the Vallozes filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court (case no. 1111335) asking that we order the trial court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss the complaint filed against them by Tiffin. Freightliner, Allison Transmission, and Cummins also have filed a mandamus petition in the Valloze action (case no. 1111337). State Farm filed a mandamus petition asking that we order the trial court to vacate its order denying its motion to dismiss the complaint filed by Tiffin in the Katnich action (case no. 1111368). Freightliner also has filed a mandamus petition in the Katnich action (case no. 1111378).
On August 9, 2012, Tiffin filed motions in the trial court to dismiss defendants Freightliner, Allison Transmission, and Cummins in the Valloze action and defendants Freightliner, Custom, Waterway, ABC, and Maxzone in the Katnich action. Subsequently, this Court ordered answers and briefs to the four petitions, and we ordered a stay of all proceedings in both actions in the trial court. The trial court granted Tiffin's motions to dismiss certain defendants in the two actions, but then set aside those orders when it became aware of the stays issued by this Court.
This Court has stated that "[f]or a declaratory-judgment action to withstand a motion to dismiss there must be a bona fide justiciable controversy that should be settled." Harper v. Brown, Stagner, Richardson, Inc., 873 So.2d 220, 223 (Ala.2003). "`If no justiciable controversy exists when the suit is commenced, then the court lacks jurisdiction.'" Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Whetstone, 935 So.2d 1177, 1182 (Ala.2006) (quoting Durham v. Community Bank of Marshall County, 584 So.2d 834, 835 (Ala.1991)).
The petitioners further note that this Court has stated that "`[a] controversy is justiciable where present "legal rights are thwarted or affected [so as] to warrant proceedings under the Declaratory Judgment statutes."'" Harper, 873 So.2d at 224 (quoting Creola Land Dev., 828 So.2d at 288, quoting in turn Town of Warrior v. Blaylock, 275 Ala. 113, 114, 152 So.2d 661, 662 (1963)). The petitioners contend that Tiffin's rights have not been thwarted or affected in any way because, they assert, there is no right to be free from the mere possibility of a lawsuit. According to the petitioners, the fact that Tiffin did not state any injury it had sustained or request any damages underscores the fact that Tiffin's rights have not been affected.
Tiffin rejoins that all the facts necessary for a dispute already have occurred in each case: the subject motor homes sustained fire damage, the insurers reimbursed their insureds for their losses, investigations have preliminarily concluded that the fires were caused by manufacturing defects, and the insurers informed Tiffin and other potential defendants of their potential subrogation claims. Tiffin particularly notes that State Farm's letter explicitly stated that State Farm would commence litigation unless Tiffin agreed to terms offered by State Farm to settle its claim.
Tiffin also argues that the petitioners misunderstand the purpose of a declaratory-judgment action. It contends that
Tiffin's brief, p. 9.
It is true that "declaratory-judgment actions are designed to be preemptive," but this is because they seek to "`set controversies to rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights, and the commission of wrongs.'" Carey v. Howard, 950 So.2d 1131, 1134
Gulf Beach Hotel, 935 So.2d at 1183 (emphasis omitted). Even if we could assume that "litigation is inevitable" between Nationwide and Tiffin or between State Farm and Tiffin, Tiffin has not shown how either insurer's "delay" in invoking judicial proceedings injures Tiffin. The harm giving rise to the insurers' subrogation rights — the fire damage to the subject motor homes — has already occurred. Whatever Tiffin's liability might be as a result of that damage already exists. A "speedy determination" of liability by way of a declaratory-judgment action does nothing to prevent Tiffin from repudiating some obligation on its part or incurring some further liability, nor will it prevent some harm to Tiffin or some invasion of Tiffin's rights.
Furthermore, it is not a given that "litigation is inevitable" between these parties. No "actual controversy" exists between Nationwide and Tiffin or State Farm and Tiffin because neither insurer has elected to pursue a claim based upon its alleged subrogation rights. It is still possible that both insurers or either insurer could determine that it has no such rights, that for any number of reasons its best interests would not be served pursuing judicial enforcement of whatever rights it might have, or that Tiffin is not a party to be held responsible for the damage that gave rise to those rights. In any event, the subrogation rights belong to Nationwide and State Farm, and Tiffin cannot use a declaratory-judgment action to force the insurers to embark upon a judicial testing of the insurers' rights and the rights of the owners of the motor homes.
Tiffin claims that the petitioners' position is not supported in the law, but in fact it is Tiffin's use of declaratory relief in this context that lacks legal authority. None of the cases cited by Tiffin in support of its position involved the use of a declaratory-judgment action to obtain a determination of potential tort liability. Indeed, our own research has failed to turn up a single Alabama case suggesting that declaratory relief was intended to be used for such a purpose. Although this Court has not had occasion to address the issue, courts in other jurisdictions repeatedly have denied the use of declaratory relief for this purpose. See, e.g., Cunningham Bros., Inc. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165, 1167 (7th Cir.1969) (concluding that "to compel potential personal injury plaintiffs to litigate their claims at a time and in a forum chosen by the alleged tort-feasor would be a perversion of the Declaratory Judgment Act"); United Ins. Co. of America v. Harris, 939 F.Supp. 1527, 1531 (M.D.Ala.1996) (stating that courts "have almost uniformly concluded that tort claims are ill-suited for declaratory relief"); Sun Oil Co. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 108 F.Supp. 280, 282 (E.D.Pa.1952) (stating that "it is not one of the purposes of the declaratory judgment acts to enable a prospective negligence action defendant to obtain a declaration of non-liability" (footnote
We agree with the conclusion of the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions that declaratory-judgment actions are not intended to be a vehicle for potential tort defendants to obtain a declaration of nonliability. The "plaintiff [has a] right to choose a forum." Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So.2d 497, 500 (Ala.1995). Using declaratory relief in the manner employed by Tiffin in these cases deprives tort plaintiffs of this right. It also deprives such plaintiffs, within the confines of the applicable statute of limitations, of the ability to elect the timing for bringing such an action, which may affect a plaintiff's preparation for litigation. Further, such use of declaratory relief "reverse[s] the roles of the parties" in a way that "would jeopardize those procedures which the law has traditionally provided to injured parties by which to seek judicial relief." Cunningham Bros., 407 F.2d at 1168. In short, declaratory-judgment actions are ill suited to resolving tort claims.
Because a bona fide justiciable controversy does not exist in the Valloze action or the Katnich action and because a declaratory-judgment action is not intended to permit a potential tort defendant to obtain a declaration of non-liability, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the petitioners' motions to dismiss Tiffin's complaints.
1111335 — PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
1111337 — PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
1111368 — PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
1111378 — PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
BOLIN, MAIN, WISE, and BRYAN, JJ., concur.
Pharmacia Corp. v. Suggs, 932 So.2d 95, 97 n. 4 (Ala.2005).